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
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
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THE CRUSADERS IN THE EAST



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THE CRUSADERS IN THE EAST

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WARS OF ISLAM
WITH THE LATINS IN SYRIA DURING THE
TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

BY

W. B. STEVENSON, M.A.

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PREFACE.

THE subject of the following pages is less, and more, than a history of the crusades. It is a history of the political relations between the states which the crusaders founded and those Moslem states with which they waged war, or a history of the struggle between the Latins and the Moslems in Syria during the 12th and 13th centuries. In the treatment of this subject the eastern point of view has been emphasised and the main thread of the narrative is drawn, as far as possible, from the history of the Moslem states. The stress laid on the eastern point of view, and the special attention paid to the chronology of the period, may be held to justify a new work on the subject. In the narrative the writer endeavours to trace the course of events from year to year as closely as the sources permit. Some marked variations in the fulness of treatment are explained by differences in the fulness of the available sources. In the notes the requirements of future investigators and of the editors of new texts have been particularly kept in view. The writer's special contribution to the chronology of the period is drawn from Arabic sources and the critical methods applied to these sources are the subject of appendix A. Some new suggestions regarding the chronology of William of Tyre are offered in appendix B. The minor corrections of accepted dates made throughout the work are very numerous and results of wider importance may be held to have been established in a considerable number of cases for the first time.

Chapters I and II, containing the history of the Latin conquest, describe the course of events necessarily more from the side of the Latins than of the Moslems and the detailed narrative of chapter VI is limited to the periods when there was war between the Moslems and their opponents. While the history in chapter VI is sketched more broadly than in the earlier chapters, attention may be called to the fresh contributions offered in the treatment, for example, of the crusades of Theobald of Navarre, Richard of Cornwall and Frederick II.

The writer owes his interest in the subject of this volume, and his conception of the history of the crusades as part of the history of the Moslem east, to the late Sir William Muir, K.C.S.I. As Principal of Edinburgh University he pointed out the opportunity for research in this department and in response to his invitation the present writer was the author of a University Prize Essay on the subject. The list of books on pages 372-376 may be regarded as an acknowledgment of the writer's debt to the modern authors who are there mentioned.

W. B. STEVENSON.

BALA,
2 August 1907.

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ERRATA.

Page 21, 73, 74, 83 and 84, for *Kilij Arslan* read *Kilij Arslan*.

Page 42, line 7, for '*Akka*' read *Jaffa*.

" 46, n. 2, for *Bongar's* read *Bongars'*.

" 58, for *Munnitera* read *Munnitara*.

" 63, for *Shaulak* read *Shauluk*.

" 70, top, for A.D. 1099 1100 read A.D. 1099 1101.

" 144, for *Alak* read *Aluk*.

INTRODUCTION.

LATE in the summer of 1097 an invading army entered Syria. It streamed out in bands from Asia Minor and the gates of the Taurus. The invaders came from Western Europe and were the soldiers of the first "European concert." But their enterprise itself was no novelty. Syria is a stage which waits from century to century for a repetition of the same drama. Its destiny is to be invaded and to be conquered. Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Turk, a long succession of aliens have been the makers of Syrian history. The land is geographically distinct, a natural unity, yet the people have never achieved the unity of a national state. Their central and exposed position invites attack. The mountains which crowd the land from north to south have favoured the growth of petty city-states and kingdoms. And so the Syrians have always been a people ready to perish.

Syria in 1097 was not effectively part of any empire. Its latest conquerors, the Seljuk Turks, were engaged in civil war. Every city ruler was prince again for the time. The cities seldom or never change, so that the city-states of the period are those also of older times. Damascus, Jerusalem, Hama (Hama), Tyre, Aleppo (Haleb) and Antioch are among the most important. Disunity was their fatal weakness, in spite of many advantages which they possessed. The defence of fortified towns against attack was even easier then than now. The invaders were far from their nearest base of supplies, and were not themselves united. They had taken the Sign of the Cross as a symbol of that which they had in common, the Latin form of Christianity. But international jealousy and rival ambitions

marred their concert. They had combined to make a conquest, but without any agreement regarding the future division or government of the country. The leaders were in full earnest only where there was a prospect of making gain for themselves. The joint conquest was a scramble for a share in the spoil. The establishment of rival spheres of government was the natural result. The enterprise lost the character of one which aimed at a systematic conquest.

Yet the success of the Latins was rapid, for the native states were small and disunited. By the end of the century, or a little later, the first invaders, aided by fresh supports from the West, established in Syria four principalities or states. These embraced not only the greater part of Syria, they included portions of Asia Minor and of Mesopotamia. They are called by the names of their capital cities, in order from north to south, Edessa, Antioch, Tripolis and Jerusalem. The political history of these states during the period of their existence is one of constant struggle with the Moslem princes opposed to them. Their original success was due only to the disunion of their enemies. Afterwards they maintained themselves by the reinforcements which came in a constant stream from Europe. Their own resources were unequal to the contest. But interest waned in Europe and a new Turko-Arab power rose to empire in the East. Within a hundred years the end of the Latin states seemed imminent. Fragments of the conquest survived another century. It is a time of expiring interest in the West, and in the East one of waiting for the end. The history of the establishment of the Latins in the East is the history of the first crusade. An account of their subsequent fortunes in Syria may be called the history of the crusaders in the East.

The crusades were military expeditions to establish and maintain a Latin power in Syria. They belong to a period nearly co-extensive with two centuries, the 12th and 13th. Many nationalities shared in the enterprise, but principally those of Western Europe. They joined together in the name of obedience to the Latin Church. Two features in the movement are obscured by the terms in popular use when the crusades are spoken of. The first is that Western Europe was continuously

at war with the Moslem East for nearly two centuries. The second that Syria is the station from which the course of events should be watched; the crusades are essentially a chapter in Eastern history.

The crusades have been numbered as if they were a series well-defined and easily counted. Some eight of all the bands and armies which passed by sea or land to Syria have been selected as the eight crusades. They are chosen on no clear principle. Those generally named are not uniformly the largest nor the most successful. But why should even size or success be made the test? No expedition which went to help the Latins can be refused the name crusade. Together they form a continuous stream for the greater part of the 12th and 13th centuries. The numbering of a selected few obscures this fact. Only the first crusade is rightly defined by the numeral attached. The meaning is definite and the name appropriate. Similar expressions applied to the other crusades should seldom or never be used.

A history of the crusades to have an organic unity, after the commencement, must be written as a history of the crusading states in Syria. Such treatment alone explains the rise and fall of interest in the West, and gives to each of the greater expeditions an appropriate setting and its full significance. The influence of the smaller expeditions is also most easily taken account of in this way. Every difficulty of treatment is not indeed removed by adopting an Eastern point of view. The problem of unifying the history of the four Latin states remains. Their first systematic historian was William of Tyre. His method was to make the kingdom of Jerusalem the centre of interest. He was influenced by national and religious considerations. The other states were little to him in comparison with his own. Its capital, besides, was Jerusalem, the holy city. But the northern states, Edessa, while it existed, and Antioch, were politically far more important. They bore the brunt of Moslem attack, and their failure involved the failure of all. A history of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem cannot be an adequate treatment of the political history of the Latin states. Indeed if their external history is to be viewed as a whole, it is

better definitely to come outside their borders and view them from a Moslem standpoint. Their history is part of the general history of Syria and the Moslem East. It is treated as such by the Arabic historians of the period, who contribute much to our knowledge, and even Western writers do best to follow them. The story is one of a contest between Moslems and Latins. Very soon the unity and definite purpose lie wholly on the side of the former. It is that which really determines the best point of view. Not only are the crusades an essential part of the history of the Turkish empire, they are best treated in the main as such.

The first stage of the crusading movement, especially, is the part which properly belongs to Western history. As the Eastern point of view is that adopted in the following pages it is most convenient to deal briefly here, in the introduction, with this portion of the history. The question may be put in this form : what moved the people of Western Europe to set out on their first expedition ? It is matter of common knowledge that they were summoned by the authority of the Pope and of a Council which ratified his suggestion. But what prepared the people to respond ? And what suggested the Pope's action ?

The popular enthusiasm of the movement finds its principal explanation in the religious ideals of the time. These were not satisfied at all by any common round or daily task. The vast majority of men were constrained to live lives which their ideals condemned as worldly. In their estimation monks and nuns were "the religious." This contradiction between the real and the ideal found a solution in the crusading movement. It was possible as a crusader to satisfy religious conviction without sacrifice of lay character, or the adoption of a monkish life. That was one great attraction. Again, appeal was made to one of the great passions of Latin Christianity, its reverence for holy things and places. It came as a marvellous thought to thousands that *they* should be privileged to kiss the rock where our Saviour died, and kneel in prayer within His tomb. Besides the holy places called for deliverance. They were profaned by infidel hands ; it was said perhaps that such evil was rampant round them as there had never been before. The effect on Europe of

the capture of Jerusalem by the Seljuk Turks has probably been exaggerated. But a new era of travel and pilgrimage had commenced. Men knew more of the Holy Land than in earlier times, and their knowledge stirred their action.

The lower classes were affected by social conditions as well as by religious ideals. The depressed condition and perhaps, in some cases, almost hopeless misery of great masses of the people, made it a relief to leave their homes, and not a sacrifice. The crusade offered a way of escape from starvation and oppression. It promised temporal as well as spiritual blessing.

There were special secular inducements which appealed to the upper classes also. A spirit of adventure and a love of war prevailed. An expedition against the East was an unequalled opportunity in the eyes of all knights and princes. Some needed greater scope for their ambition than they found at home. The crusade appealed especially to certain peoples. The Norman Bohemond went without doubt in quest of a principedom to the East. His spirit was characteristic of his race. For two centuries the stream of Norman conquest had been sweeping over the seas. France, England, and Sicily had been touched or flooded by its waves. Its energy was still unexpended. The Moslems had already been met and conquered in Sicily. The Italian island lies like a stepping stone between West and East. From it the Normans now looked across the sea. Much of the response to the Pope's appeal was given by men of vigorous Norman blood.

In northern Italy another race was tending eastward under a different impulse. The republics of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa were commercial states in possession of growing fleets. Their expanding commerce had already brought them into hostile contact with the Moslems of Sardinia and Africa. Half the shores of the Mediterranean were in these alien hands. The creation of a Christian Syria gave the Italians a new outlet and another open door. Very soon, though not at first, the highway to Syria was found to lie over the sea in the track of the Italian ships. The republican fleets supplied the needed lines of communication between Syria and Western Europe. In return for trading privileges they gave the Latins their firm support. The part they played in the capture of sea-port towns was of vital

importance. Without them, it may be said, Syria could neither have been conquered nor held for a single year.

In southern France also there was an element of national hostility to a Moslem state. Several times in the latter part of the 11th century the people there had aided the Christians of Spain in their constant struggle with the Moors. The idea of federating Christendom to wage a holy war may have gained something from this example. It was in southern France that the crusade was first proclaimed. It was probably the attitude of such men as Raymond of Toulouse that encouraged the Pope to the final step.

In these various ways Western Europe was prepared to respond to the Pope's appeal. But what, we have now to ask, suggested that appeal and led up to it? The growth of papal power, the establishment of the Turkish empire and the consequent danger of the Byzantine emperors are also parts of the preparation for the crusades. Among the direct political causes of the first crusade the establishment and growth of the Turkish empire must be given a foremost place. The Turkish advance westward suggested and called forth a Latin counter advance eastward. One most prominent aspect of the crusades is that they formed a barrier against Turkish advance. They originated indeed in an appeal which aimed at nothing further. It was sent to the Pope by the Roman emperor of the East, the Byzantine or Greek emperor. It was inspired by fear of fresh Turkish conquests. The empire of the Seljuk Turks was founded under the vigorous rule of the sultan Togrul Beg (1038). It gradually absorbed the territories of the caliphs of Baghdad. It even added to their extent, notably at the expense of the Greek empire. Within ten years from the battle of Manzikert (1071) Asia Minor was practically over-run. It was only another step to Europe and to Constantinople itself.

The emperor turned for help to the West. Common interest and old association might be pleaded. Christianity also was a bond of union, for the enemy were Moslems. The request was directed to the Pope as the head of the Latin Church, and of the kingdoms of the West. It came to him when and because the Papacy was prepared to respond. The growth of Papal

power is an essential part of the preparation for the crusades. This was the authority which united the Latins in their enterprise. The Church had entered on the period of its greatest temporal power. Step by step the Popes had gained a position in which they were as truly the successors of the emperors of Rome as those who claimed the title. The great Hildebrand, Gregory VII, now wore the papal crown. He had formulated without reserve his doctrine that every temporal power owes obedience to the Church, and to its earthly head, the Pope. But this was not easily established in practice. Contests with Henry IV, the Western or German emperor, occupied much of Hildebrand's energy. He was never sufficiently free to summon Europe to the Holy War. His successor was a man of different temper, and during his pontificate there was truce between Greek and Turk. The delay was not without importance. In those years of waiting the emperor's suggestion matured in the western mind to a new conception. Palestine was more to it than Asia Minor.

The next motion came in the year 1095. It was a favourable time for an aggressive movement in Asia Minor. The great sultan Malik Shah had died (1092), and the Moslem states were plunged in endless confusion. With some help from the Latins the emperor Alexius (1081-1118) hoped easily to recover the lost provinces of his empire. He appealed to the Pope as his predecessor had done. Urban II occupied the chair of Hildebrand, and renewed his policy. He felt the power of the call to engage the armies of the Church in a holy war. In spite of conflicts with the German emperor and others, his position seemed secure enough. Without doubt he first consulted some of the leading princes. Then at the Council of Clermont in November 1095, he proclaimed his summons to the people. *Deus le volt, Deus le volt*, they replied, deeply convinced that the call was divine. The message was carried far and wide by preachers like Peter the Hermit¹. Everywhere the same enthusiasm pre-

¹ It remains Peter's fame that he was one of the most successful preachers in northern France. His legendary history still appears in recent books on the crusades in place of a sober account of the preparation for the movement. It is sufficiently well known to be passed over here. Popular thought seeks to explain every great

ailed. But neither Pope nor people gave much heed to the service asked by the Eastern emperor. The Pope had summoned Christian Europe to unite under the banner of the Cross for the release of Jerusalem. Possibly this was not even a part of Alexius' scheme. The recovery of Asia Minor was certainly his principal object. Hildebrand's thoughts had also moved in that direction. It seems that his motive was the hope of extending his power as head of the Church over the Christians of the East, Greek and Armenian. He was prepared to help the Greek empire in return for acknowledgment of the see of Rome. Pope Urban, by the form of his appeal, inaugurated another movement. By his official action, whatever his personal share in the matter¹, he gave the Latins a cause which was independent of the need of the Byzantine empire. It suited better the policy and position of the Church and the temper which inspired Latin Christendom. War with the infidel for its own sake and for the release of Jerusalem was the purpose to which they vowed themselves. The crusade so conceived was not merely an adoption of Alexius' proposal, though still capable of attaining some of its objects. There was to be war with the Turks. The expedition was to start from Constantinople. Syria was to be conquered, and a Christian state established there. The Greek empire must gain directly. If Syria were handed over to Alexius it would also gain indirectly. But there is no evidence that even the Pope intended this. The Latin leaders certainly hoped to establish princedoms for themselves.

event by the initiative and achievement of some one individual. The necessary criticism of the sources will be found in H. Hagenmeyer's *Peter der Heremite*. In the legend Peter represents the supernatural agency which early writers believed to be the real cause of the crusading movement (Hagenmeyer).

¹ In March 1095 at the council of Piacenza, Urban is reported to have made appeals for help against the Turks on behalf of Alexius. The project for a deliverance of the Holy Land does not come to the surface until the Council of Clermont in November. It is accordingly possible that the ruling conception of a crusade for the deliverance of Jerusalem and the Holy Land was definitely formulated for the first time in the interval between these two councils. For a full discussion of the part played in the crusading movement by Popes Gregory and Urban respectively see Riant, *Archives* i. 60 ff. He minimises somewhat the extent and urgency of Alexius' appeals for help and lays stress on the movements of the Moslems in Spain as accounting for the papal policy (i. 101 ff.). The papal records for the years 1095-97 unfortunately are not available, having been burned in the year 1098.

Here were the germs of a fatal situation. The emperor expected an expedition to his aid. The Latins were sending one to accomplish their own purposes and realise their own ideals.

The first crusade had one aspect in the mind of Alexius, another in the heart of the Pope. There is a third aspect which comes nearer than the others to the true character of the crusade as estimated by its actual results. It was a joint expedition for the conquest and partition of Syria. In this aspect the most important features are the composite character of the crusade, and the rivalry of its leaders. There was no supreme authority to direct the army and its movements. The Papal Legate has most claim to be regarded as formally at the head of the expedition. But in military matters each chief claimed the right to act for himself. When the leaders met in council national jealousy and suspicion disturbed their deliberations. The key to an understanding of the issue of the crusade is a knowledge of its national elements and of its various leaders. The conspicuous elements are three in number, Provençals, or southern French, Normans from Sicily and the north of France and Burgundians or the men of Lorraine. Of the Frenchmen, perhaps the most notable was the wealthy and powerful prince Raymond of Toulouse. It was said that he had vowed to spend the rest of his days in the East. There need be no doubt of his religious sincerity. But of course he counted on being a ruler in conquered Syria as he had been at home. The spirit of the Norman has been described already. Robert of Normandy, eldest son of the Conqueror, was weak and without much influence. The foremost Norman chiefs were from Sicily. Bohemond, son of Robert Guiscard, was the ablest and the most ambitious. He possessed exceptional military and political capacity. He knew better than any other the situation in the East. He had nothing to lose at home, and the crusade offered him that very opportunity which his ambition desired. His reputation and ability gathered round him an army far beyond his slender means. He aimed at a principedom in Antioch. Tancred was Bohemond's nephew¹ and his successor as prince

¹ Tancred was Bohemond's nephew according to Albert ii. 19, *ML. Ed.* i. 50, and *Ekk.* p. 319. The view that he was Bohemond's cousin rests on a wrong interpretation

of Antioch. He was wanting perhaps in his uncle's foresight but invaluable where dash and energy were demanded. The Burgundian leaders were two brothers and a nephew. Godfrey was the future prince of Jerusalem. Round him therefore legend has wound her fairest garlands. It is the more difficult to estimate his position as a leader of the crusade. He does not seem to have stood quite in the foremost rank. But his position was strengthened by his brother Baldwin, founder of the first Latin state, Edessa. Their nephew, another Baldwin, also played an important part in the after history. It is instructive to note how the Normans and Burgundians seem to race and jostle for their princedoms as they approach the borders of Syria.

What may be termed the official purpose of the crusade was necessarily something more than the deliverance of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre. If these were to be permanently secured for Christendom it was essential that they should become part of a Christian state. This was certainly recognised by the responsible leaders of the movement. Presumably they also assumed that the new state would be occupied and maintained by western colonists and knights, whatever their relation to the Greek emperor might be. The goal of the first crusade, therefore, was the establishment of a Latin power in Syria. Had the crusaders been of one nationality or even had they recognised the authority of one sovereign the result might have been the establishment of a single state in the conquered territories. But the conflicting ambitions of the Latin chiefs and the jealousies of the national elements which were represented made that impossible. Of course Jerusalem was to be delivered. That was every man's business. But the immediate object to which each leader gave his separate attention was the winning of a princedom for himself. Neither Bohemond of Antioch nor Baldwin of Edessa took any part in the capture of Jerusalem. They were too much engaged with the affairs of their own territories in northern Syria. The aim of the leaders stamps the character of the crusade. Effectively it was an enterprise for

of the words "*cognatus Bonamundi*" which are found in several of the sources (Hagenmeyer, Ekk.).

the conquest and partition of Syria. Only in this light can we understand the history of the invasion.

Whenever the emperor Alexius realised the vast extent of the response made to his appeal he realised also the danger that threatened him from his allies. It was clear that the popular uprising in western Europe cared nothing for the safety of his empire. It was unlikely that so powerful a host would submit to act merely as his auxiliaries. He had been at war not many years previously with the Normans of Sicily, who were strongly represented among the crusaders. Such being the situation Alexius used every device to secure that the expedition, so far as possible, should still play the part he had originally designed for it. As the leaders of the crusade arrived in Constantinople one after another, the emperor demanded of them an oath that they would hand over to the Greeks all their conquests of cities and territories that had formerly belonged to the empire. Presumably the districts referred to were those which the Turks had recently occupied and did not include the land of Palestine. Perhaps most of the leaders when they took the oath had Asia Minor chiefly in view. The emperor promised in exchange military support to the expedition and assistance in provisioning the army. His advice regarding a march through Asia Minor was certainly of value, and many of the crusaders were in need of the pecuniary assistance he was able to give. Conflicts between the Greeks and the hosts of strangers who passed through their territories were of course inevitable. Suspicion and discord arose between the emperor himself and his supposed allies. But with surprisingly little difficulty Alexius secured from most of the prominent leaders the oath which he asked for. Only Raymond of Toulouse refused point blank. Even he swore that he would do nothing against the life or the honour of the emperor. With that Alexius had to be content.

The route to Palestine from Constantinople lay through Asia Minor. The passage of the crusade occupied the greater part of the summer of 1097. Its victorious progress paved the way for the restoration to the Greeks of all the western part of the peninsula. Nicaea was the only city in the west which the crusaders themselves besieged. It was surrendered on the 29th

of June after a siege of somewhat more than a month. Considerable discontent was caused by the action of Alexius' representative who negotiated the surrender and took possession of the town without consultation or arrangement with the Latin chiefs. Only one pitched battle was fought during the whole march through Asia Minor, at Doryleum on the 1st of July. From this point a small Greek force accompanied the crusaders, while Alexius himself proceeded to the recovery of his former possessions in the west. So far the crusade accomplished what the emperor had designed it should.

Further east, in Cilicia and Euphratesia, the Latins made their first conquests for themselves. Antioch and the towns of Cilicia were secured by Bohemond and Tancred, the hereditary enemies of the Greeks. Antioch had belonged to the empire as recently as the year 1085. After the final victory of the crusaders just outside the city, in July 1098, a majority of the leaders were ready to hand over the town and district to the emperor, provided he came to take possession with the army he had promised. Unfortunately for his own interests he had turned back some time previously when bad news reached him of the progress of the crusade. His conduct exposed him to a charge of breach of faith and of failure to carry out his part of the arrangement made in Constantinople. In all probability these occurrences suited Bohemond's intentions admirably. Being in possession of Antioch he decisively refused to acknowledge the emperor's claim. Thus the antagonism between Greek and Latin passes into another stage. In Bohemond's lifetime, and long afterwards, it was a prominent part of the emperor's policy to wrest Cilicia and Antioch from the Latins. The recurrence of war with Greece distracted the Normans of Antioch at more than one crisis in their struggle with the Moslems. Inevitably this breach between the Greeks and the Latins affected the whole history of the crusading movement. It culminated in the Latin conquest and occupation of Constantinople (1204-1261). In the thirteenth century it drew the interest and the attention of Western Europe away from the Latin states and was partly responsible for the small amount of help that was given them during their last struggle with the

Moslems. It was a fatal destiny that linked the fortunes of the crusades with the history of the Greek empire.

The actual conquests of the first crusade in Syria were not numerous. After the capture of Antioch in the north and of Jerusalem in the south its force was practically spent. The creation of the Latin states was the work of a quarter of a century or more. It was accomplished by crusaders who remained in the east, with the assistance of pilgrim bands, which came regularly from Europe, generally twice a year, before Easter and in the summer. Considering the small numbers of the western colonists their progress in a comparatively short time is striking. But the growth of the Latin states was checked before Syria was subdued. Palestine was conquered and ultimately the coast of Syria with the hills stretching parallel to it at a short distance inland. Parts of Cilicia and of the country in the neighbourhood of Edessa were also occupied. But all the important inland towns of Syria—Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus—remained in Moslem hands. Possibly the rise of Zanki of Moṣul made the failure of the Latins inevitable. But their division into four princedoms or petty states was a serious hindrance to their success. The origin of these separate states is clear. They were due to the international character of the first crusade and to the rivalries of its chiefs. Edessa and Jerusalem were Burgundian princedoms, Antioch was Norman, and Tripolis Provençal. The discord of the founders was perpetuated in the history of their successors. They failed to co-operate at critical times and even engaged occasionally in open war. The dissensions of the Syrian states, added to the dissensions of the Greeks and Latins, crippled their aggressive power at the very time when their Moslem foes were weakest and they themselves were most enthusiastic.

The short period of rapid progress is succeeded by a longer period of slow Moslem recovery and advance. It covers the greater part of the twelfth century and culminates in the achievements of Saladin. At Saladin's death the Moslems were again predominant in Syria and so they remained. The history of the crusaders in the east extends over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but the events of the thirteenth century

are only an epilogue to what precedes. The Latin towns more and more assume the character of colonial trading centres without much religious or political importance. Their independence is preserved rather by the forbearance of Saladin's successors than by their own power. So feeble is their last resistance that some insidious unseen disease might seem to have wasted them away.

Symptoms of the Moslem reaction of the 12th century appear as early as the year 1110. But Zanki, atabek of Mosul (1127-46), was the first to face the Latins on more than equal terms. His capture of Edessa in 1144 was the first great blow in the downfall of the Latin states. His son Nureddin, sultan of Aleppo and afterwards of Damascus, added Egypt to his dominions and thus completely altered the balance of power in Syria (1146-74). The capture of Ascalon by the Latins (1153), although important, was an isolated event compared with the steady forward movement of the Moslems during this sultanate, especially on the borders of Antioch. Then came Saladin (1174-93) who almost swept the Latins out of Syria and effectively maintained his ground against the armies of Europe. Saladin's dominions were divided after his death and his immediate successors made concessions to the Latins for the sake of peace. Even Jerusalem which Saladin had captured was restored (1229-44). The sultans of Egypt, the most powerful of the Moslem princes, preferred to avoid the risk of a European invasion and were not ambitious of making conquests in Syria. The invasion of the Kharismian Turks, when Jerusalem was retaken (1244), is a landmark in the history. But the mamluk sultan Baibars was the first who set himself, and that with brilliant success, to complete Saladin's unfinished task (1260-77). After him Kalawun was less persistent but only his sudden death deprived him of the honour of dealing the last blow at the Latin towns (1279-90). Next year 'Akka and the remaining cities on the coast yielded to the troops of his son and successor El-malik el-ashraf (1291).

The crusading states could not have existed so long without the help which they received from Europe. The support of the west was vital to their very existence. But the prosperity of

the Syrian colonies was only one matter of interest out of many to the peoples and rulers of the West. When there was a crisis in the history of the Syrian states it was not always clear that it possessed a first claim on the attention of Latin Europe. The sending of the first crusade is spoken of as a challenge of Christendom to Islam, but there was no federated body which could be held responsible for the defence of the crusading colonies. The amount of help given by the western states depended from time to time on the political condition of Europe and the fluctuating strength of a religious ideal. Soon after the beginning of the 13th century it is clear that a turning point has been reached and that the period of greatest sacrifice and effort in the West is over. Enthusiasm was damped by the practical failure of expeditions for which every possible effort seemed to have been made. Sympathy for the Syrian Latins gave place to alienation. They had acquired something of the character of an eastern people and were tainted besides, just as much as western states, by selfishness and party strife and secular ambition. A century's experience of hard facts stripped the glamour from the Holy Land and robbed the crusading knights of their early halo. Accordingly as the need of the Latin states increased the help they received grew less. The great crusades of the 13th century were those which followed the downfall of Edessa and the victories of Saladin. But the first was a complete failure (1148-49) and the second only checked Saladin's career without really undoing his work (1189-92). The greatest expedition of the 13th century was at the very commencement and was directed to the conquest of the Byzantine empire (1202-04). The crusades of Frederick II (1228-29) and of Theobald and of Richard of Cornwall (1239-41) were important because of the concessions which they secured rather than because of their military strength. The invasion of Egypt was twice attempted and both times was an utter failure owing to the ignorance and mismanagement of the leaders (1218-21 and 1249-50). In the latter part of the 13th century the only expedition of consequence was the second crusade of Louis IX, which spent its power in Tunis. On the whole it is remarkable how little these expeditions accomplished. The

main cause of their failure seems to have been their international character and the inevitable dissensions resulting from it. Christendom was not sufficiently united to accomplish the task that was set before it.

The internal causes of the overthrow of the Latin states are clear beyond dispute. The comparatively small number of crusaders permanently resident in Syria and the dissensions by which they were rent are the principal factors in the case. The numbers of those who went on crusade to the Holy Land are much exaggerated in the early chronicles. Even of those who actually left home a large number never reached Syria, and of the remainder only a small proportion settled in the East. Thus the ordinary population of the Latin states, which always included a considerable alien and Moslem element, was inferior at the best to the opposing forces when these were themselves united. The calamitous effect of the division of the Latins into four princedoms in the 12th century has already been spoken of. In the 13th century the union between the Latin towns was so slight that their prolonged existence depended almost wholly on the favourable character of the external political situation. Even single cities were independent of one another and made war and peace with the Moslems as they pleased. The struggles of the Italian republics for supremacy in the Mediterranean introduced fresh elements of discord. The Templars and the Hospitallers, the chief military support of the colonies, were antagonistic to one another. Rival claimants for the kingship of Jerusalem multiplied occasions of civil war and created fresh parties in the state. All these things no doubt fostered selfishness and bred indifference to the common cause, just as the commercial instincts of the Italians drew them into alliance with the Moslem sultans. It may thus be argued that moral declension hastened the decay and overthrow of the Latin states. But it is not true that their doom was caused by any extraordinary or exceptional corruption. They were probably no worse in character than other peoples of the period. Nor did they manifestly degenerate as time went on. The fatality of their situation was that disunion delivered them into the hands of watchful enemies.

In broadest outline the history of the Latin states falls into three periods. There is a period of conquest and of general advance up to 1127 when Zanki became ruler of Moṣul ; a period of Moslem reaction and triumph under Zanki, Nureddin and Saladin, culminating in the victories of Saladin and the repulse of the "third crusade"; and finally a long drawn out period of civil wars and petty strife with the Moslems ending in a rapid downfall. The first two periods are the special subject of this essay. Chapters I and II relate the history of the Latin conquest and early advance ; chapters III, IV and V deal with the reigns of Zanki, Nureddin and Saladin respectively, and chapter VI contains a survey of the third period, which almost coincides with the 13th century.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST CRUSADE; JERUSALEM AND TRIPOLIS, A.D. 1099-1119.

THE situation in Syria at the time of the Latin invasion cannot well be explained without some reference to the general condition of the Moslem East. Islam was at first a bond of political as well as of religious unity. The caliphs of Mekka succeeded to the secular and spiritual position of the Prophet Mohammed (A.D. 632). But the countries over which they claimed authority were as difficult to unite as Europe itself. Natural divisions of land and race favoured separation. The inherent authority of the caliphs was "spiritual" and therefore liable to become that and nothing more. Disputes arose regarding the legitimate line of succession, and these opened the way for schism. The combined effect is manifest in the time of the Abbasite caliphs. They ruled in Bagdad from the year 750 A.D. and were at no time sovereigns of all Islam as their predecessors had been. Within a hundred years their power was in process of decay. Private ambitions and the aspirations of conquered races sheltered themselves behind the claims of the rival line which traced its descent from 'Ali. It was in North Africa, about the beginning of the 10th century, that a rival caliphate actually established itself, that of the Fatimites. About 970 A.D. Egypt was conquered by these new caliphs. The greater part of Syria, also, soon passed into their hands, and continued theirs until the Turkish conquest. At the same time the power of the Abbasite caliphs in Bagdad passed to foreign dynasties, who acknowledged only their spiritual supremacy.

In the 11th century the Moslem East was united by another power than that of the caliphs. The first Turkish empire was established by the Seljuḳ Turks. From 1038 to 1092 they were ruled by three sultans of exceptional ability, who professed Islam, acknowledged the Abbasite caliph, and once more made Bagdad the seat of effective government. Their conquests in some directions exceeded the boundaries of the caliphate which they professed to restore. They recovered Syria almost entirely, although they did not succeed in their attempt on Egypt itself. But their empire also was fated to dissolution. All depended on the individual ability of the sultan. Even his own emirs recognised his authority only so long as he had strength to compel them. The Turks were a small minority in the lands they ruled, and even the caliph was not always the sultan's friend. When therefore Malik Shah died in 1092 and his death was followed by twelve years of almost continuous dynastic strife, the result was inevitable. The Seljuḳ empire fell to pieces. In Syria every town of any consequence was free to go its own way. In Asia Minor the sultanate of Rum entered on a period of complete independence.

It was just at this critical time that the crusaders passed through Asia Minor into Syria. They had little to fear from the Turkish sultans. Mohammed was the son of Malik Shah who ultimately secured the succession, after the death of his brother and rival Bark-yaroḳ in 1104. He was a competent ruler, but the Latin states were already established and Mohammed never took the field against them in person. After his death in 1118 the sultanate was further divided. His brother Sinjar ruled in the far east until 1157, unconcerned about Syria. At Bagdad Mohammed's sons continued on the throne till 1152. But they had no leisure for Syrian wars, and other princes rivalled their power even in Mesopotamia.

In Egypt the Fatimite caliphs experienced a fate similar to that of their rivals in the north. They were not long in losing their first African possessions, and they soon became mere puppets in the hands of foreign mercenaries. The Turkish conquest of Syria (1070-1075) threatened Egypt itself. But Badr el-jamali became wazir, and as the real ruler of Egypt

averted the danger, preserved Ascalon, and even recovered important Syrian coast-towns which had been lost, Tyre, Sidon, and 'Akka. His policy was to strengthen Egypt internally rather than to extend its conquests in Syria. When he died in 1094 his son Shah-an-shah el-asfal succeeded to his position. It was he who guided the policy of Egypt at the advent of the first crusade. It seems likely that he mistook their intentions for a time. They landed in Asia Minor, and they had come at the request of the Greek emperor to his assistance. They seemed well adapted to weaken the power of the Turks. So far from combining against them, El-asfal was prepared to make alliance with them. He hoped they would be content with their conquests in the north and leave Palestine to Egypt. After news came of the fall of Antioch he captured Jerusalem from its Turkish governor, in the summer of 1098¹. The crusaders delayed their march to Palestine for several months, and this may have deceived him further. It was not until after the siege and capture of Jerusalem that an Egyptian army entered Palestine to oppose the crusaders. It was surprised and defeated at Ascalon. After this for a few years the port of Jaffa was constantly menaced by the garrison of Ascalon aided by fleets from Egypt, but the only occasion on which El-asfal sent a strong army into Syria was in the year 1105. Having again been defeated in this year he made no further serious attempt to invade the country. Even the support which he gave to the Moslem coast-towns was uncertain and ineffective. The prosperity of Egypt was little affected by the presence of the Latins, and the circumstances of its domestic affairs were not favourable to the carrying on of foreign wars. El-asfal died in December 1121 and from that time Egypt was too weak to take the offensive.

The establishment of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum has been already alluded to. Its territories, as the name implies, were acquired at the expense of the Roman empire of the East, that is of the Byzantine empire. Previous to the battle of Manzikert, in 1071, the luckless Armenians on the borders of

¹ See Defrémery's discussion in *Journal asiatique*, 1872, p. 85 ff., deciding against the year 1096 given by some sources.

the empire were the principal sufferers at the hands of the advancing Turks. But after that date Asia Minor was rapidly over-run. Within ten years the greater part of it was subdued by the Turks. They established their capital at Nicea, which was at no great distance from Constantinople itself. It was fear of this new power that drove Alexius to appeal for help to the kings of Western Christendom. The first Moslems with whom the crusaders measured arms were the soldiers of Kilij Arslan of Rum (1092-1107). Their success profoundly influenced the position of the Greek empire in Asia Minor. It may be said to have delayed the Turkish invasion of Europe for three centuries and a half. Within a few years of the capture of Nicea, in June 1097, Alexius regained nearly half of Asia Minor. The geographical position of the new Moslem capital, Iconium, marks the difference in the situation. But the sultanate of Rum does not play a great part in the history of the Latins themselves. The goal of the crusade lay beyond Asia Minor and the dominions of Kilij Arslan. After the strength of the crusaders had been shown at Doryleum, Kilij Arslan's policy was to see them safely out of his dominions. Their occupation of Syria concerned him little. He was protected from them by the ranges of the Taurus. His attention besides was fully occupied by his contest with the Greeks. In that the Latins took no further share. They regarded the service they had rendered the emperor as merely incidental to the accomplishment of their own purposes.

The main body of the crusaders did not directly continue their march to Syria after they had passed the territories of Kilij Arslan. At Heraclea, the modern Ereğli, they turned sharply north and made a long detour through Armenia Minor. In this district there was no powerful ruler or sovereign to oppose them. Nominally it was subject to the sultan of Bagdad, whose intervention was only a remote contingency. The presence of a large and friendly Armenian population was the cardinal feature of the situation. These Christians had been driven by the Turks from their old homes by sufferings such as again recently have been their lot in Armenia Minor, their new home. They occupied the Taurus ranges and the country to the west

and east, portions of Cilicia, western Mesopotamia, and Euphratesia, or the country between the Euphrates and the Taurus¹. The border lands between Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were recent Turkish conquests and imperfectly subdued. There were still towns and castles held by Greek and Armenian governors, and even the beginnings of a new Armenian principdom. Without doubt the situation was known from the first to some of the Latin chiefs. The mere presence of the Latin army was sufficient to secure the country. Its march northwards away from the goal of the crusade is explained by these facts. The assistance rendered to the Armenian towns was amply rewarded. The crusaders found welcome allies and a base of operations against Syria proper.

It was in Armenian territory also that the Latins made their first settlements, and founded their first state, that of Edessa. There was a section of the crusaders which crossed directly into Cilicia from Heraclea. It is not altogether certain that this was part of a concerted plan. Although it was both prudent and feasible for a portion of the crusade to occupy Cilicia, private ambitions may have led to the separation. Tancred, it may be, was commissioned by Bohemond to secure the province for the Normans. Baldwin, whether by accident or intention, followed close at his heels and disputed possession with him. At Tarsus where the rivals met there was a bitter quarrel, and at Mamistra there was actual fighting. Finally Baldwin left the Norman in Cilicia² and went to try his fortune in the district of Tell bashir near the Euphrates. He followed

¹ Regarding this country and people, see Ed. Dulaurier in *Recueil Hist. Arm.* i.

² Neither Tancred's conquests after Baldwin's departure nor the time that he spent in Cilicia are exactly specified by the sources. If the attack on Tadmor on the 19th of August (p. 25, n. 4) was made by the fleet which left the crusaders at Mamistra (Albert iii. 39) they must have been there about that date and if Tancred reached Bagras on September 12th (p. 25, n. 5) he may have left Cilicia some days previously. Hagenmeyer's *Chronologie* vi. 505 gives 21st September as the approximate date when the Latins reached Tarsus and consequently the beginning of October as the date of Tancred's operations in Cilicia after Baldwin left. But these dates are calculated from estimates of distances and rates of marching and here they conflict with the only documentary evidence, which is that of Kemal ed-din (see p. 25, n. 5). The details of the conflicts at Tarsus and Mamistra are given from the rival points of view by the *Gesta Tancredi*, cc. 34-44, and Albert iii. 5-17. Baldwin left a garrison in Tarsus, but Fulcher i. 6 probably implies that Tancred nevertheless afterwards took possession.

the advice of an exiled Armenian who had joined him at Nicca. The exile's name was Pakrad (Pancratius), and he and his brother Basil kogh were men of rank and influence in that district¹. Before beginning his new enterprise Baldwin seems to have waited for the main army of the crusaders², which was now advancing across the hills from Caesarea in Cappadocia to Mar'ash. Presumably he wished to consult his brother Godfrey and to strengthen his forces. He separated again from the main body a short distance south of Mar'ash, and whilst they proceeded to the siege of Antioch he began the occupation of Tell bashir (October 1097). His rapid progress in this neighbourhood during the following months was less due to actual conquest than to revolts of the Armenian population and to treaties with the governors of Armenian towns. Many like Pakrad's brother welcomed the crusader as a deliverer from the Moslem yoke. The inevitable friction between the new settlers and the older inhabitants did not yet much affect the situation³. In the beginning of 1098 the Latins gained a footing on the eastern side of the Euphrates, and the town of

¹ Albert iii. 17. Tyre vii. 5 shows that the "Corrovassil" of Albert v. 13-14 was Pakrad's brother. Basil's towns were Ra'ban and Kaiyun (Michael i. 339).

² There is no certainty regarding what Baldwin was doing whilst Tancred secured Cilicia and carried on his campaign against the castles near Antioch (p. 25, n. 5). The *Gesta Tancredi*, cc. 45-47, relates that he proceeded from Cilicia to Artah, of which he became master and where he had to defend himself against Moslem attacks. If so, this must be reckoned part of his projected campaign in Armenian territory. But Artah lies only 20 miles north-west of Aleppo near the river 'Afrin on the road to Iskanderun, quite away from the Tell bashir district with which according even to the evidence of the *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 42 (Rec. lil. 637), Baldwin had been in communication at Tarsus. Possibly the *Gesta* gives Baldwin's name wrongly for some other, e.g. that of Raymond of Toulouse (cf. p. 25, n. 5). Albert iii. 28-31 attributes the occupation of Artah to the main army as it came south but Kemal ad-din rather supports an earlier date (p. 25, n. 5). Except for the evidence of the *Gesta Tancredi* there is no difficulty in supposing that Baldwin when he left Cilicia found himself insufficiently equipped for his new enterprise and resolved to wait the arrival of the main army which he knew would soon pass through Mar'ash. The interval might still be employed in negotiations with the Armenians of the district. Fulcher i. 6 and Tyre iii. 25 favour the view that Baldwin came to Mar'ash directly from Cilicia.

³ Baldwin and Pakrad soon became enemies and the Armenian sought alliance with Bohemond (Albert iii. 18, iv. 9, v. 13-14). Pakrad ("Pancras") was resident in Kaiyun ("Cresson") with Basil to the year 1111 when they fought in Tancred's army (Albert xi. 40). He was finally deprived of his possessions by Baldwin II in 1117 (Mt. Ed. i. 117).

Edessa became their capital. Baldwin was invited there by Thoros, nominally a Greek governor, and by the city council. He was adopted by Thoros and appointed his successor. The proceedings appear to have followed the wish of the citizens more than the choice of their ruler. A fortnight later¹ a popular uprising put Thoros to death and set Baldwin in his place (9th March 1098)². The Latin prince ruled the province of Edessa until October 1100. He took no direct share in the siege of Antioch. But he sent the besiegers much needed supplies and his presence on the Euphrates was probably a check on some who might have rendered help to the Moslems of northern Syria.

From the situation in the countries bordering on Syria we now pass, with the crusaders, to Syria itself. There the resistance to the invaders depended mainly on the efforts of the petty rulers or emirs of the principal towns. Some professed allegiance to Bagdad, some to Egypt, none cared much for the fate of any other. The dissensions which arose after the death of Taj ed-daula Tutush, brother of Malik Shah, in 1095, had not yet subsided³. Tutush had been an aspirant to the sultanate and lost his life in the contest. His sons Rudwan and Duḡaḡ each succeeded to a portion of his power. Fakhr el-muluk Rudwan held Aleppo and tried without success to improve his position. Shams el-muluk Duḡaḡ maintained himself in Damascus, which he owed to his atabek Ḳābir ed-dīn Ṭuḡṭākin.

¹ Fulcher l. 6 ("per xv dies"). Mt. Ed. i. 37 speaks of an expedition of Baldwin's against Samsat in the 2nd week of Lent (17th-23rd February) some days after he reached Edessa (cf. Albert iii. 21). This is the very week of Baldwin's arrival according to Fulcher if his "15 days" be reckoned backwards from 9th March (note 2), or from the 6th of March when the resurrection broke out (Mt. Ed.). The statement of Mt. Ed. i. 35 that Tell bashir was captured *anno armen.* 547, i.e. later than 28th February 1098, may be regarded as giving the wrong year. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* vi. 538 ff., denies the possibility of the expedition against Samsat partly because of Fulcher's silence and partly on chronological grounds. The chronological difficulty only exists if the 2nd week of Lent is understood to mean 14th-20th February, and if at the same time Fulcher's 15 days are reckoned to end on the 7th of March (whereas they may end at least several days earlier when the conspirators revealed their plot to Baldwin).

² According to Mt. Ed. i. 37 on Tuesday in the 5th week of Lent (i.e. 9th March).

³ For the events from 1095-1098, see Kemal ed-dīn (de Sacy's extracts).

Yāgi Siyan¹ of Antioch and other emirs supported one side or the other as it suited them. Suḡman ibn Ortok, who had possessions in Mesopotamia, also took part in these contests, principally as ally of Ruḡwan². In 1097 Jenah ed-daula of Ḥomṣ declared independence of Ruḡwan. The latter had just made peace with Yāgi Siyan and these two now agreed to besiege Ḥomṣ in alliance. They had scarcely united their forces when news came of the advance of the Latins upon Antioch. To the chagrin of his ally Yāgi Siyan hurried back to oppose the invader. Tancred had already passed Iskanderun and pillaged Balana³, which lies at the entrance to the pass leading down to the plains of Antioch. Laodicea was assailed by a pirate fleet which had allied itself with the crusaders in Cilicia⁴. Where the Armenian population was strong the outlying castles dependent on Antioch were being surrendered. Yāgi Siyan sent appeals for help to the neighbouring states, and prepared to withstand a siege.

The first of the crusading army seem to have approached Antioch on the 7th of October⁵. Gradually the host assembled

¹ Yāgi Siyan is another reading of the same name.

² He was for a time governor of Jerusalem when his brother Ilgazi, its emir, was a prisoner of Duḡak. Suḡman returned from Jerusalem to Aleppo in A.H. 490 (ends 18th December 1096). In 1098 he was a vassal of Duḡak (Kem. iii. 580).

³ Kem. iii. 578; cf. n. 5.

⁴ Particulars are given by Albert iii. 14, iii. 59, and vi. 55. He dates the capture of Laodicea some time after the commencement of the siege of Antioch. Kem. iii. 578 speaks of an attack on the city by 22 ships from Cyprus on the 19th of August (8th Ramadan 490). Although apparently represented as only a passing attack, this may have been the commencement of the siege recorded by Albert, since the date harmonises with the only other evidence regarding the time when the privateering fleet left Cilicia, viz. the date of Tancred's reaching Bagras (note 5). The captors of Laodicea were soon dispossessed by an English fleet in the service of Alexius (Gesta Tancredi, ch. 58; cf. Albert iii. 59). Agiles, ch. 32, mentions the occupation by an English fleet but does not speak of its relation to Alexius. Ordericus Vitalis x. 10 (in Migne, vol. 188) states that English crusaders under Edgar Atheling handed over the town to Robert of Normandy after Kerbogha's defeat; he dates the surrender to the Greeks somewhat later. In fact the English garrison invited Robert to their assistance during the siege of Antioch (Gesta Tancredi, ch. 58). After the capture of Antioch Raymond of Toulouse had possession of Laodicea for a time; he transferred his rights to Alexius when he left the north for Jerusalem (Albert vi. 55; cf. p. 51, note 1). For a full discussion of Albert's narrative see Kugler's Albert, pp. 43-48.

⁵ Kem. iii. 578 says that the Latins plundered and passed Balana, that they encamped at Bagras on 2nd Shawal 490 (September 12th), that the castles in the neigh-

and the various leaders took up their positions. A stubborn resistance was to be expected, and in fact for months the position of the besiegers was no better than that of the besieged. Fortunately they were not dependent on themselves alone. The fleets which occupied Laodicea¹ and St Simeon secured communication with the West and the friendship of the Armenians provided a supply of provisions. But even with this help as winter advanced there was much hardship and suffering in the camp. Famine was only one cause, disease and also inclement weather severely tested the endurance of the besiegers. The issue depended chiefly on the amount of help the Moslem town received. The history of the attempts at relief are of more importance than the details of the siege operations.

Rudwan was little inclined to help. He was annoyed at the failure of his plan against Homs, and was attracted by the prospect of alliance with El-afdal of Egypt, who was then negotiating with the crusaders. But for this very reason Duḡak and Jenah ed-daula were the more ready to give their help. After joining forces they attacked a section of the Latin army which was scouring the country near El-bara (31st December)².

Neighbourhood of Antioch began to revolt, that the inhabitants of Antak called the Latins to their assistance and that Antioch was approached on the 27th of Shawal (7th of October). The line of march is evidently that of Tancred. If the dates hold good for his movements he was at Baḡras 6 weeks before the main army reached Antioch and the length of time occupied by his operations as related in the *Gesta Tancredi*, cc. 45-47, and Albert iii. 26 is determined. It reduces the time spent in Cilicia and implies a vigorous campaign against the castles of Antioch conducted from the neighbourhood of Baḡras. Five hundred knights under the command of Raymond of Toulouse also reached Antioch before the arrival of the main army (*Gesta Francorum*, ch. 11). It is not clear whether they came by the eastern or western shore of the lake of Antioch. If by the latter Kem's statements may apply in part to them. They are stated to have spent some time making conquests in the neighbourhood of Er-rūj (Rugin). According to Albert iii. 31, Tancred rejoined the main army at Antak. It reached "the iron bridge," 8 miles east of Antioch, on October 20th (*Gesta Francorum*, ch. 12). A Moslem force was defeated there and that night Bohemond and 4000 men encamped outside the walls of Antioch. On Wednesday, October 21st (xii Kal. Nov.), the rest of the army followed.

¹ Regarding the capture of Laodicea and its occupation by an English fleet, see p. 25, n. 4.

² The date is given by an anonymous chronicle (*Recueil* iii. 188, ch. 40), and is confirmed by a calculation of Hagenmeyer (*Gesta*, p. 251, note 16) who combines the statement of the *Gesta*, ch. 13, that the army started on December 28th, with that of Albert iii. 50-51 (*Recueil*, ch. 51) that the battle took place on the fourth day. It is to be

The result of the battle was indecisive, but at least it prevented an immediate advance on Antioch. The next movement, some weeks later, was after the allies had been reinforced from Aleppo. It was the one real attempt to relieve the city before its fall. The Moslems were defeated at Bagras, in the beginning of February¹. The Latins gained the important castle of Harim, which guarded Antioch in the direction of Aleppo².

The siege now dragged on its course for four months longer, until an Armenian, on the 3rd of June³, admitted the Latins to the town. Yaği Siyan was killed in attempting to escape, and his head was brought to the Latin leaders. The capture was just in time. A large army, gathered with the approval of Bark-yarok, and commanded by Kerboğa (Kerbuğa) of Moşul, was close at hand. It encamped before Antioch on the 8th of June⁴. Had this army arrived a few days sooner the crusades might have been extinguished at their very commencement. Even yet the Latins were in a critical situation. The citadel of Antioch was still uncaptured, so their enemies were before and behind them. Many despaired entirely and fled to the ships on the coast. An attempt was made to come to terms with the Moslems. On the other hand Kerboğa was disliked and suspected; there was discord between the Arab and Turkish elements of his army and Ridwan's intrigues are said to have

observed, however, that the battle, according to Albert, extends over two days, the 4th and the 5th after the start (iii. 51-52).

¹ End of Šafar 491, ending 5th February (Kem. iii. 579). On Tuesday, 9th February, according to *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 17, i.e. Shrove Tuesday (Albert iii. 62 and *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 56).

² "Areg" or "Arech" (*Gesta Francorum*, ch. 17) is identified with Harim by Hagenmeyer and is said to have been deserted and burned by the defeated Turks after the battle. According to Kem. iii. 579 the Armenian population of the place now became its masters. Shortly afterwards it appears as Tancredi's possession (*Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 59). Harenc is a misreading of the name Harim in the MSS. of the *Gesta Tancredi* and of Wm of Tyre.

³ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 20 (Thursday, June 3rd), Kem. iii. 580 (Thursday, 1st Rajab 491, calendar date 4th June). The Latins were admitted to the town on the Wednesday night (i.e. according to Arabic reckoning Thursday night). I. A. i. 193 gives Jumada i (ending 5th May 1098) although he says the siege lasted nine months (i. 192). The nationality of the traitor is uncertain (cf. Hag., *Gesta*, p. 293).

⁴ Tuesday, 6th Rajab 491, calendar date 9th June (Kem. iii. 582). *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 21, says that the "præcursores" of the Moslem army rode up to the city on the 3rd day after the Latins entered it.

caused desertions¹. The Latins were greatly encouraged by the finding of the Holy Lance. It was believed to be that used at the Crucifixion, and was regarded as authentic especially by Raymond and the Provençals. Its existence and hiding-place were made known, it is said, by a vision. It was dug up in the Church of St Peter on the 14th of June. On the 28th² the Latins gallantly made an attack on Kerbogha's army. The generalship of Bohemond and the enthusiasm inspired by the Holy Lance, combined with dissension and over-confidence in the Moslem camp, secured a Latin victory. Ruin had stared the Latins in the face, their wonderful success paved the way for all that follows.

When the citadel of Antioch surrendered a week later³, it was decided to postpone the march on Jerusalem until November. There is no cause for surprise in this. Rest was required after the recent hardships. The season of the year was unfavourable. The conditions in Antioch may be judged from the epidemic which raged there for three months, from September to November. It carried off hundreds among the knights alone. But we may credit the leaders with another motive. It was time to decide who should guard and maintain the northern province. Baldwin's position in Edessa was undisputed. But was Antioch to be given to Alexius or left in the hands of Bohemond? There was reason to suppose that the emperor's action or inaction before the 1st of November would clear the way for a decision of this embarrassing question.

If Alexius had been on the spot it may be assumed that he would have received possession of Antioch and Cilicia. As parts of the empire at a recent date they were to be restored to him, according to agreement, provided he assisted the crusaders in their enterprise. Bohemond's claim was subordinate to this. Before the capture of Antioch he had astutely obtained a provisional acknowledgment of his title, on the assumption that Alexius might not join the Latins or might not give all the help that he had promised⁴. In June Latin fugitives met a Greek

¹ Kem. iii. 583 f.

² Monday, 26th Rajab, calendar date 29th June.

³ Monday, 2nd Sha'ban 491 (Kem. iii. 583); cf., however, *Recueil Hist. occ.* iii. 893 (for June 28th or 29th) and Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie*, vii. 310 f.

⁴ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 20; Albert iv. 15-16. Bohemond after having arranged

army on the way to Antioch and painted the situation of their recent comrades so darkly that the emperor marched back to Constantinople. This was Bohemond's opportunity. After Kerbogā's defeat he exercised authority as the acknowledged ruler of Antioch. Raymond of Toulouse, Bohemond's bitter enemy, was evidently the only whole-hearted supporter of the emperor. He alone refused to withdraw his men from the posts which they occupied in Antioch. Still it was agreed to send an embassy to Constantinople to ascertain the emperor's intentions, and possibly a majority of the Latin chiefs may have hoped that he would join them in November¹. Meantime, during the summer, Bohemond and Tancred strengthened their position in Cilicia and in the neighbourhood of Antioch². Raymond was disabled for a time by illness but after his recovery captured El-bara³. Godfrey helped to secure his brother's authority in the district of Tell bashir⁴, and spent much of his time in Baldwin's territory, coming and going to Antioch as occasion required.

regarding his admission to the city seems to have extorted this concession from the other leaders as the price of his services when Kerbogā's army was known to be at hand. His advantage was afterwards increased by the surrender of the citadel to him (*Gesta*, ch. 29; *Fulcher* i. 15).

¹ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 30; *Albert* v. 2-3. In the narrative of the *Gesta* there is no indication of opposition to Alexius' claims and the message of the embassy is an invitation to the emperor to come and receive Antioch and fulfil his promise of assistance. This may be regarded as the appropriate language of diplomacy in the circumstances.

² *Tyre* vii. 2; *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 96. It may be observed that some of the places between Antioch and Aleppo which are spoken of as captured now or previously may have been surprised and plundered without being permanently occupied. Er-ruj and Famiya were captured before 9th December 1097, according to *Sibt* iii. 517, but were not occupied until 1106. Kafr jab seems to have been one of the earliest acquisitions. It was taken before 9th December 1097, according to *Sibt* iii. 517 (cf. iii. 481 and *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 34, "Capharda"). *Kem.* iii. 588, without the *Recueil* emendation, implies that it was permanently occupied before the middle of 1100, for he does not speak of its capture then. Certainly it was so occupied before 1103 (*Kem.* iii. 592) and probably therefore before Bohemond's captivity.

³ Towards the end of November (*Kem.* iii. 586, confirmed by *Fulcher* i. 16) or at the end of October (*Agiles*, ch. 20, with which *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 31, agrees).

⁴ *Albert* v. 13-14. He enjoyed the revenues of the district during the siege, after Baldwin went to Edessa (*Albert* iv. 9), and was practically its lord for the time. The emir of 'Ezzā now invited the Latins to his assistance against Ridwan and became for a time their dependent ally (*Albert* v. 5-12). His capture by Ridwan soon put an end to this relationship (*Kem.* iii. 586) and the fortress was still a dependency of Aleppo in A.D. 1107 (A.H. 501, *Kem.* iii. 595). 'Ezzā guards the road between Tell bashir and the neighbourhood of Antioch (via Artah).

The disputes regarding the lordship of Antioch reached a crisis in November when the march to Jerusalem should have been resumed. No communication had come from the emperor. Bohemond demanded full possession of the town, and Raymond opposed him. The Lorraine chiefs stood neutral. Time passed and those of the rank and file whose chief object was the delivery of Jerusalem grew restless. They had come for Christ's sake, they said, and would start with him as their leader¹.

Toward the end of November Bohemond and Raymond came to a partial understanding. They agreed to lay siege to Ma'arat en-nu'man which had been attacked already without success in July². It is uncertain which of the other leaders took part in the enterprise; Robert of Flanders was one³. The movement was probably represented as the beginning of the march on Jerusalem. It is not likely, however, that the agreement between Bohemond and Raymond went so far⁴. Raymond may have thought that the movement would hasten a united march on Jerusalem, while Bohemond may have calculated that the siege would postpone it further. Raymond invested Ma'ara on the 26th of November⁵. He was accompanied by large numbers of those who chafed at the delay of the crusading chiefs. Bohemond joined the besiegers on the 28th soon after the first assault⁶. The town was captured on the 11th of December⁷. Then all the old disputes revived. Raymond

¹ Agiles, ch. 21.

² According to *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 30, only for a single day which Hagenmeyer calculates to have been July 19th (Eng. p. 389, note 33). According to Kem. iii. 584 in Sha'ban 491 which commences on July 4th.

³ Agiles, ch. 22, names him only.

⁴ Fulcher i. 16 "desiderantes tramitem dilatare"; Tyre vii. 9, "ne nil interim ageretur."

⁵ Kem. iii. 586 ("when 2 nights of Dhu'l-hijja had still to pass," i.e. on the 27th Dhu'l-hijja, Friday, 26th November). *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 33, says "quarto die exeunte Novembrio," i.e. 27th November. While both authorities are very exact in their dates, Kem. may here be preferred, seeing Bohemond's arrival is set by the *Gesta* on a Sunday and by Tyre vii. 9 on the 3rd day after Raymond's arrival. Sunday, 28th November, agrees with both these statements when the 26th is taken as the date of Raymond's arrival.

⁶ Agiles, ch. 22. The day was Sunday, 28th November, according to last note. *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 33, dates the assault on the day after Raymond's arrival and so implicitly on the 28th also.

⁷ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 33 (Saturday, 11th December); Almi Ya'in quoted by Sib;

wished to give Ma'ara to his protégé the bishop of El-bara. Bohemond would not agree. Regarding the march to Jerusalem Bohemond argued that it should be postponed until after Easter. Raymond hesitated. Then, in response to urgent entreaties, he announced that he would start in fifteen days. The Norman prince mocked at this but had reason to be satisfied. He returned to Antioch. Only Robert of Normandy and Tancred, of the other leaders, joined Raymond, in spite of his persuasions. The multitude of pilgrims who tore down the walls of Ma'ara when they heard of the proposal to garrison the city and postpone the march on Jerusalem, did not add greatly to the strength of his army. The town was burned before the Latins started south, on the 13th of January¹. From that time Bohemond was lord of Antioch.

The slowness of Raymond's march possibly marks the unwillingness with which he moved. As he passed up the valley of the Orontes the towns on the hill slopes and in the plain gladly offered him provisions and money to be left alone. When the crusaders reached the plain beside the Castle of the Kurds, *Ḥiṣn el-akrad*, they halted for fifteen days². They were greatly impressed by the fertility and abundance of the country, the emirs of *Ḥomṣ* and *Tripolis* sent envoys to Raymond and *Ḥiṣn el-akrad* was not the only stronghold which he occupied. Probably in these circumstances he conceived the hope of founding a principedom beyond Bohemond's reach. His next undertaking, the siege of *'Arḩa*, seems to have been inspired, in part at least, by this hope. *'Arḩa*, or *'Irḩa*, lies on the northern slopes of Lebanon some distance down the valley which leads from *Ḥomṣ* and *Hama* to the coast. Raymond's army encamped there on the 14th of February³, shortly after

iii. 519 (14th Muḥarram 592). In Kem. iii. 587, 24th Muḥarram is a textual error for the same date. Fulcher i. 16 says the siege lasted 20 days. Kem. iii. 588 makes Baldwin of Edessa take part in it. Albert v. 26, 29, 30 gives a confused account of the events.

¹ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 34, agreeing exactly with Kem. iii. 587, who says the Latins occupied the town for 33 days. I. A. i. 126 says they were in Ma'ara for 40 days.

² *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 34. Albert v. 31 says 8 days.

³ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 34, a Monday in the middle of February, and so the 14th.

leaving Hışn el-akrad. At first his plans prospered. Anṭarṭus (Tortosa), on the coast, was deserted by its garrison and occupied. This secured communication with crusading fleets and a plentiful supply of provisions. Maraḥḥya, another coast-town, also submitted¹. But 'Arḥa itself remained uncaptured. Godfrey and Robert of Flanders joined Raymond with fresh forces before the middle of March². Early in February manifestations of popular impatience had induced them to fix their departure from Antioch for the 1st of March. They had marched south by the coast and had begun the siege of Jabala³ on the way. But Raymond apprehended attack and urged them to come directly to where he was. The united forces spent two months together in the neighbourhood of 'Arḥa. Raymond's siege operations did not benefit much by their presence. One cause of dissension after another kept the leaders in perpetual antagonism. Shortly before Easter (10th April) ambassadors from Alexius announced that he intended coming to Syria before St John's day (24th June) and requested the crusaders to delay their march on Jerusalem until that date. Raymond eagerly advocated this proposal, which suited his own plans and would certainly have imperilled Bohemond's position in Antioch. But the other leaders put no trust in the emperor's promises and a policy of further delay was unpopular amongst Raymond's own followers. It was decided to march on Jerusalem whatever course of action he might choose to follow. When the army started on the 13th of May⁴ Raymond followed most unwillingly. He had gained nothing by all his schemes and efforts. Anṭarṭus and his other captures were not maintained.

¹ Gesta Francorum, ch. 34, gives particulars.

² The date may be fixed by calculation from the statements of Albert v. 33-34.

³ I.A. i. 215 mentions several attacks on Jabala which must fall about this time.

⁴ Gesta Francorum, ch. 36 (inferentially). In ch. 35, the period spent before 'Arḥa is reckoned at 3 months less 1 day (i.e. 14th February to 13th May). Elsewhere this writer reckons a month at 28 days. Fuleher i. 17 gives April as the month. I.A. i. 197 wrongly says the siege of 'Arḥa lasted 4 months. His statement that the emir of Shaizar made peace *alatha* does not necessarily refer to 'Arḥa. The reference to Shaizar and the statement that Uḡḡas was attacked and that its emir made peace are not chronologically in their right place. They fall before and not after the siege of 'Arḥa.

The march south now occupied less than a month. No time was spent in operations on the road, nor was any opposition offered by the cities on the coast. The dangerous hill paths south of Tripolis and the pass by the Dog River were unobstructed. The crusaders gazed with interest on the "ancient walls" of the Phœnician towns. The learned among them speculated as to what each city was and sought to identify its name and history. In Palestine the line of march led the pilgrims close to the walls of 'Akka, Haifa, Caesarea and Arsuf in succession. A short distance inland, on the way to Jerusalem, the little town of Ramla was found to be deserted, and became the first Latin possession in southern Syria. A bishopric was established in honour of St George and a small garrison was left in the town. On the morning of the 7th of June (1099)¹ the crusaders reached the holy city. The Egyptian garrison may be estimated roundly at 1000 men, and the whole fighting population of the city cannot have exceeded a few thousands². Provided that neither the Egyptians nor the neighbouring Moslems interfered, the success of the Latins was assured from the first. Their numbers have been estimated at about 40,000, of whom perhaps 20,000 were fighting men³.

The siege lasted five weeks, but most of that time was occupied in the preparation of siege engines. The crusaders pitched their tents opposite those parts of the town where the wall appeared to be most vulnerable. Raymond eventually

¹ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 37, gives "viii^o Idus Junii" instead of "vii^o Id. Jun.," and Albert vi. 6, Tuesday in the 2nd week "mensis Julii" instead of "mensis Junii"; the latter is a textual error and perhaps the former also. Cf. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* vii. 463 f.

² These numbers correspond to what is known of the effective forces of such towns as Ascalon and Damascus. The strength of the garrison may be got by combining Albert vi. 20, 400 Egyptian equites, and Fulcher ii. 18 (p. 836), about 500 Æthiopes, i.e. Nubian infantry, in the tower of David. These numbers are more likely to be above than under the reality.

³ *Annales B. H.* ii. 429 (of 40,000 in the army only 20,000 were fully equipped soldiers and 500 mounted men). Agiles, ch. 38, p. 657, puts the army at about 12,000 fighting men, including 12-1300 knights but excluding very many "debiles et pauperes" (cf. Agiles, ch. 33, p. 650). *Hist. reg.* v. 231 estimates the numbers at 30,000 foot, 5000 equites and 5000 women and children. Albert v. 41 makes the host when it reached 'Akka 50,000, but of these scarcely 20,000 were effective troops; Albert v. 45 gives a total of 60,000.

stationed himself on the south side, Godfrey, Tancred and the other leaders on the north-west and north. After the failure of an assault on the 13th of June¹ it was decided to proceed at once with the construction of siege towers and mangonels. A native Christian informed the leaders where wood might be procured, about four miles away. The Moslems of the neighbouring villages were compelled to assist in bringing timber to the camp. The arrival of a small Genoese fleet in Jaffa about the 17th of June² was specially welcome because of the supply of provisions which it brought. The Genoese abandoned their ships and joined Raymond on the south side of the city. The besiegers suffered greatly from want of water, the springs in the neighbourhood having been filled up and the cisterns emptied. Two siege towers and a number of siege engines were completed by the end of the first week of July. On Friday the 8th there was a procession round the town. The following days were spent in moving the engines and towers into position and in filling up a moat on the south side. Wednesday the 13th was the first day of the renewed assault³, and on Friday the 15th Godfrey's troops successfully scaled the wall at the north-east corner. After it was apparent that the city had been captured the Egyptian governor and the defenders of the "tower of David" on the southern wall, which was the principal stronghold, capitulated to Raymond. They surrendered on the assurance that they would be free to retire to Ascalon. A general massacre followed the occupation of the town, and the slain were mutilated in the usual fashion of the wars of the period. "Heaps of heads and hands and feet were to be seen through the streets and squares of the city⁴." Even on the 16th some were put to death. Three hundred who had taken refuge on the roof of the mosque of El-akṣa were

¹ A Monday, according to *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 37, and the 7th day after the arrival of the Latins, according to Fulcher ii. 18 (p. 853). Albert vi. 1 reads "v^a die obsidionis," and *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 118, calls it "proxima parascève" (i.e. Friday).

² The date may be calculated from *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 37. Caffarus xviii. 44 (*Recueil* v. 36) says there were two galleys. Raimund of Agiles, *Rec.* iii. 294, 6 *naves* (the reading 9 in Migne, 653, having less ms. support).

³ *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 38; according to Raimund of Agiles apparently Thursday.

⁴ Agiles, ch. 38 (p. 659).

spared by Tancred, but were afterwards slaughtered by pilgrims who had no respect for his banner¹. Raymond escorted his prisoners safely away to Ascalon and earned the reputation of caring more for wealth than for the cause of Christianity.

A decisive victory gained over the Egyptians near Ascalon about four weeks later secured the position of the Latins in Jerusalem (12th August 1099)². When the crusaders learned that preparations were being made to attack them they wisely took the aggressive. Godfrey commanded an army of about 10,000 men and the Moslems may have numbered twice as many³. But they were taken in a measure by surprise, or at least before their preparations were complete. The battle was over in less than an hour and was decided by the irresistible charge of the Latin knights. After such a victory it might well seem to the Moslems of Syria that the Latins were invincible. The offer of the emir of Ascalon to surrender to Raymond, made some days after the battle and after the return of the Latins to Jerusalem, is evidence of the impression which was produced. Raymond's banner was in fact hoisted above the city gate. But Godfrey would not tolerate any infringement of his new princely rights, and when the emir learned that a quarrel had broken out between the Latin chiefs he sent back Raymond's banner and refused to surrender⁴.

A third Latin principedom had now been founded, with Jerusalem as its capital. Its elected ruler was Godfrey of Bouillon. Even before the capture of the city the choice of a king had been proposed as a remedy for the dissensions of the

¹ Albert vi. 28.

² *Gesta Francorum*, ch. 39; Albert vi. 50.

³ 1200 knights and 9000 foot in the Latin army (Raimund of Agiles, ch. 42, p. 663), 10000 milites and 3000 foot in Godfrey's division, one of three (Albert vi. 45). Ekk. 'a total, 5000 knights and 15,000 foot (p. 176) may be exaggerated so as to bear some proportion to the Moslem numbers, 100,000 horse and 400,000 foot! The Moslem army is given by Sib. iii. 519 as 20,000 and that is about the maximum possible for a ruler of Egypt at this date.

⁴ This is the account of Baldric of Dol (Receuil iv. 110 f.). The statements of the western sources are discussed by Hagenmeyer, *Gesta*, pp. 500 ff. Sib. iii. 520 may be more exact than Baldric in making the emir's offer one of tribute only (20,000 dinars). The statement of I.A. i. 101, that the tribute was actually paid (12,000 or 20,000 dinars) is presumably an error. This governor of Ascalon is the same person as the governor of Jerusalem who surrendered the tower of David to Raymond.

leaders. The bishops and clergy were against the proposal. "A king," they said, "should not be chosen where God suffered and was crowned¹." In spite of their opposition one of the earliest decisions after Jerusalem was captured was to elect a prince. Raymond of Toulouse was the first choice made. But he shared the views of the clergy and refused the position². Then Godfrey was chosen³. In most of the earliest writers his designation is Dux or Defender of the Holy Sepulchre. These titles express the attitude of the church party to his position. An illustration of the same attitude may be found in Raymond's attempts to keep possession of the tower of David and to secure Ascalon for himself. But Godfrey was determined to be prince in fact, whatever his title might be. He wielded the authority of a king and his successor was crowned as such.

Neither the capture of Jerusalem nor the battle of Ascalon completed the work of the first crusade. Most, indeed, of the crusaders returned home without lending their assistance further. They had endured hardships enough, they had delivered Jerusalem and fulfilled their vows. Many sailed for Europe that very autumn, others only awaited the Easter celebrations before they returned. If it be said that the crusade was ended the Latin tenure of Jerusalem was much too precarious to justify the boast that the crusaders' purpose had been accomplished. Palestine at least was yet to be conquered. There is no break in the continuity of events between the ending of the crusade and the further history of the crusaders in the east. The work of conquest proceeds without interruption. The "exiles" in Palestine laboured still in the cause which their former comrades now relinquished.

The conquest of Palestine proper⁴ was an undertaking of less extent than a survey of the map might lead one to suppose.

¹ Agiles, ch. 35.

² The sincerity of his churchly sympathies has been unwarrantably doubted. Hagenmeyer believes that his refusal was influenced by his having intentions against Tripolis. Von Sybel thinks that he felt himself unpopular and therefore not strong enough for the position.

³ The sources vary in the date they give between the days from the 22nd to the 25th of July. See Hagenmeyer, *Gesta* 478, note 11 (deciding for the 22nd) and Kugler, *Albert* 123 (in favour of the 24th).

⁴ The history of the northern states is dealt with in chap. II.

The real contest lay with the coast-towns. Inland the most populous centres were mere villages and the sparse country population either took refuge in Egypt or readily submitted to the new lords of the little country towns. It mattered little to the Syrian peasant of what nationality his master was, Turkish or Egyptian or Latin as the case might be. The feudal system of the Latins easily adapted itself to the land tenure of the country. The revenues of the districts assigned to the vassals of the crown or to the sub-vassals of the great feudatories, such as Tancred of Tiberias, were easily collected from the heads of the villages or casalia which covered the country with a perfect net-work. Whenever the Latins established themselves in such centres as Jaffa or Jerusalem or Tiberias the population of the surrounding country submitted to them as a matter of course. The friendly relations of the native Christians and Moslems, established by long association, remained undisturbed, with the difference that the Christians for a time were the principal medium in the development of friendly intercourse with the new rulers. Zahir ed-din Tughtakin of Damascus (1098-1128) might have made the Latin occupation of northern Palestine insecure. But his outlook and activity were more in the direction of Tripolis, and for several years he seems to have refrained as far as possible from active hostilities. His only collision was with Tancred of Tiberias when that chief claimed the revenues of some districts beyond Jordan which were tributary to Damascus.

The real task which the Latins had to face was the conquest of the towns on the coast. Until these were subdued even the occupation of the interior was precarious and the lines of communication with Europe unsafe. In southern Syria they were the only wealthy and important towns excepting Jerusalem and Damascus. But their strength from a military point of view was much weakened by their political isolation. Each town depended for its defence almost entirely upon its own inhabitants, and the military element, especially in the larger towns, was no doubt small compared with the civilian population. It is clear from the subsequent history that the fate of the coast-towns was decided in the last resort in every case by the naval

superiority of the Latins. As long as Egyptian ships had free access to their harbours the towns were safe. On the other hand their capture was easily effected when the command of the sea was held by an Italian fleet. The Egyptian fleets hardly ever fought a naval battle and altogether played a very timorous part in the struggle. On the other hand the Italian states sent fleets to Palestine which eagerly offered their services to the Latin princes. They had played a part in the first crusade during the operations against Antioch, 'Arka and Jerusalem. After the fall of Jerusalem they came again, conveying bands of pilgrims from Europe. At once they saw their opportunity. When the Syrian coast towns were conquered they could establish markets there and import their merchandise free of duty. To these Italians the new colonies were the doors of commercial intercourse between east and west. The Italian fleets were the decisive factor in the conquest of Latin Syria. The republics which equipped them and sent them forth were rewarded by the grant of a special quarter in such towns as they assisted in capturing. A large and wealthy Italian population soon controlled a great part of the revenues of the coast towns and the surrounding districts and enjoyed a system of communal government, much to the advantage of their trade and commerce. The one disadvantage of their presence was that they introduced another line of cleavage into an already much divided state. But the civil consequences of this are scarcely apparent for a century or more and at the outset the co-operation of the Italians was an essential condition of the success of the Latin enterprise.

During the earliest years of the Latin occupation the only formidable Moslem attacks were those of the Egyptian troops whose headquarters were at Ascalon. Unlike Damascus Egypt had considerable reason to resist the Latin invaders. Some of the coast towns were still its dependencies and all Palestine had recently seemed just within its grasp. But El-afdal's policy was weak. After his defeat at Ascalon in 1099 his Syrian expeditions have no other apparent object than the capture of Jaffa and incidentally of Ramla. The forces which he sent to Palestine could not be expected to fight successful

battles with the army of Jerusalem, or at least were much inferior to what might have been sent into the field for this purpose. Their numbers are much exaggerated by the Latin chroniclers. They do not ever appear to have exceeded 10,000 men and usually they may be estimated at from three to five thousand. The Latins with an army half that size won victories year after year in virtue of superior fighting qualities and better tactics. Their numbers increased until they were a match for the strongest army that the Egyptians could produce. The expeditions from Ascalon became mere garrison raids and El-afḍal's opportunity passed completely away. Had he used his numerical advantage to the full when the Latin armies numbered only two or three thousand men the course of the Latin conquest of Syria would not have run so smoothly.

In the autumn of 1099 the army which remained with Godfrey for the defence of the Holy Sepulchre and the completion of the work of the first crusade did not exceed 3000 men¹. When this became obvious, the emirs of the coast towns, who had hitherto anxiously avoided conflict with the crusaders, began to recover confidence. Arsuf lay nearest to the Latin settlements and was the first to challenge its new neighbours to a trial of strength. Godfrey besieged the town for 7 weeks, from the end of October to the middle of December². His failure was due principally to the want of a fleet³. At Christmas Bohemond of Antioch and Baldwin of Edessa visited Jerusalem in company with archbishop Daimbert (Dagobert) of Pisa. A large Pisan fleet with the archbishop on board had landed in Laodicea three months before. Daimbert was now elected patriarch of Jerusalem and he and the town of Pisa received special rights in Jaffa, which had lain in ruins up till now and was rebuilt by Godfrey and the Italians in the early part of next year (1100)⁴. In

¹ This was the size of the army which besieged Arsuf (Albert vii. 1). According to *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 139, about 200 knights remained in Palestine. In the spring of 1100 the Latin army consisted of 200 knights and 1000 foot soldiers (Albert vii. 16).

² Albert vii. 1 and 6.

³ Tyre ix. 19.

⁴ In the following June, however, it still presented the appearance of a deserted city to the Venetians when they landed (*Translatio* 271). The Pisans seem to have remained in Palestine until after Easter [Daimbert's letter, edit. Riant 213 f.], and Albert vii. 12 relates the fortification of Jaffa after the peace with Arsuf.

February and March there were skirmishes with the troops of Arsuf supported by horsemen from Ascalon and Arabs from the south of Palestine¹. The garrison of Ramla, which numbered 100 knights and 200 foot-soldiers², was active on the Latin side. It may be supposed that the visit of the knights of Antioch and Edessa and especially the arrival of the Pisan fleet convinced the Moslems that the Latin power was not to be estimated merely by the strength of Godfrey's army. At all events about Easter (1100) first the emir of Arsuf and then those of Ascalon, Caesarea and 'Akka offered tribute in return for a period of truce³. Their proposals were accepted and turned out much to the advantage of the Latins. After Easter there was a perfect exodus of crusaders from the country, and many of those who remained were induced to do so with the greatest difficulty⁴. During the summer pestilence broke out, owing, it is said, to the number of unburied bodies which polluted the country. There was a general failure of the Syrian crops, also, and therefore a great scarcity of food. Many of the natives went down to Egypt in consequence of the pestilence and famine⁵. The Latins found welcome markets in the Moslem towns with which they had peace and received large supplies especially from Ascalon.

Whilst there was peace with the towns on the coast Godfrey assisted Tancred, who was now establishing his authority in the district beyond Jordan nearest to Tiberias. The inhabitants of Nablus had voluntarily submitted to him immediately after the fall of Jerusalem⁶ and Baisan was one of his early acquisitions⁷. Possibly before the siege of Arsuf in 1099 Godfrey assisted him in the fortification of Tiberias and there he had

¹ Albert vii. 6-11.

² Albert vii. 6.

³ Albert vii. 13, according to which Ascalon, Caesarea and 'Akka each paid 5000 byzants.

⁴ Daimbert's letter, edit. Riant 214.

⁵ I.M. iii. 464, under A.H. 493.

⁶ Agiles, ch. 43 (p. 665).

⁷ *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 139 (after the battle of Ascalon). According to Baldric of Dol (*Rec.* iv. 111) Hlifa was occupied after the battle of Ascalon and before Tiberias. If so it was not a permanent acquisition and it is unlikely, therefore, that the citadel was captured at all.

remained as the king's vassal, with 60-80 knights in his service¹. The two expeditions in which Godfrey now took part were both against the same sheikh or emir. The first lasted a week early in the spring of 1100², the second occupied a fortnight about the end of the following May³. The Latin army in the former case included 200 knights and a 1000 foot-soldiers, and its rear-guard was attacked on the way home by some hundreds of horsemen from Damascus. The main purpose and effect of the expeditions was to secure that the revenues of the district should be paid to Tancred.

So far the Latins had escaped disaster, although their position was evidently precarious. The possibility of their having to evacuate the country was openly referred to⁴. Urgent appeals were sent to Europe for further help, and the Pope earnestly exhorted the "exiles" to continue faithful to their charge⁵. The arrival of a great Venetian fleet of 200 sail in the 2nd week of June (1100) opened up brighter prospects and marks a turning-point in the history of the Latin settlement. Just then Godfrey was struck down by the pestilence which was raging⁶, but an agreement was made with the Venetians that they should co-operate with the Latin army from the 24th of June to the 15th of August. Their terms were that in all the Latin towns they should be exempted from the payment of customs and should receive a church and ground suitable for the construction of a "forum." In every town captured by their

¹ The numbers 60 and 80 are given by Albert vii. 16 and *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 139 respectively. Godfrey's help is mentioned by Albert and dated in Advent, i.e. after November 27th (*Recueil* text, which shows that Migne has misplaced the words *in adventu Domini*). There is however scarcely time for it before the visit of Bohemond and Baldwin to Jerusalem after the siege of Arsuf and it is not likely to have been given during the siege, so that it may be dated before its commencement. Tiberias was occupied by Tancred not long after the battle of Ascalon, having been deserted by its population with the exception of a few Syrians (*Baldric of Dol*, Rec. iv. 111).

² After the truce with Arsuf and the other towns (Albert vii. 16).

³ Albert vii. 17.

⁴ *Translatio* v. 271.

⁵ *Migoe*, vol. 163, 42 f.

⁶ As the king's illness lasted five weeks (Albert vii. 11) it began in the 2nd week of June; this determines the date of the arrival of the Venetian fleet, which fell about the same time (Albert vii. 19). Ekkehard 200 ff. says Godfrey was a victim of the pestilence; I.A. and Sibb. iii. 513 are certainly in error in saying that he was killed by an arrow at the siege of Akka.

assistance they were to be given one-third of the spoil, and if ever their ships were wrecked on the Latin coast the merchandise on board was to remain the legal property of its owners. After it had been decided to attack 'Akka and whilst the land forces under the command of Tancred were on the march, Godfrey died (18th July 1100)¹. The Venetian fleet was still in the port of 'Akka. At Tancred's suggestion it sailed for Haifa a few days later². Within a month this town was captured³, after a vigorous attack in which the besiegers employed seven mangonels and a large moveable tower. On the day of the capture the garrison and the inhabitants were invited to gather round a cross, as to a place of safety, and were then pitilessly massacred without regard to age or sex. The Venetians resigned their share of the spoil to the Syrian Latins and sailed home without further delay, in order to escape the storms of winter.

Godfrey's death at once re-opened the constitutinal question which had been so warmly discussed in July of the previous year. When Daimbert was elected patriarch both Godfrey and Bohemond had accepted from him a formal title to their lands. Even in Godfrey's lifetime the patriarch claimed that this act, done "for the love of God"⁴, was an acknowledgment of his supreme authority in Jerusalem. He now sought to establish his claim and appealed to the Norman chiefs for help. Godfrey had named his brother Baldwin of Edessa as one well fitted to succeed him. The nomination satisfied most of the southern Latins but was distasteful to Tancred as well as to the patriarch. It is unlikely that Bohemond, in any circumstances, would have

¹ The most exact account of these events is given by the *Translatio Nicolai*; in Albert vii. 20ff. there are a number of errors and inconsistencies. The date of Godfrey's death is from Fulcher i. 24 and Ekk. 203. In *Annales Bn. l.* 430 "juign" may be a textual error for "juignet" (July). Wilken ii. 59 and Weil iii. 174 give August 17th without reference to any authority.

² *Translatio*, ch. 40. Haifa was nearer and weaker and only 4 weeks remained of the time for which the Venetians had promised to give their services; possibly also Godfrey had promised 'Akka to Geldemar Carpenel (cf. Albert vii. 22 who makes this statement of Haifa and does not mention 'Akka at all).

³ *Translatio*, ch. 43 (p. 177). According to Ibn Kh. i. 160 in Shawal 493, commencing 9th August 1100.

⁴ Fulcher iii. 34.

been merely subservient to Daimbert's policy. He would rather have attempted to add Jerusalem to his own possessions and to unite all Syria under himself. But just at the crisis and before the news of Godfrey's death had reached him he was captured by the Moslems¹. Baldwin, accordingly, when he reached Jerusalem in the second week of November², had no great difficulty in bearing down all opposition. In the following March (1101) Tancred relinquished Tiberias and went north to take Bohemond's place in Antioch. A few months later Daimbert was deposed and Baldwin's authority was no longer seriously questioned³. The later patriarchs, especially Baldwin's friend Arnulf (1111-1118), altogether abandoned the claim which Daimbert had sought to establish.

The Latins could have had no more competent leader in their early Moslem wars than Baldwin I. His invariable policy was one of aggression and bold attack. A serious enemy rarely got within striking distance of any Latin town without first measuring arms with Baldwin. He wore out the spirit of the garrison of Ascalon by his constant readiness, and only once suffered a reverse at their hands. On the Damascus border he was equally vigilant. From the year 1105 Tugtakın of Damascus co-operated more actively with the Egyptians and with the Syrian coast towns. But Baldwin's own army, exclusive of western reinforcements, might now be reckoned at from five to six thousand foot-soldiers, and such a force was more than a match for the armies of the enemy. The outstanding features of the first portion of his reign (1100-1108), more particularly, have just been described, those characteristic of the latter portion (1109-1118) receive comment later on.

Baldwin's first enterprise as Godfrey's successor is characteristic of the spirit by which he was animated and its purpose may be inferred from the impression which it could not fail to produce on friend and foe alike. A week after his arrival he left Jerusalem with 150 knights and 500 foot-soldiers. He

¹ Chap. II, p. 73.

² About Martinmas (Albert vii. 37). He left Edessa on the 2nd of October (Fulcher ii. 2) but 2-3 days were spent in Antioch, Laodicea, Hama and Jaffa respectively.

³ In 1107 the Pope ordered his reinstatement, but fortunately for Baldwin he died on his way back to Palestine.

encamped for a few days beside Ascalon and skirmished with its garrison. Next he punished some Arab tribes which had been making the roads unsafe for pilgrims. Afterwards he raided some districts beyond the Dead Sea and when he returned to Jerusalem he had been absent altogether for 4 weeks¹. On Christmas day he was crowned by the patriarch at Bethlehem as the first of the Latin kings.

In the spring of 1101 a Genoese fleet which had wintered in Laodicea arrived in Jaffa. After Easter its help secured the capture of Arsuf and Caesarea. The former capitulated within three days and its inhabitants were permitted to withdraw to Ascalon. The latter was stormed after a fortnight's resistance and a large part of the adult male population was put to the sword (May 1101)². In both cases the Genoese fleet received one-third of the spoils and had a special quarter of the town assigned to them. Alarmed by these events Iḥ-ashā of Egypt strongly reinforced the garrison of Ascalon (beginning of July)³, and sought an alliance with Ṭuḡtakin of Damascus. In the beginning of September the Egyptians were on the point of moving, probably against Jaffa, without Ṭuḡtakin's assistance. Within 3 days of the time when Baldwin heard of their intention he had assembled a force of from 12-1300 men⁴, had

¹ Fulcher ii. 3 and 4; Albert vii. 38-43.

² Fulcher ii. 7-8 gives particulars. The siege of Arsuf is dated after Easter (21st April); before commencing the siege the Genoese visited the Jordan "in belaloma serialium" (cf. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* lx. 413), and made a short stay in Jaffa, so that the siege cannot have begun much less than a week after Easter (these particulars are from Caffarus, *Mon. Germ.* xviii. 13). The attack on Arsuf lasted 3 days and was followed immediately by the siege of Caesarea, which lasted a fortnight. Probably, therefore, the capture of Caesarea, which fell on a Friday (Fulcher ii. 8), was not later than the 31st of May. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* lx. 426 f. and 431 f. calculates that the capture of Arsuf was on the 29th of April and that of Caesarea on the 17th of May. He argues that a later date for the capture of Caesarea would not leave a sufficient interval between it and the battle of Ramla, so as to include some days spent in Caesarea after the capture, 24 days spent in Ramla (Fulcher ii. 9), 70 days in Jaffa undisturbed by the Moslems (Fulcher ii. 10) and a time of preparation for the forthcoming battle. It is not impossible, however, that Fulcher's 70 days include all the time spent in Jaffa before the battle.

³ I.M. iii. 464 (beginning of Ramadan 494). Fulcher ii. 9 seems to imply early in June (cf. note 2). The troops left Egypt in Sha'ban (1st-29th June).

⁴ Albert vii. 63 (300 horse and 1000 foot), *Illst. reg.* v. 233 and Fulcher, *Recueil* ii. 10 (260 knights and 900 foot; 240+900 in Migne's Fulcher). Ekk. 268 f. gives

anticipated the enemy's attack and had won a brilliant victory (7th September 1101)¹. It was fortunate for the Latins that several hundred Egyptian horsemen rode off the field towards Jaffa thinking that the battle was a Moslem victory because they had defeated their immediate opponents². The issue of the battle was decided within an hour from its commencement by the advance of the rear divisions under Baldwin's own command. The arrival in Jaffa on September 9th of a fleet of 30 ships with some thousands of pilgrims on board was a happy coincidence. A Moslem fleet which had been waiting to co-operate with the land army sailed away³.

In March next year (1102) Baldwin was encamped for 18 days near Beirut. His purpose was to protect the pilgrims who had escaped from Asia Minor⁴ and were now on their way to celebrate Easter in Jerusalem⁵. About the middle of May reinforcements arrived in Ascalon⁶, and shortly afterwards the Moslems laid siege to Ramla. Baldwin hurried to the rescue with a small force⁷, which the enemy quickly surrounded and overpowered (27th May)⁸. Some fled to Ramla, others to Jaffa, Baldwin himself escaped to Arsuf. Immediately Ramla was captured and Jaffa was besieged. Ten days after the battle the king entered Jaffa by sea and the Egyptian army withdrew and lay in the plains of Ascalon. After three weeks they pitched their camp again in the neighbourhood of Jaffa and remained there for a fortnight, apparently preparing for a regular siege.

1000+7000 and I.M. lii. 464, 1000+10,000. The date when Baldwin heard of the Moslem movement is given by Ekk. 167.

¹ Fulcher ii. 11 and Albert vii. 68, I.A.'s reference (ii. 215) under A.H. 495 should be a year earlier (cf. p. 46, n. 1).

² Fulcher ii. 12.

³ Ekk. 173.

⁴ See chap. II, p. 75.

⁵ Fulcher, Recuell ii. 17 (Migne ii. 16); cf. Tyre x. 19. Reckoning back 18 days (in Migne's text given as 18) from the time when the pilgrims probably joined him (see p. 53, n. 1) gives the beginning of March for the commencement of the king's stay at Beirut. This is no doubt the incident to which I.A. refers when he speaks of a prolonged siege of Beirut in A.H. 495.

⁶ Fulcher ii. 14. In I.A. i. 213 Rajab 495, ending 21st May 1102.

⁷ Seven hundred *foricati* according to Albert ix. 3 with which Sibé iii. 525 (700 horse and foot) and I.A. i. 214 (700 horsemen) both agree. Fulcher ii. 17 says there were only 200 knights and comments on the want of foot-soldiers, without perhaps, implying that there were none at all.

⁸ Chron. Maxentii 421 (vi Kal. Junii), supported by Fulcher ii. 14, later than *mediante Maio*, and Albert ix. 2, about Pentecost, i.e. May 25th.

On the third of July a pilgrim fleet arrived and on the 6th the king attacked the Moslems in their camp and succeeded in finally driving them away¹.

The Latin defeat at Ramla had for the moment created such an alarming situation that Baldwin had sent messages to Antioch and Edessa urgently requesting assistance. Hence the arrival of Tancred and Baldwin of Edessa in September with an army of 500 knights and 1000 foot-soldiers². The unusual strength of the Latin forces made it appear opportune to besiege Ascalon. It was invested for 8 days only. The Moslems were driven back when they sallied out and all the country round was laid waste. But the city defied capture and the Latins retired³. The northern princes were probably unwilling to spend much time away from home and the season had come when it was usual for the pilgrims to return to Europe.

'Akka was now the Moslem coast-town nearest to the Latins. Baldwin accordingly laid siege to it in the following spring, after Easter 1103, with an army of 5000 men. After 5 weeks it was relieved by a Moslem fleet from the coast-towns further north and the Latins broke up the siege⁴. The want of a fleet was

¹ These particulars are from Albert ix. 9-12. Fletcher II. 20 passes over the greater part of the 6 weeks between the first defeat of the Latins and their final victory and Ekk. 326 makes the victory follow on the 3rd day after the defeat. Hagenmeyer's proposal (in Ekk. 326) to correct the 3rd July of Albert ix. 11 into 3rd June in order to agree with Ekkehard introduces what seems an impossible contradiction into Albert's own text (cf. ix. 10). I.A. reproduces two narratives which are obviously duplicate accounts of the events of this same year from different sources (l. 213 f. and f. 215). One is correctly dated in A.H. 495 (A.D. 1102) the other in A.H. 496, which is also I.M.'s date (Rec. iii. 465). As often happens in such cases I.A. has been misled by the difference of date into supposing that different events were referred to by his two sources. His dependence on two sources at this point is confirmed by a variation in the Arabic form of the name Baldwin, given by the first source as *Bardufin*, by the second as *Badrufi*. I.A. l. 215 says Ramla was besieged 15 days before its capture. The reference in l. 228 is to this same capture of Ramla, the year in question being probably A.H. 496 and not A.H. 497 as might appear at first sight.

² Albert ix. 13 in Recueil iv. ; 500 has better MS. support than Migne's (= Bongars') 700.

³ Albert ix. 13-15. Cf. I.M. iii. 464, who speaks of a battle in the month of Dhu'l-hijja 494 (commences 27th September 1103). I.A. l. 216 says the western pilgrims were the instigators of the retreat. Gesta Tancredi, ch. 145, alludes to Tancred's assistance.

⁴ Albert ix. 19. I.A. gives the month correctly, Jumada II, but under the wrong year, 495 instead of 496.

evidently the cause of this failure¹. In July of this same year the king was attacked and severely wounded by a troop of Moslems whilst he was out hunting. It was several months before he recovered from the wounds. During his convalescence El-afdal planned an attack on Jaffa. But the Egyptian commander in Ascalon failed to co-operate effectively with the fleet, although reinforcements had been sent him for the purpose².

In 1104 Baldwin secured the help of a Genoese fleet³ for the renewal of his attack on 'Akka. Its emir capitulated after a siege and blockade of only 20 days⁴. The inhabitants were promised their lives and their property and the Italians are charged with having commenced the pillage and murder which followed the occupation of the town (Ascension Sunday, 26th May)⁵. Two raids in September are the only signs of activity on the part of the garrison of Ascalon this year⁶.

In 1105 El-afdal made what may be considered his most serious attempt to retrieve the situation in Palestine after his crushing defeat in 1099. Possibly the fall of 'Akka spurred him to a renewed effort. His army included 1300 horsemen from Damascus and probably numbered fully 10,000 men⁷. Baldwin lay in Jaffa for some weeks until the Moslems moved from the neighbourhood of Ascalon towards Ramla, on the 27th August⁸.

¹ Tyre x. 26, although I.A. i. 213 says the Latins employed 16 ships.

² I.A. i. 216, under A.H. 496; cf. Albert ix. 23-25, who says that Jaffa was harassed by Moslem attacks until October.

³ See p. 55.

⁴ Fulcher ii. 24.

⁵ Albert ix. 28-29. Fulcher ii. 24 gives the same date and Ibn Kh. iii. 455 the correct month, Sha'ban 497. Abu'l-Mehasin iii. 495 gives Ramadan 497, which commences on May 28th 1104.

⁶ Albert ix. 30 and 31 (500 horsemen against Jaffa, 60 against Caesarea).

⁷ Sibṭ iii. 519; I.A. i. 229 gives the number of the Damascus contingent, 1300, and the total as 5000 (? not including infantry). Fulcher ii. 30 speaks of 1000 Damascus archers (? mounted), and ii. 31 estimates the Moslem army at 15,000 men, in agreement with Annales A ii. ii. 430. The estimates of the Latin army vary considerably. Fulcher ii. 31 gives 500 knights, 2000 foot and a number of mounted men; Hbt. reg. v. 233, 500 *armatos* + 7000 *pedites*; Annales A li. ii. 430, 500 *gens*; Albert ix. 49, 6000 in all; Ekk. 286, 4000; I.A. i. 774, 1300 horse and 8000 foot.

⁸ I.M. iii. 466 (24th Dhu'l-hijja 498) and Fulcher ii. 31. Albert ix. 49 rightly notes that it was the last Sunday of the month. I.A. i. 228 correctly gives Dhu'l-hijja 498 (Recueil inaccurately September).

The Latins gained a decisive but hard-won victory. The Moslems on the fleet outside Jaffa were informed of the result by the head of the emir of Ascalon being thrown on board one of their ships. On the voyage home, after a visit paid to Tyre and Sidon, they also met with disaster, for 25 of the ships were wrecked in a storm.

Ṭuḡtakin's share in the invasion of this year is noteworthy. It seems to have been the course of domestic affairs which at length involved him in war with the Latins. In June 1104 Duḡaḡ of Damascus died. Ṭuḡtakin then governed in the name of his son, being in fact absolute ruler. Baktash, a brother of Duḡaḡ¹, claimed to be his successor and established himself in the Ḥauran. He negotiated with Baldwin and actually fought as an ally of the Latins against Egypt in 1105². This no doubt explains the co-operation of troops from Damascus on the other side. It was Ṭuḡtakin's first act of aggression and the commencement of hostilities which continued for some years (1105-08).

In the spring of 1106 Baldwin's troops destroyed the crops and laid waste the country round Ascalon. In the summer preparations were made for besieging Sidon. The arrival of 7000 pilgrims, chiefly English, emboldened the Latins to the undertaking. While the king was making ready news came to him of the death of Hugh of Tiberias. The Sidonians had already offered him a sum of money to abstain from his attack and this he now resolved to accept. He had been inclined to do so previously, for he was much in need of money. The pilgrims were informed of the situation and returned home. Baldwin hastened to Tiberias³. A Latin castle in the district of Suwad, in the Ḥauran, had been causing the Moslems of Damascus much annoyance. Ṭuḡtakin was on an expedition against it when he encountered Hugh of Tiberias. The Latins were defeated, Hugh slain and the castle destroyed⁴. Baldwin may

¹ Wrongly spoken of as Duḡaḡ's son in Röhricht 57, note 1; see I.A. i. 223, 229 and I.M. iii. 466. Ṭuḡtakin first proclaimed Duḡaḡ's son, then Baktash, and then, after a quarrel with the latter, Duḡaḡ's son again.

² I.A. i. 229 (224).

³ The narrative and dates are from Albert ix. 51 to x. 7. The year of the pilgrims' arrival is called the 7th of Baldwin, i.e. later than July 1106 (x. 1).

⁴ Fulcher ii. 34 dates this event in the summer or later. Albert seems to imply

have apprehended some further attack. He appointed a French knight, Gervase, to be Hugh's successor and spent some time himself in Tiberias. He was recalled by the news of a dangerous raid from Ascalon, in the second week of October. A company of incautious pilgrims had been surprised near Ramla, the garrison of Jaffa had been repulsed, and Castle Arnolf had been attacked and surrendered. After the arrival of the king in the neighbourhood of Ascalon there was no further movement on either side¹.

Ṭuḡtakin now anticipated that he would be attacked, and from the commencement of 1107, or even earlier, was encamped in the district of Suwad, ready to meet invasion². Baldwin's only aggressive movement however was against a Moslem castle to the east of the Dead Sea. The castle had been recently built and was deserted by its garrison upon Baldwin's approach. This was in the second week of March³. The expedition went by the south of the Dead Sea and returned by the north. Baldwin, for his part, was apprehensive of attack from Ṭuḡtakin. For this reason he was in Tiberias for a short time in the early days of January and again after Easter⁴. On the second occasion news that the governor of Tyre threatened the Latin fortress of Tibnin⁵ was the probable cause of his leaving for 'Akka⁶. No particulars of what occurred are known. Shortly afterwards the

it was not much before October. As I.A. i. 129 gives October-November 1105 and Sibḡ iii. 530 February-March 1106 there is a considerable element of uncertainty in the matter. Albert differs from the representation of the text, which follows the Arabic sources, in making Hugh's defeat take place near Banyns while he was returning from an expedition into the Suwad. It is to be noted that the Arabic writers do not mention Hugh's name. Sibḡ calls the castle 'Ad (7).

¹ Albert x. 8-16. The "castellum Arnolfi" is in the same locality as the "castellum Arnaldi" which Tyre xlv. 8 says was built in 1133. Possibly the castles may be identified and Tyre's "building" understood to mean rebuilding.

² Sibḡ iii. 530.

³ Albert x. 27. Baldwin started on the day after Ash Wednesday, i.e. 28th February.

⁴ Albert x. 24 and 30.

⁵ Built by Hugh of Tiberias shortly before his death (Tyre xl. 5); Annales ii. ii. 430 agrees that it was fortified by Hugh but wrongly dates in 1108. The castle was captured by the Moslems some time before 1117 or 1118 (see p. 66, n. 1).

⁶ Sibḡ iii. 530, which may be supposed to refer to this occasion rather than to the visit in January (A.ii. 500).

garrison of Ascalon again displayed activity. They gained no success but their movements kept the Latins on the alert. It is said that there were troops from Damascus co-operating with them¹. Seventy-five men from Jaffa fought a successful skirmish with a superior number of Moslems in November².

In 1108, possibly in June or July, Baldwin appeared with an army before Tyre. He remained in the neighbourhood during four weeks. He was chiefly occupied in building a castle which was intended, no doubt, to be a protection against such expeditions as that which had been made from the town in the previous year. After receiving a payment of 7000 pieces of gold from the governor the king withdrew his forces³. In August he laid siege to Sidon. The city walls and two towers were severely injured by the bombardment of the Latin engines. But before the besiegers had pressed their advantage ships from Egypt and from Tripolis defeated and drove away Baldwin's fleet. A vigorous sally from the town next day showed how the Moslems were encouraged. News came that Ṭuḡtakīn was advancing to relieve the town. Baldwin burned his engines and marched off on the following day⁴. It was after this, according to Arabic testimony⁵, that Gervase of Tiberias was defeated by troops from Damascus. The Latin force was cut to pieces and its leader captured⁶. Following this Baldwin and Ṭuḡtakīn made peace. They agreed to observe a four years' truce⁷ and to partition the revenues of the territories in dispute, Suwad and Jebel 'auf⁸. Judged by later custom the treaty was binding only as between Damascus and Jerusalem. Certainly both Baldwin and Ṭuḡtakīn took part next year in the warfare which was being carried on in

¹ Albert x. 31-34.

² Fulcher ii. 35.

³ I.A. i. 257; also I.M. iii. 467 and Sibṭ iii. 534. The date is inferred from that of the following siege of Sidon.

⁴ Albert x. 45-50. I.A.'s account is under the year A.H. 501 which ends on the 10th of August 1108 (i. 257).

⁵ In A.H. 501 (commencing 11th August 1108) according to I.A.; in A.H. 501 but still after the siege of Sidon according to Sibṭ. Albert x. 53 relates the incident after the siege of Sidon, but dates it towards the middle of May ("tempore Rogationum Instante").

⁶ Sibṭ says he was sent to the sultan. I.A. and Albert agree that he was put to death.

⁷ I.A. i. 469.

⁸ Sibṭ iii. 537.

Tripolis¹. From the year 1109 the policy of Jerusalem begins to be affected by the course of events in northern Syria. Both a cause and a symptom of the change is the establishment of a new relation between Tripolis and Jerusalem. Before relating the events of 1109 it is desirable to sketch the history of Tripolis up to this point.

The early history of Latin Tripolis gives it a certain claim to separate mention in the list of Latin states. But previous to 1109 it was merely a state in embryo. Tripolis, its capital, was still in Moslem hands and the Latin towns were few and comparatively insignificant. The conquest of the district was at last effected by the help of Baldwin of Jerusalem and others of the neighbouring Latins. As a consequence Tripolis became a dependency of Jerusalem. The first counts of Tripolis, in fact, were not strong enough to create a separate principedom and their successors for many years were vassals of Jerusalem. Raymond of Toulouse had he lived a few years longer might, indeed, have been successful in creating an independent state. But such compensation for his misfortunes during the first crusade was snatched from him by his early death. His history after the battle of Ascalon (August 1099) is shortly told. Without much delay he returned to northern Syria. He found Bohemond attempting to capture Laodicea from the Greeks, and frustrated the attempt by his interference. He remained in the town some months, until his departure to Constantinople in the beginning of 1100². He took part in one of the unsuccessful crusades of the year 1101³ and returned to Syria in the beginning of 1102. The three remaining years of his life were spent in the endeavour to make conquests in the neighbourhood of Tripolis.

It has already been observed that the territories of Damascus

¹ I. A. i. 270 states that after Tugtkin was defeated in Tripolis, next year, he received assurances from Baldwin that the peace with Jerusalem remained unaffected.

² Albert vi. 55-60. According to Fulcher i. 22 Raymond was still in Laodicea at the beginning of 1100. In Anna's account of events after the fall of Jerusalem in 1099-1100 she says that Raymond handed over Laodicea, Marakhiya and Balanyas to the Greeks. Possibly this describes his earlier action before he left for Jerusalem (see p. 25, n. 4) rather than his present service to the emperor. According to Caffarus xviii. 45 Marakhiya was Greek about the date of the capture of Antioch, whereas Balanyas was Moslem.

³ See chap. II, p. 75.

were in closer touch with the county of Tripolis than with the kingdom of Jerusalem. Tuğtakin aimed persistently at the conquest of Homs and Hama, and these towns were the near neighbours of Tripolis. The valley of the Bika', between the ranges of Lebanon and Anti-lebanon, may be said to have lain within the territory of Damascus, and after the death of Jennh ed-daula of Homs, in May 1103, Homs itself was a dependency. When Baldwin was on his way south to become Godfrey's successor (October 1100) the Moslem forces which obstructed his passage through the pass north of the Dog River (Nahr el-kelb) were chiefly from Homs and Damascus¹. Tuğtakin also gave some help to the Moslems of Tripolis, during their nine years struggle with the Latins. At the same time the hills of Lebanon and the Jebel Anşariya form a natural boundary to the west of which the Latins might establish themselves without causing much concern to the rulers of Damascus. Damascus always faced towards Aleppo, and whatever question might complicate the problems of Syrian politics its first concern was to strengthen its position and to expand its territories in that direction. When Homs and Hama were tributary it still looked northwards and not to the coast of Tripolis. The Latins deprived Damascus of no territory which it coveted or possessed so long as they remained within the shelter of the hills which divided them from the central plains of Syria. Raymond might in fact establish himself in Tripolis without encountering much opposition from Tuğtakin. The measure of his success would be the measure of his superiority over the local emirs. With "marvellous audacity" he sought to conquer Tripolis with a force of some 400 men². His chief gains were made with the help of two Italian fleets. Aided by them and by western pilgrims he secured a footing in the county from which he could not easily be dislodged. The emir of Tripolis remained safe within the walls of his capital but was no match elsewhere for Raymond's activity and boldness. The friendship between Raymond and Alexius gave the latter an ally against the Normans in Antioch and the former indis-

¹ Full particulars are given by Fulcher ii. 1-2 and Albert vii. 33-35. I.A. and Sib; claim a Moslem victory.

² *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 145.

pensible support for his campaigns in Tripolis. In February 1105, when Raymond died, the principedom which had so often escaped him seemed at length to be just within his grasp.

When Raymond began operations in 1102 he was assisted by the crusaders who had survived the disasters of the previous year in Asia Minor and by a Genoese fleet which came northwards after having paid a short visit to Jerusalem. Anṭarṭus yielded to the Latin forces, with little or no resistance, and was left "by common consent" in Raymond's hands (March 1102)¹. He had a claim to this town dating from the time of the first crusade². Fakhr el-mulk, emir of Tripolis, seeing the Latins within easy reach of his very gates, now sent for help to Ḥomṣ and Damascus. A united Moslem force, under Jenāḥ ed-daula of Ḥomṣ, invested Anṭarṭus in the following month, but only for a few days, at the end of which the Moslems were surprised in their camp, and driven away (April 1102)³. Raymond in his

¹ Albert viii. 42 and Anna 66 f. The surviving leaders of the crusade were all assembled in Antioch about the beginning of March ("Martio inchoante," Albert viii. 41), and they reached Jaffa, after the capture of Anṭarṭus, a fortnight before Easter, which fell on the 6th of April (Albert viii. 44, cf. Fulcher ii. 17). This makes the capture of Anṭarṭus about the middle of March. The date of the Chron. Maxentii 241 is accordingly a month too late (xii Kal. Maii = 20th April). Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* x. 403 ff., accepts Damberger's correction of the Chron. Maxentii into xii Kal. Martii (18th February) and argues against the reading *Martio inchoante* in Albert viii. 41. The date of Baldwin's arrival at Beirut about the beginning of March (p. 45, n. 5) does not, however, seem to affect Albert's date for the re-union of the crusaders in Antioch, since the king's protection for the pilgrims may have been requested even before the leaders had all assembled, and Baldwin did not require many days to prepare for his movement to Beirut.

² Immediately before the attack on Anṭarṭus Raymond was a prisoner of Tancred's in Antioch for a short time and was released on the condition "ne quidquam terrae hac ex parte civitatis Acre [= Akko] invaderet" (Albert viii. 42). It has been assumed by modern historians that his occupation of Anṭarṭus was a breach of his promise to Tancred. If so it is remarkable that Albert, so far from suggesting this, almost excludes it by the way in which he relates the matter. When Fulcher ii. 16 says that the pilgrims expected Raymond to accompany them to Jerusalem he is not necessarily in conflict with Albert's statement that the city was given to Raymond *ex communis consilio*. Fulcher says nothing about Raymond's oath to Tancred.

³ Sibṭ iii. 525 gives Jumada il 495 (commences 23rd March 1102) as the date of the battle, and he and Anna 67 f. and Caffarus, *Liberatio* xviii. 47, the locality as just outside Anṭarṭus. I.A. i. 211 f. narrates the same events as happening previous to the siege of Anṭarṭus and locates the battle outside Tripolis (to which the Moslems retreated according to Caffarus). The order of events preferred in the text rests on statements of Anna and Caffarus, which harmonise with the dates given by Albert and Sibṭ for the capture and battle of Anṭarṭus respectively. It is to be observed that

turn advanced to the walls of Tripolis and then immediately withdrew, having received a sum of money and a number of horses from the emir¹. A hill just outside the town attracted his attention as an ideal site for the erection of a castle. He communicated his plan to Alexius and afterwards, probably in 1103, received from Cyprus the men and material he required for its construction². An attempt of Raymond's to relieve the town of Laodicea, which Tancred was besieging, falls in the latter part of 1102 or the beginning of 1103³.

In the spring of 1103 the castle of Ṭuban was attacked and immediately afterwards Ḥiṣn el-akrad was invested (April)⁴. On the 1st of May of this year Jenāḥ ed-daula of Ḥims was assassinated⁵. When Raymond heard the news at Ḥiṣn el-akrad he immediately presented himself before the city, and the inhabitants were compelled to buy his retreat by the payment of a sum of money. Ṭuḡtakin now took possession of Ḥims and ravaged the territory of his rival Ruḍwan of Aleppo⁶. During 1103 Raymond's chief occupation was the erection of his projected castle on the "Pilgrims' hill" (Mons peregrinus). The Moslems of Tripolis made sallies from the town and raided the country and tried to destroy the fortifications which were in process of construction. But after the castle was complete it so guarded the approaches to the town and menaced its safety that Fakhr el-mulk for a time at least paid tribute to Raymond for the sake of peace⁷. Round the fortress there quickly grew up a

Anna 66 ff. does not refer to the events of the years 1099-1100, although afterwards on p. 70 ff. she speaks of what happened in 1100.

¹ I.A. i. 312. Perhaps the exact date of this event is preserved by Codex arab. Quatremercé quoted in Kugler, Boemund 74, note 35 (19th Rajab 495=9th May 1101).

² Anna i. 68 f. (vaguely dating after the fall of Anjaras and possibly during Tancred's siege of Laodicea). Caffarus xviii. 47 dates the completion of the castle before the siege of Jubail early in 1104 and similarly Albert ix. 32 (before capture of Akka).

³ Geste Tancredi, ch. 145.

⁴ The date is inferred from I.A. who puts these events just before the death of Jenāḥ ed-daula; cf. note 5.

⁵ Kem. iii. 590 f. Sibḡ iii. 525 gives A.H. 495 but cites Ibn el-kalanasi for A.H. 496. I.A. also has 495 but his dates here are in evident confusion (see p. 46, n. 1).

⁶ Kem. iii. 591.

⁷ Cf. Tyre x. 27. I.A. i. 317 ff. under A.H. 496 (ends 4th October 1103) speaks of

Latin Tripolis only a short distance inland from the Moslem coast town.

In the spring of 1104 a Genoese fleet of 40 galleys assisted Raymond to capture Jubail, which lies a short distance south of Tripolis on the way to Beirut¹. The Genoese received one-third of the town as their reward. The same fleet immediately afterwards assisted Baldwin at the siege of 'Akka, and Raymond accompanied them there. It may be supposed that during the summer and autumn he co-operated with the Greeks in their campaign against Antioch² and thereby also strengthened his own position on the coast. In February 1105, during a Moslem attack on the houses at the foot of the Pilgrims' hill, Raymond was injured by the fall of a burning house, and died 10 days later (28th February 1105)³. During the first crusade he was over-matched by his rival Bohemond and he never gained in Syria the position which his wealth and ability might have been expected to secure for him. But he was one of the first men of rank and influence to pledge himself to be a crusader, and by his prompt adhesion he doubtless contributed greatly to the success of the movement in Europe.

In 1105 Ruqlwan of Aleppo, Tuğtakin of Damascus, and Suḡman of Maridin, all appear to have contemplated expeditions against the Latins of Tripolis. Most probably the death of Raymond roused their hopes. Tuğtakin gained Rafaniya (April-May 1105)⁴ but Suḡman ibn Ortok died at Ḳaryetain

the Moslem rakla from Tripolis, Sibī iii. 528 and Abu'l-mehasin iii. 495 of a successful attack on the Latin castle in Dhu'l-hijja 497 (August-September 1104). There appear to have been negotiations for a more permanent peace about the time of Raymond's death (Sibī iii. 528; cf. Abu'l-mehasin iii. 489).

¹ Caffarus, *Liberatio* xviii. 47. Jubail is the Greek Byblos. It is easily confused with Jabala, to the north of Tripolis, owing to the similarity of the Arabic names. Jabala was captured in 1109 and William of Tyre xi. 9 and other sources put the capture of Jubail in that year. It may be dated in the month of April (1104), since it shortly preceded the siege of 'Akka. Besides it may confidently be assumed that Sibī iii. 527 alludes to the siege and capture of Jubail, where the *Recueil* text reads Tripolis. He gives the date Rajab 497, which commences 30th March 1104. Codex arab. Quatremère (in Kugler's *Boemund* 68, note 41) dates exactly the last day of Rajab 497=28th April 1104. I.A. i. 219 states that Raymond and the Latin fleet attacked Tripolis for a time before proceeding to the siege of Jubail.

² Chap. II, p. 79.

³ Fulcher ii. 29.

⁴ Sha'ban 498 (Sibī); I.A. i. 230 after Šafar 499, which ends 10th November 1104.

on the way and the Latins do not appear to have been exposed to any further attack¹. William Jordan, or William of Cerdagne, a nephew of Raymond, was his successor. Scarcely any particulars are known of the petty warfare which he waged with his Moslem neighbours from 1105 to 1109. Tripolis suffered most. Its trade was ruined and supplies of food for the city were obtained with difficulty. Mention is once made of its receiving provisions from the Greeks of Laodicea². Fakhr el-mulk appealed in vain for help to the sultan and to the Moslems of Syria. In 1108 he left the town in charge of a cousin and in Bagdad and elsewhere described the extremities to which he was reduced and the danger of the situation in Syria. Even this effort to rouse interest and gain support had no practical result. The sultan and the emirs of Mesopotamia were just then engaged in serious conflicts of their own³. Meantime the inhabitants of Tripolis placed themselves under the protection of Egypt. Fakhr el-mulk's officers were arrested and sent to Egypt. When he himself returned in the middle of August he took up his residence in Jabala⁴. About this same time⁵ the governor of 'Arka transferred his allegiance to Tuğtakin of Damascus. Tuğtakin sent troops to occupy the town, and afterwards, in the beginning of 1109, followed in person with 4000 horsemen under his command. He was attacked by the Latins near 'Arka. His troops were seized with panic, and he saved himself only by headlong flight (early in March 1109). After this William Jordan laid siege to 'Arka, and so completely cut off supplies that in three weeks time its defenders made their escape to the hills and left the town unoccupied for the Latins to take possession (beginning of April 1109)⁶.

¹ Regarding Sukman, see I.A. i. 226 f. Kem. iii. 593 only says that Ruḡwan "determined to attack" Tripolis. The *Recueil* translation is inaccurate.

² I.A. i. 236, under A.H. 499, which commences 13th September 1105.

³ See chap. II, p. 84 f.

⁴ I.A. i. 255.

⁵ I.A. i. 269.

⁶ The most exact dates are those of Ibn Kh. iii. 456, who says the siege commenced at the beginning of Sha'ban 502 (commencing 6th March 1109) and the capture was made in Rabi'ul-an (commences 4th April). Albert gives the length of the siege as three weeks and I.A. i. 269 puts Tuğtakin's defeat in Sha'ban 502 (*Recueil* inaccurately March 1108). Particulars are given by I.A. i. 269 f. and 779 and by Albert xl. 1-2. Albert dates "at the time of Baldwin's return from Sidon," i.e. in August 1108.

In the year 1109 Tripolis was at last actively besieged and captured. The capture was effected by a combined attack in which all the Latin states took part. The year is made notable by this union of forces and by the circumstances which led to it. Sometime in March¹, Bertram, a son of Raymond of Toulouse, appeared in Syria. He came from France to claim his father's inheritance. His claim was disputed by William Jordan, who received assurance of support from Tancred. On the other hand Bertram was promised help by Baldwin of Jerusalem. Bertram had with him a considerable force of ships and men and vigorously began the siege of Tripolis². He was joined in three weeks by Baldwin of Jerusalem with about 1000 men. Tancred and Baldwin of Edessa arrived soon afterwards to discuss the situation, at the invitation of Baldwin of Jerusalem. Bertram and William were reconciled in accordance with an agreement by which the former was acknowledged to be his father's heir, while the latter was confirmed in the possession of 'Arqa and other conquests he had made³. The mediators were not without their reward, Bertram became Baldwin's vassal and William swore allegiance to Tancred⁴. After this the siege of Tripolis was pressed forward and the city surrendered on the 12th of July 1109⁵. Relief was on the way from Egypt, but too late.

Shortly after these events William Jordan was assassinated by one of his attendants⁶. His removal no doubt secured more completely Bertram's position, as defined by the recent compact. But Tancred seems to have gained most of the advantage.

I.A. i. 270 says Tughtakin captured the castle of El-kama before his defeat. Derenbourg, Ousama 76, note 3, identifies this with El-alma near Tripolis.

¹ Sha'ban 502, i.e. between 6th March and 3rd April 1109. I.A. gives the month but under the year 503 (cf. note 5).

² Abu'l-mehasin and Sibī date this on 1st Sha'ban (6th March). I.A. i. 273 gives Ramadan, which in A.H. 502 commenced on April 4th.

³ Albert xi. 11-12. Bertram's share according to this arrangement would include Antartus, Jubail and Tripolis. Tyre xi. 9 however gives Antartus to William.

⁴ Tyre xi. 9.

⁵ Monday, 11th Dhu'l-hijja 502 (Abu'l-mehasin iii. 489, Sibī iii. 536, Ibn Kh. iii. 435). The same day and month in I.A. i. 274 but under A.H. 503. Fulcher ii. 39 gives the Zodiac date for 12th July, a Tuesday. Tyre xi. 10 and Annales ii. ii. 430 (10th June 1109) probably both contain textual errors (comp. p. 33, n. 1 and p. 41, n. 1).

⁶ Albert xi. 15. Fulcher ii. 39 before the capture of Tripolis.

Even Anṭarṭus, to which Bertram had a good claim, was seized by Tancred¹. 'Arḩa, however, passed into the hands of Bertram. The attack on the Moslems of the neighbourhood during the following year was chiefly Tancred's work². But one movement may be attributed to Bertram. In A.D. 1103, and so probably before the end of A.D. 1109, Rafaniya was threatened by the Latins. Tuḡtakin assembled his forces for its protection and finally a treaty was made by which the Latins received the fortresses of Munaitera and 'Akkar and in addition the revenues of other districts³. Tuḡtakin was now seriously alarmed at the course of events. That winter he thought of accompanying Fakhr el-mulk to Baḡdad to explain the state of affairs again to the sultan. In the beginning of 1110, however, he laid siege to Ba'albek, the governor of which he suspected of negotiating with the Latins. The town was captured in Ramaḡan (ends 22nd April) and handed over to Taj el-muluk Buri, a son of Tuḡtakin⁴. By this time it was evident that Bertram was engaged elsewhere. Without attempting further to extend his borders he devoted himself, as a vassal of the kingdom of Jerusalem, to the furtherance of Baldwin's schemes. For 70 years the history of the county of Tripolis is almost merged in that of the kingdom of Jerusalem. One narrative suffices for both.

There could be no uncertainty regarding Baldwin's best policy in the year 1110. The Moslem towns of Tyre, Sidon and Beirut commanded the coast from the borders of Palestine to the borders of Tripolis and made communications with the north by sea and land equally unsafe. The towns on the coast of Palestine had been subdued, excepting Ascalon, and Sidon had already been besieged. The current peace with Damascus and the practical annexation of Tripolis in 1109 were important factors in the situation. But Baldwin's capture of Beirut and Sidon in one year (1110) is more than a testimony to the soundness of his judgment, it was the result and evidence of remarkable energy and personal effort. In February 1110⁵

¹ Albert xi. 40; Anṭarṭus was one of Raymond's possessions (cf. p. 57, n. 3).

² See chsp. II, p. 86 f.

³ Sibṡ iii. 537.

⁴ Sibṡ iii. 538 f.

⁵ Fulcher ii. 40 (and Tyre xi. 13); Albert xi. 15 apparently December 1109.

Baldwin, Bertram and a portion, at least, of the Italian fleets which had besieged Tripolis in the previous summer, invested Beirut. An adjacent pine forest supplied timber for the siege towers and mangonels. Relief ships from Tyre and Sidon left the town to its fate when they found how strictly the harbour was guarded. On Friday the 13th of May¹, in the 11th week of the siege, the Latins stormed the town. Some of the inhabitants escaped in ships to Cyprus but many were massacred before effective orders were given that the survivors should be spared².

Before the capture of Beirut news reached Baldwin that Edessa was besieged and in great peril. Joscelin of Tell bashir was the messenger. Perhaps the co-operation of the Latins at the siege of Tripolis last year suggested their common action now. Besides Baldwin understood the situation of Edessa; he had founded the state himself and realised the nature of its needs. In the beginning of June, after a short visit to Jerusalem, he set out to the assistance of his nephew Baldwin. The particulars of the expedition belong to the history of the north; here it need only be said that its main purpose was achieved and the relief of Edessa effected³.

This expedition occupied Baldwin three months or more. In August, during his absence, an Egyptian fleet threatened both Beirut and 'Akka and 500 horsemen started from Ascalon, with the intention, it was supposed, of surprising Jerusalem, only however to be themselves surprised and defeated⁴. When Baldwin returned home he found that a large Norwegian fleet had arrived in Palestine. It was decided to make an attack on Sidon at once with the help of so important an ally. The besiegers were also joined by a Venetian fleet⁵. After a siege

¹ Fulcher li. 40 (where *his decies* in Migne should be *his decies*); Ibn Kh. lii. 436 (Friday, 21st Shawal 503). Albert xi. 17 rightly gives Friday but calls it the Friday before Whitsunday, which would be May 27th in this year and is inconsistent with his own narrative of Baldwin's later movements. Tyre xi. 13 gives April 27th. The Recueil text of I.A. is defective at this point. Ibn Kh.'s date is also Yakut's (p. 76).

² Albert represents the massacre as contrary to an agreement made with the garrison before they opened their gates. It may be assumed that there was some such agreement, but Fulcher and Wm Tyre make it probable that the town was stormed in the first place.

³ See chap. II, p. 88 f.

⁴ Albert xi. 27-29.

⁵ Heyd l. 157 (French translation i. 142).

which lasted from the 19th of October¹ to the 5th of December² the Moslem town surrendered, on the condition that the lives and property of the citizens should be spared and that those who chose might leave the city with such property as they could carry with them. The terms were granted and observed. About 5000 of the inhabitants availed themselves of the permission to leave the city. Two notable captures had been made in the year which now closed. Only Tyre of the old Phœnician constowns remained in Moslem hands.

In the early part of 1111 there was a threat of renewed war between Damascus and Jerusalem. Baldwin lay at Tiberias with the intention of invading the territory of Ṭuḡtakin, and Ṭuḡtakin took up his position at Ras el-ina ready to meet the invader. The cause of these movements is not certain. The truce of 1108, if it was for four years, had not yet expired. But no military engagement took place. The truce was renewed on terms more advantageous to Baldwin than previously³. Ṭuḡtakin's interest continued to lie more in the north than in the south.

In the summer Baldwin's attention was devoted to the position of affairs in Ascalon. There seemed to be an opportunity of gaining that city. The governor was disaffected to Egypt and opened correspondence with Baldwin. Finally he declared his independence and strengthened his position by enrolling Armenian troops in his service. Shortly after this, however, he was assassinated (beginning of July) and an Egyptian governor resumed control of the town⁴. Baldwin would soon have interfered but was powerless from the outside.

¹ 3rd Rabi' II 504 (I.A. i. 275).

² In I.A. i. 276 and Ibn Kh. iii. 456, 10th Jumada I 504, calendar date 4th December 1110; but Fulcher ii. 41 has December 5th and this agrees exactly with the length of the siege given by I.A. (47 days) since he always reckons inclusively. Tyre xi. 14 gives December 19th, exactly a fortnight later (for his year see appendix).

³ Sibē iii. 541. He says Baldwin broke the truce but gives no particulars of what he did. These incidents are no doubt alluded to by Albert xi. 36. He appears to represent Baldwin's movement as the commencement of an advance northwards through the territory of Damascus. It is not impossible that Baldwin thought he might do this in virtue of the peace. Albert says he encamped at "Solome" (?Sanamain in the Hauran); Sibē mentions Tiberias.

⁴ Sibē iii. 541, I.A. i. 276f. Albert xi. 35-37 agrees in essentials, but almost implies that a Latin garrison was introduced into the city. His *milites Christiani* (*catholici*) may be the Armenians spoken of in the text.

Still in the same year, 1111, Baldwin's assistance was claimed and given a second time to the Latins of the north. Maudud of Mosul, the besieger of Edessa in 1110, this year invested Joscelin in Tell bashir. Afterwards a portion of his army entered the territory of Aleppo and threatened the dependencies of Antioch. It was now that Baldwin joined Tancred (beginning of September)¹. Tuğtakin was in the opposite camp with Maudud. There was no serious engagement, but the co-operation of Baldwin's forces made the Latin army amply sufficient to keep the enemy in check².

Even yet king Baldwin's display of energy and perseverance this year was not exhausted. After his return from the north he prepared for the siege of Tyre. The Greek emperor promised to send a fleet. On the other side the Tyrians were warned of their danger and obtained reinforcements from Tuğtakin. The town was invested on the 30th of November³, St Andrew's day. The blockade was weak because the Greek ships failed to appear. The principal effort to capture the city was made in the following spring (1112). Two lofty siege towers were constructed and advanced against the walls (March). But the courage and skill of the defenders were equal to the needs of their situation. One of the towers was speedily set on fire and completely destroyed. About a month later the second shared its fate. The townsmen were so encouraged by this success that they sallied out and now destroyed a number of the besiegers' engines. This was a final blow to the Latins, who were completely dispirited and withdrew their forces on the 10th of April⁴.

¹ See chap. II, p. 93. It is rather surprising that Baldwin did not go north sooner. He seems to have been free to do so in July. It may be supposed, indeed, that he was not asked to give his help until Maudud left Edessa and entered the territory of Antioch. Perhaps however Albert xi. 36 may be evidence of his intention to go north even sooner (cf. p. 60, n. 3).

² See further chap. II, p. 93.

³ Albert xii. 5 (St Andrew's day); 25th Jumada i 505, calendar date 29th November (Abu'l-mehasin iii. 491, I.A. i. 283 where Recueil wrongly has 27th November). Sib; iii. 543 has 21st Jumada i (25th November).

⁴ The date, 10th Shawal 505, is from I.A. i. 286 (Recueil wrongly 21st April), the other particulars from Sib; iii. 544 f. Albert xii. 7 gives the Sunday before Palm Sunday, i.e. 7th April. From the duplicate narrative in Sib; iii. 545 ff (see p. 62, n. 2) we learn that when the Tyrians sent for help Tuğtakin was at Hama, that Buri, his son, sent some troops and that Tuğtakin afterwards sent additional reinforcements.

Ṭuḡtakin's proximity had probably influenced their decision to retreat. During the siege he captured the Latin castle of Ḥubais or Ḥabis¹, and latterly he had made his presence felt in the neighbourhood of Tyre. The failure of the Latins was more than a temporary repulse. They were discouraged and exhausted by the results of the siege. After Easter Baldwin plundered a caravan as it passed by the south of the Dead Sea. Two hundred horsemen accompanied him and rich booty was made. But this was the only enterprise of the year 1112².

In the spring of 1113 Baldwin and 300 knights went to escort a company of 1500 pilgrims past the neighbourhood of Tyre. Five hundred Moslems sallied from the city and were repulsed, but the pilgrims turned back to 'Akka because of news of further danger³. In the beginning of May Maudud of Moṣul crossed the Euphrates⁴ in the direction of Syria. It seems that Baldwin received word from Edessa that an attack on himself in southern Syria was intended⁵. At all events in the beginning of June he took the aggressive against the territories of Damascus by an expedition into the Suwad⁶. It is not clear what Maudud had been doing up to this time. Now he agreed to invade Jerusalem along with Ṭuḡtakin and at his request. The allies met at Salamiya, near Hama, shortly after the 18th of June⁷. Then they marched south together through the Biḡa' and laid siege to Tiberias. Baldwin did not wait for the arrival of the reinforcements which were expected from Antioch and Edessa. The army of Jerusalem was numerically less inferior to the invaders, it may be supposed, than it had been to the much

¹ I.A. i. 286, 781, Sibḡ iii. 544. Abu'l-mehasin, iii. 497 is to be corrected accordingly. The castle (in the Suwad?) was recovered in 1118 (I.A. i. 784).

² Albert xii. 8; Sibḡ iii. 545 f. speaks of the threat of a second attack on Tyre in this year or the beginning of 1113 (A.H. 506). But his narrative contains apparently a duplicate account of the events of A.H. 505, the siege already described.

³ Albert xii. 10; Maudud's advance is given as the cause of the pilgrims' turning back.

⁴ End of Dhu'l-ḡa'da 506, ends 18th May 1113 (I.A. i. 288). In Albert xii. 9 March may be the date of his preparations (*disposuit transire*) or a textual error for May (*Martio* for *Madia*).

⁵ Albert xii. 9.

⁶ I.A. i. 288 (towards the end of A.H. 506, which ends 17th June 1113); Sibḡ iii. 546. The date agrees with Albert's statement referred to in note 3.

⁷ Muḥarram 507, which commences on June 18th (I.A. i. 288).

defeated Egyptian armies of previous years. But when Baldwin advanced to raise the siege of Tiberias, having marched into an ambush, or having been taken by surprise in his camp¹, he suffered a very severe defeat (28th June 1113)². Happily for the kingdom he himself escaped and his forces rallied quickly on the hills above the town and lake. They were joined immediately by large reinforcements, by pilgrims who had just arrived in Palestine and by the expected contingents from the north. For 26 days more the enemies faced one another. Then the Moslems withdrew southwards towards Baisan with the intention of ravaging the country in that direction. They stayed there five days³ and scoured the country toward 'Akka and Jerusalem. Nablus was destroyed. At the same time the inhabitants of Jerusalem were alarmed by a raid from Ascalon. But the Latin army kept close to the Moslem headquarters, and the invaders being short of provisions quickly left their new position and crossed the Jordan into the Hauran (beginning of August)⁴. Maudud dismissed his troops but decided to remain himself in Damascus for the winter. He entered the town on the 9th of September⁵. There he was assassinated in the court of the mosque after divine service on September 12th⁶. The effect of this event on the general progress of the Moslem contest with the Latins is explained in chapter II. It occurred most opportunely for the Latins of Jerusalem. By the removal of

¹ The former according to Fulcher, the latter according to Albert. The siege of Tiberias is mentioned by Albert xii. 9 and I.A. ii. 34 f. But just before the battle the Moslems appear to have been stationed across the Jordan to the south-east of Lake Tiberias (I.A. l. 288, Sib. iii. 546 f.; cf. Fulcher ii. 47).

² Fulcher ii. 47; cf. Albert xii. 11 (on the Festival of St Peter and St Paul, strictly 29th June); 13th Muharram, calendar date 30th June (I.A. ii. 35 and l. 289, where Recueil July 12 is to be corrected according to l. 781).

³ I.A. ii. 35.

⁴ Particulars chiefly from I.A. Albert xii. 13 dates the retreat about the beginning of August in agreement with I.A.'s chronology. Sib. iii. 546 f. has a less exact account of Maudud's campaign. Fulcher ii. 47 names Sichem (Nablus). Albert xii. 9 makes the siege of Tiberias (? period of invasion) 3 months. He does not distinguish specially the time during which the Moslems were posted at Baisan.

⁵ 25th Rabi' i (I.A. l. 289; Recueil 30th August is corrected on p. 781).

⁶ Last Friday of Rabi' i 507, I.A. i. 289 f. Ibn Kh. i. 217 gives Friday 12th Rabi' ii, September 16th. Albert xii. 18 relates the event under the wrong year.

Maudud they were saved from a repetition of the invasion of this year. Tughtakin, having lost his ally, was disposed to resume his policy of maintaining peace with Baldwin in the south. Besides, next year his relations with the sultan induced him to seek alliance with the Latin princes. Maudud was the sultan's brother and Tughtakin was suspected of complicity in his death. Baldwin, for his part, seems never to have thought of undertaking the conquest of Damascus. He also was inclined to be at peace with his neighbour. There does not appear to have been any further conflict between Damascus and Jerusalem until after Baldwin's death in 1118.

From this point the history of events in Jerusalem need not be narrated separately from the history of the northern states. The history of the making of the kingdom demanded separate treatment. In southern Syria the period of conquest ends practically with the year 1112. Two important towns on the coast were indeed unsubdued. Tyre was not captured until 1124 and Ascalon not until 1153. But these captures were isolated events. The failure of the attack on Tyre in 1112 marks the end of the period of conquest. The date coincides remarkably with the commencement of a wave of Moslem advance. At first this advance was directed against the Latins of the north. But at once it affected the situation in Jerusalem also. Baldwin recognised the presence of a common enemy. In 1110 and 1111 he took part in the defence of Edessa and Antioch against Maudud, and in return the rulers of these states joined Baldwin against Maudud in 1113. In these circumstances the history of the Latin states begins to flow in a single channel. The successive invaders of northern Syria become the principal enemies of the kingdom of Jerusalem and its history merges in the history of the north. Hence the statement already made that the course of events in Antioch and Edessa, as traced in chapter II, is the main stream of the present history. We must turn back and make a fresh start from the date when Bohemond and Baldwin founded their princedoms in the north.

But first it will be convenient to summarise briefly the events of the remaining years of Baldwin's reign (1114-1118) and certain incidents which occurred just after his death. There is

little of note or importance to record. Affairs in the north demanded Baldwin's presence only once, in the year 1115. There was peace with Damascus, as already observed. No further attempt was made to conquer Tyre, and Ascalon was left undisturbed. The immunity of the coast-towns may be attributed to Baldwin's lack of a fleet and to the failure of his great effort in the winter of 1111-12. On the Moslem side the Egyptian garrison of Ascalon was never wholly inactive. During the invasion of Maudud in 1113 an expedition from Ascalon threatened the town of Jerusalem¹. Again when Baldwin was absent in the north in 1115 two attempts were made to surprise Jaffa (beginning of September). A considerable fleet took part in the first attack, and it may have lasted some days. The second did not continue more than six hours; it was a renewal of the first after an interval of ten days². In the autumn of 1115, after his return to Jerusalem, Baldwin built a castle, Shaubak, on a lofty eminence some distance to the south of the Dead Sea³. One object he had in view was to facilitate attacks on the caravans which passed that way, coming and going to Egypt. The name Mont Royal was given to the hill on which the castle stood in commemoration of the king's share in the building. Next year, 1116, Baldwin spent some time in exploring the country to the south of Palestine. He set out from Shaubak with a little cavalcade of horsemen and penetrated to Aila on the Red Sea. From there he advanced towards the monastery of Sinai, but turned back when he learned that the monks were unwilling that he should visit them. He entered Palestine again by way of Hebron. In the plains of Ascalon he made considerable booty before returning home⁴. Probably in consequence of these events El-afdal of Egypt asked for peace and

¹ Fulcher li. 47.

² Fulcher li. 51. The date is derived inferentially from Albert xii. 17. He relates the movements of the Egyptian fleet which arrived in Tyre on the feast of the Assumption and left on the second day after the birthday of the Virgin. The fleet which attacked Jaffa sailed to Tyre (Fulcher) and so may be identified with this other.

³ Fulcher li. 53 and Albert xii. 21. Albert's year appears to be (wrongly) 1116; but it is he who mentions that the season was autumn.

⁴ Albert xii. 21-22 and Fulcher li. 54.

a truce was made with him¹. In March 1117 the king was seriously ill for a time at 'Akka. An Egyptian fleet lay ready in Tyre to take advantage of his death, should it occur. Possibly the recapture of Tibnin, situated in the hills east of Tyre, may be dated towards the end of April in this year². In June, or later, Baldwin built the castle of Iskanderun (Skandaleon) as a further protection against the garrison of Tyre³. His death took place in the following year. He was absent at the time from his kingdom, making an incursion into Egypt. The expedition was an adventurous one, for the king had with him only 600 men, 200 horsemen and 400 foot-soldiers. His special purpose was to retaliate for the annoyance caused by the garrison of Ascalon. Possibly he hoped to make plunder and extort money as the price of peace. The expedition started in the second week of March. After twelve days marching it reached Farafra on the Nile (21st of March)⁴. The town was stormed and plundered on the following day; two days were spent in resting; on the third day while preparations for departure were being made the king fell ill. His sorrowing soldiers carried him homewards, but he died on the way back (2nd April 1118)⁵. Five days later the body was carried into Jerusalem. Fortunately Baldwin of Edessa was in the city. He was unanimously chosen to be his uncle's successor⁶.

It is remarkable how little Baldwin's expedition and his subsequent death stirred the activity of the Egyptian government. But Ṭuḡtakīn endeavoured to profit by his opportunity. His terms of peace having been refused he crossed the Jordan

¹ Sibṭ iii. 558f., Abu'l-mehasin iii. 498. The connection of events assumed in the text is based on the statement that the truce was made after Baldwin had attacked a caravan in a locality which appears to have been in the neighbourhood of Ascalon. The date is given as A.H. 509, which ends 15 May 1116.

² The date Friday 11st Dhu'l-hijja 511 in Ibn Kh. iii. 456 contains a textual error, since the day of the week and the day of the month do not agree. Two corrections suggest themselves, Friday 11th Dhu'l-hijja 511 (5th April 1118) and Friday 11st Dhu'l-hijja 510 (27th April 1117, calendar date 26th April 1117). A.H. 511 is supported by Abu'l-mehasin iii. 487 (from Ed-dahab?) and is textually easier, but the circumstances of the kingdom in A.D. 1117 make that year more probable than 1118.

³ Fulcher ii. 60.

⁴ The date is from Albert xii. 25, who gives the fullest particulars.

⁵ Fulcher ii. 61.

⁶ The relationship to Baldwin I is given by Albert xii. 30.

and plundered Tiberias and the adjacent country (May). Then he proceeded to Ascalon and received command of the Egyptian forces there. But the Latins assembled an army which ʿUḡtakin did not judge it prudent to attack. It included troops from Tripolis and Antioch. Two months passed, or more, without either side taking the offensive¹. At the end of this time ʿUḡtakin returned to Damascus, probably because Iḡāzī desired his co-operation in the north. About the same time the Latins made an expedition into the Ḥauran. They penetrated as far as Boṣra and ravaged the country in its neighbourhood. The castle of Ḥubais was recaptured² and the Moslem forces under ʿUḡtakin's son Buri were defeated³. But ʿUḡtakin did not allow these movements to deter him from joining Iḡāzī in northern Syria. After consultation with his new ally ʿUḡtakin gave up his plans in the south and agreed to join in a campaign against Antioch in the following summer⁴. Still peace was not renewed with Jerusalem, and the Latins of the south showed a disposition to continue their operations. Joscelin of Tiberias, in particular, was determined to avenge the recent invasion of his territory. He was leader, it seems, of the raid against Boṣra in 1118⁵, and in 1119 he made another similar expedition over the Jordan. A large number of Arabs were pasturing their flocks in the Ḥauran, relying on the protection of Damascus. Joscelin set out to attack them with 60 foot-soldiers and 160 horse⁶. He divided his force into three companies which lost touch at the critical moment. The main body was surrounded and cut to pieces; the other divisions played a small part in the engagement and saved themselves by flight (30th

¹ I.A. two months; Fulcher iii. 2 almost 3 months.

² I.A. i. 784. Cf. p. 62.

³ These events are related by I.A. i. 315 f. and Sibḡ iii. 560 f. Fulcher iii. 2 describes the situation in Ascalon.

⁴ Sibḡ iii. 560, Kem. iii. 615, 617. Kem. says the meeting took place at the castle of Dawsar which the Recueil editor identifies with Ja'har. Sibḡ iii. 560 says Iḡāzī came to Damascus, but under A.H. 513 a duplicate account speaks of ʿUḡtakin going to Aleppo (iii. 561). It would appear from I.A. i. 315 f. and Sibḡ 560 f. that ʿUḡtakin was in the south during part of the time of the Latin invasion and left his territory while it was actually in progress. More probably he started north before the invasion commenced.

⁵ If Kem. iii. 614 refers to this event (as the Recueil editor supposes).

⁶ Albert xii. 31. I.A. says 200 horsemen.

March 1119)¹. When Baldwin II heard the news he prepared to retaliate. He accepted, however, a sum of money and pledged himself to leave the flocks of the Arabs henceforth undisturbed². Possibly he still intended to attack the territories of Damascus³. But the death of Roger of Antioch on the 28th of June and the demands which the situation in the north made on Baldwin's attention put an end to any such intentions. In the autumn Joscelin himself left Tiberias to become lord of Edessa⁴.

The Latin conquest of southern Syria and the establishment in Palestine of a well-compacted Latin state were the work of Baldwin I more than of any other individual. Only the very first steps towards this end had been taken before he came to the throne in the year after the fall of Jerusalem (1100 A.D.). His reign is made illustrious by the capture of a goodly series of Moslem towns and much of the credit is deservedly his own. His resources were never very great but he knew how to use them to the utmost advantage. He was conspicuous for personal valour and made his mark as a fighting king. But the creation of a stable government in the newly-founded state was also largely his achievement. It was his determination and, indeed, his high-handed treatment of opponents that shattered the project of an ecclesiastical or papal state in Palestine. Yet everyone deplored his loss, when he was laid to rest beside his brother Godfrey in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

¹ Easter Sunday (Albert). I.A. i. 323 relates the history under A.D. 513 which commences on the 14th April 1119. Albert's account is followed in the text. I.A. says that Joscelin and his division of the force lost their way and did not take part in the attack at all. On the same day 700 pilgrims going down from Jerusalem to the Jordan were attacked by Moslems from Tyre and Ascalon. Three hundred were slain and 60 taken prisoners (Albert xii. 33).

² Albert xii. 32.

³ Fulcher lii. 4. The reference may simply be to Baldwin's projected expedition against the Arabs which Albert says went as far as Baisan. If so two months elapsed between Joscelin's defeat and the king's advance to Baisan. But the situation in June would account for the abandonment of the proposed expedition more plausibly than Albert's vague charges do.

⁴ He joined Baldwin sometime after August 14th (p. 106, n. 2). I.A. i. 326 mentions an attack by Joscelin on Ascalon with the assistance of troops from Tripolis sometime after his defeat in the Hauran and so presumably in the summer of 1119.

CHAPTER II.

ANTIOCH AND EDESSA; MOSLEM REACTION DOWN TO A.D. 1127.

EDESSA was the farthest north of the Latin princedoms. The circumstances of Baldwin's settlement there have been described in chapter I. It was in March 1098 that he became lord of Edessa. Soon afterwards he secured possession of Samsat (Samosata) and of Saruj¹, both situated close at hand, to the north and southwest respectively. The occupation of Samsat brought Baldwin nearer to Constantine of Karkar, one of the most friendly of his Armenian allies. Their alliance was cemented and Baldwin's territory extended by his subsequent marriage to a niece of Constantine². The only serious menace to the Latin occupation was in May 1098 when the army of Kerboğa of Moşul passed through the district. He came at the beginning of harvest and spent some weeks ravaging the country during this vulnerable season. Edessa itself was invested for three days³. After the defeat of Kerboğa's army⁴, while the headquarters of the crusading army were at Antioch, Baldwin received considerable assistance from Godfrey and others of the Latin chiefs. His inclination to favour these western allies roused dissatisfaction amongst the Armenians and already there were signs that the lordship of the Latins would not permanently

¹ Albert iii. 24-25.

² Albert iii. 31.

³ Albert iv. 11-12. Fulcher i. 11 makes Kerboğa's army remain in the province for 3 weeks. Mt. Ed. i. 39 implies a stay of 40 days.

⁴ See chap. I, p. 27 f.

satisfy even the population which at first welcomed them as deliverers¹. In 1099² famine severely afflicted the inhabitants of the province. In November of that year Baldwin left Edessa to visit Jerusalem and was absent from his principedom for about three months. When he himself succeeded Godfrey in Jerusalem his nephew Baldwin II became ruler of Edessa (October 1100). Not long afterwards Sukman of Maridin attacked Saruj (January-February 1101)³. Sukman's nephew Balak had been its ruler previous to the Latin occupation⁴. Baldwin attempted to raise the siege and was defeated. He escaped to Edessa and then set out for Antioch to get assistance. He returned with 600 horse and 700 foot under his command, and with these troops drove away the Moslems from Saruj, about a month from the date of his previous attempt. The fact that he had now to storm the city in order to gain an entrance is significant of the relations between himself and the Armenian population⁵. In 1101 or 1102⁶, apparently, Joscelin of Courtenay settled in western Edessa as Baldwin's vassal. He shared the government of the country with Baldwin. His residence was Tell bashir and his fief extended over a large part of Euphratesia.

The district so occupied and ruled was bounded on the north and west by the ranges of the Taurus mountains which separated the Latins from the Moslems of Asia Minor⁷. Its southern limits were defined by the territories of Antioch and Aleppo. The

¹ Albert v. 15-17. Cf. chap. I, p. 23, n. 3.

² The year ending 23rd February 1100 (Mt. Ed. i. 49).

³ Rabi' i 493, commencing 18th January 1101 (Abu Ya'la quoted Sib' ill. 523). According to I.A. i. 208 Sukman assembled his troops in Saruj to attack the Latins; he was defeated and the city captured (Rabi' i 494).

⁴ I.A. i. 217. Albert iii. 23 has Balas for Balak. Kerr. ill. 523 under A.H. 489 (A.D. 1096) calls Sukman its ruler. I.A. i. 198 says that Sukman established himself in the town of Edessa after he left Jerusalem. The Keeneil editor would substitute Saruj for Edessa.

⁵ Mt. Ed. i. 53 f.

⁶ Tyre x. 24 without a definite date. Any time from the end of 1100 to the beginning of 1103 is permitted by the context.

⁷ Mar'ash seems at first to have remained independent of the Latins. There is scarcely room, however, for Bohemond's unsuccessful attack upon it in 1100 before his capture as related by Mt. Ed. i. 50 f. Possibly its assailant about this time was Baldwin of Edessa or the reference may only be to Bohemond's presence in the neighbourhood when on his way towards Mal'liya. Regarding the capture of Mar'ash by the Greeks in 1100, see p. 76, n. 4.

town of Edessa stood nearly on the eastern border of the principedom. The Armenian population ended here and with it the Latin suzerainty. The nearest Moslem emirate on this side was that of the Ortoks on the upper reaches of the Tigris. To the east and northeast Sulḡman ibn Ortok, before his death in 1105, ruled Maridin, Hiṣn kaifa, Niṣibin and Diyar bckr. The Latins made no conquests at the expense of their Moslem neighbours. Even H̄arran, within an easy day's march south of Edessa, was always independent of the "lords of Edessa and Saruj." The fact is explained by the character of the Latin occupation. Where the population was friendly the Latins garrisoned the towns and castles of the country. But they were few in number and too weak for aggressive wars. Western immigrants added little, numerically, to the growth of settlements so far away from Jerusalem. It is the relation of Edessa to Antioch that gives it importance in the history of the Latin colonies. Edessa was the shield of Antioch against the Moslems of Mesopotamia and its natural ally against Aleppo. Little is recorded of its separate history and no attempt is made in this volume to follow it further. The main thread of the history of the north lies in Antioch.

Bohemond was the founder and first prince of the Latin state of Antioch. He made the Normans the ruling power in northern Syria and so created an independent principedom for himself. The whole character of the Latin occupation was influenced by his action and example. But his personal share in the development was small, for the period of his government was short. The first stage of the enterprise which he undertook when he joined the crusade had been accomplished by the commencement of 1099. The most important town in Syria was his capital. From the walls of Antioch he commanded a country which promised him a fair inheritance. Already not a few of the towns and castles east of Antioch were in the possession of his soldiers. His position was acknowledged by the chiefs of the crusading army and so far his footing was secure. But these achievements were only the first steps in the founding of his principedom. Neither the extent nor the limits of Latin power were marked as yet by definite borders. Even

within his sphere of influence Bohemond was not supreme. There were Moslem garrisons unsubdued and a Moslem population ready to revolt at the earliest opportunity. The task of establishing a Latin principality in northern Syria was also complicated by the rivalry of the emperor Alexius. He was determined to enforce the historic claims of the Greek empire by every means in his power. Following in the track of the first crusade his armies had recovered much of Asia Minor and had brought the borders of the empire near to Syria. In 1099 or 1100 the Cilician towns which Tancred had conquered were occupied by the Greeks¹. Laodicea was theirs already and Bohemond vainly attempted to wrest it from them². For a time he may have thought it possible to ignore their advance while he sought to strengthen his position at the expense of Aleppo. But the menace in his rear was too serious to be ignored; Antioch itself was unsafe and a struggle with the empire was inevitable. Finally the pressure of these facts determined Bohemond to leave Syria and to return to Europe in the autumn of 1104.

In northern Syria Aleppo was the principal Moslem town and therefore the chief rival of the Latins of Antioch. It lay between Antioch and Edessa, directly to the south of Euphratesia, or the country of Joscelyn. The first dependencies of Antioch were west and south of Aleppo in districts which had been subject to Ruḍwan. In the spring of 1100 Bohemond led his forces in this direction. The crops were destroyed in the fields round Famiya and the city was harassed for several days (May)³. Early in June⁴ Ruḍwan advanced to the rescue. After spending some days beside Atharib he marched to Kella. There he was attacked and defeated and 500 of his men were taken prisoners (5th July 1100). Immediately afterwards Kafr Haleb and the castle of Ḥaḍir were captured by the Latins⁵.

¹ *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 143; the date is vaguely defined as previous to Bohemond's capture (July 1100).

² See chap. I, p. 51.

³ *Rajah* 493 which ends on the 9th of June (C.A. I. 104). Assuming Ruḍwan's advance to have followed this attack, the attack may be placed at the end of May.

⁴ Last days of *Rajah* (Kem. iii. 588).

⁵ The particulars from Kem. iii. 588. Kella has not been identified.

Encouraged by these events Bohemond began to prepare for the siege of Aleppo¹. Stores were collected and a Latin army assembled at El-mushrifā on the southern side of the town. A day or two later Bohemond's plans were completely changed. A messenger came from Gabriel the Armenian governor of Malaṭiya announcing that he was attacked by a Moslem emir, Kumushtakin ibn Danishmend, and offering possession of the town in return for help. With 300 horsemen Bohemond started at once for Malaṭiya. It was a disastrous undertaking. On the road, near Mar'ash, he was intercepted and made prisoner by Ibn Danishmend. When Baldwin of Edessa heard the news he made an attempt to rescue him. But Kumushtakin retreated beyond Malaṭiya and Baldwin was too weak to maintain the pursuit. He left 50 soldiers to strengthen the garrison of Malaṭiya and returned to Edessa².

It was just after this³, in the latter part of July, that news of Godfrey's death reached the north. Had Bohemond been at liberty he would have attempted no doubt to secure the throne of Jerusalem. It is not however certain, as has been supposed, that his success would have involved the union of all Syria in one Latin principedom. Nor is it clear in what way the conflict in the north between Antioch and Aleppo would have been influenced by Bohemond's departure south. Probably his mischance affected more his personal history than the wider

¹ Kem. iii. 589 wrongly prefers A.D. 995 but mentions that there is authority for an earlier date. He also says that Tancred was Bohemond's ally, which is impossible in July 1100.

² Fulcher i. 23, Albert vii. 27-29. The strength of Bohemond's force is uncertain (I.A. i. 203 = 5000 men; Albert = 300 *militēs* against 500 Moslems). Baldwin's rescue force included 140 *equites*. Kem. iii. 589 puts the defeat in the district of Mar'ash. Malaṭiya was captured by Kumushtakin in September 1101 or 1102 (Barhebr. 290); after his death (2 years later?) it was seized by Kilij Arslan (Barhebr. 293, Michael i. 330; cf. Mt. Ed. i. 74). In 1109 it seems again to have been Gabriel's (Tyre xi. 11). Baldwin II married Gabriel's daughter between 1100 and 1103 (Tyre x. 24; cf. xl. 11 and xii. 4).

³ Bohemond's capture may be dated about the middle of July before the news of Godfrey's death (18th July) reached the north. Gesta Tancredi, ch. 142 says Godfrey died shortly after Bohemond's capture, "capto mox Boamundo," which accordingly would be previous to the 18th. Fulcher puts Bohemond's expedition in July in agreement with this, Albert in August, I.A. in Dhul-ka'da 493, which commences on September 7th. Regarding an alleged attack of Bohemond on Mar'ash, see p. 70, n. 7.

issues which were at stake. The controlling elements of the situation were stronger than the influence of any one individual.

Overtures for Bohemond's ransom soon reached Kumushtakin from several quarters. Alexius was anxious to secure possession of such a dangerous enemy and offered large sums for his surrender. The Armenian prince Basil kogh of Kaişun and Baldwin II, the new ruler of Edessa, exerted themselves with more disinterestedness on behalf of the captive¹. A year and a half passed before the negotiations came to a successful termination. Kumushtakin accepted the lesser ransom which was offered by Bohemond's friends. He was influenced by the desire of obtaining an ally against his rival Kilij Arslan. Bohemond was released shortly before Easter of the year 1103², along with his nephew Richard, who had been captured at the same time as himself.

During the greater part of Bohemond's captivity Tancred ruled in Antioch. The decision to invite him north was easily come to. As Bohemond's nephew and the conqueror of Cilicia he had a double claim to the vacant post. But Tancred was embarked on a career of his own in Palestine and hesitated to sacrifice the opportunities which Godfrey's death presented to him there. It was only after he was compelled to submit to Baldwin's authority in the south that he preferred the prospects that were open to him in Antioch (spring 1101). Throughout the autumn and winter the presence of a Genoese fleet had been a security to the town and the occasion of some operations against the Moslems³. But neither at this time nor after Tancred's arrival was there much danger of attack from the other side. When the Latins retired from El-mushrifā, Rudwan

¹ Mt. Ed. i. 69 f. gives the credit of the release to Basil. *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 147 names Baldwin. It appears to be implied that Tancred was lukewarm in the matter. Regarding the friendship of Bohemond and Basil see chap. I, p. 23, n. 3.

² News reached Jerusalem about Easter, i.e. March 29th (Fulcher ii. 22). I.A. relates the event before the death of Jennh ed-daula (1st May 1103). Romenald of Salerno (Muratori vii. 178) dates in A.D. 1101, i.e. before 25th March 1103 if he begins his year as was usual then in southern Italy. The context of Tyre x. 25 favours 1103 but he makes the imprisonment last four years and is quoted by Wilken in favour of 1104. Albert ix. 38 apparently has May 1104, but his language is obscure (cf. Kugler, Albert 335) and in ix. 36 he says Bohemond was a prisoner for two years.

³ Mt. Ed. i. 70.

⁴ Caffarus, *Annales*.

seized the stores accumulated there. Immediately afterwards he was attacked and defeated by Jenāḥ ed-daula of Ḥomṣ and compelled to stand on the defensive against him¹. Instead of combining their forces against Antioch the Moslem emirs quarrelled with one another. During 1101 Asia Minor was invaded by the hosts of a "second crusade" which foolishly endeavoured to rescue Bohemond on its way to Palestine. Three separate armies, one after another, were routed and dispersed by the forces of several confederate emirs. Only fragments of the expedition reached Syria and its influence on the history of the Latin states was insignificant. For a time these events occupied Ruḍwan's attention and he appears to have joined in the repulse of the invaders². His quarrels with Jenāḥ ed-daula of Ḥomṣ also continued. Ruḍwan favoured the Persian sect of "Esoterics" (Batanians) who were extending their influence in northern Syria. They based their power on the systematic practice of assassination and being known also as Assassins³ gave that word its present meaning. Ruḍwan's patronage of the sect was a cause of estrangement between him and his Moslem neighbours. He remained at enmity with Jenāḥ ed-daula until the assassination of that emir in May 1103. Naturally Ruḍwan was suspected of complicity in the deed. But Ḥomṣ became a dependency of Damascus⁴.

Tancred meantime devoted himself chiefly to war with the Greeks. Baldwin of Edessa does not seem to have welcomed his arrival⁵, and this made the relations of the two princes unfriendly from the first. Without the co-operation of Edessa it was natural that operations against Aleppo should pause⁶. Besides no attempt had yet been made to check the course of Greek aggression. In 1101 Tancred recovered the Cilician towns which had been lost in the preceding year. Then he proceeded to attack Laodicea. The siege was prolonged for a

¹ Kem. iii. 589 f.

² Albert viii. 13.

³ Originally applied to them as users of *hashish*, an intoxicating drug.

⁴ Kem. iii. 390 f.

⁵ Gesta Tancredi, ch. 143.

⁶ Gesta Tancredi, ch. 145 contains a general reference to Tancred's war with the "Turks"; but the name of the enemy is not given nor is it stated which side was the aggressor.

year and a half, although Tancred himself was not present in person during all that time. Once Raymond attempted to interfere but without success¹. In September 1102 when Baldwin I was hard pressed in the south Tancred and Baldwin of Edessa made a joint expedition to his relief. Early in 1103, after Tancred's return, a notable success was gained. A large part of the garrison of Laodicea sallied out against the besiegers and was cut off. Shortly afterwards the town surrendered². Tancred's victories of course provoked reprisals. The Italian fleets whose help was of such vital consequence to the welfare of the Latin colonies were pursued and attacked by Greek squadrons³. In the summer of 1103 an army was sent by land to recover Cilicia. But the Armenians were still faithful and the campaign was fruitless⁴.

Bohemond's release put fresh life into the Moslem war. His policy was to attack the lands between Antioch and Edessa in alliance with Baldwin II. The northern states were thus united in one enterprise advantageous to both. It was also part of Bohemond's purpose to isolate Aleppo from Mesopotamia by the conquest of Harran and the districts south of Edessa. This was the issue at stake in the campaign of 1104. It is not surprising that such far-reaching plans united in some degree the Moslem opposition. At the end of 1103, when the activity of the Latins had become apparent, Jakarmish of Mosul and Sukman of Maridin laid aside their feuds and prepared to take the field next spring. A most fortunate Moslem victory secured the safety of the territories which were in jeopardy and indirectly brought Bohemond's career in Syria to its conclusion.

In the summer of 1103 Bohemond and Baldwin attacked El-muslimiya, raided the territories of Aleppo and imposed

¹ *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 145; cf. *Anna*.

² *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 146.

³ In April a Pisan fleet was pursued and attacked (*Anna* l. 78 ff.). In the spring of 1104 a Genoese fleet was pursued (*Anna* l. 85 f.).

⁴ Only part of the army entered Cilicia; finding the Armenians in league with Tancred the leader passed on to Mar'ash, "Maresis," and occupied the castle there and the neighbouring towns and villages (*Anna* l. 78). Mar'ash was surrendered by the Greeks to Joscelin before his capture in May 1104 (*Mt. Ed.* l. 75) but was again in their possession previous to 1117 (p. 103, n. 2).

contributions on the districts through which they passed. Rudwan purchased peace by a payment of 7000 pieces of gold and a present of 10 horses. The Latins released their prisoners with the exception of those taken at El-muslimiya¹. Tribute was imposed on the districts of El-'awāsim and Ḳinnesrin². In November the troops of Edessa made a successful expedition against Raḳḳa and Ja'bar³. It was in this direction that the Latins intended to strike next year. Baldwin's raid against the territories of Maridin in this same year⁴ was no part of the general plan. But the capture of Baṣarfut at the end of March 1104, by the troops of Edessa⁵, helped to secure the road between Antioch and Edessa and was a preliminary to the following campaign.

In the spring of 1104 the allies laid siege to Harran⁶. Very soon news came that a Moslem army was approaching and the Latins marched out to meet them. A battle was fought two days later. The first division of the Latin army, under Baldwin and Joscelin, was routed and its leaders captured. The rear division under Bohemond and Tancred took no part in the engagement. They were pursued, however, as they retreated and lost severely at the crossing of the river Balikh (May 1104)⁷. The fugitives rallied in Edessa, where the citizens were greatly alarmed at the news of Baldwin's capture. Bohemond returned to Antioch but Tancred remained to protect and govern the province. Eight days later Jakarmish appeared and encamped against the city. Messengers were sent to Antioch asking help. The siege lasted only fifteen days. Tancred sallied out one

¹ Kem. iii. 591 under A.H. 496 which ends 4th October 1103.

² I.A. i. 212 (soon after Bohemond's release).

³ I.A. i. 217 ff. (Ḥafas 497, commences 4th November). Abu'l-meḥasin iii. 488 mentions this expedition and the one following against Harran both under the date "commencement of 497." The Recueil text seems to be in confusion; incidents of the expedition against Harran are related as if they occurred during the expedition against Raḳḳa.

⁴ Mt. Ed. i. 70 in the year 24th February 1103—23rd February 1104.

⁵ On the last day of Jumada ii 497=29th March 1104 (Cod. arab. Quatremère as given by Kugler, Boemund 68, note 53). Cf. Kem. iii. 591 f.

⁶ Both Albert ix. 38 and the Gesta Tancredi, ch. 148 represent the expedition as due to a Moslem attack on Edessa.

⁷ The narrative follows Mt. Ed. i. 71 ff.; similarly I.A. i. 221 ff. Cf. also Abu'l-meḥasin iii. 494. Sibṭ iii. 527 is very vague but supplies the date of the battle, Sha'ban 497.

morning before daylight and surprised the besiegers in their camp. The Moslems were driven away in headlong flight and their rout was completed by Bohemond, who arrived opportunely at this very moment¹. In Edessa all danger was now past.

It was otherwise in Antioch. The recent defeat had revealed in a most startling manner the insecurity of the tenure by which the Latins held their possessions there. The Greeks used the opportunity to attack Laidicea and the seaports on the coast towards Tripolis; throughout the country the Moslem population watched every movement of the Latin garrisons; even the Armenians who had welcomed the Latins as deliverers were ready to transfer their allegiance to Rudwan of Aleppo. Antioch was crowded with fugitives from the outlying towns and many surrendered in panic to the Moslems on the assurance that their lives would be spared². It is not easy to estimate the number of the Latin strongholds which actually changed hands. The Armenian inhabitants of Artah admitted Rudwan's soldiers to the town³ and no doubt there were other similar cases in which the Moslems gained the upper hand without striking a blow⁴. Still the opportunity for such changes was brief and Rudwan was not the man to use it to the best advantage. He raided the country as far as the iron bridge over the Orontes on the way to Antioch⁵. But there was no attempt on his part at serious operations either before or after Bohemond's return. Schemes for the occupation of Damascus attracted him more than war with the Latins⁶. Bohemond might easily have restored confidence and retrieved the situation had Rudwan been his only enemy. It was the perpetual hostility of the Greek empire which threatened him with ruin.

¹ Particulars chiefly from Albert ix. 38-46. The account of the *Gesta Tancredi* is also full. I.A. i. 123 says the length of the siege was 15 days.

² Kem. iii. 592.

³ Kem. iii. 593, Sib. iii. 519; cf. *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 151.

⁴ Kem. iii. 593 gives a list too extensive to be reliable. It is suspicious that the record of the recovery which must have followed if they were really lost is so limited (cf. p. 81, n. 3).

⁵ *Gesta Tancredi*, ch. 151 ("pontem Farfar"). Albert ix. 47 probably contains a reference to this invasion and not to another before the battle of Artah in 1105.

⁶ His brother Duḡak of Damascus died in June (Kem. iii. 593). It may have been in consequence of this that Hama became a dependency of Aleppo (Kem. iii. 592). But Tughtakin retained Damascus.

The exact date of the Greek invasion in the spring of 1104 does not seem to be ascertainable. It began with a casual attack on Laodicea by Kantakouzenos. He had just been pursuing a Genoese fleet without success and probably learned that the opportunity was favourable for an attack on Laodicea¹. The harbour was captured at the first assault and the town was occupied apparently without resistance. The citadel continued in possession of its garrison, a force of 600 men. When the emperor learned what the position of affairs was he sent an army overland to co-operate with the fleet. As it marched through Cilicia on its way the Latin garrisons were expelled by the inhabitants of the Cilician towns and the Greeks were received with open arms². Before it reached Laodicea Kantakouzenos had gained several seaports in the direction of Tripolis. The date of the capture of the citadel is unknown. It still held out when Bohemond returned from Edessa, for he provisioned it afresh and changed its garrison. Probably its capture influenced his decision to leave Antioch at the end of summer. He recognised that his forces were unequal to the conflict which the fatal enmity of Greece imposed. He summoned Tancred to Antioch and informed him that he had decided to leave the principedom in his hands while he himself sailed to Europe to raise fresh forces. He left Syria at the close of summer³, never to return. In France and elsewhere his appeals for help met with an enthusiastic response. Having gathered a large army he resolved to attack his arch enemy Alexius in Europe. In the latter part of 1107 he laid siege to Durazzo. The attempt to strike a decisive blow in this direction proved a failure. Within a year he was compelled to accept the terms dictated to him by the emperor. He acknowledged Alexius' title to all his Syrian possessions and swore to be his faithful vassal

¹ Anna i. 86 ff. As this is the fleet which took part in the sieges of Jubail and 'Akka (May 6-16) the date is probably in the month of April. The decision of the admiral to attack Laodicea may have been due to his knowledge of Bohemond's absence rather than to the news of the disaster near Hâran.

² Gesta Tancredi, ch. 131.

³ Fulcher ii. 25. Romoald vii. 178 says he arrived in Apulia in December 1103 (read December 1104) for which the chronicle of Bari in Muratori v. 155 gives January 1105.

(September 1108)¹. The remaining years of his life were spent in the vain effort to raise another army. He died in the year 1111. So passed away the ablest of the Latin princes and the most notable figure in the first crusade. It is tempting to imagine that had he remained in Syria until his death he would have guided the fortunes of Antioch so that it would have prospered and grown to something greater than it ever became. In correction of such a view it is to be remembered that Bohemond's attack on the empire in Europe, although itself a failure, contributed much to the security which Tancred enjoyed throughout his career as ruler and builder up of Antioch. It has been argued that Bohemond need not have wasted his strength in Europe and should have led his forces back with him to Syria in 1107. But it may be doubted if such a policy would have succeeded better than that which he adopted. The conquest of Aleppo would certainly have given the Norman principedom a power and extent which it never had and would have cleared the way for the further conquest of all Syria by the Latins. But was it possible for Bohemond to accomplish this in 1107? The power of Aleppo was much greater for resistance than for attack, and its neighbours would never have left it to its fate without some assistance. But above all the struggle with Greece was inevitable. If not in Europe, it had still to be fought in Cilicia or Syria, and without any prospect of more success. The claims of the empire demanded their victim and it was Bohemond's hard fate to supply it.

Rudwan of Aleppo was not an enemy from whom Tancred had much to fear. He does not appear to have realised at all adequately the menace of the situation which was created by the presence of the Latins in Syria. He treated them as he might have treated any Turkish emirate newly established in his neighbourhood. Love of war and the lust of conquest, characteristics then of his race, inspired him singularly little. When victories over the Latins were gained by others he was bold enough to venture a blow against them. But when he was attacked in return he submitted timorously or was disheartened by the issue of a single battle. His resources were probably

¹ Anna l. 186.

inadequate, but such as they were he showed neither energy nor capacity in the use of them. The flickering efforts which he made were easily extinguished. So Tancred found in 1105. In that year he opened his first campaign after Bohemond's departure. Ruḍwan was preparing to march to the relief of Tripolis¹ when he heard that Artah was besieged. He led his forces against the Latins and was decisively defeated in the neighbourhood of the castle (20th April 1105)². Artah was deserted by its garrison and Tancred took possession. When Ruḍwan shut himself up in Aleppo it was the turn of the Moslem population in the smaller towns to seek refuge along with him in their metropolis. For a time the Latins scoured the country and before the summer was over all the territory they had lost in the preceding year was again securely in their possession. Serious military operations may not have been required to accomplish this result³. In some cases, at least, it was enough simply to re-occupy the positions which had been evacuated, and the more important castles, whatever they were, may have been secured by treaty rather than by capture. Ruḍwan must have sued for peace and been granted it on Tancred's terms. What these were is nowhere explicitly stated. But the continuance of peace during the next five years almost certainly implies that Ruḍwan was Tancred's submissive tributary during all that time. The Latin prince was at liberty to extend his borders by the conquest of the castles and petty towns which were ruled by the independent emirs of northern Syria. The wars which Ruḍwan waged were in Mesopotamia with Moslem emirs⁴.

¹ Rajah 498, ending 17th April (Sibt iii. 519); Kem. iii. 593, where the translation wrongly implies that Ruḍwan went to the help of Tripolis.

² 3 Sha'ban, Kem. iii. 593; Fulcher ii. 29, April. Albert ix. 49 and Fulcher ii. 29 write as if the attack came from Ruḍwan's side. Probably they confuse the invasion of 1104 with the events of this year. The Arabic sources are here followed (I.A. i. 127 f.).

³ Kem. is not very explicit in his statements about Tancred's operations after the battle of Artah and gives no further dates. Kugler, Boernund 71, note 6 quotes Cod. arab. Quentremère regarding his capture in Dhul-hijja 498 (commences 14th August 1105) of "Tell Ada" [Tell aḡḡi], "Latmlr" and "Suran."

⁴ In May 1106 he was the ally of Suḡman's brother and successor Iḡazi ibn Ortoḡ at the siege of Niḡblin. During 1107 he was the ally of Jawāl in his attack on Jakarmiāl.

In 1106 Tancred's principal achievement was the siege and capture of Famiya¹. Khalaf ibn Mula'ib, its emir, was assassinated on the 3rd of February². The instigator of the murder was a former *qaḍi* of Sarmin, Abu 'l-faṭḥ³, and his purpose was to gain possession of the town. The Christian inhabitants were numerous and they invited Tancred's intervention. He invested the town for three weeks without success and then withdrew. After Easter he returned with siege appliances and stronger forces. Two sons of the late emir joined him to avenge their father's death. Finally in August, according to one account, or on the 14th of September, according to another⁴, the town was starved into surrender. The fate of the *qaḍi* is uncertain⁵. Khalaf's sons were given fiefs in the neighbourhood. A line between Famiya and Kafr ṣab became the southern boundary of the possessions of Antioch. Eastwards they extended to Atharib⁶.

During Bohemond's attack on the western border of the Greek empire Tancred assailed its eastern frontier (1107-08). Alexius was compelled to withdraw part of the army of Cilicia in order to repel Bohemond's invasion in the west. This gave Tancred his opportunity. An army of Armenians and Latins was collected, siege engines were constructed and every possible preparation was made for the siege of the Cilician towns. It was in such warfare that Tancred specially excelled. His army invaded Cilicia by sea and land. Alexius' general was incompetent and the issue was never doubtful⁷. Probably after this campaign, in the early part of 1108, Laodicea was again captured from the Greeks. It, also, had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops

¹ A full account is given by Albert x. 17-23. Of the Arabic historians the fullest is I.A. i. 331 ff. He does not distinguish the two attacks on Famiya and he represents Tancred as instigated by one of Khalaf's sons. Cf. also Kem. iii. 594 f.

² 26th Jumādā i, I.M. iii. 466.

³ In Albert "Botherus."

⁴ Albert x. 21, August (in A.D. 1106 to judge from x. 17), I.A. before 3rd September 1106. Wm Tyre dates along with the capture of Laodicea which Albert x. 19 puts in this same year. 13th Muḥarram 500, 14th September 1106, is Kem.'s date (iii. 595). Well iii. 187 says that "western sources" give A.D. 1107.

⁵ I.A. and Kem. both say he was killed. Albert x. 22-23 expressly relates that he was spared and taken a prisoner to Antioch.

⁶ Kem.

⁷ Anna i. 100 ff. The date is uncertain; Anna's account follows immediately her narrative of Bohemond's departure (apparently in 1105). But Kantakouzenos, who was withdrawn from Cilicia to engage in war with Bohemond, did so only in 1108 (i. 142).

and a Pisan fleet gave Tancred the necessary assistance by sea¹. Tancred's Greek wars were now ended. The emperor sent ambassadors to Syria to explain his rights and to win Bertram and Baldwin to his cause². Tancred yielded nothing and treated the ambassadors with complete disdain. Alexius, however, had other wars to wage, and before the Greeks and Latins resumed their quarrel both he and his antagonist had passed away.

From 1105 to 1108 Edessa was nominally under Tancred's rule but really was governed by his brother-in-law, Bohemond's nephew Richard. Probably the western knights who lorded it over the population of the country were satisfied with the situation, but not so the unhappy Armenians, their subjects. The Latins were no protection against Moslem invaders and they were themselves a cruel scourge. According to the Armenian historian³ they robbed and oppressed their subjects and treated with contempt their religious rites and all their customs. The population decreased, the churches fell into ruin and the cultivation of the ground was neglected. Weak and timid as the Armenians appear to have been, such conduct began to drive them to revolt⁴. It was well for the Latins that the Moslems round about were so engrossed in civil strife. Jakarmish had to contend with a host of enemies, chief among them the sultan Mohammed himself. Even Kilij Arslan of Rum joined in the fray. In 1106 he attacked Harran. In 1107 he endeavoured to secure Mosul⁵. His career ended in August of that year when he was defeated by Jawali⁶ and drowned in his flight. Moslem attacks on Edessa in these circumstances were

¹ For evidence in favour of 1108 see Heyd l. 160 f. (French translation l. 145 f.), criticised by Kugler, *Albert* x. 19 dates in the early part of 1106.

² There were two embassies, one to Tancred (possibly in 1109) the other to Bertram and Baldwin (early in 1112). Anna l. 188 ff. appears to date the first embassy in the year following Bohemond's treaty with Alexius (1108) but she says it was sent after Bohemond's death which occurred in 1111. Bertram was no friend of Tancred's and promised to help Alexius if he invaded Syria. Pons succeeded his father Bertram before the ambassadors returned home and swore allegiance to the emperor. Baldwin of Jerusalem would not acknowledge Alexius' claims.

³ *Mt. Ed.* l. 80 f.

⁴ In 1105 the population of Abiastha revolted (*Mt. Ed.* l. 79); in 1108 the Armenians of the town of Edessa were held guilty of treason by Baldwin (*Mt. Ed.*).

⁵ Barheh. 293 f.

⁶ Successor of Jakarmish in Mosul.

only incidental. In 1105 Jakarmish ravaged the country when the harvest was on the fields. Richard sallied out against him but was driven back with loss. Among the most significant events of 1106 and 1107 are Kilij Arslan's fearless marches across the territories of Edessa¹. The power of the Latins, in fact, extended no further than the walls of their fortified towns. When the Turks attacked Basil the Armenian (1107) he defended himself without assistance from Antioch or Edessa². To the west of Edessa purely Armenian princes were establishing states of their own.

During all these years Baldwin and Joscelin were prisoners, first of Jakarmish, then of Jawali. Tancred took no trouble to secure their deliverance, his enemies said that he put obstacles in the way. Finally in 1108 the course of events in Mosul led to their release. Jawali incurred the sultan's displeasure and was suspected of disloyalty. Mandud, Muhammed's brother, was sent with an army to reduce him to obedience. Jawali fortified Mosul, left it in charge of his wife, who was a daughter or sister of Bursuk of Hamadan³, and set off to gain allies and create a diversion outside the city. He took Baldwin and Joscelin with him and shortly afterwards released them. The terms on which he did so speak for themselves. The Latin princes were required to pay a ransom, to liberate their Moslem prisoners and to give Jawali help whenever danger threatened his person, his army or his possessions. They were set at liberty about the middle of August 1108⁴.

A rare opportunity now presented itself for striking a blow at the Moslems on the borders of Edessa. The siege of Mosul was

¹ According to *MT. Ed.* i. 81 he invested the town of Edessa itself for some days in 1106.

² In the year commencing 27th February 1107 (*MT. Ed.* i. 83 f.).

³ I.A. says daughter, Barheba sister.

⁴ The particulars of this paragraph are from I.A. i. 258 ff. Joscelin was released before Baldwin but went back to captivity as a hostage when Baldwin was set free and so was released a second time shortly afterwards (I.A. i. 261 and *MT. Ed.*). The date is determined by the fact that Fakhr el-mulk's visit to Jawali (I.A. i. 264 f.) was after the release of the princes (i. 263) and not later than the middle of Muharram (26th August) when he left Mesopotamia (i. 256). It may also be determined on the supposition that Jawali left Mosul not long before the siege commenced (ii. 85, n. 1) and that he released his prisoners perhaps a week later.

in progress¹. Jawali and his friends looked to the Latins for assistance. If Tancred were well disposed and joined his forces to those of Edessa much could be accomplished. But Tancred would not lay aside his enmity to Baldwin, and would not even permit his quiet restoration to his old possessions. Baldwin and Joscelin made their headquarters at Tell bashir and there Tancred hurried to attack them. Some time was spent in negotiations and indecisive skirmishing². Basil kogh sent reinforcements to the camp of the rightful claimants and Jawali also came to their assistance³. On Tancred's side were the forces of Ruḍwan of Aleppo whom Jawali had recently provoked. A battle was fought in the neighbourhood of Tell bashir on the 18th of September⁴. Jawali defeated Tancred's infantry but the knights of Antioch swept the Latins of Edessa off the field and then Jawali's men took flight. As Tancred made no important captives the victory brought him no advantage. His opponents were too strong to be driven out of their possessions⁵ and a formal reconciliation was effected in the following year. But the golden opportunity had passed and seeds of fresh bitterness had been sown. Moṣul was captured before the battle of Tell bashir⁶ and Jawali prudently made peace with the sultan⁷.

¹ About the beginning of Muḥarram, 11th August (I.A. i. 259 Arabic text).

² I.A. i. 262, who says that Tancred returned to Antioch, that his territories were then invaded by Baldwin and Joscelin and that the battle of Tell bashir took place after this.

³ Jawali had 5000 horsemen and Basil sent 800 men besides a body of Greek mercenaries (Mt. Ed. i. 86). Tancred's forces are estimated at 1000 horsemen + infantry (Mt. i. 87) and also at 1500 horsemen + 600 of Ruḍwan's (Barhebr. 197, Syriac text 191). Albert x. 37 writes as if Jawali were not actually engaged in the battle and only threatened to intervene afterwards.

⁴ 9th Ṣafar, I.A. i. 263. The date agrees with the statement, i. 266, that the fall of Moṣul took place shortly before (cf. note 6), but not with the information that Jawali besieged Balis 13th-17th Ṣafar, before joining Baldwin (i. 265). Possibly the siege was from 3rd to 7th Ṣafar or else after the date of the battle.

⁵ Mt. Ed. i. 87 says Baldwin escaped to Rawandan and Joscelin to Tell bashir, Albert x. 37 that Baldwin escaped to Tuluppa (Duluk) where he was besieged for a time by Tancred.

⁶ I.A. i. 257 dates in Ṣafar, i.e. after 10th September. i. 259 supplies more exact data: the town was captured before the end of Muḥarram on a Friday (presumably on 4th September, the last Friday in Muḥarram), the citadel 8 days later (i.e. on the 12th September in agreement with L. 257).

⁷ The principal authority for this paragraph is I.A. It is to be observed that his narrative contains a duplicate account of these events. From the middle of i. 263 his

The history of the siege and capture of Tripolis during 1109 has been related in chapter I¹. Baldwin of Edessa, Joscelin and Tancred were all present. Bertram claimed that part of Antioch which Raymond had once possessed², so Tancred became a supporter of William of Cerdagne. When the rival claims were settled he gained an extension of territory by becoming William's overlord. Besides he received back his former Palestinian possessions, Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa. For them he swore allegiance to the king. The price of his gains was a formal resignation of all claims to Edessa³.

Tancred's policy now was to extend his possessions in the direction of Tripolis. He devoted himself to the task with energy and success. After the capture of Tripolis (12th July 1109) the services of the Genoese fleet enabled him to subdue two of the neighbouring coast-towns. Balanyas was occupied without resistance and Jabala surrendered the very day it was attacked (23rd July)⁴. Possibly the troops of Tancred had already harassed the latter town during the recent siege of Tripolis⁵. Fakhr el-mulk escaped to Damascus and settled there⁶. Throughout the following Moslem year, A.H. 503⁷, Tancred added to his conquests in the same region. He occupied Anjarfus which should have belonged to Bertram⁸ and Iḥṣān

history goes on from the point reached at the foot of p. 160 and repeats with fuller particulars as a part of Jawālī's history what has been already related as part of the history of Baldwin and Tancred. It may be assumed that this second account, i. 166 f., is in error in representing the quarrel of Jawālī and Rūḍwān as leading up to the battle of Tell Ḥashir. Barhebr. 296 ff. seems to draw on the same source as the second of I.A.'s narratives. (Well iii. 191 f. and Köbricht 71 f. have been misled into regarding these duplicate narratives as one continuous history.) The other sources are M. Ed. i. 86 f. and Albert x. 36-37. I.A.'s statement that Raḥḥa was besieged for 70 days (i. 164) is impossible; 7 days may be correct. Harlebraeus names Raḥḥa.

¹ p. 57.

² Albert xi. 5-6.

³ Albert xi. 12.

⁴ 22nd Dhū'l-ḥijja 502, Sibṭ iii. 536. I.A. i. 174 gives the same date but under A.H. 503 and with the name Jubāl for Jabala. In Abū'l-maḥasin iii. 490 12th Dhū'l-ḥijja is to be regarded as a textual error, seeing the 12th would be the day after the capture of Tripolis, and Banyas (Balanyas) was occupied in the interval (I.A. i. 174). Ibn Kh. iii. 456 gives the year 502 and the name Jubāl for Jabala.

⁵ Cod. arab. Quatremère (Kugler, Boemund 74, note 36) says it was besieged from the end of Shawāl (1st June) to the 22nd Dhū'l-ḥijja.

⁶ I.A. i. 174 f.

⁷ Commences 31st July 1109, ends 19th July 1110.

⁸ Albert x. 40 in A.D. 1111 speaks of it as already taken. It may be supposed that Sibṭ's reference to the capture of "Tarsus" in A.H. 503 should be understood of Anjarfus (iii. 539).

el-akrad was captured from the Moslems¹. Tuḡtakin had been assured that Ḥiṣn el-akrad and Maṣyaf should be left untouched, but that was presumably Bertram's promise and did not bind Tancred. Several attacks were made on Shaizar about this time and it also paid tribute to Antioch².

The year 1110 is a turning-point in the history of the Latin occupation. The European concert had thrown its armies on the shores of Syria and had established colonies all along the coast. Steadily the new settlements extended, occupying the intervals between them and gradually spreading inland. As the tide covers a rocky beach, advancing swiftly at one point, more slowly at another, leaving little islands behind in its general progress, surrounding rocks with its dashing waves before it has strength to cover them, so the Latins advanced in Syria. There was no organised opposition to their progress and no systematic war was waged against them. No spirit of national unity existed to inspire opposition to their conquests and as yet nothing had appeared to take its place. The year 1110 marks the beginning of a change; with it a period of Moslem reaction set in. Mesopotamia was the starting-point of the new movement. There the sultan and the caliph embodied the idea of Moslem unity and acknowledged an abstract responsibility for the welfare of the Moslem world. When Fakhr el-mulk of Tripolis in 1108 visited Baḡdad to implore the sultan's help he received a promise of assistance. In the winter of 1109, after the fall of Tripolis, he renewed his appeal². The bare facts of the situation in Syria spoke eloquently on their own behalf. The contest for the possession of Moṣul was at an end. Its gifted ruler Sharaf ed-daula Maudud was the leader whom the times demanded. With the sanction and encouragement of his brother, the sultan Moḥammed, he roused the faithful once again to engage in the Holy War. During the four brief years which remained of his life he never drew back from the task to which he thus devoted himself. And when he died he bequeathed a duty and example which were not forgotten. Hereditary ambition, religious duty, and hopes of conquest in Syria all inspired the emirs of the Mesopotamian towns to continue the work Maudud began.

¹ Sibṭ iii. 539.

² Sibṭ iii. 537 f.

The movement which overthrew the Latin states was initiated by this emir.

Preparations for Maudud's first campaign began in December 1109¹. He was joined by Ilgazi ibn Ortoğ of Maridin and others. It was agreed to attack the town of Edessa. In the month following the 23rd of April the siege commenced². Tancred of Antioch appears to have made no movement and the Latins of Jerusalem were Baldwin's only hope of succour. Their willing response was a good omen for the future. About the beginning of June Baldwin of Jerusalem set out in person for the north. He took with him 700 horsemen and 300 foot-soldiers and a month was spent on the road. Basil kogh and other Armenian chiefs joined the expedition as it advanced in the direction of Samsat³. The besieging army retired towards Harran, where it was reinforced by 'Jugtakin and the troops of Damascus⁴. On both sides such co-operation was something new. Even Tancred was persuaded to join the Latins with 1500 men, and made formal acknowledgment of his obligation to be loyal and faithful to the common cause⁵. At first the Latins advanced and the Moslems retired. But Tancred became suspicious of his allies and withdrew his troops to Samsat⁶. Then Baldwin decided to provision Edessa and to escort out of danger those of the inhabitants who chose to leave. A multitude of refugees from the town and the country put themselves under his protection. When the Euphrates was reached there were only a few boats and rafts to take them across. As they were being slowly ferried over, the Turkish army charged them in the rear. Most of the knights were already on the further side. Many foot-soldiers and a large number of the unfortunate refugees, men, women and children, chiefly Armenians, were

¹ Jumada I 503, Sily iii. 537 (Kecueli wrongly December 1108).

² Shawal, Sily iii. 540.

³ Mt. Ed. i. 92.

⁴ Kem. iii. 596; cf. Sily iii. 540.

⁵ Mt. Ed. makes Tancred join Baldwin on his way north; Albert's account, which is fuller, puts the junction of forces after the Moslem retreat; Fuicher ii. 41 is obscure. Albert relates that Baldwin of Edessa accused Tancred of instigating Maudud's invasion; Mt. Ed. charges Baldwin with having called Maudud to his help against Antioch.

⁶ Mt. Ed. i. 93.

drowned or killed or taken prisoners. Baldwin of Edessa was in the rear out of sight with 300 men. He was also attacked and the result was a second disaster. He narrowly escaped capture and a return to his Moslem prison-house. But troops from the main army, sent to his assistance, found him and escorted him safely into Edessa¹. After this Baldwin of Jerusalem and Tancred returned home. Baldwin ravaged the Biḡa' as he marched southward². The invasion of Edessa had lasted about 100 days and the whole province had suffered greatly³.

Six years previously the defeat of the Latins in Edessa had encouraged Ruḡwan to commence hostilities with Antioch. In 1110 he grasped eagerly at what seemed a similar opportunity. Regardless of his treaty obligations he invaded Tancred's territory. He secured considerable spoil and made a number of Armenian prisoners, chiefly peasantry it may be supposed. But when Tancred returned from Edessa in perfect safety and Ruḡwan heard the news he withdrew at once to Aleppo⁴. The Latins ravaged the districts through which they passed on their way back, and occupied En-naḡira, which was deserted by its inhabitants⁵. This was only a foretaste of more serious operations. A few miles to the west of Aleppo three fortresses, Artah, Atharib and Zaredna stretched in a chain from north to south. The security of Aleppo depended largely on their preservation. Artah was already in the hands of the Latins, the other two were now also captured⁶. Atharib was first attacked⁷.

¹ This last incident is related by Albert, whose general account is fullest (xi. 19-25). Fulcher ii. 41 and I.A. i. 281 mention the provisioning of Edessa, Mt. Ed. i. 93 and I.A. the flight of the refugees, Mt. Ed. and Fulcher their fate; Fulcher notes that they were Armenians. I.A. confuses the events of this year with those of 1111 (see p. 92, n. 1). Tyre xi. 7 gives what appears to be his account under A.D. 1108.

² Siliḡ iii. 540. He does not distinguish the crossing of the Euphrates by the Latins on their way to Edessa from their crossing of it on their homeward journey, and so omits all that lies between.

³ Mt. Ed. i. 92 (more probably the length of the invasion than the duration of the siege of Edessa).

⁴ As Ruḡwan began his movement after the disaster on the Euphrates (Kem. iii. 596) it does not account in any degree for Tancred's desertion of his allies.

⁵ Kem. iii. 596 f.; cf. I.A. i. 281.

⁶ Kem. iii. 597 f.; cf. I.A. i. 278.

⁷ Wilken and others identify this siege with that of Gerez related by Albert of Aix (xi. 43). The siege would then commence in October and end after Christmas. But Gerez seems to be 'Ezaz, which was besieged next year. The date of the siege of

The tremendous strokes of Tancred's battering ram rang in the defenders' ears long afterwards as they told the story of the siege. Rudwan negotiated in vain on behalf of the strictly invested castle. A carrier pigeon sent by the garrison with news of their desperate straits alighted in the besiegers' camp and its message assured Tancred of success. An attempt to mine the ground beneath the tents of the besiegers was betrayed, provisions ran short in the castle and the garrison, despairing of relief, accepted Tancred's terms. He granted them their lives and liberty (between 15th December 1110 and 12th January 1111)¹. After this success Zaredna proved an easy prey. Its capture² and that of Atharib made the situation of Aleppo critical in the extreme. Of Atharib Ibn al-athir says that it "held Aleppo by the throat". Panic fell on the population of all the smaller towns and villages that were still dependent on the Moslem capital. Mambij and Balis were deserted by their inhabitants and burned by Tancred's orders³. Rudwan sued for peace and by offering a large sum of money obtained a truce which was to last until the harvest season was past⁴. Tancred had meantime other plans to complete. He proceeded to the siege and capture of the castle of Bikhrayil which lay on the hills to the east of Jabala. It may be supposed that this is the castle which Albert of Aix names *Vetula*. If so the siege commenced about mid-February and lasted three months. When the destruction wrought by Tancred's engines had made the castle indefensible it was evacuated by its garrison.

Gerez is October 1111 (Albert xi. 43), after the operations beside Shalzar, and the name exactly corresponds to a simple misreading of the Arabic 'Ezaz. Kem. relates an attack on 'Ezaz at this very time (p. 93, n. 5). For the identification with Atharib it may be argued that Albert identifies Gerez with "*Sarepta Sklonorum*" and that other authors call Atharib "*Cerep*." There is however nothing improbable in the supposition that different authors should identify these ancient names differently. *Sarepta* is of course neither 'Ezaz nor Atharib.

¹ *Junada ii* [504], ending 12th January 1111 (Kem. iii. 598). I.A. i. 278 perhaps implies that the castle was stormed. The date at the beginning of Albert xi. 43 refers rather to the siege of "*Vetula*" than to the capture of "*Gerez*" as Köhricht 88, note 2 assumes. In either case however it is not the date of the capture of Atharib.

² I.A. i. 278. It appears to have belonged previously to the Latins in 1100 (Kem. iii. 588).

³ I.A. i. 278, Barhebr. 299.

⁴ I.A. i. 279, Kem. iii. 598. The duration of the truce is not given.

Tancred took possession and enforced his authority in the district round about¹. The crops were now being gathered in the fields round Aleppo, and Ruḍwan had not yet made good his recent promise. Tancred returned to Atharib and the threat of his presence at such a time secured prompt payment and submission to fresh demands, which may be regarded as the penalty of Ruḍwan's breach of faith². After this the Latin prince proceeded once more to Shaizar. He began to build a fortress on Tell ibn Ma'shar and he was still employed in its construction or rebuilding when news came that Maudud had laid siege to Tell bashir³ (end of June).

Maudud's campaign in 1110 had caused terror and dismay throughout Edessa but had not materially altered the situation there. In Syria from the Moslem point of view affairs were becoming worse; Tancred's power grew steadily and Aleppo lay almost at his mercy. Some who had suffered from his ravages betook themselves to Bagdad and stirred up excitement and religious zeal by describing the situation in Syria. On Fridays they interrupted the preachers in the mosques and clamoured that the armies of Islam should be sent against the Latins. There were riots which penetrated into the very palace of the caliph. The sultan urged his emirs to devote themselves to the holy war. He sent his son Mas'ud to act along with Maudud at the head of the army⁴. It was resolved to besiege Tell bashir. In May or June, before preparations were quite complete, Maudud attacked some Latin castles near Edessa. At Tell kurad the little garrison of 40 men surrendered and Maudud put them to the sword⁵. Some days were spent

¹ The particulars are from Albert xi. 45-47. Kem. iii. 599 mentions the capture of Bilgisrayil without particulars; its situation and the date of the siege justify its being identified with Albert's "Vetula." Wilken identifies "Vetula" with Zaredann and is followed by Kugler, Albert 381, and by Köhrich 83, note 3. Although the siege of Vetula is related after the siege of Gerex and is actually stated at the beginning of ch. 45 (in an interpolated sentence) to have followed it, the date is clearly in the beginning of 1111 and therefore before the siege of Gerex.

² Kem. iii. 598.

³ Kem. iii. 599 f. In Sibb's text, iii. 542, Tell bashir is obviously an error for Tell ibn Ma'shar.

⁴ I.A. I. 279 f., Kem. iii. 598 f.

⁵ Mt. Ed. i. 96, cf. Kem. iii. 599.

in the neighbourhood of Edessa¹. Then Tell bashir was invested. But Maudud's army contained too many conflicting elements. Discipline and harmony were unattainable. After 45 days² the siege was broken up. It was decided to invade Syria and invite the co-operation of Ruḡwan. But when the army reached Aleppo Ruḡwan was found to be suspicious of the allies and unwilling to break his recent agreement with Tancred. For 17 days³ the Moslems encamped in the neighbourhood of the town and ravaged the country "more cruelly than the Christians had done".⁴ Tuḡtakin of Damascus joined them at the head of a considerable force. His proposal that the army should move south and attack Tripolis kindled fresh disputes. It commended itself to the Syrian Moslems. In their eyes the deliverance of Syria was the very *raison d'être* of the expedition and the fall of Tripolis in 1109 its originating cause. On the other hand the Mesopotamian emirs had exhausted their energies, they saw no more prospect of success against Tripolis than against Tell bashir, and they were asked to advance further from their homes than others might reap an uncertain advantage. With the sole exception of Maudud⁵ they ranged themselves against Tuḡtakin's policy and quickly put an end to the prospects of a continued campaign in Syria. After a hesitating march to Ma'arat en-nu'man (beginning of September)⁶ a large part of the Moslem forces returned home. Only Maudud and Tuḡtakin remained together⁷. At the request of Abu'l-

¹ Mt. Ed. i. 96, Barhebr. 300. I.A. i. 281 f. may also refer to this attack. I.A. i. 280 f. gives under A.11. 505 what is his account of Maudud's campaign of A.11. 504 (A.11. 1110); Köhricht 90 uses it as if it were actually an authority for 1111 (A.11. 505).

² I.A. i. 282. Albert xi. 38 says two months, Fulcher II. 43 one month. Kem. iii. 599 actually says one of the emirs was bribed by Joscelin and that the capture of the town would otherwise have been made.

³ Kem. iii. 600.

⁴ Sibḡ iii. 542.

⁵ I.A., Atabeks ii. 33 f., represents the breaking up of the campaign as due to discord between Maudud and Tuḡtakin and to Tuḡtakin's action in making peace with the Latins; cf. Barhebr. 300. This is inconsistent with the representation of other sources, including I.A.'s Kamil (cf. p. 97, n. 1), according to which there was special friendship between Maudud and Tuḡtakin.

⁶ End of Šafir 505, ending 6th September (Kem. iii. 601). According to I.A. i. 282 it was here that Tuḡtakin joined the allies, but Kem. agrees with Sibḡ's quite explicit statement.

⁷ The movements of the Moslems up to this point are clearly related by Kem. iii. 599 f.; I.A. i. 281 ff. and Sibḡ iii. 542 supply useful supplements. Albert xi. 38 puts

'asakir ibn munkidh, emir of Shaizar, who feared a renewal of Tancred's operations against himself, Shaizar became the headquarters of the Moslem army. From the time the allies left Aleppo¹ Tancred had lain watching them at Er-ruj. He was joined there by Baldwin of Jerusalem and Bertram of Tripolis on the 10th of September. Next day the Latins marched to Famiya and there they mustered in full force. On the third day they advanced towards Shaizar². The Moslems were superior to the Latins in mobility and avoided a pitched battle. On their swift horses they encircled the Latin army and scoured the country round about. Their opponents suffered from scarcity of food and forage. On the fifteenth day the skirmishing was more serious than usual and the Moslems held the advantage. On the sixteenth day, which was the feast of St Michael the archangel, the Latins retired to their own territory (29th September). The Moslem army then dispersed and Tancred's allies returned home³.

Rudwan gained nothing by his refusal to join the Moslem invaders this summer. Without even dispersing his troops Tancred resumed his campaign of the previous year against the castles of Aleppo. In October he besieged 'Ezaz' and would not accept Rudwan's offer of twenty thousand pieces of gold which he was willing to pay if the Latins gave up their enterprise. Rudwan turned for help to Tuğtakin⁴, who was still

the dispersal of the Moslem force too early (just after the siege of Tell bashir). I.A. i. 182 f. states the exchange which were given by the emirs for returning home.

¹ The date of Tancred's arrival at Er-ruj is got by adding the five days he waited there for the king (Fulcher li. 43) to the 19 days which the following operations occupied (Albert xl. 41). Counting back from the 29th September this gives the beginning of September, the 5th or the 6th, and agrees closely with the date of p. 92, n. 6.

² Fulcher li. 43 and Albert xl. 38-41 (with the fullest account of the Latin movements). It may be assumed that Albert's "castellum de Girit" is Fulcher's Apamla (Famiya).

³ The date is from Albert xl. 41. There is the usual discrepancy between the sources regarding which party was the first to retire. It is unlikely that the Latins would leave their territory unprotected while the Moslems were still in force.

⁴ It is assumed that Albert's "Gerez" is 'Ezaz. See p. 89, n. 7.

⁵ Kem.'s text at this point in *Recueil* iii. 601 is not very clear and the translation does not appear to be quite adequate. Two other translations may be quoted for the sake of comparison:

"Il le [Tuğtakin] manda à Alep lorsqu'il voulut que Tancrede renonçât à exiger le

in Hama, and terms of alliance were arranged between the two emirs. But Tuğtakin did not fulfil his promises¹. The siege of Tyre commenced on the 30th of November and he departed to southern Syria², where his own special interests were at stake. 'Ezaz was left to its fate. Shortly after Christmas the castle keep became so ruined that it fell and brought down with it in its fall two neighbouring towers. The assailants fought with the defenders hand to hand through a breach in the wall, but the resistance of the garrison was still so formidable that Tancred agreed to grant them terms of surrender. The castle was given up to the Latins and the defenders withdrew in safety. It was Tancred's last conquest and it does not appear to have been maintained long after his death.

Next year (1112) was the year of Tancred's death, probably in December³. In the summer he waged war with Basil kogh and captured Ra'ban. The Armenian prince died soon after peace was made (12th October)⁴. Tancred himself did not survive much longer. His career coincides with the first period of the history of the crusaders in the east and mirrors its leading features. Along with Bohemond he founded the Latin state of Antioch. More than Bohemond he determined the final extent and boundaries of the principedom. During the ten years of his rule (1101-03, 1104-12) he preserved and extended its territories in every direction. Twice he recovered the Cilician towns and wrested Laodicea from the Greeks. He made Aleppn tributary and added to his territory at its expense. He occupied the

chateau d'Azaz. R. avait offert à ce chef à titre de tribut pour le principauté d'Alep 20000 pièces d'or, des chevaux etc. Mais T. avait refusé" (Desfrémery, *Mélanges d'histoire orientale*, 1^{re} partie, p. 64).

"Tancred se disposait alors à marcher contre Ezaz. Redouan pour l'en détourner lui offrit 20000 dinars à lever sur Alep, un cheval et plusieurs autres avantages, mais Tancred rejeta ses offres" (de Sacy in *Reichert's Beiträge*, 1874, p. 242).

¹ The *Recueil* translation of Kem. iii. 602 makes the breach of faith on the side of Raḡwan. The Arabic is ambiguous.

² Sib. iii. 545.

³ I.A. i. 287 has 30th November (8th Jumada II 505, which might be 29th November); Mt. Ed. i. 103 Thursday 5th December (18th Maresi); Fulcher ii. 45 12th December (the 26th day in the sign Sagittarius). These dates are separated from one another by intervals of exactly one week. Albert xii. 8, during Advent, strictly excludes the first.

⁴ Mt. Ed. i. 102.

coast towards Tripolis and steadily subdued the fortresses of the Jebel Anṣariya. Every year was marked by advance in some direction. While Tancred lived the conquering spirit of the first crusade lived on. He never laid aside his sword nor rested on his laurels. It has been charged against him that he lacked the statesmanlike ability and foresight of Bohemond, that his enmity to Baldwin was a source of weakness, that he never attempted to occupy Aleppo, and that his relations with the Armenians were not satisfactory. The charges may be true. But now that the storm of Moslem attack was breaking over the Latin colonies it was a grave loss for such as Tancred to be taken from them. The danger of the next generation was that they should become mere defenders of inherited possessions. Tancred was a principedom maker and would have continued to aim at further conquests¹.

Maudud's third campaign, in 1112, was directed against Edessa. He appeared before the city unexpectedly on Easter Monday, the 23rd of April. For eight or ten weeks the Moslems invested Baldwin's capital seeking, probably, to reduce it by starvation rather than by direct attack. Towards the conclusion of the siege Joscelin was posted in Saruj, and surprised a large body of Maudud's horsemen who were seeking pasture in the neighbourhood (15th June). They lost their baggage and many of their horses, some were slain and a few prisoners were taken. Maudud found no opportunity of retaliation although he spent a week in the neighbourhood of Saruj after this reverse. Joscelin joined Baldwin in Edessa and Maudud returned to his former post. The siege ended with the failure of an attempt to gain admittance to the town by the help of traitors. The sufferings of the inhabitants induced certain of them to admit the enemy to a tower which commanded the eastern wall. But there was only a brief struggle on the ramparts in the darkness before the Moslems were driven headlong by the impetuous valour of the Latin chiefs. The

¹ Tancred's career receives very suggestive treatment in a booklet by Bernhard Kugler (*Bohemund und Tankred*, 1863) but the faults of his character and policy seem to be unduly emphasised. The sudden pause in the activity of the Latins under Tancred's nephew and successor, Roger son of Richard, is very striking.

inhabitants were severely punished for this act of treachery. Tell mauzen was captured by the retiring army¹.

In 1113 the friendship of Tuğtakin and Maudud bore important fruit. The hope long cherished by Tuğtakin that the emirs beyond the Euphrates would come to the rescue of their Syrian brothers in the faith was now in a measure realised. Maudud devoted himself this year wholly to a Syrian campaign. In the beginning of May², it seems, he crossed the Euphrates. For six weeks his movements are a matter of conjecture. Some time was spent in fruitless negotiations with Ridwan³. In the latter part of June Maudud and Tuğtakin were encamped beside Salamiya and there it was decided to invade Palestine. The subsequent course of the campaign has been related in chapter I⁴. It was not the desire of territorial gain which prompted Maudud to an expedition so far from his own possessions. Like the soldiers of the first crusade he sought the deliverance of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. He thus anticipated by many years the aspirations of Nureddin and Saladin. The cause of Moslem reaction was seriously checked by his untimely death in September and, possibly, was driven into a narrower channel. For a time the emirs of Mesopotamia and Syria waged war with one another and when the contest with the Latins was resumed it took the form of a struggle for the possession of Aleppo (1118-1128).

Probably in the latter part of 1113 Joscelin ceased to be lord of Tell bashir. He was deprived of his fief by Baldwin of Edessa in consequence of a quarrel which took place between them. In Jerusalem king Baldwin granted him the lordship of Tiberias⁵.

Maudud's death brought no immediate respite to Edessa. For the third time in five successive years, its capital was besieged next summer by a Moslem army (1114). The sultan continued to support the prosecution of the Latin war. The new emir of

¹ Mt. Ed. i. 100 f.; cf. I.A. i. 287.

² End of Dhul-ka'da 506, I.A. i. 288. Albert xii. 9 either should read Maio (Madio) for Marlo or refers to the beginning of the preparations for the campaign.

³ Kem. iii. 602.

⁴ Page 62 f.

⁵ Tyre xi. 22. Mt. Ed. i. 125 fixes the date as after Tancred's death. Cf. p. 67 f.

Moşul, Akşonkor el-burskî¹, commanded the Moslem forces. The investment lasted a month, from the 15th of May, until it was broken up because of the difficulty of obtaining supplies. Before the Moslems retired from the province they ravaged the country along the banks of the Euphrates and inflicted considerable loss. At Samsat overtures were made to them by the widow of Basil kogh. She placed herself under Moslem protection and the Latins were expelled from Kaişun, Mar'ash and Ra'ban².

El-burskî's advancement by the sultan was viewed with jealousy by Ilgazi of Maridin and he took no share personally in the campaign against Edessa. El-burskî after his return avenged the slight by laying waste the territory of Maridin. In 1115 Ilgazi retaliated and El-burskî was defeated in a battle fought towards the end of May³. The quarrel provoked the sultan's displeasure on both parties. El-burskî was deprived of the emirate of Moşul and retired to Raḥaba where he lived in obscurity for some years. Ilgazi fled to Syria to concert measures of defence with Tuḡtakin, who was also under suspicion since Maudud's assassination in Damascus. The immediate sequel of these events was an invasion of Syria by the armies of the sultan and the formation of a Syrian league in which Moslems and Christians united to resist the invaders. The Latins bore the brunt of the fighting, but they fought as the allies of Ilgazi and Tuḡtakin.

Ruḍwan of Aleppo died on the 10th of December 1113⁴. Power really passed into the hands of a certain Lulu el-yaya, who made first one and then another of Ruḍwan's sons nominal emir. The city was deplorably misgoverned and the tribute which the Latins exacted added to the burdens of the

¹ I.A. i. 300. In the Atabeks (an earlier work) Juyush Beg immediately follows Maudud and El-burskî is passed over.

² Mt. Ed. i. 109 and I.A. i. 292 f.; cf. Barhebr. 302 ff. I.A. makes the investment of Edessa last two months and some days (cf. Barhebr. 302). Perhaps this was the whole duration of the invasion. The exact date of its commencement is from Mt. Ed. I.A. gives Dhu'l-hijja 508, ending 26th May.

³ End of A.H. 508, I.A. i. 294.

⁴ 28 Jumada ii 507, Kem. iii. 602; Ibn Kh. i. 274 reads Jumada i (the last day of the month). The following particulars are from Kem. iii. 602-608 (nn pp. 604 and 605 the Recueil has A.D. 1115 instead of A.D. 1114).

unfortunate inhabitants. Tuğtakin broke off all relations with Lulu who then appealed for help to the sultan. When Ilgazi joined Tuğtakin in the summer of 1115 they decided to occupy Aleppo, that it might not fall into the hands of the sultan's army. This accomplished, it was further resolved to make alliance with the Latins. Roger of Antioch had completed his preparations in expectation of war, but glacially listened to the overtures which were made to him. The allies joined forces at Famiya in June, Roger with 2000 men, it is said, and the Moslems with a larger number, estimated at 10,000¹. Two months passed before the alliance was put to the test. In the month of August² Bursuk of Hamadan³ invaded Syria as the sultan's representative and chief commander. His principal Syrian supporters were the emirs of Homs and Shaizar. He was instructed to hand over his conquests to Kirkhan of Homs. Before the invaders reached Aleppo, Ilgazi and Tuğtakin garrisoned the town with their troops⁴. Bursuk therefore passed on to Hama. It yielded without much resistance and was occupied by Kirkhan⁵. A few days later the sultan's army advanced to Shaizar. The Latins were still in their original position not far away. When the enemy approached Roger gave orders that his soldiers should not leave the camp on any pretext. Bursuk vainly employed every artifice to provoke them to an engagement. Roger waited for the arrival of his allies. Baldwin of Jerusalem, Pons of Tripolis and the confederate Moslem emirs⁶ soon joined him and greatly increased

¹ Walter i. 2. The following particulars regarding the Latins are taken from this, which is the fullest of the sources.

² Walter i. 2. Sibṭ iii. 554 may be understood to agree with this explicit statement. Fulcher ii. 51 gives June, the month of Ilgazi's arrival in Syria, as if it were the date of the arrival of the sultan's army. Albert xii. 19 who says the invasion lasted 11 weeks seems also to count from June. I.A. i. 296 says Bursuk crossed the Euphrates at Raḳḳa about the end of May (end of A.H. 508) but this is exactly the date he gives for Ilgazi's victory over Bursuk (p. 97, n. 3).

³ The resemblance of his name to that of El-bursukī has led to confusion. Wilken makes El-bursukī leader of this expedition.

⁴ I.A. i. 296, cf. Kem. iii. 608.

⁵ Sibṭ iii. 554, Kem. iii. 608 (to be corrected according to iii. 757; Kafaniya is not mentioned).

⁶ There is no very definite evidence regarding the return of Ilgazi and Tuğtakin. Albert-xii. 19 says that Tuğtakin joined Roger along with Baldwin but almost implies that he came from Damascus, which is impossible.

the number of his troops. It was now Bursuğ's turn to hesitate and draw back. He seems to have invested Hīṣn el-akrad¹, but the Latins were ignorant of his position and supposed that he had started home. In their uncertainty they attacked El-jisr, which had recently been captured from them, and burned its suburbs. Still the hostile army did not appear, and the purpose of the allies seemed to be accomplished. Tuğtakin marched towards Damascus, saying that he feared attack in that direction². The Latins dispersed their forces.

But Bursuğ was still in Syria. With alarming swiftness he descended on Kafr ṭab, which was captured and destroyed on the 3rd of September³. Then he advanced to Ma'arat en-nu'man. For a whole week the districts round lay at the mercy of his plundering bands. But his forces lacked coherence, like every Mesopotamian army composed of miscellaneous levies. The emirs were weary of the campaign and began to return home⁴. Part of the army was sent to occupy Buza'a and Bursuğ himself moved towards Aleppo⁵. After the morning march on the 14th of September preparations were made to encamp at Danith el-bakl⁶. No precautions had been taken to guard against surprise and in the confusion of arrival at the camping ground the Moslems were set upon by the Latins of Antioch and Edessa.

Walter, chancellor of Antioch, has left a full account of the Latin movements. When Roger heard that Bursuğ had captured Kafr ṭab and was laying waste the country round Ma'ara he and Baldwin summoned such troops as were available for immediate action. They met at Er-ruj. On Sunday the 12th of September⁷, Walter tells us, the patriarch addressed the army

¹ Kem. iii. 609; Albert xii. 19 "versus civitatem Malatīnam in montana."

² Sibṭ iii. 555. Perhaps he was afraid of the movements of Bursuğ's army. Albert also says that at the time of the battle of Danith a section of Bursuğ's army was attacked by Tuğtakin in the region of "Carnolia" near the "castrum Malbeck."

³ Friday 13th Rabi' ii (Ousama 105).

⁴ Sibṭ iii. 555. He and I.A. mention that jealousy of Kırkhan was prevalent amongst them.

⁵ Kem. iii. 609 f., I.A. i. 297 f. Walter says that while at Ma'ara Bursuğ made preparations to besiege Zaredna.

⁶ I.A. i. 297 f. So Walter l. 4, "in valle Sarmiti."

⁷ Tyre xi. 25 gives this as the date when the Latins met at Er-ruj. Walter is the principal authority at this point. I.A. i. 297 f. gives a clear account of the battle.

"plainly and openly, in a manner pleasing to God rather than to man. He did not ignore their faults nor the features in their conduct which he knew to be contrary to God's will; but by argument, entreaty and rebuke he taught them as a father those things which they should avoid and those things which they should follow." Next day the Latins encamped at Ilab. On the day following as they approached their next camping ground a scout brought word that the Moslems were there already in the very act of pitching their tents. It was the festival of the elevation of the cross and therefore a day of happy omen. The bishop of Jabala carried the cross up and down the ranks, the soldiers knelt before it three times in reverence, and having thus commended themselves to God they mounted their horses.

When the Latins swept down on the Moslem tents only the baggage animals and the servants were there. Bursuğ's troops straggled up in detachments and were defeated as they arrived. Bursuğ attempted to rally his men on the slope of a neighbouring hill, but finding that success was hopeless, he saved himself by flight. The Latins secured much plunder. No doubt the spoil and the prisoners of the recent campaign were for the most part recovered (14th September 1115)¹. Roger remained on the field for two or three days² dividing the spoil. He was received in Antioch with much enthusiasm and publicly gave thanks to God for his great victory in the church of St Peter. Kafr ṭab and Ma'ara were rebuilt by the Latins.

The peculiar situation of 1115 did not continue. Ilgazi and Ṭuḡtakin both effected their reconciliation with the sultan. They had not compromised themselves unduly by their cautious movements in the recent campaign and Roger's victory at Danith was a warning to the Moslems to close their ranks. But the prosecution of the Holy War was not immediately resumed. In 1116 and 1117 the Latins were free to follow

¹ The day of the elevation of the cross (Walter and Albert). The date in Fulcher ii. 52, according to which three nights in the constellation of Virgo were still to follow, agrees exactly with this, so that Recueil iii. 431, 13th September, is inaccurate. Ousama 105, Tuesday 13rd Rabi' ii, calendar date 15th September, gives the same date. So possibly Kem. iii. 609 also, although Tuesday 10th Rabi' ii may easily contain a textual error; in any case Recueil 13rd September is incorrect.

² Walter, three days; Tyre xl. 25, *biduo*.

what policy they chose. It was a favourable opportunity for attack on Aleppo. But Roger or his counsellors lacked initiative¹. During the four years which followed Tancred's death (1113-16) there were no hostilities between Antioch and Aleppo. Even the victory at Danith produced no change of policy. In 1117 Roger played the part of protector to Aleppo. Friendly relations were not altogether broken off until the following year.

Baldwin of Edessa spent the interval in dealing with the position of the Armenians on his western border. After a prolonged and bitter struggle the principedom founded by Basil kogh was completely destroyed and its principal towns were restored to the jurisdiction of Edessa². Pons of Tripolis seems to have carried on an active warfare with the Moslems, but his operations were on a minor scale. When Tuğtakin visited Baghdad in the spring of 1116 he gave as a reason for the shortness of his visit the danger to which his territories were exposed³. Perhaps his relations with Tripolis caused him most anxiety. In the autumn of 1115 Pons captured Rafaniya and its Latin garrison became the scourge of the country round; it was recaptured however within a month⁴. In the early summer of 1116 Pons invaded the Biḡa' and posted himself at 'Ain jar. He was immediately attacked and repulsed by the troops of Damascus⁵. In 1117 the same kind of border warfare was continued⁶.

¹ Previous to 1115 Roger's only share in the Moslem war, as prince of Antioch, was his expedition to assist Baldwin of Jerusalem (summer of 1113).

² Mt. Ed. i. 116 ff. gives particulars. Mar'ash also was seized from its Greek governor (in i. 118 for Recueil "Boëmond" read Baldwin). Pakrad was now deprived of his possessions (i. 117).

³ Sibṭ iii. 556. Particulars of the visit are given by Sibṭ iii. 557 f. quoting Ibn el-kalanasi; the date Dhu'l-ḡa'da 509, ending 15th April 1116, by I.A. i. 300.

⁴ I.A. i. 298 f. (Jumada ii 509); cf. Ibn el-kalanasi in Sibṭ iii. 557. Kem. iii. 608 should contain no mention of Rafaniya (see p. 98, n. 5).

⁵ Sibṭ gives a duplicate account of this invasion: one in continuation of the history of Tuğtakin's visit to Baghdad, iii. 557, the other in its chronological position under A.H. 510 from Ibn el-kalanasi, iii. 559. The former shows the date was in spring or early summer. The Latin leader is wrongly given as Bertram.

⁶ The suburbs of Hama were attacked on the night of the 16th of June, when there was a total eclipse of the moon (I.A. i. 309). The night of 14th Šafar 511, 17th June, according to our reckoning is the night of the 16th; Recueil wrongly 13th June. When Tuğtakin attacked Hama a Latin movement caused his retreat.

The years 1117 and 1118 were momentous years in the history of Aleppo. Early in 1117 Lulu el-yaya was assassinated¹. El-burski of Raḥaba and Ilgazi of Maridin were two of several candidates for the vacant emirate. Ilgazi was actually in possession of the city for a short time. But his position was untenable owing to the distrust of the populace and the inadequacy of the revenues which were available. El-burski was refused admission when he advanced to the gates with his supporter Tuḡtakin. He was menaced by the Latins of Antioch and retired. Ilgazi had also suffered from their attacks. Roger received the fortress of El-ḡubba and other concessions in return for his services. After this the citizens welcomed Kirkhan of Ḥomṣ as their protector and Tuḡtakin ravaged the territories of Ḥomṣ in consequence². The situation awakened the Latins to their opportunity. The depredations of the garrison of El-ḡubba and the harshness with which the Latin dues were exacted brought matters to a crisis³. Roger was resolved to make war on the Moslem city.

In the spring of 1118 the Moslem castle of Balatunus, on the hills to the east of Laodicea, was captured by the Latins after a siege which lasted from the 22nd of April to the 5th of May⁴. Roger and his ally Leo, an Armenian ruler in Cilicia, then laid siege to 'Ezaz, which had been regained by the Moslems shortly after Tancred's death⁵. It lay somewhat north of Aleppo on the road between Antioch and Tell bashir. The citizens of Aleppo in great alarm sent for help to Tuḡtakin, but found him completely occupied in the hostilities which followed the death

¹ Kem. lii. 610 not long before the end of A.D. 510 (ending 4th May 1117). This explains I.A.'s statement (i. 308 f.) that authorities vary between 510 and 511.

² Kem. lii. 610 ff.

³ Kem. lii. 613 f.

⁴ Berchem, *Inscrip.* 494 (where the position of the castle is determined). According to Cod. arab. Quatremère (Kugler, Boemund 77, note 68) Roger previous to this (in A.D. 511, ending 23rd April 1118) also captured Ḥiṣn el-marḡab near Banyas (Balanyas) south of Jabala. Later, however, this was still a Moslem stronghold (chap. III, p. 148, n. 1).

⁵ There is no record of its recapture. It was however in Moslem hands in November 1114 (Kem. lii. 608) and possibly was gained in 1113 after Tancred's death. Regarding the blank in the record of Maudad's movements in May-June 1113 see page 96.

of Baldwin I of Jerusalem¹. Ilgazi of Maridin was then invited to occupy and protect the town. He came at once but without sufficient troops to justify his attacking the Latin army. He offered Roger a large sum of money on condition that he would raise the siege, but his offer was rejected. The garrison of 'Ezaz then made terms for itself and surrendered the castle. Ilgazi purchased a general truce by further concessions. Arrcars of tribute, due for four months, were paid and the fortress of Herak and some territory in the neighbourhood of Aleppo was surrendered. Time was needed for warlike preparations. Ilgazi had a conference with ʿUğtakin of Damascus and arranged to co-operate with him in the following summer. Then he returned to Maridin to collect his forces. The sultan Mohammed was dead, having died on the 18th of April of this year (1118)², but his son and successor Mahmud gave every support to Ilgazi's plans.

In 1119 Ilgazi's power to assist Aleppo was put to a decisive test. The danger of the city was now extreme. The Latins ravaged what territory it still possessed and captured Buza'a, to the east towards the Euphrates³. The unfortunate Alepins urged Ilgazi not to delay his march to their assistance. He reached Aleppo in the first days of June⁴, having ravaged the fields of Tell bashir on the way. Roger sent for help to Tripolis and Jerusalem. In the previous year Baldwin of Edessa had become king of Jerusalem. Both Pons and he promised their help. But meantime Ilgazi's movements disturbed the defenders of the Latin castles and the owners of the lands he ravaged, and they prevailed on Roger to take the field alone. His army consisted of 700 knights and 3000 foot-soldiers⁵. He took up

¹ Kem. iii. 614 gives his defeat by Joscelin as the reason of his not helping Aleppo. The reference may be to Ibrī's defeat (chap. I, p. 67). But the siege of 'Ezaz probably began earlier in the summer, when ʿUğtakin was in Ascalon, although Kem. makes it commence after Joscelin's victory.

² Thursday 24th Dhū'l-hijja 511 (L.A. i. 303, Recueil wrongly 17th April).

³ L.A. i. 323. Within two years or less it was again in Moslem hands (i. 341).

⁴ End of Šafar 513, Kem. iii. 616. During the harvest season, previous to the Latin invasion, there was a truce for four months (Barhebr. 306). Possibly this was in continuation of that arranged by Ilgazi in 1118.

⁵ The numbers from Walter, who again has a full description of these events. Kem. iii. 616ff. also gives a full account. Sibī has a double narrative (iii. 360 and 361). In the second the Recueil editor conjectures that an attack on Artah is referred to. The lowest estimate of Ilgazi's army is 7000 men (Barhebr. 306).

an unfavourable position at Balat, near Atharib, in a valley among the hills (20th June)¹. Ilġazi hesitated to make an attack before he was joined by Tuġtakin. Finally however the impatience of his troops prevailed and he moved his position towards the Latin camp (27th June). The interval had given him time to mature his plans. On the morning of the 28th² he made his attack. The Latins had not realised how vulnerable their position was and were taken in a measure by surprise. They believed that the Moslem army lay in the direction of Atharib where there had been skirmishing the day before. But Ilġazi's troops poured into the valley from three sides at once³. Roger sent a detachment to hold off one of these divisions and drew up his main force beside the tents of his encampment. The battle was soon over. Almost at the first shock Roger's left wing broke and carried the right back in confusion with it. A dust-storm swept across the field of battle and completed the discomfiture of the Latins. The detachment at the entrance of the valley saved itself by flight. Roger was slain and 70 of his knights were captured⁴. The Moslems were jubilant over their victory. Ilġazi, it seems, permitted and encouraged the most cruel treatment of the inferior captives, who numbered about 500⁵. But he did not follow up his victory to any purpose. He allowed his forces to scatter in the accomplishment of minor undertakings. The Latins were terrified by the bands which scoured the country, but their fear was greater than their danger. Baldwin and Pons quickly appeared on the scene. Ilġazi sent troops to oppose their march but these were repulsed in the neighbourhood of Jabala. After this the Moslem raiders retired from the neighbourhood of Antioch to which they had advanced. Baldwin and Pons did not immediately take the aggressive. They were content at first to restore confidence

¹ Friday 9th Rabi' I, Kem. iii. 617.

² The dates are from Kem. iii. 617 f. Mt. Ed. i. 123 has apparently the same date for the battle. In I.A. i. 325 the middle of Rabi' I is given too definitely by the French translation as 26th June.

³ I.A. i. 324. Similarly Kem. and Walter ("ex tribus partibus triplici bello").

⁴ I.A. i. 324.

⁵ Walter ii. 8 (cf. 17-18). Kem. iii. 622 says that the men of rank were ransomed and that about 30 prisoners who were destitute of means were executed.

in the principedom. Bohemond's son, Bohemond II, was Roger's prospective heir. But he was a boy only 11 years old and still in France. So Baldwin himself was appointed regent and thus an important step was taken in the unification of the Latin power. For seven years the king of Jerusalem commanded the united armies of the Syrian Latins. Their battleground was northern Syria and the question to be decided was the fate of Aleppo.

Ilġazi, it seems, was prevented from taking the field for three weeks by fever (July)¹. After his recovery, having been joined by Tuġtakin of Damascus, he laid siege to Atharib (beginning of August). Here, as elsewhere, the garrison had been weakened in order to add to the strength of the army in the field. The Moslems were fortunate in gaining a speedy success, for the castle surrendered while Baldwin was on the march to its relief. When the king received news of this fresh disaster he posted himself at Danith. His camp numbered 200 tents². The castle of Zaredna capitulated that very day (13th August)³. Tidings reached the king at night and he made his final preparations for battle before he slept. All day his troops had been harassed by Moslem skirmishers; in the evening the enemy were joined by Ilġazi himself. The battle next day (14th August)⁴ was confusing in its character and indefinite in its results; both sides sustained severe loss; part of each army was routed and part victorious. But the substantial fruits of victory remained with Baldwin. Ilġazi retired to Aleppo, his allies dispersed and he himself returned to Maridīn to gather fresh forces⁵. Baldwin claimed victory by collecting his forces and occupying the field of battle on the following day. Having no further opposition to encounter in the open field he commenced a campaign against the neighbouring Moslem strongholds. Most of the places named in the list of

¹ Ousama 117, Arabic text 83. 'The fever was brought on by excessive drinking; cf. Walter ii. 9 "potationibus intentus."

² Kem. iii. 620.

³ Kem. iii. 620 with which Walter ii. 16 agrees.

⁴ The vigil of the Assumption (Walter ii. 16 and Tyre xii. 12). Kem. iii. 620 does not give the date of the battle although he perhaps implies that it was on the day after the surrender of Zaredna. M. Ed. (according to *Recueil* i. 124), gives August 16th. Fulcher's date seems to be equivalent to August 19th (iii. 65).

⁵ Before the end of Jumada I 513, ending 8th September (Kem. iii. 622).

captures which he made¹ were Latin possessions and so must recently have been lost. But as neither Atharib nor Zaredna were recovered Ilgazi had good cause to be satisfied with the fruits of his first campaign. He had loosened the strong hand from the throat of Aleppo and had gained a Moslem victory with which only one or two others could compare as yet in all the history of the struggle with the Latins.

During Baldwin's campaign after the battle of Danith he was joined by Joscelin of Tiberias². Previous to 1113 Joscelin had been lord of Tell bashir³. Baldwin now conferred on him the lordship of the whole county of Edessa. There was need for such a bold leader on the northern borders, and since Baldwin's accession to the kingdom of Jerusalem he and Joscelin were again friends. Ilgazi's first movements in 1120 were in Joscelin's new territories. He commenced operations in the month of May. After four days spent in the neighbourhood of Edessa he crossed the Euphrates (26th May)⁴ and ravaged the country between Tell bashir and Kaşun. Joscelin attacked the Moslems with some success but did not prevent them from entering the territories of Antioch. Passing by 'Ezaz, Ilgazi advanced on the town of Antioch. After a day spent in the vicinity he retired towards ʿİnnessin. These fruitless movements produced discontent amongst his troops. There was not sufficient plunder to satisfy their wants and gratify their expectations and Ilgazi had no money to silence their murmurs. His Turkish horsemen began to melt away and only the arrival of Tuğtakın with reinforcements enabled him to keep the field. When the Latins marched out from Antioch under the leadership of Baldwin the Moslems hung closely on the flanks of the

¹ Kafr ruma, Kafr ʿash, Sarmin, Maʿarat meşrin (Kem. iii. 623 f.). Sarmin is not named among the places assigned to the Latins by treaty in 1120 (Kem. iii. 623) but it is under 1121 (Kem. iii. 627). Fulcher iii. 7 says the king remained a considerable time in Antioch.

² Kem. iii. 623. Tyre xii. 9 referring to Joscelin in the beginning of 1119 speaks of him as ruler of Edessa but this is inaccurate. Mt. Ed. i. 125 dates Joscelin's restoration to Edessa *anno armen.* 368, which commences 20th February 1119.

³ pp. 70 and 96.

⁴ 25th Şafar 514, Kem. iii. 623. Particulars of these movements in Mt. Ed. i. 116f.

advancing column and made it difficult for the soldiers to obtain food and water. But Baldwin kept his men in close order and they resisted every temptation to break their ranks. They reached Ma'arat mesrin in safety and only one day later the Moslems retired to Aleppo¹. Having thus cleared the country the Latins returned to Antioch. Peace was made until March of the following year². All this took place before the end of June. In the same month Ilgazi destroyed Zaredna that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy³.

Joscelin, it appears, did not consider himself bound by the truce which Baldwin had made. Early in 1121 he cruelly raided the district of El-ahass⁴ and later the district in the neighbourhood of Buza'a. Ilgazi's governor in Aleppo was obliged to make separate terms with him. About the same time the territory of Shaizar was attacked by the Latins of Antioch and its emir bought a short truce by a payment of money⁵. When the truce with Aleppo expired the attacks on its territory were resumed. Atharib was twice attacked with a month's interval between, and Aleppo itself was menaced⁶. Affairs in Maridin detained Ilgazi in the east and he sent orders that peace should be made on whatever terms the Latins demanded. In 1120 the Latin title to some of the districts taken from them in 1119 had been acknowledged; now further concessions were made. It was even arranged that they should have possession of Atharib, but the garrison refused to hand it over. Not long afterwards Ilgazi's son Sulaiman, governor of Aleppo, revolted against his father. The Latins utilised their opportunity to re-occupy and fortify Zaredna (August-September 1121). Several less important castles which the Moslems held were invested and also captured. After three days attack on

¹ I.A. i. 332. For these events see Kem. iii. 623 ff.

² End of A.H. 514, Kem. iii. 625.

³ Rabi' i 514, Kem. iii. 625.

⁴ Shawal 514, ending 21st January 1121, Kem. iii. 626.

⁵ Kem. iii. 626.

⁶ This last event falls in Rabi' ii 515, commencing 19th June 1121 (Kem. iii. 627). Baldwin led the expedition and possibly had been in Antioch since the preceding year. In the beginning of July he was back in Jerusalem (Fulcher iii. 10; cf. Kem. iii. 628 which says he was not in Antioch when peace was concluded).

Atharib Baldwin returned to Antioch. News of these occurrences brought Ilġazi back to Syria. Sulaiman submitted to him and he entered Aleppo on the 13th of November. He remained in Syria four months. During that time a temporary peace was made with the Latins and the lands which had been theirs when they held Atharib and Zaredna were again surrendered to them¹.

Ilġazi returned to Syria at the end of June 1122 in order to resume the Latin war. He was accompanied by his nephew Nur ed-daula Balak and was joined again by Tuġtakin. Zaredna was besieged on the 27th of July. Baldwin was in Tripolis enforcing his authority as Pons' overlord. When he approached at the head of a relief force, Ilġazi withdrew from the castle. The siege had lasted only a fortnight. The Latins avoided battle with Ilġazi and a number of indecisive movements followed. Finally the illness which resulted in Ilġazi's death attacked him, and in consequence the Moslem army broke up. Ilġazi withdrew to Aleppo and Tuġtakin to Damasqus². Balak's emirate was near Malaṭiya and he also started homewards. On the way a piece of great good fortune befel him. He was pursued and overtaken by Joscelin. Balak's force was superior³ and besides he was posted in a spot guarded by marshes. It was folly for the Latins to attack him in these circumstances, but they did so. Their horses sank in the mire, the arrows of the enemy rained upon them and their only safety lay in flight. Joscelin was taken prisoner and from 25 to 60 of his companions with him (13th September)⁴. Balak shut up his prisoners in the castle of Khartbart. By his fortunate capture he marked himself out as the successor of his dying uncle, Ilġazi ibn Ortoċ.

¹ Kem. iii. 625-631.

² Kem. iii. 631 ff. and Fulcher iii. 11. Tyre xii. 14 runs together Ilġazi's campaigns of 1120, 1121 and 1122 in a chapter which stands between a narrative of the year 1119 (xii. 12) and one of 1121 (xii. 16).

³ Mt. Ed. gives Joscelin 100 men and Balak 800; I.A. says Balak had only 400.

⁴ The date and principal details from Mt. Ed. i. 131 f.; he puts the number of prisoners at 25, Kem. iii. 634 at 60. I.A.'s account, i. 344, agrees with Mt. Ed. but is under A.H. 515 instead of A.H. 516 and relates also an earlier brief attack of Balak's on Edessa. Kem. iii. 633 f. says the fight took place near Saruj, which is not probable; his date is Rajab 516. Barheb. 308 f. relates Joscelin's capture twice, under different years, but supports the day of the month given by Mt. Ed.

Ilğazi lay ill for six weeks in Aleppo. Having recovered a little he attempted to return to Maridin but died on the way (3rd November 1122). His government of Aleppo (1118-1122) marks an important stage in the history of the Latin war. Being ruler of both Maridin and Aleppo he drew the relations between Syria and Mesopotamia much closer than Maudud had left them. The capital of northern Syria in the hands of a Mesopotamian emir was no longer isolated and dependent on the hazard of chance alliances. Ilğazi's career itself proved the advantage of its new relations. The Latin occupation of the country received its first rude shock from the blows which he delivered. A new hope and the promise of a better future dawned on the inhabitants of Aleppo.

Baldwin heard the news of Joscelin's capture at Tripolis on his way home¹, and returned at once to Antioch. The season did not permit of serious operations, but throughout the winter and especially after Ilğazi's death the Latins made constant attacks on the territory of Aleppo². The governor for the time was Badr ed-daula, also a nephew of Ilğazi. On the 9th of April (1123) he surrendered Atharib and made peace with the Latins. Forthwith Baldwin set out to attack Balak, who was besieging the castle of Karkar. Once more the Moslems gained a notable success (18th April)³. Baldwin was surprised, taken captive and imprisoned along with Joscelin in Khartbart. After the capture of Karkar, a week later, Balak set out for Syria to secure Aleppo. The town was captured, after a brief resistance, on the 26th of June⁴ and the citadel surrendered three days later. Balak strengthened his position by marrying one of Ruḍwan's daughters. Harran had been occupied earlier in the month⁵.

¹ Fulcher iii. 11 does not state the cause of Baldwin's return to Antioch ("et ideo negotio") but the date leaves no doubt on the matter. Tyre xii. 17 relates this second visit to Antioch immediately after his account of the quarrel with Pons, omitting the campaign against Ilğazi (cf. p. 108, n. 2).

² Kem. iii. 633 and 634 f.

³ Mt. Ed. i. 133 (the 4th day after Easter), Barhebr. 308 (Wednesday in Easter week); cf. Kem. iii. 635, where Wednesday 29th Šafar 517 (= 18th April) is apparently the date of Baldwin's starting on his expedition.

⁴ Kem. iii. 636, Tuesday 1st Jumada I 517, calendar date 17th June.

⁵ Rabi' ii which commences 29th May.

Balak showed both energy and judgment in resuming at once the Latin war. He besieged and captured El-barrā and then attacked Kafr ṭab. While so engaged news reached him (6th August)¹ that his prisoners, the Latin princes, had escaped. In fact a band of some fifteen Armenians², in disguise and poorly dressed, having gained admission to Khartbart on some pretext³, had killed the soldiers of the guard and liberated the prisoners from the tower in which they were confined. Rescuers and rescued were then joined by those of the inhabitants who were Christians and the citadel was captured. Baldwin decided to remain in Khartbart while Joscelin went to Jerusalem for assistance. But Balak acted more swiftly than his opponents. In a fortnight⁴ he appeared before the walls; on the 16th of September⁵ the defenders were overpowered. The heroic rescuers and many of the Latins were put to death. Baldwin was again a prisoner.

When Joscelin learned that Khartbart had been captured he employed the troops he had raised in cruelly wasting the country round Aleppo. Even trees were cut down and graves profaned. In retaliation, about this time, the ḡadī of Aleppo transformed the cathedral and two other churches into mosques. Two churches still remained for the use of the Christian inhabitants. Joscelin's army dispersed shortly after the 23rd of October⁶, but afterwards in November and still later he and the troops of Edessa continued to raid and harry the country⁷.

About the middle of January (1124) Balak returned to Aleppo. Along with Ṭuḡtakin and El-bursḡi, he attempted to capture 'Ezaz but was defeated and repulsed by a relieving force.

¹ Kem. iii. 637, Tuesday 11th Jumada ii, calendar date 7th August. Fulcher iii. 23 puts the escape about the middle of August; that may be the date when the news reached Jerusalem.

² In Fulcher iii. 23 (Tyre xii. 18) the number is 50 (? text). Mt. Ed. i. 133 has fifteen and it is easier to understand how the smaller number might gain admission to the town.

³ Mt. Ed. says they pretended to have grievances which they desired to have redressed. So Fulcher iii. 23, who speaks of them as merchants or pedlars. Tyre xii. 18 says they were either monks or pedlars.

⁴ Mt. Ed. i. 135.

⁵ 23rd Rajab, Kem. iii. 637.

⁶ Tuesday 1st Ramaḡan, Kem. iii. 638.

⁷ Kem. iii. 639 f.

Later he began to prepare for an attack on Tell bashir and invited Hassan emir of Mambij to co-operate with him (April)¹. Hassan refused and was arrested, and Balak laid siege to Mambij, which was defended by the emir's brother. In response to an appeal for help Joscelin attempted to raise the siege. On the 5th of May² Balak the victorious, as he was called, repulsed the Latins and so won his last victory. While directing the attack on Mambij next day he was fatally wounded by an arrow from the ramparts. "This is death for all Moslems," he is reported to have said, as he pulled out the arrow from the wound³. It was indeed a serious blow to the Moslem cause, as events quickly showed. Balak's successor in Aleppo was Timurtash, Ilgazi's son, who proved quite incompetent. He committed a serious error to begin with, when he released Baldwin of Jerusalem. On the 24th of June⁴ it was arranged that the king should pay a ransom for his liberty and surrender, also, the fortress of 'Ezaz⁵. Two months passed, during which certain hostages were given up and part payment of the ransom was made. Then Baldwin was released (on the 29th of August)⁶. No sooner did he reach Antioch than he announced that he did not intend to keep his promise (6th September)⁷. The patriarch absolved him from his oath and bade him not keep faith with infidels. He allied himself with a rival of Timurtash, Dubais ibn Şadaka, and put an end to troublesome arguments by leading his forces against Aleppo (28th September)⁸. The

¹ Safar 518, ends 17th April, Kem. iii. 641.

² Monday 18th Rabi' I 518, Kem. iii. 642; Mt. Ed., according to Recueil i. 139, has two dates which do not harmonise (4th May and 10th Salimi).

³ Kem. iii. 642. Fulcher iii. 31 rightly gives the date of the battle as May 5th, but he was informed that the Moslems were defeated and Balak killed in battle. Joscelin sent to Antioch, Tripolis and Jerusalem what he believed was Balak's head.

⁴ 10th Jumada I, calendar date 25th June, Kem. iii. 643. The earlier date in iii. 644 (Wednesday, 4th Jumada I) may be the date when Baldwin arrived in Shaizar to conduct negotiations with the emir there.

⁵ Kem. iii. 645. This evidence is more trustworthy than that in the passage iii. 643 where Atharib, Zaredna, El-jisr and Kafr Şab are also named.

⁶ Friday 17th Rajab 518, calendar date 30th August, Kem. iii. 644. Fulcher iii. 38, 4th Kal. September, agrees exactly.

⁷ 25th Rajab, calendar date 7th September, actual date (in accordance with note 6) 6th September (Kem. iii. 643, Recueil wrongly 2nd September).

⁸ 18th Sha'ban (Kem. iii. 645), calendar date 30th September (cf. p. 112, n. 1).

Latins of Antioch encamped under the walls of the city on the 6th of October¹ and were joined by the forces of Joscelin and Dubais. There were 300 tents in the besiegers' camp and one-third of the troops were Moslems. The attack and defence were exceptionally bitter. The town was reduced to the utmost extremity by the scarcity of provisions and the prevalence of disease. The inhabitants were forced to use dogs and carcases for their food. Timurtash was in Maridīn and gave scant attention to the entreaties of the deputies who implored his assistance². Fortunately their next appeal was directed to one of a different stamp. Akşonkor el-burşki was recovering the position of which he had been deprived by the predominance of the Ortoks for so many years. Since May 1121³ he had been ruler of Moşul, for the second time. He readily promised his help and quickly made his preparations. He reached Aleppo after nightfall on Thursday the 29th of January (1125)⁴. The besiegers acknowledged their discomfiture by beating a hasty retreat. So ended the only regular siege of Aleppo which the Latins ever undertook. It lasted four months and was the climax of the danger to which the city had been exposed for many years. When El-burşki arrived the last extremity had been reached. The walls were manned by men who rose from sick beds when the enemy attacked. Aleppo was saved by the successor of Maudud and the army of Moşul. About the middle of March⁵ the emir of Shaizar handed over to El-burşki the Latin hostages who were in his possession. They included a daughter of Baldwin and a son of Joscelin. After this Baldwin lingered in Antioch no longer. He had been

¹ Kem. iii. 645 here gives the Christian date and rightly calls it a Monday. His corresponding Moslem date is however 26th Sha'ban 518, calendar date 8th October, two days later. Although according to the Nestorian calendar that would be the 6th of October (Recueil editor) the day of the week is decisive against its being correct. (In Recueil note *le 19 octobre de l'ère vulgaire* 19 seems to be a misprint for 9).

² One of them was Moḥammed Ibn Hibai-allah, great grandfather of the historian Kemal ed-dīn.

³ I.A. i. 341.

⁴ Kem. iii. 649 (Thursday, eight days before the end of Dhu'l-hijja 518). Fulcher iii. 39 gives the 30th (a Friday). He mentions that the arrival was at night. Neither authority gives Thursday night, which is got by combining their statements.

⁵ Kem. iii. 651.

absent from Jerusalem for nearly three years and set foot in it again on the 3rd of April (1125)¹. Some noteworthy events had taken place in his absence.

During the early part of the reign of Baldwin II the situation in Jerusalem was similar to what it had been in the latter part of the reign of his predecessor. The attacks from Egypt ceased altogether and those of Damascus were purely incidental and insignificant (1119-1121)². The assassination of El-asfal (5th December 1121)³ made no immediate difference in the policy of the former country. The Latins, having secured their position, did not meantime seek to extend their borders. The Moslems, having ascertained their opponents' strength, were disposed to acquiesce in the Latin occupation. Nevertheless neither the Syrian Latins nor the western pilgrims enjoyed in Palestine in these years the security of a settled country. The real situation is disclosed by the early history of the "poor knights of Christ," afterwards called the knights Templars, from their place of residence in the temple area at Jerusalem. The roads from the coast to the holy places were infested by Arabs whose depredations were made easier by the Moslem inhabitants of the country. In these circumstances, in 1119, Hugh de Payns and seven other knights vowed to devote their lives to the protection of pilgrims and travellers in the holy land. They conformed to the practice of the regular orders by professing poverty, chastity and obedience. When the council of Troyes formally sanctioned the order and gave it a rule (1128) the knights still numbered only nine, and no great change had taken place in the character and service of the order.

From the summer of 1122 until April 1125 Baldwin was continuously absent from his kingdom and for a considerable part of that time he was a prisoner. After his capture (April

¹ Fulcher iii. 40. Kem.'s statement regarding the ransom of the hostages is not in its chronological place (see p. 117, n. 2).

² Regarding the events of 1119 see chap. I, p. 67f. In the beginning of July 1121 Tuḡtakīn ravaged the Latin territories east of the Jordan. When Baldwin crossed into the Ḥaurān against him (5th July) he retreated and there was no regular battle. The Latins captured and destroyed a Moslem castle at Jarāsh (Fulcher iii. 10). I.A. speaks of a success gained by Tuḡtakīn in Jumādā I 515 (18th July—16th August). It may be a sequel of these events or I.A.'s version of them. Sibṭ iii. 362 also mentions a "great victory" of Tuḡtakīn's in A.H. 515.

³ I.A. i. 342.

1123) a council was held at 'Akka and Eustace of Caesarea and Sidon was elected regent. About the same time El-mamum, the new ruler of Egypt, resolved to attack Jaffa. He was urged by Tuğtakin and Aksonkor to make use of his opportunity¹. He sent troops by land to Jaffa and a fleet of some forty ships² to co-operate by sea. The fleet arrived in Ascalon about the middle of May. Jaffa was vigorously attacked and having only a small garrison was in great danger. But when Eustace appeared with the army of Jerusalem, after five or six days³, the Egyptians did not await his onset. They were pursued and overtaken at Yabna⁴ and again fled shamefully before they were attacked. Many were killed in their flight and the Moslem camp and large spoil fell to the victor (30th May 1123)⁵. Three days later a Venetian fleet arrived in 'Akka with the Doge on board. He was informed of what had just occurred and sailed at once to Ascalon where the Egyptian fleet now lay. The Moslems were surprised before dawn one morning, lying unsuspectingly at anchor. At the first onset their admiral's ship was sunk and after a brief resistance those still able to save themselves made off. Four galleys, four "cats" and a merchant ship were captured. Before the Venetians returned to 'Akka they captured also ten richly laden merchantmen off the Egyptian coast⁶.

On the 15th of June Eustace died and William de Buris of Tiberias was appointed his successor. In August an expedition was sent with Joscelin to assist Baldwin to escape from Khartbart. When the army reached Tell bashir, news was received that he was again a prisoner, now in Harran. The troops from Jerusalem ravaged the fields of Aleppo under Joscelin's leadership and then returned south. From 'Akka they made a raid across the Jordan before they finally dispersed⁷.

¹ I.M. iii. 468. He calls Aksonkor by anticipation "prince of Aleppo."

² I.M. iii. 469 (Fulcher 80 ships, Tyre 70).

³ Fulcher iii. 17 (5 days), I.M. iii. 469 (6 days).

⁴ Ibelim (William Tyre) or Ibenium (Fulcher).

⁵ Fulcher iii. 18 and I.M. iii. 469 (2 Rabi' ii). Most particulars are given by Fulcher iii. 17-18 and Tyre xii. 21 follows his authority. I.M. explains the retreat by the failure of Tuğtakin and Aksonkor to co-operate.

⁶ Tyre xii. 22-23. Fulcher iii. 20 is confused and inaccurate.

⁷ Fulcher iii. 22 and 25.

Ṭuḡtakin does not appear to have been engaged in the Latin war this year. He occupied the town of Ḥomṣ for a time, but failed to dislodge Ḳirkhan from the citadel. Maḥmud of Ḥama died and later on Ṭuḡtakin took possession of that town¹.

The Venetian crusade of 1123 was in response to an appeal of Baldwin's sent to Italy some time previously. During the winter which followed their arrival, after considerable discussion, an agreement was drawn out embodying the conditions on which they were willing to assist the Latins of Jerusalem. It was decided that Ascalon or Tyre should be besieged, and Tyre was chosen by lot. The city was still nominally an Egyptian dependency, but Ṭuḡtakin had already acted as its protector², and now again garrisoned and provisioned it to withstand this fresh attack. The troops which he sent were the main stay of its defence, apart from its situation and fortifications. Tyre lay on what was practically an island, although joined to the mainland by a narrow causeway about a bowshot in breadth. Round the whole circumference ran a double wall crowned by towers at intervals; on the eastern side, towards the land, were three successive walls. The Latins reached the city on the 15th of February 1124³. Their first care was to build a rampart across the causeway, from north to south, to protect them from the town. Siege engines of every kind were constructed in large numbers. Two towers were built, one by the Syrian Latins, the other by the Venetians. Only one ship was left afloat to watch the entrance of the harbour, the rest were beached. The huge stones which were shot into the town shook the walls and towers and crashed into the dwelling houses of the people. But the defenders were well equipped with powerful engines also and their well-directed fire made the task of the Latin engineers most perilous. There were constant engagements on the causeway which divided the contending parties, but the besiegers gained no ground. Once Ṭuḡtakin advanced to the neighbourhood of the town and there were rumours that an Egyptian

¹ I.A. i. 334 f. (in A.H. 517 which commences 23rd March 1123).

² In A.H. 516, commences 12th March 1122, when there was a threat of attack (I.A. i. 336). Similarly in A.D. 1122 (chap. I, p. 61 f.).

³ Fulcher iii. 28; Tyre xii. 24 and xiii. 4.

fleet was coming to the rescue. But ʿTuḡtakin withdrew when the Latins prepared to attack him, and not a single ship came from Egypt. Two insignificant raids from Ascalon were the only signs that the Egyptians took any interest in the beleaguered town. Seeing there was no help from the outside the task of the besiegers was simply to starve the town into surrender. Gradually the defence slackened. The greatest triumphs of the garrison were slight and unsubstantial. When the guardship was towed into the harbour by bold swimmers from the city it was replaced by another. On the 21st of June¹ an unexpected sally from the town resulted in the destruction of one of the most powerful of the Latin engines. But the skill of an Armenian engineer from Antioch put fresh life into the besiegers and ʿTuḡtakin counselled surrender. It was he who arranged the terms. The citizens were allowed either to depart in freedom, taking with them their moveable possessions, or to remain in the enjoyment of all their property subject to a fixed poll tax. The city surrendered on the 7th of July (1124)². Some complained that such a wealthy town should not escape being plundered, but the Latin chiefs kept faith. The Venetians were given one-third of the city, as had been agreed previously.

The occupation of Aleppo by El-burski (January 1125) and the failure of the Latin siege must have brought profound relief to ʿTuḡtakin after the death of Balak and the issue of the siege of Tyre. El-burski proved a worthy successor to Balak and Ilgazi. He won the Alepins by his justice and his wise government, and both ʿTuḡtakin and Kirkhan of Homs were his allies. Baldwin had not long been back in Jerusalem when he learned that El-burski had commenced his summer campaign (1125). Kafr ṣab was captured on the 8th of May³ and ʿEzaz was then

¹ Fulcher iii. 32 (xi Kal. July). He dates the capture of the guardship previous to this, although both he and Wm Tyre relate the event subsequently to the destruction of the machine.

² Monday 22nd Jumada I 518, Ibn Kh. iii. 456; Fulcher iii. 34 (Nones of July; *six dies* according to the Recueil text should be *ter septies*). So also Sibā iii. 565 (23rd Jumada I 518, calendar date 8th July) and I.A. i. 359 (Recueil 9th July). In I.M. iii. 469 28th Jumada I is presumably a textual error for 23rd Jumada I. Tyre xlii. 14 gives 3 Kal. July (=29th June) and Abulfida lii. 424 10th Jumada I. Most of the particulars in the text are from Tyre xlii. 5-14.

³ Friday 3rd Rabi' II 519, calendar date 9th May, Kem. iii. 651.

invested. It was in great peril when Baldwin's army arrived on the scene. A battle was fought on the 11th of June¹. By a feigned retreat the Latins threw El-burski off his guard and gained a complete victory. This on the one side, and on the other the king's desire to recover the hostages he had given at the time of his release, prepared the way for an armistice. The Latin captives were released for a ransom² and it was agreed that the revenues of Jebel summak and the other territories in dispute should be divided. It appears that the Latins did not permit the Moslem tax-gatherers to collect their share of the revenue, but there was no further war until next summer.

Baldwin seems to have remained in the north until September³. In October he built a castle on the hills beside Beirut, six miles from the town (mons Glavianus), so as to compel the natives to contribute to the Latin revenues⁴. War was then declared on ʿUḡtakin and a successful raid was made into his territories. When the king returned from this excursion he led the same forces straight to Ascalon, where a fresh garrison had just been stationed. The Moslems sallied out and were repulsed with the loss of forty men. Preparations were then made for a more serious expedition against the territories of Damascus. The Latins crossed the Jordan on the 13th of January (1126)⁵. They passed through the wadi Raḥub and marched slowly north through the territories of Damascus. On the 23rd of January they reached the traditional scene of St Paul's vision. ʿUḡtakin's army appeared in sight next day. On the 25th, which was the festival of the conversion of St Paul⁶, a battle was fought in the Marj ṣuffar. The Latin cavalry

¹ Mt. Ed. l. 143 ff. has most particulars. Fulcher iii. 42 dates the battle on June 11th ("Idibus in ternis" and the 25th day of the sun's being in Gemini). So also Mt. Ed. l. 145, Thursday 14th Dec (Recueil 11th June). In Kem. iii. 651 16th Rabi' ii 519 (i.e. 21st May, in accordance with p. 116, n. 3) may possibly be a complicated textual error for 6th Jumada i 519 (calendar date 10th June). May 21st is also a Thursday.

² Fulcher iii. 44; Mt. Ed. l. 145 confirms his evidence that the hostages remained prisoners until now (cf. p. 113, n. 1).

³ The evidence is not very clear (Kem. iii. 651 f.).

⁴ Fulcher iii. 45.

⁵ Fulcher iii. 50 (reading as Recueil text *sexto die decimae*).

⁶ Fulcher ("sacra die belli initium Conversio Pauli") agrees with Sibṭ who says that ʿUḡtakin marched out from Damascus on 27th Dhū'l-ḥijja, 24th January. I.A.

completely routed Tuḡtakin's horsemen, but when they returned from the pursuit they found that their camp had been plundered by the Turkish infantry. Probably this mischance accounts for Baldwin's decision to return home immediately. On the way back two solitary towers were captured and destroyed.

In March 1126 Pons laid siege to Rafaniya, which was still a Moslem stronghold. After eighteen days siege it was evacuated by its defenders (31st March)¹. Baldwin was present at the siege and afterwards celebrated Easter in Jerusalem. In May² a Latin expedition ravaged the territory of Homs. It retired on being menaced by the troops of El-bursḳi, who had just returned to Syria. After an interval the Moslem prince laid siege to Atharib (1st July)³. At the same time his troops captured a fortified post near Sarmel and laid waste the Latin fields⁴. The outer defences of Atharib had fallen when Baldwin and Joscelin advanced to its relief, but El-bursḳi retired without risking an engagement. He was joined by Tuḡtakin and a period of fruitless negotiation with the Latins followed. About the first week of August⁵ both parties withdrew. Tuḡtakin fell ill and returned to Damascus and El-bursḳi to Moṣul. El-bursḳi's career was already ended. He reached Moṣul in November and there on Friday the 26th of the month⁶, in the mosque at public worship, he was set upon and slain by eight "assassins" dressed as dervishes. Once more Islam had lost its champion. But its days of misfortune were nearly ended. It is El-bursḳi's fame to have saved Aleppo from its greatest peril. For twelve months

i. 372 is the only authority for the plundering of the Latin camp. His narrative is under A.H. 510 instead of A.H. 519, but gives the right month Dhu'l-hijja (ends 26th January in A.H. 519). Wm Tyre sets the arrival at the place of St Paul's conversion on its anniversary day, 25th January, which would make the battle on January 27th (against Fulcher and the Arabic sources). It is an obvious case of accommodation of dates.

¹ Fulcher iii. 53; Kem. iii. 652 gives end of Ḥafor 510, ending March 26th.

² Kem. iii. 652, about the end of Rabi' II, ends 24th May.

³ 8th Jumada II 510, Kem. iii. 653.

⁴ Kem. iii. 653; Fulcher iii. 53 calls the post "quoddam pseudo-castellum." It was fortified by Baldwin in the autumn of 1120 (Kem. iii. 618).

⁵ Middle of Rajab, Kem. iii. 653.

⁶ 9th Dhu'l-ḳa'da (Kem. iii. 654 and 'Imad ed-din quoted by Ibn Kh. i. 227); in I.A. i. 364 called 8th Dhu'l-ḳa'da (Recueil wrongly 28th November).

it was plunged again in civil war and changed its ruler more than once. After that, it was safe in the keeping of the great atabek, Zanki of Moṣul.

In the autumn of 1126 an Egyptian fleet sailed along the coast of Syria. Near Beirut the supply of water ran short and a landing was effected. The garrison of Beirut set upon the landing party and inflicted on it a sharp reverse¹. Towards the close of 1126 Bohemond II landed in Antioch and was received with the greatest rejoicing (October-November)². He was only a youth of eighteen, but affable and gallant and princely in his bearing. He was welcomed by his subjects for his father's sake, and Baldwin laid aside with equal gladness the burden of administering the northern principedom. The young prince married Baldwin's second daughter, Alice, and in the spring of 1127 his brief career opened auspiciously with the siege and recovery of Kafr ṭab³. Unfortunately a quarrel with Joscelin ensued. The old hero may not have found it easy to become the vassal of one who is described as still in fact a beardless boy. There was actual warfare, it seems, for a time, and on Joscelin's part alliance with the common Moslem foe. Baldwin⁴ however reconciled the disputants, and thus again rendered valuable service to the Latins of the north. In October, while the citadel of Aleppo was defended by one emir and attacked by another, Joscelin advanced to the gates; he was given a sum of money to retire⁵. Somewhat later, a detachment of Bohemond's troops also appeared outside the walls⁶. But already it was too late for the Latins to seek the conquest of Aleppo. 'Imad ed-din Zanki was ruler of Moṣul. A few weeks later his troops entered the Syrian town. It was now in stronger hands than even those of Ilgazi or Balak or Aḳsonkor el-bursḳi, and Zanki's career

¹ Fulcher iii. 56.

² While the sun was in the constellation of Scorpio, Fulcher iii. 61. Barhebr. 312 gives *anno græc.* 1438 which commences October 1126. Bohemond sailed from Apulia in September (Romeoald six. 419, under the year 1127, to which September 1126 may be reckoned).

³ Tyre xiii. 21.

⁴ The only other movement of Baldwin's this year (1127) was an expedition to the wadi Musa, but the exact date is unknown. Sibṭ iii. 566, in A.H. 521.

⁵ Kem. iii. 636; cf. I.A. i. 379 and Barhebr. 312 (under *anno græc.* 1439).

⁶ Only I.A. i. 379 mentions this.

ran a full course of twenty years. Of him Ibn el-athir, the Moslem historian, writes: "had not God, most high, been gracious to the Moslems and made the atabek ruler of the lands of Syria, they would certainly have become the possession of the Franks." He was not indeed the only saviour whom God raised up, as a pious Moslem might say, but he was greater than all his predecessors, and the history of the next twenty years may rightly be told under the title, 'Imad ed-din Zanki, ruler of Moşul and Aleppo.

CHAPTER III.

İMAD ED-DİN ZANKI.

LIKE the days of the Norman conquest in our own land the period of the Turkish conquest of Syrin was pre-eminently a time when noble or princely houses were founded. Zanki's father, Kāsim ed-daula Aksonkor¹, won his reputation in the armies of Malik Shah and the emirate of Aleppo was his reward. He ruled there ten years until 1094, when he lost his life in the contests for the vacant sultanate. The feature of his character which stands out most clearly is a certain ruthless strength which never spared a dangerous foe and carried him out to his own execution as if he himself had given the order. The same spirit lived again in Zanki when he was ruler. But meantime others seized Aleppo, for at his father's death Zanki was a boy only ten years of age².

About this same time, a little later, Kīwam ed-daula Kerboğa became ruler of Moşul. He had been a companion in arms of Aksonkor and for the memory of this friendship took Zanki under his protection. Thus Moşul became the place of Zanki's education and early training. From its rulers he learned lessons of success and failure in the conduct of a state. He remained resident in the town even after Kerboğa's death in 1102³. Before Maudud's accession (1108) he had distinguished himself by his bravery and capacity. He shared in that prince's campaigns against the Latins and was much esteemed by him.

¹ To be distinguished from Aksonkor el-burskl.

² A.S. Cairo 27 (his father's only surviving son).

³ I.A., from whom these particulars are taken, says that Zanki was adopted by Shams ed-daula Jakarmish. But according to Abulfida iii. 360 Jakarmish had a son of his own named Zankl (cf. Wilken ii. 578, note 2).

The Arabic historians delight to point out that his talents were thus early devoted to the *jihad* or holy war. In the expedition of 1111 he remained with Maudud through the whole campaign. In 1113 he signalled himself by his daring at the siege of Tiberias. In 1114 he served under El-burski, then for the first time ruler of Moṣul. Whatever the part he played under Mas'ud and his atabek Juyush Beg in the interval until El-burski's restoration in 1121¹, he lost by it neither the favour of El-burski nor that of the sultan Maḥmud². It was under the patronage of these latter that he entered on the career which established his fortune. In 1122 the sultan called El-burski to his help against the Arab chief Dubais ibn Ṣadāḡa and appointed him viceroy of the province of 'Irāq. Zanki rendered signal service in the contest which followed and was rewarded with the dependency of Wasit and the prefecture of Baṣra. He recognised in the promotion a stepping-stone to independence and resolved to quit El-burski's service for that of the sultan. After the decisive battle in March 1123 he refused to return to Moṣul. During the contests between the caliph and the sultan in 1125-26 Zanki was the instrument of Maḥmud's success and rose yet higher in his favour. His appointment to the important and difficult post of prefect of Bagdad and of all 'Irāq was a testimony to the confidence of the sultan in his high ability.

In the autumn of 1127 the emirate of Moṣul was rendered vacant, for the second time within a year, by the death of El-burski's son and successor. No position could have attracted Zanki more. In Bagdad he was overshadowed by the sultan. In Moṣul he was already known and esteemed, and nowhere had he less to learn of the policy which the situation demanded. It was therefore not an accident which led to the suggestion that he should be appointed atabek there, nor was there any candidate whom the sultan might reasonably prefer³. Upper Mesopotamia was assigned him as his province, along with Moṣul.

¹ See Weil iii. 214-219.

² A.S. Cairo 29.

³ Jawali, a mamluk of El-burski's, is said to have sent envoys to the sultan on his own behalf. They were bribed to act against him by a friend of Zanki's. But the considerations noted above forbid us to adopt Weil's summary statement that Zanki owed his nomination "simply to the readiness of the envoys to accept a bribe" (iii. 247). The bribery had its effect but was not everything.

'Imad ed-din Zanki in his new position was destined far to surpass the achievements of his predecessors. His career had already marked him as one well capable of consolidating the power placed in his hands. He possessed most of the qualities of a good soldier and capable ruler. He was a man of clear purpose, which is the first condition of success, and swift in the execution of his plans. He was unscrupulous and cruel in his treatment of enemies but his friends and subjects were the gainers. He was feared doubtless more than loved; yet his soldiers were attached to him, for he shrank from no danger and he made their interests his own. The power he gained was to the advantage of his people, for he sought to establish order and security in the states he governed. The even-handed justice which he administered is the mark of a strong ruler in the East. His conception of a state may still be read in his own words; it is "a garden surrounded by a hedge into which those who are outside fear to enter!"

Syria was not included in Zanki's sphere of influence by the sultan's grant. But Zanki did not allow this to set a bound to his schemes. He acted as if Aleppo was his rightful inheritance. He aimed from the first, without doubt, at establishing his sway over the whole of Moslem Syria. In this he followed the example of his predecessors. But a survey of his career brings to light a marked difference between his policy and theirs. The conquests he chiefly aimed at were from Moslem rivals. It must be concluded that he deliberately abstained from attack on the Latin states. While he built up his power he desired to be free from the risks of serious war with them. During a period of eight years, from the time he became ruler of Mosul, he invaded Latin territory only once. This invasion of Antioch in 1130 was a passing incident, called forth by special circumstances and of brief duration. The soldiers of Aleppo and Zanki's governor were indeed constantly engaged in border warfare with the Latins of Antioch. But the campaigns of the atabek in Syria were invariably directed in the first place and chiefly against Damascus and its dependencies. Zanki strained every effort to conquer Damascus; it is unlikely that the overthrow of the

¹ I.A. II. 141.

Latin states was any part of his policy. Only once before his famous capture of Edessa did he seriously take the aggressive against the Latins. It was in the year 1135, to secure a tract of country just beside Aleppo. The significance of Zanki's reign in its relation to the Latins lies in the fact that he erected a barrier against their progress and forged a weapon for their destruction. His attack on Edessa in 1144 was a deadly blow to their position but by no means characteristic of the events of his reign. It seems that he himself regarded it as a departure from his own policy, undertaken at the instigation of another¹.

It may be observed that Ibn el-athir leaves the impression that the *jihad* occupied a greater place in Zanki's career than it really did. He singles out for emphasis every expedition against the "infidels" and every victory over them, because these appeared to him the most glorious incidents in the atabek's career. As panegyrist of the rulers of Moṣul he had a special reason for exalting their services in the holy war, that they might not seem to come short of the achievements of Saladin, the supplanter of Zanki's house. An error in chronology² contributed to place the events of Zanki's first Syrian campaign in a false perspective. It was natural to think of the conqueror of Edessa as one devoted to the *jihad* throughout his whole career.

Promptitude and energy mark every step of Zanki's first movements as ruler of Moṣul. The sultan's grant was little else than a strong man's opportunity and as such Zanki used it. Without delay he secured the country north and west of Moṣul. The Ortoḡ princes were his most formidable rivals. Even they made outward submission within a few months, before the close of the year 1127. In the beginning of 1128 Zanki's troops occupied Aleppo, to the relief and satisfaction of the inhabitants. It was some months before they were followed by the atabek himself. His rear was secured by peace with Joscelin of Edessa³.

¹ Page 149, n. 3.

² See p. 129, n. 3.

³ I.A. i. 378. The truce was probably made for the year only, as next year Zanki ravaged the fields of Edessa on his way to Syria (Kem.). It was concluded apparently after the capture of Hama (I.A. i. 377, Arabic text).

and on the way he occupied the important town of Ḥarran¹. Mambij and Buza'a submitted to Zanki as he passed them² and Aleppo welcomed his appearance on the 18th of June (1128)³.

It was an opportune moment for intervention in Syrian politics. Damascus was weakened by the death of Tuḡtakin, which had taken place on the 11th of February⁴. His successor was a son named Taj el-muluk Buri⁵. The opportunity of gaining some of the dependencies of Damascus at once occupied Zanki's attention. His interview with Kırkhan of Ḥomṣ set matters in train for the following year⁶. Having spent some months in Syria⁷ and having established order in Aleppo Zanki set out for Baḡdad. The sultan was inclined to dispose of Syria, by a paper title, to another claimant, Dubais Ibn Ṣadaḡa. But Zanki was well received and in the end the diploma was conferred on him and not upon his rival⁸. Both the sultan and himself appreciated the value of the title he had already gained.

Somewhat late next year, in 1129⁹, Zanki returned to Syria. His intention was to occupy the towns between Aleppo and Damascus. With this object in view he wrote to the emir of Damascus proposing an alliance against the Latins. Burl, being distrustful, did not commit himself until he had received solemn assurances from the atabek that he would abstain from attacking Damascus, Ḥomṣ, and Ḥama¹⁰. Then he ordered his son, Beha

¹ It was not a Latin town as the Recueil translation of I.A. ii. 68 wrongly makes it appear (cf. I.A. i. 377).

² I.A. i. 380; ii. 33-34.

³ Kem. iii. 657, Monday, 17th Jumada II 522.

⁴ Ibn Kh. i. 274 (Saturday, 8th Ṣafar 522, calendar date 12th February); I.A. i. 382, 8th Ṣafar 522 (Recueil = 12th February).

⁵ Wilken reads the name sometimes Buri, sometimes Buzi; both even on the same page (ii. 584).

⁶ Kem. iii. 658.

⁷ Zanki's visit to the sultan is set by Kem. iii. 658 in A.H. 523, which commences 25th December 1128.

⁸ Kem. iii. 658; I.A. i. 380 speaks of a grant of Syria to Zanki before the occupation of Aleppo, but in a general statement such as is often inaccurate.

⁹ The best account of the following events is that given by Kem., although (Recueil text) he dates them in A.H. 524 (practically A.D. 1130). The year 523 (=A.D. 1129) is given by I.A. and is decisively confirmed by the fact that at the end of the period Bohemond's death takes place (Kem.). As that was in February 1130 (p. 129, n. 1) the preceding events fall in 1129. A.S. Cairo 31, line 3 gives A.H. 523, but in line 10 quotes Abu Ya'la for A.H. 524 (cf. line 13). Regarding Kem. see p. 126, n. 2.

¹⁰ Sibṭ iii. 568.

ed-din Sawinj of Hama, to join Zanki at Aleppo. For three days Sawinj was treated with every token of respect, and then unscrupulously arrested¹. Zanki marched at once on Hama, which was now destitute of its defenders and therefore surrendered without resistance (24th September 1129)². Kirkhan of Homs was an accomplice in this treachery. Six days after the occupation of Hama he was publicly installed governor of the city. That same day he was arrested by Zanki's order. The atabek expected to gain Homs as he had gained Hama. Buri of Damascus was entangled in a conflict with Baldwin of Jerusalem, so the opportunity was doubly favourable. But on this occasion Zanki's faithlessness failed to accomplish its purpose. He besieged Homs for forty days without success. The approach of winter compelled him to return to Aleppo in November³. There he remained for several months⁴.

The establishment of Zanki's power in Syria during the years 1128 and 1129 caused the Latins no alarm. In 1128 there was nothing in the atabek's doings to draw their special attention. In 1129 they may have welcomed his occupation of Hama and his attack on Homs, for they were themselves engaged in a joint campaign against Buri of Damascus. They advanced from the south while he attacked from the north. Damascus lay between two fires. The vital part of the conflict between Aleppo and Jerusalem for years to come appears for a moment unobscured

¹ Kem. iii. 660. The following particulars are also from Kem.

² The date is uncertain. Kem. iii. 660 gives Saturday, 8th Shawal 524. Assuming the year to be 523 (see p. 125, n. 9) the Christian date is 24th September 1129. As however this was a Tuesday there is an error in the day of the month (on this assumption). In A.H. 524 8th Shawal = 14th September 1130, a Friday.

³ Dhu'l-hijja (Kem. iii. 660). In A.H. 523 this month began on 15th November (1129), in A.H. 524 on the 5th of November (1130).

⁴ Kem. iii. 661 makes it clear that Zanki was still in Aleppo at the time of the conflict between Alice and Baldwin in the beginning of 1130 and that he invaded Antioch before he returned to Mesopotamia (see chap. III, page 129). The *Recueil* editor unnecessarily refers his statements to the events of 1131-32 (p. 131). I.A. i. 387, against the evidence of Kem., says that Zanki returned to Mosul before he attacked Antioch in the spring of 1130. Wm Tyre's statement that Alice wrote to Zanki in February or March 1130 tends to support Kem. (Tyre xlii. 27). His reference to an inroad by "Rodwan" before Bohemond's death presumably gives the Moslem emir's name wrongly (? = Zanki).

in the events of this year. Damascus was a buffer state on the fate of which much depended. It was sufficient for the Latins of Jerusalem that it should remain independent and that its power should not be cast on the side of the emir of northern Syria. But their most natural policy was to seek its conquest. All Palestine except Ascalon was now occupied. If Jerusalem was to extend its boundaries the next stage was the conquest of Damascus. Throughout Baldwin's reign it had been a troublesome enemy both in north and south, so that all the Latin states were directly interested in such an enterprise. The death of Tugtakın (February 1128) does not seem to have produced any immediate movement on the Latin side. In the following April Baldwin wasted the country round Ascalon¹, and in the course of the year a castle near Sidon was besieged by the patriarch². Plans were however being made, the execution of which depended on the anticipated arrival of reinforcements from Europe. After the order of the knights of the Temple had been sanctioned by the council of Troyes (January 1128) its master, Hugh de Payns, traversed England, Scotland and France seeking recruits for the order and for a new crusade. He returned to Palestine in 1129, accompanied by a large and distinguished band of knights, and the projected attack on Damascus was made in November of that year. Possibly the expedition was disastrously hastened by a train of circumstances whose starting-point goes back to the year 1126. In that year Banyas was given by Tugtakın into the charge of an Ismailian³ leader and the doctrines of the sect gained a footing in Damascus. He was killed in battle in 1128, but Banyas continued in possession of one of his followers. In 1129 this emir and others of the sect in Damascus plotted to surrender the city to the Latins. The plot was discovered at the commencement of September and the leaders in Damascus were put to death. It is not clear whether Baldwin's final preparations for the expedition had already commenced or whether they were precipitated in consequence of the mis-

¹ Rev. Or. Lat. iii. 46 (no. 11).

² Tyre xiii. 25 (in determination of the year see Rohricht 184, note 8).

³ Another designation of the "Assassins" of northern Syria, derived from the name Isma'il, one of the chiefs of the sect.

fortune of the conspirators. In either case it was decided to proceed. Pons of Tripolis, Bohemond of Antioch and Joscelin of Edessa all gave their help. Banyas was surrendered by its governor. Although it was the latter part of November¹ the Latins resolved to advance on Damascus. They seem to have counted on the treachery of confederates within the city or to have been unwilling to disperse their forces without some employment of their strength. They encamped near Damascus but only for a very short time. A large part of the army set off one day to strip the country of supplies. Horsemen from the city followed them; the Latins were overtaken in the Marj asfar, about 38 miles south-west of Damascus, and severely defeated (5th December)². Just at this moment the rains of winter commenced. There were violent thunderstorms and a downfall of snow. In such circumstances a siege was out of the question and the Latins returned home. Their expedition had been a most discouraging failure, although its issue might have been foreseen. Banyas however remained in their possession and was an important gain. The town lies at the head of the Jordan valley and commands the country as far as Hule and Tiberias. Its occupation gave security to a district which could not easily be protected so long as Banyas remained a Moslem stronghold. Hurl did not attempt its recovery. The policy of Damascus during his reign was altogether insignificant. He died two and a half years later on the 6th of June 1132³, of wounds received in the preceding year. Until then the Latins made no further movement against Damascus.

In the year 1130 unexpected events took place in Antioch. There was almost civil war within its borders and a situation was created which left Antioch without an effective leader for some years to come. The discord began with Bohemond's death.

¹ After the 15th (I.A. i. 385). Bohemond's capture of the castle of Qal'mus in the Jebel Anjariya in A.H. 523 (I.A. i. 387) may be dated earlier in this year. The castle had been for some time in the hands of the Assassins (I.A. i. 383).

² Tyre xlii. 16, where however A.D. 1130 is erroneous; the Arabic sources give A.H. 523. Wm Tyre gives an account of the expedition but not of the events which led up to it (recorded by I.A. i. 384 ff. and Sibh. lii. 567 f.). He mentions 'Fuṭakīn as if he were still alive.

³ Ibn Kh. i. 274 (Monday, 21st Rajab 526, calendar date 7th June); so also I.A. i. 395 f. but without the day of the week (Recueil wrongly 10th June).

In the early part of 1130, after his return from Damascus¹, he was surprised and slain in Cilicia. His infant daughter Constance was his heir. But his wife Alice, Baldwin's daughter, desired to succeed her husband. When Baldwin arrived before Antioch she refused him entrance and even wrote to Zanki proposing that he should become her ally². Certain of the nobles admitted Baldwin to the city and Alice then made her submission.

It is not surprising that Zanki was attracted by these events. Rather it is surprising that he made so little use of the opportunity they gave him. Sometime in spring he invaded the territory of Antioch³. He encamped against Atharib. Baldwin⁴ advanced to its relief and a battle was fought. The Latins were defeated but Zanki lost heavily⁵. After plundering and destroying the suburbs of Atharib⁶ he advanced to Harim. The Latins purchased his retreat by surrendering half the revenues of the district. The atabek returned to Aleppo and made no further movement. His presence was required in Mesopotamia. He left Syria and took no further personal part in its politics for several years. In the latter part of 1130 he was occupied in war with a league of the Ortok princes⁷. From 1131 to 1133 the revived energy of the caliphate demanded his attention and in

¹ I.A. i. 391 and Barhebr. 314 give A.H. 524 which commences 15th December 1129. (Willken dates in 1131 although his authority is Barhebraeus). Wm Tyre seems to imply that Bohemond's death took place soon after his return from the south (xlii. 27). He says he was in Cilicia from causes "*quæ domesticam et familiarem habebant rationem*." Romoald xix. 419 relates the event under the year 1130 (cf. Muratori vii. 185), whilst xix. 420 gives the year 1131. The right month is probably given on page 420 (February) only it must be assigned to A.D. 1130.

² Tyre xlii. 27.

³ Kem. iii. 661 passes now from A.H. 524 to 525. In reality it should be from 523 to 524 (cf. p. 125, n. 9). The particulars which follow are taken from I.A. i. 387 f. and li. 72 ff. controlled by Kem.'s statements, which may usually be preferred to those of I.A. when they conflict with them (except in the special question of chronology above noted). In particular I.A. has fallen into the serious error of dating the capture of Atharib in this year (1130) instead of 1135. Only the *rudd* or oulying houses round the castle were now destroyed. It is difficult to reconcile even I.A.'s own account of Atharib in 1138 with his statements about its alleged destruction in 1130. The Recueil translation somewhat conceals the difficulty.

⁴ In I.A. ii. 72 it is the "*klug*" who advances.

⁵ I.A. ii. 76.

⁶ Kem.'s representation (cf. note 3). He does not mention Harim but says Ma'orat mesrin suffered (iii. 661).

⁷ I.A. i. 389 f. In li. 70 ff. the fighting with the Ortoks is put before the "capture" of Atharib.

1134 he was at war with the Kurds. During these years he was represented in Aleppo by an emir named Sawar or Aswar, who had been previously in the service of Buri. He commanded the troops of Aleppo in the petty warfare which was constantly carried on with Antioch.

It is not known how long Baldwin remained in Antioch in 1130 nor how soon he contracted the illness of which he died in Jerusalem. His death took place on the 21st of August, probably in the year 1131¹. He was the last of the leaders of the first crusade and the last surviving founder of the Latin states. For twenty years in Edessa and for twelve in Jerusalem his career was one of continuous warfare. It was distinguished from first to last by unwearied energy and a certain moderate success. In Edessa Baldwin's resources were small and his achievements must be judged accordingly. But as king of Jerusalem when he commanded the united forces of the Latin states against Ilgazi and El-burski he accomplished nothing very great. It cannot well be doubted that Bohemond I or Baldwin I in his position would have achieved much more, and the fact remains that already under his leadership the Latins of Antioch were losing ground. With all deductions, however, Baldwin's death was a grave loss to the cause which he served. His policy of presenting a united front to the Moslem attacks in northern Syria was assuredly the best possible. Its abandonment, a few

¹ Tyre xii. 28. In Orlerticus xii. 23 the year is 1130 (18 Kal. September) and in favour of this it may be argued that the chronology of Wm Tyre just before this point (xiii. 26) is a year too far advanced (p. 128, n. 2) and also that Baldwin's expedition to Antioch and subsequent death are related as if they closely followed the death of Bohemond II, which was in February 1130 (p. 129, n. 1). On the other hand, at Baldwin's death his grandchild, Fulk's son, is called (Tyre xiii. 28) *puero jam minuto* (2 years old, in his second year?) which would be impossible in 1130, considering the date of his parents' marriage (p. 131, n. 2). In agreement with this Fulk at his accession is said to have been in Palestine *quasi triennio* (xiv. 2) which peculiar expression may be understood of the period from April 1129 to August 1131 but not of the lesser period to 1130. Thus Wm Tyre's narrative supplies confirmation of the date of his chronological framework (cf. appendix). Baldwin's expedition to Antioch is dated by Kem. iii. 661 and Barheh. 315 in A.H. 523 (commences 4th December 1130) and by the latter in *anno græc.* 1442 (commences 1st October 1130). These dates exclude the possibility of the king's death being in August 1130. But probably, at least in the case of Kem., the Moslem year should be A.H. 524 (cf. p. 125, n. 9, and p. 126, n. 4). It is unlikely that Baldwin's expedition is confused with that of Fulk in 1131-32 (cf. p. 131, n. 3).

years later, weakened greatly the Latin position in north and south alike.

Shortly after Baldwin's death Joscelin of Edessa died of injuries which he had received while besieging a Moslem castle in the previous year¹. He was succeeded by Joscelin II, whose mother was a sister of the Armenian prince Leo. The new king of Jerusalem was Fulk of Anjou, grandfather of Henry II of England. He was Baldwin's son-in-law and heir by the king's choice. He married Baldwin's daughter Melisend in May 1129². Immediately after his accession to the throne of Jerusalem Alice revived her claim to Antioch. She was supported by Pons of Tripolis and by Joscelin II of Edessa. Fulk maintained his predecessor's policy and occupied Antioch as the protector of Constance. Pons established himself in Er-ruj and harassed the king's party until he was attacked and severely defeated³. Peace was then happily restored and the king remained in Antioch for some time setting its affairs in order (1132?). During his stay a band of marauding Turkomans, who attacked Ma'arat mesrin and Kafr tab, were successfully repulsed⁴.

Before the end of 1132 Fulk had troubles of his own in Jerusalem. He was obliged to take the field against one of his vassals, Hugh of Jaffa. The conflict was not in itself serious but it gave the new ruler of Damascus, Shams el-muluk Isma'il an opportunity to recover Banyas (15th December 1132)⁵. Just at the same critical moment news came to the king that his presence was urgently required in the north. Pons of Tripolis had been

¹ Tyre xiv. 3; cf. Barhebr. 315, dating apparently in *anno græc.* 1442, i.e. before 1st October 1131.

² Tyre xiii. 24 (before Whitsunday, i.e. June 2nd). The date is important because it helps to determine that of Baldwin's death (p. 130, n. 1). The year is that following the events of xiii. 23, which belong to 1128. Ordericus xii. 23 gives 1129 and Bouquet xii. 552 excludes an earlier year. Since Fulk arrived in the middle of spring (beginning of April?) his marriage probably took place not later than the middle of May.

³ Tyre xiv. 4-5, without indicating how soon after Fulk's accession he went to Antioch. Kem. iii. 664 alludes to the civil war in Antioch under A.H. 526 (= 23rd November 1131-11th November 1132); I.A. L. 400 refers to it under A.H. 527.

⁴ Kem. iii. 664f.

⁵ I.A. l. 792, (397). Abu'l-mehasin iii. 308 gives A.H. 527 which includes December 1132 so that Reuencil wrongly has A.D. 1133. Tyre xiv. 17 names Taj el-muluk as ruler of Damascus. He dates the capture of Banyas at the time of the trouble with Hugh of Jaffa.

defeated by a band of Turkomans and was shut up in the castle of Barin (Mons Ferrandus)¹. Fulk at once proceeded to his rescue. He raised the siege and drove off the enemy². He also took part in an expedition shortly afterwards from Antioch against Sawar of Aleppo. Sawar was defeated near Qinnasrin in the beginning of January 1133³. Before Fulk returned to Jerusalem it was decided to invite Raymond of Poitou to be prince of Antioch⁴. He was a noble at the court of Henry I of England and readily accepted the invitation. But he did not arrive in Syria until the year 1136.

Shams el-muluk's capture of Banyas in December 1132 was the commencement of a career of promise which was soon cut off. Hama was surrendered to him on the 6th of August 1133, after two days attack, and Shaizar then became tributary⁵. In September Shams el-muluk was in Damascus. Two months later he captured Shakif tirin, a fortress in the district of Sidon. Its occupant had been an enemy both to Muslims and to Christians⁶. All this activity now stirred the Latins into action. In 1134 Fulk invaded the Hauran. Shams el-muluk caused his retreat by a counter invasion of the territories of Jerusalem⁷. It is not clear what his general policy towards the Latins would have been had he lived. In September 1134 he agreed to a temporary peace⁸ and in the beginning of the

¹ I.A. i. 399 f. (in A.H. 517). Wm Tyre makes the Alepins the besiegers and calls "Sanguineus" (Zanki) their leader.

² I.A. without naming Fulk. Cf. Kem. iii. 664 f.

³ I.A. i. 792 relates this separately before the repulse of the Turkomans but dates in Safar 517 (i.e. before 10th January 1133). He says Sawar was supported by many Turkomans (cf. Wm Tyre). Kem. iii. 665 dates in Rabi' i 518 (January 1134) if the text is correct (cf. n. 5). He adds some particulars to I.A.'s account. Possibly Fulk besieged and captured the castle of Kūsair, near Antioch, before he returned home (see p. 133, n. 6). During his absence the "castellum Arnoldi" was fortified for the protection of pilgrims to Jerusalem from the attacks of the garrison of Ascalon (Tyre xiv. 8: cf. p. 49, n. 1).

⁴ Tyre xiv. 9. Wm Tyre relates the capture of Banyas and the conflict with Hugh of Jaffa (xiv. 13-18) after giving his account of the expedition to the north (xiv. 6-9). Probably this expedition intervened in the midst of the troubles in Jerusalem between the events of xiv. 15-17 and those of xiv. 18.

⁵ I.A. i. 397 f.; Kem. iii. 666 has the same month, Shawal, and possibly same year, 517.

⁶ I.A. i. 401.

⁷ Sibj iii. 570.

⁸ I.A. i. 402, Dhu'l-ka'da 518 (ends 21st September 1134). Cf. Tyre xiv. 19 (two years after the capture of Banyas). Wm Tyre speaks of the truce as *pax temporalem* and says the captives made at Banyas in 1132 were released.

following year he was assassinated at the instigation of private enemies (30th January 1135)¹.

This event brought Zanki once more to Syria. He learned the news at Rakka, which he had just seized by an act of treachery (7th February). Its possession further secured the way between Mosul and Aleppo. By a rapid move Hama was regained², but such promptitude was of no avail against Damascus. Mu'in ed-din Anar, a mamluk of Tuğtakin's, directed its affairs for the time³. On the 16th of March Zanki gave his recognition to Shihab ed-din Mahmud, brother of the late prince. Anar received the important position of governor of Homs when it was surrendered to Mahmud by Kirkhan's children and officers⁴. In May 1136 the command of the army and the chief power in Damascus passed into the hands of the emir Bazwash⁵.

From 1130 to 1134 the chronicle of Sawar's battles with the Latins of Antioch and Edessa contains nothing of great importance⁶. Each side attacked the other as opportunity offered. The fight at Kinnesrin in January 1133 was the chief engagement

¹ 14th Rabi' ii 529, calendar date 1st February 1135 (I.A. i. 403, Kem. iii. 668, Ibn Kh. i. 274 and Abulfida iii. 458). According to Ibn Kh. the day was Thursday and so January 31st, but since Kem. calls it a Wednesday it is probable that the assassination took place on the night of Wednesday 30th January.

² Kem. iii. 670; I.A. i. 416 is rightly in harmony with this so that the Recueil editor's note is in error.

³ I.A. i. 405.

⁴ Abulfida, Recueil i. 27, A.H. 530 (begins 11th October 1135). He was in Homs on the 15th June 1137 (Kem. iii. 672, cf. also I.A. i. 420). Recueil Atlas is another reading of the name Anar. According to van Berchem the correct pronunciation is Omir or Unur. Wm Tyre writes "Ainardus."

⁵ I.A. i. 416 (Shahin 530).

⁶ After Zanki left Syria, Sawar engaged in war without success against Joscelin and also again attacked Atharib (Kem. iii. 661 dates in A.H. 523 but the previous correction to 524 = A.D. 1130 may be again required). Before Joscelin's death Kaifun was besieged for a short time by the sultan of Iconium (Tyre xiv. 3, whose date, about the time of Fulk's accession, is confirmed by Barheh. 315, *anno græc.* 1447, i.e. before October 1131). In A.H. 527 (12th November 1132-31st October 1133) "Baldwin" of Jerusalem (? Fulk) captured the castle of Kuqair (Barheh. 311). Sometime before the battle of Kinnesrin (January 1133) Kaifun was retaken from the Latins and bought by the Ismailian chief Abu'l-fath (Kem. iii. 665; I.A. i. 400 in A.H. 527). Shortly after Kinnesrin Sawar defeated a detachment of the army of Antioch and reinforcements from Edessa (I.A. i. 792, Kem. iii. 665). In Jumada ii 527 (April 1133) he invaded the territory of Tell bashir (I.A. i. 400, cf. Kem. iii. 665). In A.H. 528 he made an expedition into the district south and south-west of Aleppo (Kem. iii. 667). In this same year there was war between the Latins and the ruler of Malatya (I.A. i. 402, 793).

that was fought. Neither castles nor towns seem to have been lost or gained on either side. Very different is the record of Zanki's achievements in the spring of 1135. He resolved to attack those Latin strongholds which still lay in the very neighbourhood of Aleppo. His brief campaign was a triumphal progress. The Latins were taken by surprise and no army resisted his operations. Atharib fell first. It was captured on the 17th of April¹. Other successes followed in quick succession. Zaredna made no serious resistance. Ma'arat en-nu'man, Kafr tab² and all the country between Aleppo and Hama was restored to the Moslem faith. It was Zanki's first campaign against the Latins and was conspicuously successful³. From these conquests Zanki turned to an attack on Hama. After a feint on Barin he swiftly approached the city. While he was laying waste the neighbourhood news reached him that a Latin army had taken the field at last. It was commanded by Pons of Tripolis⁴ and doubtless included the forces both of Antioch and of Tripolis. Zanki advanced towards Kinneret, where the Latins were, and drove them off, easily it seems. Then he returned to Hama and for ten days in the beginning of August occupied himself in burning the fields round about and in delivering attacks on the city⁵. Immediately afterwards Zanki left Syria, for his presence was urgently required in Mosul and Bagdad. For more than another year he was involved in the wars of the sultan and the caliph. But the weakness of Antioch had been laid bare by the events of the summer. Zanki's lieutenant Snwar took the lesson to heart. In 1136 Antioch suffered an invasion unparalleled in its previous history. Sawar carried fire and sword across the principality to Laodicea, on the coast. A hundred villages were given to the flames⁶. The plunder of Laodicea itself was only part of the rich booty brought back to Aleppo.

¹ 1st Rajab 529 (Kem. iii. 670).

² Kem. iii. 671.

³ I.A. divides the captures of this campaign between 1130 (Atharib) and 1137 (Ma'ara and Kafr tab) during the siege of Barin (I.A. i. 422, ii. 110).

⁴ Kem. iii. 671 "son of Pons," who did not succeed until 1137.

⁵ Kem. iii. 671 (dating in the last ten days of Shawal).

⁶ Kem. Wilken represents the expedition as one into Cilicia, where there is another Laodicea. An attempt to surprise Balaninus made by the emir of Biktirayil belongs to this period (A.H. 530). Troops from Antioch raised the siege (Nuwairi quoted by van Berchem, *Inscrip.* 494).

The weakness of Antioch in these years, 1135-36, is explained by the weakness of its government. Two parties intrigued for supremacy in the principedom. Bohemond's wife Alice was nominal ruler at last. Fulk was persuaded by her sister, his wife Melisend, to abstain from interference¹. The party which supported Constance awaited the arrival of Raymond of Poitou. The patriarch craftily persuaded Alice that Raymond might become her husband. In these circumstances there was no one in Antioch to take the lead against Zanki nor was there mutual confidence between the contending parties in the divided city. Fulk of Jerusalem was the one hope of the situation and might have come to the rescue. Possibly he regarded himself as no longer responsible because of his agreement with Alice. The simplest way of acting on it was to abstain from all interference in the affairs of the north. His presence in Antioch for any purpose was sure to produce complications. At the same time Fulk's inactivity may also be viewed as the triumph of a new policy in the south. Even in Baldwin's lifetime there was a party which complained that the king wasted the strength of Jerusalem and endangered the safety of the Holy Cross in remote and perilous enterprises². He seemed neglectful of his proper kingdom in his zeal for the interests of the north. It was Baldwin's experience as ruler of Edessa which influenced his policy. He knew the danger which threatened the northern states from Mosul and Aleppo, and he understood how the interests of Jerusalem were at stake in the issue of the struggle. Fulk had not the same grasp of the situation nor the same wide outlook. He was the first of the kings of Jerusalem to be trained in an atmosphere of "separatism." The others had shared in a common cause and learned that the suffering and success of one member affected all the other members too. Fulk neither understood the true interests of Jerusalem nor realised the gravity of the situation in the north. The Moslems were left to deal with Antioch and Edessa. Tripolis was a dependency of Jerusalem and continued to receive assistance from it.

Fulk has also been charged with incapacity and weakness of

¹ Tyre xiv. 20.

² Cf. Fulcher iii. 9.

character¹. This estimate of him is founded on certain statements made by William of Tyre. He is represented as more than sixty years of age, a worn out man, with his memory almost gone, controlled by favourites. In reality when Fulk became king he was about forty years old; he was deliberately chosen by Baldwin and his councillors as a fit successor and he justified the choice by frequent displays of decision and energy. It may be said, even, that in his reign the kingdom of Jerusalem enjoyed its period of greatest prosperity. It was Fulk's northern policy, not his general ability, which was at fault. William of Tyre is not to be relied on in justification of the contrary view².

In Jerusalem the garrison of Ascalon was again active in its depredations during the years 1132-36³. Emboldened by frequent successes and continually reinforced from Egypt it was a standing menace on the borders. To guard the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem a castle was fortified at Bait nuba early in 1133. Later a scheme of planting castles at intervals round the city, within an 8-12 miles radius, was adopted. In pursuance of this plan a fortress was erected at Bait Jibrin (Jibelin) in 1136. It was situated on the edge of the plain at the foot of the hills east of Ascalon, twelve miles away. The village and the district were the property of the hospital of St John in Jerusalem and the fortress was accordingly committed to the care of the Master and brethren of that order. This was the beginning of the territorial influence of the knights Hospitallers in the neighbourhood of Ascalon and is also the first known instance of their activity as a military order. Since the capture of Jerusalem by the Latins they had been zealous as a brotherhood devoted to the nursing of the sick and to works of charity⁴. Inspired now, it may be supposed, by the example of the knights Templars they extended the range of their activities and also became a

¹ So Wilken and others.

² See Kugler's criticism in *Studien* 49 ff.

³ Tyre xiv. 8 and 22.

⁴ Before the first crusade there was a Christian hospital in Jerusalem founded by a citizen of Anath for the care of pilgrims. When the crusaders took Jerusalem the "xenodochium" was superintended by a certain Gerard. His work rapidly developed under the new conditions and received the support of Godfrey, Baldwin I and many others who recognised its value. The poorer pilgrims and especially the sick were the objects of his care. Gerard remained at the head of the institution until his death in September 1120.

military order. The transition was made under the guidance of the second Master, Raymond du Puy (1120-1160). It is significant that from the first in their new capacity the protection of the Latin borders was their special duty. It was on the borders that the service of the military orders was most required, and as their wealth increased and their organisation was perfected they became the most efficient defenders of the Holy Land. Meantime from 1136 the knights of Bait Jibrin effectively checked the raids of the garrison of Ascalon.

The year 1137 was an eventful one in Syria. In the early part of the year the army of Diunascus under Bazwash¹ invaded Tripolis, encouraged, doubtless, by the success of Sawar's invasion of Antioch in 1136. In March² a battle was fought in which Pons was defeated. He fled amongst the hills of Lebanon, was captured by the inhabitants and put to death. His son Raymond succeeded him and at once took what revenge he could on the dwellers amongst the hills. They were even suspected of having invited Bazwash to undertake his expedition.

After this Zanki returned to Syria. He reached Aleppo on the 15th of June. True to his former policy he at once renewed the siege of Homs³. Mu'in ed-din Anar was governor of the city⁴. After negotiations and attacks which occupied some three weeks Zanki relinquished his attempt (11th July)⁵, and turned away to the siege of the Latin castle of Barin. Raymond of Tripolis was joined by Fulk in an effort to raise the siege. Zanki heard of their approach and surprised the Latins on the march, entangled in the hills. Raymond was taken prisoner and Fulk took refuge in Barin, where he now became one of the besieged. Zanki again attacked the castle⁶ and by a strict

¹ I.A. i. 419; Tyre xiv. 23 (Bazeuge=Bazwash).

² I.A. Rajah 531. The exact date of Pons' death, Sunday 4th Rajah 531, 28th March 1137, is given by Cod. arab. Quiremère (Kugler, *Studien* 55, note 10).

³ The dates are given by Kem. iii. 679. In I.A. i. 420 Sha'ban is a textual error for Shawal.

⁴ Kem. iii. 672 (Recueil Anar or Oner); I.A. i. 420 (Recueil Anar).

⁵ 20th Shawal 531 (I.A. i. 421, Recueil 20th July). I.A. ii. 115 under A.H. 537 (=1143) gives what may be a wrongly dated reference to these events and those of A.D. 1138. Homs was besieged and captured in Shawal 537 and Zanki spent the following winter in the territory of Damascus.

⁶ Tyre and I.A. i. 481. Kem. iii. 673 does not mention the first attack on Barin and explains Raymond's advance against Zanki as an attempt to relieve Homs.

investment soon reduced its defenders to serious straits. The approach of another relief force induced Zanki to offer favourable terms of surrender. They were accepted by the garrison, who did not know that help was close at hand. Free exit was allowed to those in the castle and the prisoners taken in the recent battle were released. This was in the third week of August¹. The relieving army dispersed when the news reached them; it had been commanded by Raymond of Antioch. Barin was an important capture, for its garrison had been a scourge to the Moslems of the plain which stretches towards Homs and Hama.

While Moslems and Latins were thus engaged a Greek army was on the point of entering Syria. The interference of the Greeks once more in the affairs of the Latin states is the most novel feature in the history of the year 1137. The emperor John had greatly strengthened the position of the empire in Asia Minor. In Cilicia this brought him into rivalry with the Latins of Antioch and with Leo the Armenian. After Bohemond's death a proposal was made that a son of his should marry Constance and become prince of Antioch. The emperor was much aggrieved when Raymond of Poitou was preferred. It was probably in the latter part of 1136 that Raymond arrived in Antioch and married the child Constance. Alice was compelled to resign her position and Raymond took the reins of government. This settlement of affairs was one cause which led the emperor to invade Cilicia in the summer of 1137. The expedition was directed also in part against the Armenian prince Leo². The Greek army reduced the principal towns of Cilicia, made a prisoner of the Armenian prince and then advanced against Antioch. News of this advance brought Raymond hurriedly back from his expedition to the relief of Barin³.

¹ In the last ten days of Dhū'l-ka'da, i.e. 10-19 August (Kem. iii, 673). I.A. and Wm Tyre do not support Kem.'s intimation that the castle was destroyed before evacuation and it is in itself improbable.

² Ibn el-athir supposes that the emperor came to co-operate with the Latins against the Moslems!

³ According to Kinnamos i. 113 the emperor was besieging Anazarba when Raymond came to Fulk's assistance. Tyre xiv. 26 may be understood to say that he was close at hand (*pro foribus*). It is incredible that Antioch was already invested. According to an Armenian chronicle the emperor encamped before Antioch on the

Antioch was bombarded for some days by the emperor's siege engines and then Raymond judged it prudent to yield. The terms imposed were that he should swear allegiance to the emperor and hold Antioch as a fief, and, further, that as soon as Aleppo, Shaizar, Hama and Homs were conquered and handed over to him he should surrender Antioch entirely. One cannot suppose that these terms were agreeable to Raymond. Perhaps he and his advisers were influenced by the conviction that the Moslem towns, for which he was to exchange Antioch, could not be captured. It was agreed that there should be a joint campaign against them next summer. Meantime the emperor, having received Raymond's oath of fealty and seen his banner planted on the citadel of Antioch, returned to Cilicia to spend the winter. The agreement was made about the beginning of September¹.

After this Zanki resumed his campaign against the dependencies of Damascus. The presence of the Greek army did not affect his plans. An embassy from the emperor, shortly after the 10th of September², conveyed, no doubt, what appeared to be satisfactory assurances³. The departure of the Greeks to Cilicia was reassuring. There was no evidence that those who had acted this summer as Raymond's enemies would return next year to be his allies. Bazwash of Damascus on the other hand had recently given proofs of an energy and activity which might be dangerous. Zanki accordingly resolved to strike more directly at his territories. About the middle of October, after an attack on Homs, he started southward. He threatened Ba'albek as he passed and swept through the Biqa'. He captured the fortress of 'Ain Jar at its southern extremity and received the submission of the governor of Banyas. It was after the 17th of December when he turned north once more to resume the siege of Homs⁴.

20th of August (Journal asiatique, 1889, xiii. 77), i.e. after the surrender of Barin (as determined on p. 138, n. 1). Leo died a prisoner in Constantinople *anno græc.* 1459 (Barhele. 342).

¹ According to Kem. iii. 674 the emperor left Antioch shortly before the 10th of September.

² This is the date when the embassy left Nagra (12nd Dhu'l-hijja, Kem. iii. 674).

³ The only conflict with the Greeks, it appears, was a skirmish just before this in which the Moslems were commanded by Sawar (Kem. iii. 674).

⁴ All these particulars are from Kem. iii. 674; he calls the fortress of 'Ain Jar, Majlal.

Early in 1138 Raymond ordered the arrest of the Moslem merchants and of others of the same faith who were resident in Antioch (January-February)¹. Before the end of March the emperor and his army had returned to Antioch and the allies commenced their campaign on the 31st of that month. They marched, in the first place, to Buza'a, which was reached on Easter Sunday, the 3rd of April², and which capitulated six days later (April 9th)³. Four hundred of the inhabitants are said to have become Christians in order to save their lives. Others were put to death in spite of the terms of the capitulation. During the ten days which the allies spent in this neighbourhood expeditions were sent out in all directions, even across the Euphrates⁴. Zanki meantime remained at Homs and sent Sawar with reinforcements to Aleppo, which entered the town on the 9th of April⁵. On Thursday the 14th⁶ the emperor's army approached the city, having spent a day on the road from Buza'a. Next Tuesday they assaulted the town and the garrison sallied out in retaliation⁷. But no other encounter is recorded. On Wednesday the allies marched away. The scarcity of water and of supplies in the neighbourhood is given as the reason of this retreat⁸. Next day the garrison of Atharib deserted the castle and the Greeks occupied it. The line of march was southward and Kafr ṣab was captured after a brief resistance. The destination of the army was Shaizar and that was reached on the

¹ Jumada I, A.H. 532 (Kem. iii, 675).

² 31st Rajab, calendar date 31st April (Kem. iii, 675). Tyre xv. 1 says the army left Antioch about the 1st of April, but he passes over everything that happened between that and the siege of Shaizar. Kem. iii, 675 gives the date when the emperor started as Thursday in Easter week, i.e. 31st March.

³ Kem. iii, 675 says the siege lasted seven days and I.A. i. 425 dates the surrender on the 25th of Rajab, calendar date 8th April.

⁴ Niketas i. 217. The period of ten days is from Kem. iii, 675 f. and is to be reckoned from Easter Sunday to Wednesday 1st Sha'han (cf. note 6).

⁵ 27th Rajab 532 (Kem.).

⁶ According to Kem. iii, 676 they left Buza'a on Wednesday 5th Sha'han and reached Aleppo next day, on Thursday the 6th. 5th and 6th are here textual errors for 1st and 2nd, as the days of the week indicate, and in agreement with the statement that the emperor was encamped at Buza'a for ten days. The Reunell editor wrongly alters the days of the week into agreement with the month dates.

⁷ Successfully according to Kem. iii, 676, unsuccessfully according to Niketas i. 218 f.

⁸ The former by Kinnamos i. 214, the latter by Niketas i. 218.

28th of April¹. The town lies on a formidable rocky ridge which is defended on one side by the Orontes. It was the possession of an independent emir. The siege lasted twenty-four days. Several times the emperor's troops penetrated the lower part of the town. But the castle at the head of the rock defied his efforts. It was a fortnight before the siege engines were got ready. They played ineffectually on the walls for ten days and then the siege was broken up (21st May)².

This decision was the emperor's and was no doubt chiefly due to the slackness of his allies and their failure to co-operate with him³. The whole scheme, of which the siege of Shaizar was a part, must now have seemed hopeless. Zanki's resistance was still in reserve. A Turkish army had been gathered by the orders of the sultan and had crossed the Euphrates⁴. The Moslems of Iconium were invading Cilicia⁵. The allies were not united. Raymond is not likely to have been zealous to gain any of the towns whose conquest involved his surrender of Antioch. The emperor, accordingly, accepted a promise of tribute from the emir of Shaizar and the gifts which he gladly offered⁶. The allies returned to Antioch, there to continue their quarrels until the Greeks retired to Cilicia. It was some years before the emperor John came back to Syria.

The mainspring of Zanki's policy in Syria is again clearly revealed by his movements after the siege of Shaizar. Kafr ṣab was abandoned by the Greeks as they retreated, and occupied by the Moslems that very day (21st May)⁷. But Zanki was in no haste to attempt the recovery of the places he had lost⁸. He may have judged it prudent to await the final departure of the emperor. He returned by preference once more to Homs, determined to bring that city under his control. Without much

¹ These dates are all from Kem. iii. 676f. The calendar dates are each a day later than those determined by the days of the week.

² Saturday 9th Ramaḡān (Kem. iii. 678). Kem.'s dates agree exactly with I.A.'s statement that the siege lasted 24 days (i. 428).

³ Wm Tyre. I.A. says that Zanki sowed discord by his representations.

⁴ Kem. iii. 678.

⁵ Niketas i. 212 (cf. 210).

⁶ Tyre xv. 2 and the Greek sources.

⁷ Under Zanki's governor of Hama (Kem. iii. 678).

⁸ He demanded the surrender of Famīya and sent a troop of cavalry after the Greeks as they retreated (Kem. iii. 678). Niketas i. 221 implies his pursuit was unsuccessful.

delay Shihab ed-din Mahmud decided to accept his proposals. He may have feared a repetition of the invasion of the winter or have been apprehensive of attack from the side of Jerusalem. Homs was given up in exchange for Barin and two other fortresses. Peace was sealed by intermarriage; Zanki wedded Mahmud's mother and a daughter of the atabek was given to Mahmud. This settlement was made in the month of June¹. The capture of 'Arka from the Latins and its demolition may be dated after this². Buza'a was recovered on the 27th of September³ and Atharib a fortnight later, on the 10th of October⁴. The Moslems lost nothing by the Greek invasion. Antioch, on the other hand, was weakened by the loss of its Cilician towns and Raymond's spirit of enterprise was discouraged by the penalty which was now attached to the conquest of Aleppo and its sister towns. On the 20th of October a severe earthquake visited Aleppo and the neighbourhood. Six hundred people are said to have perished in the ruins of Atharib. The shocks continued until the summer of next year. Zanki returned to Mosul, where he waged war with the Ortoks, and Sawar continued to act as governor of Aleppo⁵.

The year 1139 marks a turning-point in the history of Damascus. From the time of Zanki's appearance in Syria Damascus was attacked on two sides, by the Latins of the south and the Moslems of the north. There can be little doubt which attack was the more dangerous. The Latins were quiet neighbours, on the whole, after their abortive expedition in 1129. When the peace of 1134 expired it may not have been formally renewed but there was very little war from that date to 1139⁶. Zanki's attitude and policy were widely different. He proved

¹ Kem. iii. 679.

² A.H. 533 after the Greeks had returned to their own country (I.A. ii. 102).

³ Tuesday 19th Muharram 533, calendar date 26th September (Kem. iii. 679); Recueil 16th September is presumably a misprint.

⁴ Kem. iii. 679. I.A. i. 426 is not to be understood of an earlier recapture of Atharib (cf. Kem. iii. 676).

⁵ Kem. iii. 680 relates an expedition of his probably in the earlier part of 1139 (A.H. 533) after Zanki's departure. A defeat on the way home neutralised his first success.

⁶ In the summer of 1137 when Fulk was away in Tripoli Hazwasi invaded Palestine and plundered Nablus (Kem. iii. 674, Tyre xiv. 27). Next summer, probably, Dietrich of Flanders arrived at the head of a crusading band (Tyre xv. 6, after the

himself a persistent and unscrupulous aggressor. Every one of his three campaigns in Syria clearly showed that his Moslem neighbours were in danger from his schemes. He was unremitting in his efforts to subdue Damascus and its dependencies. The settlement of 1138 was a promise of security but the events of 1139 proved it to be delusive. One obvious remedy for this chronic evil was a policy of alliance between Damascus and Jerusalem. When Zanki threatened Damascus once more in 1139 Mu'in ed-din Anar resolved to appeal for help to Fulk of Jerusalem. By securing alliance with him he saved the situation and inaugurated a new period in the relations between Damascus and its neighbours.

Zanki's excuse for interfering in the affairs of Damascus and renewing hostilities against it was the assassination of Shihab ed-din Mahmud. It took place on the night of the 22nd of June 1139¹. His nominal successor was Jemal ed-din Muḥammed, another son of Buri. Mu'in ed-din Anar, the deliverer of Damascus in 1135 and the defender of Homs in 1137-38, became wazir and actual ruler². There was need for a strong man such as Anar at this crisis, if the independence of Damascus was to be preserved. When it became clear what Zanki's intentions were, and that he would respect nothing but superior force, Anar sent an envoy to Fulk of Jerusalem to negotiate an alliance with him. Through Usama ibn munkidh³ he offered to defray by monthly payments the cost of the troops which might be sent, and agreed that Banyas should be handed

Greek invasion of 1138, "subsequente acie"). Fulk and he undertook an expedition against a castle east of the lower part of the Jordan and destroyed it. During their absence a Moslem force crossed the Jordan and invaded southern Palestine, but without any great success. Banyas was not subject to Damascus but it also appears to have been attacked in the year A.H. 533, ending 27th August 1139 (I.A. I. 533).

¹ I.e. Friday night 23rd Shawal 533 (Kem. III. 681); Ibn Kh. I. 275 names the same day of the month but says it was Thursday night (i.e. the night of Wednesday 21st June).

² It has been assumed by several modern writers, such as Weil and Kugler, that Anar was practically ruler of Damascus from 1135 onwards. This seems to be an error (comp. pages 133, 137).

³ Usama's name is mentioned because his autobiography has been preserved. It is ably edited by Hartwig Derenbourg and is a mine of information regarding the private and social life of the times. Usama's home was Shairar. In 1138 he was compelled to leave it because of the enmity of his uncle. Before that time he saw service under Zanki.

over to the Latins after its capture from Zanki's governor. He urged that Zanki was the common foe of all Syrian states and that if he gained Damascus the Latins would suffer by the increase of his power¹. The Latins were convinced that his arguments were reasonable. They were specially desirous to recover Banyas and agreed to help him.

Zanki reached Aleppo in the beginning of August (1139). From there he marched south to Ba'albek, to which he laid siege on the 28th of August². The town was captured on the 9th of October³, and the citadel surrendered on the 12th⁴. Zanki swore by the Koran and the divorce of his wives to spare the garrison of the citadel if they would surrender. He kept his promise by slaying the governor and hanging most of the others, thirty-seven in all. He then advanced on Damascus and reached Dariya on the 7th of November⁵. He does not appear to have attempted a regular siege and negotiations proved futile. The inclement season may have prevented military operations during the winter⁶. The death of Jemal ed-din Muhammed on the 27th of March 1140⁷ raised Zanki's hopes. But Anar maintained his position and appointed Mujir ed-din Abak to the

¹ These are named in Tyre xv. 7 as amongst the motives that influenced the Latins.

² 1st Muharram 534 (Kem. iii. 681). I.A. i. 432 says he arrived at Ba'albek on 20th Dhu'l-Hijja 533, calendar date the 18th of August, exactly 10 days earlier (Recueil wrongly gives 20th August). This is confirmed by Abu Ya'la quoted in Ibn Kh. iv. 484 (siege commenced Thursday 20th Dhu'l-Hijja 533, i.e. 17th August 1139, if A.H. 533 be substituted for A.H. 532). I.A. in his *Kamil* corrects his statement in the *Atabek* ii. 104 that the siege was after the death of Jemal ed-din.

³ Monday 14th Safar 534, calendar date 10th October (Kem. iii. 681) see Ibn Kh. iv. 484 without the day of the week.

⁴ In Kem. iii. 681 Thursday 23th Safar 534, but as the 23th was a Sunday it should no doubt be read 15th Safar 534, of which the calendar date is 11th October. The correction here required gives a day after the calendar date and that in note 3 a day before the calendar date, so that Kem. seems to have derived his information here from two different sources (with divergent reckonings of the month).

⁵ 13th Rabi' i 534 (I.A. i. 434). Kem. iii. 681 gives the middle of Rabi' ii, but, assuming textual error on one side or the other, the earlier date is the more probable.

⁶ If 24th Jumada i in Kem. iii. 682 belongs to A.H. 534 it proves that Zanki was in Aleppo on the 16th December 1139. It seems rather however to belong to the year A.H. 535 (cf. p. 143, n. 7).

⁷ i.e. the night of Thursday 8th Sha'ban 534 (according to Arabic reckoning the night of the 28th of March 1140, calendar date 29th March; Ibn Kh. i. 275). The same date without the day of the week is given by Kem. iii. 682 (Recueil 29th March) and I.A. i. 435 (Recueil 30th March).

vacant emirate. On the 24th of April¹ Zanki marched from Damascus into the Ḥauran intending to attack the Latins on their way from Tiberias where they were assembled. After waiting vainly for a month he returned to Damascus (25th May)². He was laying waste the country after his return when the Latins joined forces with their allies. Zanki did not risk a battle but retired at once to Ba'albek³. Then the allies proceeded together to attack Banyas. Anar fulfilled his agreement by joining in the siege. Raymond of Antioch⁴ and Raymond of Tripolis both took part. Moslems and Latins fought side by side and vied with one another in their zeal. It is not certain when the siege commenced nor how long it lasted⁵. It was found after a few days that a siege tower was required, and the wood for its construction was got by Anar from Damascus. The huge "machine" towered over the walls of the little town. There was no escape from the discharge of its missiles. The governor did not delay to accept the favourable terms which Anar was empowered to offer⁶. All this time Zanki lay at Ba'albek. When Banyas capitulated he made one defiant dash on Damascus and then retired⁷, never to return. His name was mentioned in the recitation of public prayer⁸ and with that acknowledgment he was, perforce, content. He renounced his long cherished hopes of gaining Damascus and never returned

¹ 5th Ramaḍān 534, Kem. iii. 682, I.A. L. 435 (In *Recueil* given as 24th and 25th April respectively; compare p. 244, n. 7).

² I.A. i. 433 f. (6th Shawwāl 534).

³ I.A. i. 436. Tyre xv. 8 is less exact in his chronology. He names the place where Zanki encamped Rasalīn (? = Ras el-mā).

⁴ On his way Raymond is said to have captured the governor of Banyas, Ibrahim ibn Ṭurguth, between Banyas and Tyre (I.A. i. 436, Kem. iii. 682). According to Wm Tyre Raymond arrived some time after the commencement of the siege.

⁵ Tyre xv. 9 says the siege began on May 1st (Kal. Maii). This does not agree with I.A.'s date for Zanki's return from the Ḥauran, which points to some time near the 1st of June.

⁶ These particulars are from Tyre xv. 9-10. Wilken iii. 240, note 3 and 230, note 28 says that Banyas was in Christian hands from 1134. This is a mistake which is followed by Köhricht 153, note 4 although inconsistent with his own statement on page 220 f.

⁷ I.A. i. 437; Kem. iii. 682 says he entered Aleppo 24th Jumādā i, i.e. 5th January 1141 (assuming the year to be A.H. 535 as seems probable; the *Recueil* editor supposes the year to be 534).

⁸ Kem. iii. 682; I.A. ii. 105 exaggerates his success.

again to Syria, although his career had still six years to run. The Latin alliance had been conspicuously successful. Anar adhered to his wise policy and Damascus continued to be at peace under his prudent government. The presence of the Latins in Syria did not affect the Moslem city. For seven years it was equally undisturbed by the Latins of Jerusalem and by the Moslems of northern Syria.

Fulk was well satisfied to allow his kingdom to rest in peace. Anar gave him no cause of offence, the borders of Tripolis were undisturbed and the garrison of Ascalon hardly stirred¹. Being thus left alone he was content that the boundaries of his kingdom should remain as they were. Palestine was conquered and no danger was in sight. The "spirit of the second generation," as it may be called, took possession of the Latins of Jerusalem. The men of the first generation regarded all Moslem Syria as an unoccupied promised land. Their successors viewed the Moslems as joint occupants with themselves. The country which was theirs "by divine right" was practically co-extensive with the land they now occupied. They discovered that their neighbours had much in common with themselves. They adopted Eastern dress and Eastern habits and ceased to be "exiles" in a foreign land. The purpose of the first crusade was accomplished and its force was spent.

The latter part of Fulk's reign is marked by much activity in castle building (1140-43). On the east of the Dead Sea the strong castle of Kerak was built², to increase the protection already given by Shaubak or Mont Royal. The Templars erected another at Safed. Two new castles were built in the direction of Ascalon. One was ten miles to the north of Ascalon, at Yabna, on the site and constructed from the ruins of an ancient town. Its name was Hibelin or Ibelin and it was gifted by the king to one Balian who took his name from the castle, Balian of Ibelin³. Next year Blanche garde was built at Tell es-safiya, eight miles east of Ascalon⁴. Fulk was killed by a

¹ I.A. i. 438 mentions an attack by it on Latin raiders in Ramaḡan 535, April 1141.

² Tyre xv. 31 (A.D. 1142).

³ Tyre xv. 24 (A.D. 1143).

⁴ Tyre xv. 25 ("anno proxime subsecuto...circa veris initium, hleme transcurra"; i.e. in A.D. 1144?).

fall from his horse when he was out hunting on the 10th of November 1143¹. His eldest son Baldwin was thirteen years of age. His wife Melisend, daughter of Baldwin II, took the reins of government. She was well qualified to do so, and for several years her regency was simply a continuation, in every essential respect, of her husband's reign².

In Tripolis the year 1143 is made notable by the coming of the knights Hospitallers to those districts which afterwards became their chief Syrian possessions. Hish el-akrad, Rafaniya and other lands and castles in the neighbourhood were handed over to them by Raymond. Thus they became the principal defenders of El-bukai'a, the valley which gives access to the coast from the central plains of Syria, and also the nearest neighbours to the town of Homs. Raymond's pledge that he would not make peace with the Moslems without their consent shows how important their position was from the very first³.

After Zanki left Syria in 1140 the relations between Antioch and Aleppo resumed the character which they had possessed in recent years during the periods of his absence. The old border warfare continued as before. Sawar was still the Moslem leader, although another deserter from Damascus, the emir Laja, also takes a prominent part. The chronicle of events is meagre and

¹ Annales li. li. 431. Gesta 4 and most of the sources give the year 1143. Wm Tyre's narrative in xv. 24-27 favours A.D. 1144 although possibly consistent with A.D. 1143 (cf. p. 146, notes 3 and 4). xvi. 4 clearly dates the event in the November preceeding the fall of Edessa and so in 1144 in the chronological framework (xv. 27 and xvi. 3) 1142 is the date given. There is confusion also with regard to the day of the month: xv. 27 puts the death on the 13th, the 4th day after the accident; xvi. 3 gives the 10th without qualification. The year 1144 is strongly supported by the charter in Panll's *Codex diplomatico* i. 29, no. 26, in which 1149 is referred to as Baldwin's 5th year (so G. Dodu, *De Fulconis regno*, 1894, page 60). On the other hand Baldwin III's age at his accession (13 years, Tyre xvi. 1) supports 1143, since he was probably born early in 1130 (cf. p. 130, n. 1). Gregory I. 156 dates *anno nrmn.* 592 (commencing 14th February 1143) but since this is also given (l. 157) as the year of the capture of Edessa (= A.D. 1144) it is evidence as much in favour of A.D. 1144 as of A.D. 1143. On Wm Tyre's evidence see appendix.

² Peace with Damascus was maintained until 1147. (See page 157 f.).

³ Leroux, *Cartulaire* i. no. 144. The charter is dated August 1142 and the grant included Rafaniya, Barin and all the lands belonging to them, also "Mardabech," "Cratum" (= Hish el-akrad) and "castellum Bochee" (= el-bukai'a). There is no record of Barin having been recovered since its capture by Zanki (page 137 f.) but the revenues of the district may still have been partly or wholly Latin or may have been treated as such. The case of Famijn in 1167 is exactly the same (p. 191).

unimportant¹. After an interval of two or three years Raymond was desirous of peace (spring 1143). He was attacked by a much more powerful enemy than Saww. His territory was invaded by the Greek emperor and his very independence was threatened. The Latins needed all their strength for this contest. It was fortunate for them that the Moslems of Aleppo took no particular advantage of the complications in which they were involved. But Zanki was on the alert in Mosul.

The emperor John left Syria in 1138 with the intimation that he would return at the earliest opportunity. He did return in the latter part of the year 1142. His intention was to reduce the Latins of the north to what he considered their due obedience. Before the Turkish conquest the Latin possessions had belonged to the Greeks and the leaders of the first crusade had sworn to restore them to the emperor Alexius. On these grounds John held that the country of Raymond and Joscelin rightfully belonged to him and that the Latin princes were only his vassals. He led his army first against Tell bashir. Joscelin attempted no resistance and gave hostages in token of submission. Then the emperor marched to Antioch. Raymond refused to admit him to the city and even repudiated the agreement of 1137. John was informed that the Latin nobles held that Raymond had no authority to conclude such a treaty. As winter was approaching the emperor contented himself with laying waste the country and then retired to Cilicia². There he died in April 1143. He was succeeded by his son Manuel. The situation was unchanged. Raymond took the aggressive and

¹ Kem. iii. 683 ff. gives the following particulars: in 1140 Turkoman attacks lead to retaliation by the Latins; in the autumn of 1141 a Latin incursion was followed by a counter attack of Laja's; in April 1142 Sawar invaded Latin territory; in the spring of 1143 Raymond advanced to Buza'a and peace was made after he retired; in the end of the year a Latin caravan was plundered by the soldiers of Aleppo (iii. 685); a cavalry skirmish took place in May 1144. The strong castle of Marjāb was seized from a friendly Moslem emir in 1140 by Rainald of Marāḳiya and Balanyas (Caffarus xviii. 45 f.). In Edessa 'Ain Jāb was captured in 1141 and held for a year by Simon a Maronite (?) chief (Gregory i. 133 f.).

² The narrative follows Tyre xv. 20-21. His statement however that Raymond invited the emperor to Syria (xv. 19 and 20) is improbable. I.A. i. 440 says that peace was made between the emperor and Raymond. Some sources speak of the emperor having actually entered Antioch (see Köhrich, p. 217, n. 1).

invaded Cilicia in the same year. War was waged for some time with varying fortune partly in Cilicia, partly in the neighbourhood of Antioch (1143-44). Finally Manuel's generals reduced Raymond to submission. Some time in 1144 he was compelled to go in person to Constantinople and there take an oath of allegiance as the emperor's vassal¹.

It was in these circumstances, in 1144, that Zanki captured the town of Edessa. Since 1140 his wars in Mesopotamia had been Moslem wars, chiefly in Ortoğ territory. In 1142 he was at war with the Kurds, in 1143-44² he strengthened his position round Maridīn. Throughout these years he adhered to his policy of leaving the Latins undisturbed. It was at the instigation of the emir of Harran that he finally attacked Edessa. But for his persuasion, so Zanki himself acknowledged, the attack would not have been made³. In any case the opportunity was rightly judged. Although Edessa was strongly fortified the population was chiefly Armenian and Syrian and the Latin garrison was small. Joscelin was absent in Antioch at the time⁴, for no danger was anticipated. Besides the Latins of Edessa at their best depended for support in serious danger on their neighbours of Antioch and in 1144 this help was not available. Raymond may not have been in Syria when the crisis came. At least, in all probability, he was still involved in the consequences of his war with the emperor Manuel. The contest between the Greeks and the Latins may thus be held chiefly responsible for the undoing of Edessa. Raymond and Joscelin were not good friends, but that alone could hardly have induced Raymond to deny his help⁵. Jerusalem although remote and now little in touch with northern affairs was Joscelin's only hope. When Edessa was besieged he hastened in person to Queen Melisend to obtain the help he needed. Troops were sent in

¹ Kinnamos i. 127 f. The chronology is uncertain (see Kugler, *Studien*, p. 74). Wm Tyre does not mention the war with Manuel at all.

² Regarding I.A. ii. 115 see p. 137, n. 5.

³ Kem. iii. 686; cf. Barhebraeus as in next note.

⁴ Barhebr. 332 says that Joscelin had gone to Antioch (*anno gratie*, 11456) and that the inhabitants of Harran informed Zanki that Edessa was in a defenceless state. Cf. Kem. iii. 685.

⁵ This is Wm Tyre's explanation of the absence of support from Antioch (xvi. 4). For criticism of it see Kugler's *Studien*.

response to his appeal, but Edessa was captured before they came within striking distance. How far they went seems to be unrecorded. Joscelin himself has been severely blamed for the loss of Edessa. His failure to raise the siege was largely due, no doubt, to causes which were beyond his personal control. It may be said however that he allowed Zanki to take him unduly by surprise. His residence in Tell bashir, although not in itself blameworthy¹, may have prevented supervision of the defences of Edessa. The essential fact seems to be that the Latins were lulled into a feeling of false security by their long continued exemption from attack. Joscelin's personal courage and military capacity are praised by the Moslem historians². But his own resources could not save Edessa and there was little he could do except appeal for help to others. Seeing this was without result the city was left to defend itself.

The first sign of change in Zanki's policy towards the Latins may be observed in the summer of 1144³. Some Latin castles in the province of Edessa were then attacked and captured. Joscelin should have been warned, whereas on the contrary Zanki was encouraged to proceed. Edessa, the capital, was not attacked until late in the year. The interval was no doubt largely spent in preparations. But Zanki carefully concealed his plans. Even when he started for Edessa he led his army first in another direction. The Moslem troops took their position under the walls of the city on Tuesday the 28th of November (1144)⁴. The defence was brave but it lasted no more than twenty-eight days. Zanki pressed the siege with all his power and employed every possible means of attack. The walls and towers were mined and seven siege towers were stationed round the city. At last a great breach was made in one of the walls. The garrison fought bravely in the breach, but this weakened their defence at other points and the enemy swarmed over the

¹ Against Wm Tyre. Kugler, *Studien* 78 f. gives reasons for holding that Tell bashir and not Edessa was the home of the Joscelins.

² Cf. I.A. I. 433. But there may be confusion with Joscelin I.

³ Kem. iii. 583 only gives the year (A.H. 538, ending 3rd July 1144). But this movement is not likely to have been long before the final attack on the capital.

⁴ Barheh. 331.

walls into the town (23rd December)¹. The usual massacre followed. For three hours the sword "drank the blood of old and young, men and women, priests and deacons, coenobites and hermits, monks and virgins, infants, bridegrooms and brides." The ruthlessness which marks Zanki's whole career again found illustration two days later on the 25th of December², when the garrison of the citadel surrendered. Zanki pledged his word that the defenders should be spared and then, in spite of that, sent at least the Latins amongst them to execution. Zanki's "humanity" on this occasion has been praised by some modern writers and it is true that the citizens of Edessa experienced some forbearance at his hands. For the sake of the future prosperity of the city it was needful to retain its native population. When the first hours of pillage and massacre were over protection was granted to the Armenian and Syrian Christians who chose to remain in Edessa. The ruins caused by the siege were repaired as quickly as possible and a Moslem garrison was installed where the Latins had ruled so long³.

Zanki's capture of Edessa did not lead immediately to the conquest of the Latin province. Saruj seems to have been the only other Latin town which was captured before Zanki's death. Whatever his motives the atabek did not make any attempt to follow up his great success. As he did not live much longer it is not possible to be certain what his intentions were. Troubles in Mosul occupied him during the latter part of 1145 and the beginning of 1146. Then he took the field to besiege Kal'at Ja'bar, a castle on the Euphrates. There on Saturday night the 14th of September 1146⁴ he was assassinated in his tent by

¹ Ibn Kh. i. 540 (Saturday 25th Jumada II 539); Gregory i. 157 (Saturday 23rd December, St Stephen's day; under the year 1143 instead of 1144). See also Kem. iii. 686 where 16th Jumada II 539 is a textual error for 16th Jumada II. L.A. i. 443 also has 16th Jumada II for 16th Jumada II but says that the siege lasted 18 days, which is exact if reckoned between 28th November and 25th December, both days inclusive. Barheb. 333 (Syriac text, p. 337) gives Saturday 3rd Kanun II (= 3rd January) but the day of the week and day of the month do not agree. Probably there is here also a textual error for 23rd Kanun I (= 23rd December).

² Barheb. 335 (allowance being made for the errors in the month and the day of the month pointed out in note 1).

³ Most of the particulars in this paragraph are from Barheb. 332 ff. Tyre xvi. 5 has less detail.

⁴ Kem. iii. 687 f. calls the day 6th Rabi' II 541 (15th September) according to

his own slaves. He was more than sixty years of age. His career is commonly viewed in the light of the supreme service he rendered to Islam by the conquest of Edessa. This shed a certain glory round all his life, as posterity judged it. Men delighted to give him the honourable title of *shahid*, martyr, or champion of Islam. For this one deed he was counted worthy of the reward of Paradise.

Arabic usage. I.A. (li. 133 and l. 453) and Makrizi viii. 199 give 5th Rabi' li of which the calendar date is 14th September; in Ibn Kh. l. 541 15th Rabi' il 541 is presumably a textual error for this same date. Abū'l-mehasin lii. 504, 17th Rabi' li (presumably for 7th Rabi' li).

CHAPTER IV.

NUR ED-DIN MAHMUD.

FOR nearly fifty years Edessa was the bulwark of the Latin states. A glance at the map shows the importance of its position. It stood like a rampart opposite Mosul and nearest the capital of the caliphs. It commanded the roads from Mosul to Aleppo and penetrated like a wedge between Moslem Syria and the emirates of Mesopotamia. By menacing east and south it isolated Aleppo and protected the Syrian Latins. Aleppo was weakened even more than the Latins were strengthened. It was almost encircled by Edessa and the adjoining state of Antioch. With its best allies in Mesopotamia it depended for safety on constant communication with the east. But the line of march from Mosul to Aleppo was never free from peril so long as the Latins held Edessa. In the country from Harran to Rakka there was danger of attack at any moment and those who passed through safely left a dangerous enemy in the rear. The gain of Aleppo when Edessa was destroyed was threefold: its communication with the east was secured; its enemy was now in front, no longer in the rear as well; it in turn began to encircle what was left of Latin territory.

Even the death of Zanki and the division of his power which followed made the position of the Latin states worse in one important particular. Their opponent was not so strong, but the very limitation of his power made him a more decided and determined enemy. Zanki was succeeded by two of his sons Saif ed-din Ġazi and Nur ed-din Maḥmud. The former secured Mosul and the eastern part of his father's dominions. The

latter ruled in the west with Aleppo for his capital. The river Khabur was the boundary between the brothers. The permanent independence of Aleppo which this division implied had been rendered possible by the capture of Edessa. Aleppo after that was strong enough to stand alone. Under Nureddin it entered on an independent career in which the conquest of the Latin states was a pressing duty. For if Nureddin respected his brother's territory and yet aimed at making conquests he was bound to seek them in the neighbouring Latin states. Not only so, he was free from those complications with the Ortoks, the sultan, the caliph and the Kurds which had engaged so much of Zanki's energy. He owed this also to the limitation of his territory. Saifeddin inherited Zanki's Mesopotamian wars, Nureddin the lesser struggle with the Latins. The crusading states had a more dangerous foe than ever before, because his whole energy was directed against them. Nureddin's religious zeal and the earliest incidents of his reign combined in urging him to the task which the political situation imposed upon him.

It must not however be forgotten, in qualification of what has been said, that the separation of Aleppo from Mosul was a source of weakness also. Zanki's principal strength lay in Mesopotamia. When it withdrew from the contest the opposing forces were not unequally matched. A great part of Nureddin's task, therefore, was the consolidation and strengthening of the dominions he inherited. By inclination and capacity he was perhaps better fitted for this work than for a career of mere conquest. Both factors, the need of his kingdom and his personal character, may account for the fact that the progress made against the Latins during his reign was slower than we should have expected. But it was he who built up a Syrian power capable of challenging the Latins without support from Mesopotamia.

The fall of Edessa should have warned the Latins of the danger of disunion and of the enemy they had most to fear. It might have been a salutary lesson, although painful. It had no such effect, least of all in Jerusalem. During the period of the "second crusade" there was no co-operation between north and south, and even enmity began to replace the indifference which in itself had proved so harmful. The only Moslem wars

in which Jerusalem took much interest were those waged upon its own borders. One evil result of this spirit, neglect to support the efforts of Antioch, has already been dwelt on. Another speedily followed. Damascus lay nearer than Aleppo and this was sufficient reason, in the eyes of those responsible for the policy of Jerusalem, for making war on it in preference to combining with Antioch against Nureddin. In spite of the efforts of Anar to cultivate friendly relations advantageous to both parties, Queen Melisend and her counsellors failed to see that Damascus was now an important ally and that persistent war would simply force Anar into the arms of Nureddin. They were guilty of the unutterable folly of directing against Damascus the whole force of the armies which Europe sent to recover Edessa and combat the power of the house of Zanki. Instead of combining with Antioch and Damascus against Nureddin they awaited the inevitable attack and employed the interval in alienating their allies and in giving Nureddin those advantages which they meantime possessed.

Nureddin's character contrasts considerably with that of his predecessor. He was not so much an imperialist nor perhaps as great a soldier as his father. Yet war with the Latins was a definite part of his policy in a manner not characteristic of Zanki's reign. The influence of his political position helps to explain this, and also his personal piety. Piety is a prominent feature in his character and appears in much that is related of him. He believed that the chief protector of Islam and its lands was not himself but God, the one true God¹, and he carried on war against the Christians as a religious duty. If the inspiration of the mere soldier was lacking somewhat, this motive took its place. The reflection that "fortune is like a shadow, which if pursued flies away, if avoided follows after"² marks a temperament apt to fail when energetic initiative is required. But Nureddin was fortunate in his emirs. Asad ed-din Shirkuh devoted to his service for many years an enterprise and resolution rarely excelled. It is not easy to apportion the military credit of Nureddin's reign between the sultan and his emirs. But from first to last he was master within his own dominions. He was a

¹ I.A. ii. 307.

² I.A. ii. 300.

wise and beneficent ruler and the prosperity of his reign was due in the first place to himself. Even his enemies did not withhold their admiration of him¹. His mode of life was simple², as befitted a son of Zanki and a loyal follower of the Prophet. He embellished and improved the towns under his sway. He endowed public institutions to promote religion, to care for the sick and diseased, and for the advantage of travellers. The courts of justice were administered with equity and he himself gave an example of submission to them. By such means as much as by deeds of arms he created the Syrian power which in the hands of Saladin, along with Egypt, completed the overthrow of the Latin states.

When Saifeddin hurried from the scene of his father's death to occupy Mosul Nureddin at once led back the Syrian troops in the camp to Aleppo. His occupation of the town gained its dependencies also. He had acted on the advice and with the assistance of Asad ed-din Shirkuh³. But he was neither of an age⁴ nor of a character to be a puppet in the hands of anyone. Next month⁵ when Nejm ed-din Ayub, governor of Ba'albek, Shirkuh's brother, entered the service of Anar the governorship of Aleppo was transferred from Shirkuh to Mejd ed-din ibn ed-dayan⁶.

The situation required a ruler capable of acting with rapidity and decision. The death of Zanki encouraged his enemies to try their strength against his successor. When Raymond heard the news he sent troops against Aleppo and Hama. As they retired with their plunder Shirkuh followed. He recovered much that had been lost and pillaged Artah in retaliation for the rest⁷. On the other hand when Ba'albek was captured by

¹ Wm. Tyre describes him as "princeps justus, vaser et provokus et acerrimus gentis suae traditiones religiosus."

² I do not know what ground Archer and Kingsford have for speaking (p. 238) of his "greed." Ibn el-atbir gives a very different account.

³ I.A. II. 153; Ibn abi Tai in A.S. Cairo 46.

⁴ 30 years old (A.S. iv. 11).

⁵ Jumada I 541 (ending 7th November 1146).

⁶ Ibn abi Tai in A.S. iv. 49 f. Ayub was made governor of Ba'albek by Zanki after its capture in 1139 (I.A. i. 561; A.S. Cairo 139).

⁷ Ibn abi Tai in A.S. iv. 48 f., Cairo 48; he calls the ruler of Antioch Bohemond and says he received word of Zanki's death a week after Nureddin was established in Aleppo. Nureddin occupied the castle of Aleppo on Monday 7th Rabi' II, i.e. 16th September (A.S. Cairo 46, line 34; in 47, line 3, Rabi' I is an error).

Anar of Damascus shortly afterwards no steps could be taken for its recovery. It was too immediately followed by another event which threatened serious loss. In November Joscelin attempted to recover Edessa with the help of the Armenians still resident in the town. Nureddin hurried to its rescue and arrived before Joscelin had penetrated the citadel. The Latins were now compelled to face an attack on two sides and as they endeavoured to retreat were severely defeated. The treatment accorded to the inhabitants by the victor demands one observation only. Neither Christians nor Moslems ever displayed much humanity in their treatment of one another and Nureddin's drastic punishment of the rebels was a security against similar revolts.

It is easy to understand Nureddin's policy in a situation which threatened much danger. He was resolved to prosecute war with Antioch and cultivate the friendship of his Moslem neighbours. An agreement with his brother was easily made and the importance of peace with Damascus was recognised and acted on. While frequent embassies passed between Aleppo and Damascus a vigorous attack was opened on the territories of Antioch. The list of the captured strongholds¹ is sufficient to show how the tide was turning. The Latins were losing ground which they had held since the days of the first crusade. No wonder Raymond pressed for another like crusade and darkly painted the situation which the fall of Edessa had created. The treaty with Anar was signed in Damascus on the 28th of March (1147)². It also marked an important gain. The way was prepared for the detachment of Damascus from alliance with Jerusalem. The Latins furthered Nureddin's plans in this direction. He had scarcely celebrated his marriage with Anar's daughter, in accordance with the recent treaty, when an urgent request for help arrived from Damascus. Nureddin responded gladly. The Latins of Jerusalem in spite of Anar's protests and warnings had formally broken their alliance and

¹ Artah, Barai (Mamula), Baqarful (Baqarfun), Kafir Iatha, A.S. Cairo 51 quoting I.A.; I.A. I. 461 gives the variants in brackets; Kern. Blochet 7 f. (=iiil. 515 f.) has Mamula and adds Hab.

² Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 51, Cairo 50 (1301 Shawal 541).

were on the point of invading the Ḥauran. Tuntash¹, emir of Boşra and Şarkhad, had tempted them by offering the surrender of his towns. Some recognised how unwise it was to listen to the offer, but they were overruled. Anar threw his army in front of the threatened position and was promptly joined by Nureddin, about the beginning of June². The Latins found they had been anticipated³ and that the enemy were too strong. They beat a retreat with much difficulty. Their privations in a bare and waterless region, with the enemy in the rear, are graphically described by William of Tyre. Anar was still anxious for peace⁴ and may not have pressed his advantage. After the occupation of Boşra and Şarkhad the allies returned to Damascus. But the Latins showed no willingness to renew the broken alliance. Next year they continued the war and wasted on it the strength of the "second crusade" (1148).

The news of the fall of Edessa had stirred once more to its utmost depths the crusading spirit of the west. The enthusiasm was greatest in France, the home of the first crusade. Pope Eugene encouraged a French expedition; in Italy he had contests of his own to wage. The French were most akin to the Syrian Latins and responded to the preaching of St Bernard and the influence of their king, Louis VII. St Bernard secured also the adhesion of the emperor Conrad. His army increased the size of the crusade but diminished its unity and so perhaps its efficiency. A fleet of English and Flemish ships was the first to start. Its principal achievement was in Portugal, against the Moslems of that country. Only part of the expedition continued the voyage to Syria. They arrived in the spring of 1148 and took part in the siege of Damascus. The French and German crusades took the old route by land through the Greek empire; the Germans started first. As before there was discord, suspicion and fighting between the crusaders and the Greeks. Manuel still regarded the Latins as merely his

¹ A.S. Wm Tyre gives Tantaia.

² A.S. Cairo 50. Tuntash therefore probably came to Jerusalem with his proposal about the end of April (*mensis praeterierat*, Tyre xvi. 8).

³ Tyre xvi. 10 reports they believed that the city was already occupied by Anar ("infelici rumore"). According to Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 51 the actual occupation was later.

⁴ Cf. Tyre xvi. 11.

agents or the auxiliaries of his empire. It scarcely required the presence of the Normans of Sicily, his hereditary enemies, to renew the old feuds. Finally Manuel made peace with the Moslems of Asia Minor and took no part in the progress of the crusade. Conrad started from Constantinople without waiting for the French. The enemy were fully prepared to meet him. His army split into two parts, both of which came to a miserable end. The failure of provisions led to the final disaster. The French, who followed, were more fortunate. They kept farther south, through a difficult country, in the hope of avoiding the enemy. They were accompanied by part of the German army after Conrad returned to Constantinople. They learned watchfulness by defeat and succeeded in repelling the enemy. A large part of the army sailed from Attalia to Antioch. There were not ships for the mass of humbler pilgrims and these were left to their fate. About the middle of April (1148), a month after Louis' arrival, Conrad came by sea from Constantinople. He landed in 'Akka and other crusading bands which also came by sea disembarked in the territory of Jerusalem.

The crusaders had now to choose between two policies which the Syrian Latins laid before them. One was advocated by Raymond of Antioch and the northern states, the other by the Latins of Jerusalem. Each party doubtless considered its own advantage, but Raymond's proposal to attack Nureddin was that which deserved adoption. The original purpose of the crusade was to retrieve the fall of Edessa, it was in the north only that the Latins were losing ground, and Nureddin was by far their most dangerous enemy. The security and prosperity of the south may be judged from the conclusion which Conrad seems to have come to, that the Syrian Latins required no service from the crusade. The southern Latins proposed to attack Anar of Damascus. He was willing and anxious to remain at peace. If attacked he was certain to join hands with Nureddin. There would be alliance once more between Damascus and the Moslems of the north as there had been in the days of Tuğtakin. It may be granted that the occupation of Damascus would have been a decided gain¹ but this was not

¹ See chap. III, page 127.

the opportunity. War with Nureddin was inevitable, for the choice lay between attacking him directly and separately¹ and attacking Damascus with him as its ally².

Conrad had landed in the south and was surrounded by the party which proposed war with Damascus. He allowed himself to be persuaded in favour of the southern policy. Louis remained in Antioch till June. He left it partly, perhaps, because of an intrigue of Raymond's with his wife³. He also gave his adhesion to the plan which had been formed in Jerusalem. Conrad and others were inclined to return home, but all joined in the expedition. In the latter part of July the Latins left Tiberias, their gathering point, and the siege of Damascus began on Saturday the 24th⁴. Neither Antioch nor Tripolis took any part.

Within five days the besiegers were in full retreat. They approached the city from the south-west and forced their way up to the walls through the orchards which stretch for some miles down the valley. During the next two days they in turn stood on the defensive, behind ramparts of felled trees. Reinforcements were pouring into the city and relief was expected from Saifeddin and Nureddin. On the fourth day the Latins made little or no response to the attacks and challenges of the enemy. The Moslems feared some stratagem. In reality no doubt the question of retreat was being discussed. Early next morning the besiegers' camp was abandoned and the rejoicing Damascenes pursued their discomfited enemies as they departed homeward⁵.

¹ I.e. without Anar as an ally; Saifeddin would probably have helped him.

² It is quite inadequate to describe Raymond's policy as "the conquest of Aleppo, Shalzar and some neighbouring towns" and it was not altogether to Louis' credit if "his pious desire to visit the Saviour's grave in Jerusalem resisted with triumphant strength every argument and allurements." The quotations are from Wilken iii. 225-226. On page 229 the true view is introduced by an "allerdings."

³ Raymond was then himself to blame, partly, for the loss of Louis' support (Kugler). William of Tyre represents the intrigue as begun from motives of revenge after Louis' refusal to agree to Raymond's plan (Wilken, etc.).

⁴ Saturday 6th Rabi' I 543, calendar date 25th July, Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 56, Cairo 52; I.A. I. 468 without the day. Tyre xvii. 2 wrongly states that the Latins were in Tiberias by the 25th of May.

⁵ The account of this paragraph is from Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 56-59, Cairo 52 (also translated in Wilken, vol. III. appendix).

The causes of the retreat are uncertain. The account of William of Tyre is generally accepted¹. This historian says that during the siege, the duration of which he does not state, some of the Syrian knights were bribed by Anar and treacherously advised that the allied camp should be moved from the orchards to the open country south and east of the city. They are supposed to have done so because they knew that the second position was untenable owing to the difficulty of obtaining water and provisions. The leaders discovered this after the change had been made and resolved to retreat when they found that the orchards had been occupied by the enemy.

It is to be remembered that the new position spoken of lay just outside the woods in which the crusaders were and we are asked to suppose that the leaders were in utter ignorance of the character of the ground there and took no precaution to ascertain whether the (alleged) statements made to them were true or false. The Arabic historians have no account of the movement and Abu Ya'la's narrative leaves room for it only on the night before the retreat was commenced. If assigned to that night it becomes almost incredible, for we have then to suppose (as has been done) that "a single glance revealed the situation"² and yet that the leaders had supposed they were moving to a better position. It is much more likely that Conrad and the malcontents who had advocated returning home felt it necessary to blame someone else and gave currency to the story. No wonder that William of Tyre confesses that there was no agreement regarding the authors of the "treachery"³. It is quite possible that some movement preliminary to retreat was later given an unjustifiable significance.

The siege was abandoned when it was discovered that it could not succeed without prolonged effort. It is sufficiently

¹ xvii. 5-6; Michaud alone expresses scepticism.

² Kugler. The anonymous history printed in Kugler, *Studien* 15 ff., is also evidence against the supposed movement. It says, however, that the final decision to retreat was come to after the Latins had left the orchards and entered "panicium."

³ Raymond of Antioch, of course, is accused! At a later time the Templars were held responsible. There was a fable current that certain Syrian barons were bribed by 250,000 gold pieces which proved to be gilt copper or at least were miraculously changed into copper. Cf. Tyre xvii. 7.

easy to find motives for the decision without supposing that there was treachery on the part of anyone. There was probably a revulsion of feeling among the crusaders at the time. The Latins of Jerusalem had declared that it would be an easy matter to capture Damascus¹. They had done so, no doubt, to overcome the unwillingness which some felt regarding the undertaking. It made their position difficult when the siege did not at once succeed. The food taken with the army was insufficient² and siege material was apparently wanting. The season was unfavourable to a prolonged campaign and it was clear that every day made the arrival of powerful reinforcements more certain. Nureddin and Saifeddin were not far off and it was known that the city had already been reinforced³. These facts were all discouraging and Conrad in particular was ready to make the most of them. Even the Syrian Latins had reason on reflection to reconsider their position. They are said to have been alienated by a proposal to give the city, on its conquest, to a crusader⁴. They could not now fail to realise how likely it was that the siege would throw Damascus into the hands of Nureddin and his brother⁵. There is every reason to believe that Anar pressed these facts on their notice⁶ and it is not unlikely that his representations were accompanied by "gifts". Hence no doubt the statement that the Syrian Latins were bribed. Anar had much reason to desire that the siege should be raised without the co-operation of his northern allies. They required as a condition of their assistance that the town should be placed in their hands⁷. It is no wonder that Anar's suspicions were roused, in spite of the assurance that the city would be evacuated whenever the objects of the alliance were attained. Anar understood the value of such promises of evacuation.

¹ Tyre xvii. 6.

² I.A.; Abu Ya'la.

³ Tyre xvii. 7 (cf. I.A. i. 469). Dietrich of Flanders might be the crusader in question, although he finally supported the proposal to retreat (against Kugler, Studien).

⁴ I.A. mentions this also.

⁵ I.A.

⁶ This is inferred from the charges of bribery made by the Christian historians. I.A. wrongly puts the surrender of Banyas now instead of in 1140. It may be noted that Weil iii. 324 by an oversight assumes I.A.'s accuracy although rejecting his account in iii. 293 note.

⁷ The demand is represented as Saifeddin's (I.A., Kem.).

It must have seemed deplorable to many that an expedition worthy to be compared in equipment with the first crusade should return home having accomplished absolutely nothing. It was proposed that Ascalon should be attacked, so that the memory of the expedition might be somewhat redeemed in the judgment of posterity by one important capture¹. Louis and Conrad appeared at the gathering place but the Syrian Latins did not. Conrad delayed his return voyage no longer (September); Louis remained until the following Easter in order to celebrate the holy season in Jerusalem. It is not clear why the Syrian knights acted as they did. Probably it was too soon to begin a fresh and arduous undertaking after the recent failure. Possibly the antagonism latent between the Latins of Syria and the crusaders from Europe now became active. Recent incidents and the impression produced by the crusading host, as contrasted with that of the small and scattered bands of pilgrims and soldiers with which the Syrians were familiar, were well calculated to effect this. The Syrian Latins felt that the crusaders were more foreigners than kinsmen, that their own home was now Syria not Europe, and that their interests were not identical with those of the newcomers. Even if this sense of distinction and estrangement did not operate to prevent co-operation against Ascalon its accentuation was yet one of the gravest results of the crusade.

The danger which had threatened Moslem Syria had passed away. The principal features of the situation now are the enthusiastic confidence of the Moslems and the weakened position of the Syrian Latins due to the indifference and distrust which Europeans had learned to cherish toward them. Islam and Christendom had measured arms and the followers of the Prophet had been victorious. The armies of Christendom had been impotent against the swords and prayers of the "true believers." After the failure of such an effort there seemed no

¹ "Factum aliquod in quo memoriam suam posteris possint reddere commendabilem" (Tyre xvii. 7).

² The break up of the crusade, it is to be remembered, was not the result of any actual defeat. Its aspect was therefore the more miraculous. When Damascus was hard pressed during the siege Anar moved the citizens by religious appeals and the exhibition of 'Othman's Koran, the sacred relic of the city. On another occasion

reason to fear anything that Europe might ever attempt again. Besides the effort had expended itself and only the Syrian Latins remained to be dealt with. On the other side the discord and suspicion which had been aroused between Syrians and Westerns showed its effects at once. The hope of another crusade was indefinitely postponed and the annual stream of pilgrims which brought money and men and arms to the holy land was seriously checked and diminished. Louis indeed remained loyal to the cause, but it was never in his power to send another crusade. The popes, on their part, were wholly engaged, during the next forty years, by their contest with the German emperors. Even the feeling of bitterness against the Greek emperor roused, or rather stirred into fresh life, in Europe by the incidents of the crusade, had its effect later on the fortunes of the Latins. The contest with Nureddin had now to be fought out with little help from Europe.

Anar's conference with Nureddin at Ba'albek just after the siege of Damascus¹ was no doubt for the purpose of arranging further co-operation. It could not yet be realised that the crusade was ended. Before the princes separated a proposal that they should attack 'Arima came from the count of Tripolis. The castle was in his own state and had been occupied by a grandson of Raymond of Toulouse, a crusader who now claimed the whole principedom². The Moslem princes willingly agreed. The castle was captured and destroyed and Bertram, Raymond's rival, was carried prisoner by Nureddin to Aleppo³. As soon as it became evident that Damascus was no longer in danger Anar was willing to make peace again with Jerusalem. The Latins for a short time continued the war by incursions into the Hauran. They sued for peace probably when Louis left Palestine. In May 1149 peace was granted them for two years⁴. Affairs thus returned to their original condition in the south.

Nureddin was urged to spend more money on preparations for war and less on religious institutions and devotees. He replied that the prayers offered for Islam were its best weapons.

¹ I.A. i. 470, ii. 162.

² I.A., Kam.

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 60, Cairo 55.

⁴ Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 57 (Muharram 544).

In the north Nureddin at once resumed his attacks on Antioch. Basūṭa and Hab were added to previous captures¹. But Raymond surprised and defeated the troops of Aleppo while they were in the neighbourhood of Famiya and this ended the campaign for the year 1148 (November—December)². Probably in consequence of their success the Latins now prepared to take the offensive. Nureddin however anticipated their attack and defeated them at Baḡras or Yaḡra³, to the north of Antioch. After being joined by troops from Damascus, whose services he had previously asked and now received in return for his own help last year, he laid siege to Anab, a castle not far from Sarmin⁴. Raymond with foolhardy daring advanced at the head of a small force. When Nureddin ascertained the weakness of the enemy he surrounded them without difficulty and gained a complete victory (29th June)⁵. Many prisoners were taken and Raymond himself was killed, by the hand, it is said, of Shirkuh, who was rising in favour again⁶. The army of Aleppo now swept unresisted past the walls of Antioch down to the very sea, plundering as it went. The capture of Famiya was a permanent result of the victory and marks a definite stage in the reconquest of the country (26th July)⁷. Baldwin of Jerusalem

¹ I.A. in A.S. Cairo 55, line 10.

² *Rajal* 543 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 60, Cairo 55, line 13).

³ Different readings of the same name, the former from Kem. (de Sacy) the latter in I.A. *Recueil* text. Wilken follows A.S. (Cairo 55) in narrating a victory of Nureddin's at Baḡra in the Hauran after his defeat at Famiya. Well and Kugler (*Studien*) follow the same account and the latter endeavours to explain Nureddin's sudden start southwards and equally sudden return. It may be assumed that Yaḡra should be read in A.S. for Baḡra (so also Köhricht 259, note 2). The forms of the names in Arabic differ very slightly and A.S.'s authority is I.A. whose *Recueil* text gives Yaḡra. The same verses are quoted in celebration of the battle of Yaḡra and the (supposed) battle of Baḡra.

⁴ The suburbs of Harim were plundered and destroyed previous to the siege of Anab (I.A. i. 476, *Barhebr.* 347). The battle with Raymond took place between Famiya and Er-ruj (Tyre xvii. 9), apparently beside Anab itself (Abu Ya'la).

⁵ Wednesday 21st Šafar 544, calendar date 30th June (Kem. Blochet 13 (=iii. 521) and Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 62, Cairo 58, line 4); the festival of St Peter and St Paul (Tyre xvii. 9 where June 27th is a textual error for June 29th).

⁶ Ibn abi Tal in A.S. Cairo 55, line 18 ff. and 58, line 15 ff. (*Recueil* iv. 63 f.).

⁷ 18th Kabi' i 544 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 62; in A.S. Cairo 58, line 9 the name Famiya is wanting). Kem. wrongly puts the capture of Famiya and the campaign against Joscelin's country in the beginning of A.H. 545 just before Joscelin's capture in May 1150 (Blochet 14 f. =iii. 522 f.). A.S. Cairo 62 quotes I.A.'s account under

showed the spirit of his ancestor the second Baldwin by hastening to the rescue of the northern principedom. He was a few days too late to save Famiya and was not strong enough to recover it. Nureddin was willing to accept a peace on the basis of the *status quo* and this was the arrangement made¹. Baldwin had the more reason to be satisfied because Mas'ud of Leonium, attracted by the news of Raymond's death, had begun to attack the scattered possessions of the Latins in Euphratesia (September)². Joscelin of Tell bashir purchased his enemy's withdrawal after the loss of several of his few remaining strongholds³.

During the same year (1149) events occurred which turned Nureddin's attention for a time in another direction. His brother Saifeddin died about the beginning of November and Nureddin was invited to occupy Sinjar. He did so (14th November)⁴ but almost immediately surrendered it to another brother Ẓuṭb ed-din Maudud. It was agreed that Nureddin should confine himself to Syria as before and that Ẓuṭb ed-din should succeed in Mesopotamia. He ruled in Mosul from 1149 to 1170. Nureddin's action may have been influenced in part by the situation in Damascus which again invited his interference. Mu'in ed-din Anar had died on 29th August⁵, and the troubles associated with dynastic change had broken out although Tuḡtakin's grandson, Mujir ed-din, continued nominal ruler. It was a favourable opportunity for bringing Damascus into line with Aleppo against the Latins, perhaps even for making it wholly dependent. Nureddin's plans in the north were liable to interference at any moment unless Damascus acted as a check on Jerusalem. Baldwin's appearance in Antioch this very

A.H. 544 but in I.A. i. 478 the date is 545 and perhaps il. 180 should be under that year also. Wm Tyre instead of recording the capture of Famiya speaks of Iḥrim being captured (xvii. 10). But only the suburbs of Iḥrim were destroyed in this year (see p. 165, n. 4) and the castle was still a Latin possession in 1156 (p. 176). Weil's references to Iḥrim at this point are very inconsistent (iii. pp. 295, 300, 303).

¹ A.S. Cairo 58 and 61.

² Gregory i. 162.

³ Tyre xvii. 10. Mar'ash was one of the places lost (Gregory i. 162, Barhebr. 343).

⁴ Monday 10th Rajab, calendar date 13th November (I.A. ii. 176).

⁵ Abū Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 64, line 16, Ibn Kh. i. 275 (night of 23rd Rabi' ii 544). Röhricht's mention of Mu'in ed-din as alive in 1150 (page 263) is a slip (cf. p. 253, note 3).

summer would have made the fact patent to a ruler much less intelligent than Nureddin. Anar's death was a happy event for the ruler of Aleppo. But Nureddin's first attempt had no substantial success. He advanced against Damascus probably in March (1150) and sought to gain his purpose by professing friendship and offering alliance against the Latins¹. But the Damascenes were suspicious of his good faith and unwilling to break the peace with Baldwin which Anar had renewed last year. The Latins promptly showed their willingness to assist their allies. Heavy rains disturbed Nureddin's movements. Finally he contented himself with the barren acknowledgment that his name should be mentioned in public prayer, el-khutba, after those of the caliph and the sultan. Peace was made in the beginning of May².

Nureddin's early policy of attack on Antioch had accomplished its immediate purpose and now there was more to be gained by operations against Joscelin's country or what was left of the principality of Edessa. The last of the possessions of Antioch east of the "backbone of Syria" had been gained by the capture of Famiya, and everything was quiet in this direction. Raymond's widow ruled the principedom, and it was unlikely that her advisers would break the truce with Aleppo. The way was clear for an advance northwards. For eight months Joscelin's country had been "ground between two millstones"; the troops of Mas'ud of Iconium on the one side, and those of Aleppo on the other³. Just as Nureddin was coming north from Damascus, Joscelin was captured by a troop of soldiers under orders from Ibn ed-daya, governor of Aleppo (commencement of May 1150)⁴. Both Mas'ud and Nureddin hastened to profit by this

¹ Abu Ya'la's suggestion that the Latins had been attacking the Hauran is a partisan's excuse for Nureddin's movement (A.S. iv. 64f., Cairo 69). There had been peace with Jerusalem since May 1149 (p. 164, n. 4). After Baldwin's return from Antioch (end of 1149) he was engaged in building a castle at Gaza. It was nearly completed in the spring of 1150 and was handed over to the Templars (Tyre xvii. 12). Baldwin came directly from Gaza to Anar's assistance (Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 69).

² Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 70; cf. Abu'l-mehasin lii. 306 f.

³ Wm Tyre's expression descriptive of the situation in May 1150 (xvii. 15).

⁴ A victory of Joscelin's related as if just preceding his capture (I.A. ii. 181, Kem. Blochet 15=iii. 523), if over Nureddin in person, must have been some time previously.

⁵ "The news came from Aleppo" on the 5th of Muharram 545, 4th May (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 67); cf. Kem. Blochet 16=iii. 524 (in Muharram 545). I.A.'s

further advantage¹. Nureddin's gain was in the districts bordering on Aleppo. 'Ezaz seems to have been his first object of attack and the siege lasted some time. It was captured on the 15th of July². But the whole territory was doomed from the time it became a fragment dependent on the support of the Latins of Antioch and the south. Its friends recognised now that they could not undertake the task of preserving it. Baldwin of Jerusalem had hurried north to bring help. It was decided to retire from the position. The emperor Manuel was also attracted by the situation, and proposed that the castles still remaining should be occupied by Greek soldiers. It was resolved to accept his proposal. The transfer was made in August³, and Baldwin conducted the Latin inhabitants and garrisons to the shelter of Antioch. On the way from Duluk to 'Ain ṭab, and somewhat farther, Nureddin and his troops harassed the line of march, but no great battle was fought⁴.

The last stage in the reconquest of Edessa proceeded now apace. The Greeks proved quite unable to maintain its crumbling fragments. Within a year the whole district of Euphratesia again became a Moslem province⁵. It was Mas'ud

account is under 546 but A.S. quotes it under 545. Nureddin was at Homy when he heard the news (I.A.). Barheh. 344 dates *anno græc.* 1460 (A.D. 1149).

¹ Tyre xvii. 15. According to Barheh. 344 (*anno græc.* 1461) the inhabitants of Kaṣun, Behesna, Ka'ban, Barzaman and Mar'ash made joint terms with Mas'ud and surrendered to him. The Latins of these towns were permitted to depart to 'Ain ṭab (cf. Wm Tyre who says Tell bashir). Both Mas'ud and Nureddin besieged Tell bashir without success. Gregory i. 165 puts the surrender of Kaṣun, Behesna and Ka'ban in May 1150. Kaṣun and Behesna had not long been in Joscelin's possession (Barheh. 343). "Babula" was captured by another emir, Kara Arslan (Barheh. 343, where Mar'ash is also mentioned). Tilmurtash of Maridīn also made some gains about this time (Barheh. 345).

² 18th Rabi' i 545, Kem. Blochet 16=iii. 524; Abu Ya'fa in A.S. iv. 67 gives the month only.

³ Tyre xvii. 17. Barheh. 345 names Tell bashir, 'Ain ṭab and 'Ezaz as the places so transferred but without any exact date. He mentions that they were afterwards captured by Nureddin, but does not necessarily mean in this same year (compare p. 175, n. 5).

⁴ This account follows Tyre xvii. 17. It is not unlikely that Duluk was now captured (I.A. ii. 185 and in A.S. Cairo 76) and if so the battle described by Tyre xvii. 17 is probably that fought before its capture. I.A. i. 485, followed by Kem. Blochet 18=iii. 526, dates its capture in 1152 (A.H. 547).

⁵ Tyre xvii. 17. He is wrong however in representing Nureddin as his conqueror (cf. note 1).

of Iconium who made the greatest gain. Nureddin's first share was small¹. His chief acquisitions were made in the year 1155, at the expense of Mas'ud's son. Some captures may also have been made in 1152, but most of the intervening years were occupied in efforts to gain possession of Damascus. Until this was accomplished it was the main object of Nureddin's policy, and drew him away from Euphratesia.

The precise occasion of Nureddin's second attack on Damascus, in 1151, is not explained by the Arabic historians. Baldwin's second appearance in the north may have been of some influence. But still more important is the fact that Anar's last truce with Jerusalem was just expiring. The time was opportune for another attempt to bring about a reversal of the late prince's policy. Nureddin reached the neighbourhood of Damascus about the end of April², shortly before the truce expired, and remained there until the beginning of June. He was compelled to move by the advance of an army from Jerusalem and finally retreated into the Biḡa'. Instead of pursuing him the allies entered the Hauran. Their object seems to have been to attack Sarkhak of Boşra, who was disaffected to Damascus. Nureddin had already sent 4000 horse into the Hauran, but their movements are not recorded. The Latins are said to have been repulsed by the emir of Boşra. Their return to Jerusalem was caused, more probably, by the ravages of an Egyptian fleet which unexpectedly attacked the coast-towns at this very time³. Nureddin continued operations some time longer. Finally on July 27th terms were arranged with the prince and wazir of Damascus⁴. Nureddin's relations with Mujir ed-din now became somewhat more cordial. The joint

¹ In Rajab 545 (October—November 1150) he besieged Tell khaliḍ, defeated a (Latin) relieving force near Tell bashir and captured the castle (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 67 f.). Tell bashir is said to have opened negotiations with a view to surrender on 25th Rabi' i 546=July 8th 1151 after a prolonged series of attacks (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 73; cf. Gregory I. 166, who dates the change of government in the year commencing 12th February 1151). Kem. Blochet 16=iii 524 mentions the surrender under A.H. 545, and yet reproduces I.A.'s statements on page 18 f.=iii. 526 f. (cf. p. 175, n. 5).

² Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 69, Cairo 79.

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 72, Cairo 80; I.M. iii. 470 gives the date as Rabi' i 546 (commencing 18th June 1151).

⁴ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 74, Cairo 81 (10th Rabi' ii 546).

expedition against Bosra after the treaty was signed¹ is evidence of this, and also the visit of the Damascene prince to Aleppo in November². But there was no change in the relations of Jerusalem and Damascus; the southern states remained still at peace. An attack on Banyas in December 1151³, and the events connected with it, were an episode for which Mujir ed-din was not responsible. The aggressors were Turkomans whom he disclaimed, and although the Latins retaliated on the territories of the Biḡa' and Aynb uf Ba'albek could not refrain from making a counter-attack on the invaders, Mujir ed-din's friendly spirit prevented further hostilities. It was no doubt about this time that he commenced the payment of the annual contribution which was evidence of his weakness and dependence on the Latins. In 1152 the only military movement from Damascus seems to have been against the emir of Bosra⁴.

The most important events of the year 1152 took place within the borders of Jerusalem. For some years Baldwin III had displayed qualities which showed his fitness to exercise the complete sovereignty that was still denied him. His interest in the affairs of the north marked also a certain independence of the policy of his advisers. But his mother Melisend was unwilling to resign the position she had occupied during his minority and the king chafed under the restrictions put upon his authority. Matters came to a crisis in 1152. A compromise by which the kingdom was divided into two portions did not satisfy Baldwin. He demanded his full inheritance. Civil war broke out and the queen-mother was besieged in the citadel of Jerusalem before Baldwin received the recognition he desired.

These events must have been watched with interest by the surrounding Moslem states. It was fortunate for the Latins that their enemies did not take more advantage of their quarrels. Damascus remained a dependent ally. Nureddin spent the year in the north, in war perhaps with Tripolis⁵, or in operations

¹ A.S. represents Sarkhak as a rebel against Nureddin and an ally of the Latins.

² He left Damascus 12th Rajab and returned 6th Sha'ban (A.S. Cairo 83).

³ End of Sha'ban 546 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 74 f., Cairo 83 f.).

⁴ Safar 547 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 89).

⁵ The assassination of Raymond II (Tyre xvii. 19) may be dated in 1151 or 1152; he was alive in 1151 (Leroux i. 154).

against the old castles of Edessa¹. It was left to an Ortok prince, Timurtash of Maridin², to make a bold dash for the city which his ancestor once had ruled. The Latin army gathered at Nablus and the daring invader pitched his camp on the Mount of Olives. The retreat was as sudden as the attack. A vigorous sally from Jerusalem routed the enemy and they were again defeated as they sought safety in flight over the Jordan. Baldwin's independent reign had just commenced and the victory seemed a happy omen for the future. The king's desire to signalise his accession and the encouragement just received prompted a further enterprise. It was resolved to attack Ascalon, "the bride of Syria."

The project required all Baldwin's energy to accomplish it. The conditions were favourable, yet the siege lasted from January to August (1153)³. It was the absence of all prospect of relief and the apparent determination of the Latins which induced the citizens to accept the favourable terms offered to them. Egypt had recently been more active than for many years, but a new ruler preferred his personal advantage to the safety of Ascalon. The only help he sent was by sea, a supply of provisions and men on one occasion. Nureddin had been appealed to, and even Mujir ed-din showed for a time some inclination to assist. About the end of May these two princes approached Banyas in company. But there a dispute arose and the enterprise was abandoned. Perhaps Mujir ed-din wished to

¹ Abu Ya'la dates in Muharram 547 (commences 8th April 1152) the capture of Anjarsus and Yahmur both in the territory of Tripolis (A.S. Cairo 86, Recueil iv. 75 f.). In the beginning of 1153, before coming south to join Mujir ed-din at Banyas, Nureddin captured Asis, which had a mixed Armenian and Latin garrison (Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 90, Recueil iv. 77). See also p. 168, n. 4 and p. 169, n. 1.

² Tyre xvii. 10 who gives particulars names the invader "Hlaroquin." The identification with Timurtash is Wilken's (iv. 17).

³ From the 25th January (Tyre xvii. 21) to the 12th August (xvii. 30) or more probably the 22nd. For an enumeration of the statements of the sources see Röhricht 277, note 2. The 27th of Jumada II 548 in Beh. iii. 99 if read 27th Jumada I (calendar date 20th August 1153) agrees exactly with the evidence of Annales B 431 (19th August) and other western sources (so Röhricht). Since two or three days elapsed between the capitulation and the Latin occupation (Tyre xvii. 30) it is highly probable that Wm Tyre's August 12 is a textual error for August 22 and gives the day the town was occupied. Ibn Kh. iv. 518 quotes Beh. for 27th Jumada II 548 and Yakut for 24th Jumada II 548. In Tyre xvii. 30 the year is wrongly 1154. Beh. iii. 99 says Ascalon was held by the Latins for 35 years (i.e. A.D. 548-583).

attack Banyas rather than march on Ascalon. He returned to Damascus in the second week of June, and Nureddin made no further attempt to help the distressed Moslem bride¹.

Ascalon was one of the strongest and wealthiest of the Syrian towns, and the last Moslem possession in Palestine. Its capture completed the conquest of the country. A gate of entrance to Egyptian troops was closed, and the way cleared for an attack on Egypt. The Latins were jubilant at the capture. But their gain was more in appearance than in reality. Ascalon had long been harmless and Egypt inactive. By the opportunity of invading Egypt the disposition to neglect affairs in the north was strengthened. The events of this very year made a serious change in the situation there.

The vacillation of Mujir ed-din, his failure to help Ascalon and his quarrel with Nureddin created a party in Damascus which resolved to put Nureddin in his place. Shirkuh's brother, Ayub of Ba'albek, was a moving spirit in the plot². Nureddin accused his most dangerous opponents, those who were loyal to Mujir ed-din, of treacherous overtures to himself, and in this manner secured their disgrace and removal³. Then Shirkuh brought matters to a crisis. He appeared before Damascus with a considerable force (early in April 1154)⁴ and acted in such a manner that Mujir ed-din refused to receive him. When Nureddin heard this he advanced in person and laid siege to the city (April 18th)⁵. Seven days later the town was captured (April 25th)⁶. An undefended part of the wall was climbed by some of Shirkuh's soldiers and one of the gates was opened by disaffected citizens. Mujir ed-din surrendered the citadel with-

¹ Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 90.

² A.S. Cairo 130, line 2; I.A. l. 362.

³ I.A. l. 496.

⁴ Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 96 (in the 11th and 12th days of Muharram 549).

⁵ Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 96 and Ibn Kh. iii. 339 (3rd Šafar 549, which may be the 18th or the 19th of April; cf. note 6). I.A. ii. 191 says the siege lasted "ten days."

⁶ The exact date is given by Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 96 (Sunday 10th Šafar 549) and Ibn Kh. iii. 339 (Sunday 9th Šafar). Ibn abi Tal in A.S. Cairo 96 and I.A. ii. 191 also have 10th Šafar 549. In Kem. Blochet 19 (=ii. 527), Šafar 547 may be a misprint for Šafar 549 (cf. line 4) or should be A.H. 548 as Kem. de Sacy 317. Tyre xvii. 26 puts the capture during the siege of Ascalon (cf. p. 171, n. 3) and before an attack on Banyas which he supposes Nureddin then to have made.

out further resistance¹. The long cherished schemes of Zanki and Nureddin were at length successful. The blow came so suddenly that the Latin alliance was unavailing.

For the next ten years Nureddin manifestly inclines to peace with his Latin neighbours. Time was needed for the welding together of long divided interests. The combined resources of the Latin states were still superior. Nureddin ruled no Mesopotamian towns, as Zanki had done. His sovereignty over Moslem Syria remained imperfect. Ba'albek did not follow the example of its metropolis. Shaizar may not have been the only place of some importance to maintain a certain independence for some years to come. Besides, the old country of Edessa was still unconquered. Obviously the desire to round off his territories northwards of Aleppo held Nureddin back in some degree from attack on the Latin states. His wars with Baldwin in 1157 and 1158, and again in 1160, were commenced by the other side. So long as the Latins left Nureddin undisturbed his only pressing motive to engage in war against them was the call of religious duty. Mere territorial ambitions had an outlet in that part of Joscelin's country which the sultan of Iconium now possessed. Besides, after 1159 the Greek empire became a more pressing danger to the Moslems of Syria than it had been for many years. Fear of the emperor Manuel undoubtedly acted as a check on Nureddin from that date onwards.

Some influences have just been named which prevented the capture of Damascus from becoming, as it might have been, a powerful stimulus to Nureddin in the prosecution of his Latin wars. But the acquisition of Damascus by Nureddin is none the less a landmark in the history. An important step was taken towards the removal of the disunity which had made the existence of the Latin states a possibility. A united Latin power now stretched along the Latin border. In time of war Nureddin could strike with all his force at north or south according as he pleased. The barrier between Jerusalem and the sultan of the north was broken down. The old scourge of

¹ I. A. L. 497 is obviously less accurate than the sources already quoted on which the narrative of the text is based. The *Recueil* text of A.S. is not so full as that of the Cairo edition (96 ff.).

Antioch and Edessa came near Jerusalem. When the Moslem sultan judged that the time had come the way was open for an attack on the Holy City.

When Nureddin occupied Damascus one of the charges on the revenues of the city was an annual payment to the Latins of Jerusalem. It seems to have been conceded by Mujir ed-din some time after the death of Anar. Nureddin's treatment of the obligation is only a matter of inference. It appears probable, however, that he continued the payment¹. The fact, if certain, would be a striking illustration of his policy, for the time, towards the Latins of the south. It can hardly be doubted that his principal aim was to avoid provoking attack, and to make it appear that the situation in Damascus was unchanged by his advent there. He required time to establish himself firmly in his new possessions, and freedom to complete his schemes of conquest in the north. Even virtual tribute to the Latins of Jerusalem was not too great a price to pay for these advantages. On whatever conditions, almost certainly in accordance with some treaty, Baldwin left Nureddin undisturbed. After all he could hardly undo the conquest now, and there were aggressive movements from the side of Egypt to be guarded against². So two years passed in peace. It was probably the time set by treaty. After its expiry both parties were willing that it should be extended. In the end of 1156 (November—December)³ peace was arranged for another year. Nureddin bound himself to pay 8000 dinars.

During these same years the northern Latins, also, left the Moslems undisturbed. In Antioch there was a new ruler, Reginald of Chatillon. Raymond's widow, Constance, had been

¹ This may be inferred from the fact that peace was unbroken in 1154-55 and from the terms of the agreement in 1156. Gregory I. 183 also implies something of the kind ("à prix d'or"). Wilken definitely says tribute was paid for two years and refers to A.S. as his authority (cf. note 3).

² An Egyptian fleet engaged in privateering off the Syrian coast in 1155 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 82, I.M. iii. 470). In 1156 from July to the commencement of the following year there was a continuous series of attacks by sea and land (I.M. iii. 471).

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 83 (Shawwāl 551). Wilken iv. 41 says there was to be no payment of tribute under this agreement (cf. iv. 32, note 40). But this is inconsistent with the Recueil and Cairo texts of A.S. who is apparently Wilken's authority.

urged persistently to remarry for the sake of the principedom. At last she made choice of this Reginald (1153)¹. He was a young Frenchman who had been in Syria since the crusade of Louis VII. His daring and enterprise were conspicuous many years later in the wars with Saladin. Something of the same spirit marks his career in Antioch from 1154 to 1160. But he was not the man for the post. He dissipated his energy in other undertakings than the war against Nureddin, which demanded the concentration of every power. First he seems to have embroiled himself with the Armenian prince Thoros². Under the vigorous rule of this sovereign a new Armenian state was becoming powerful in Cilicia and should have been a helpful ally. The conflict does not appear to have been serious but it was ominous for the future. It led, also, to an adventurous expedition against Cyprus in the year 1156³. This dissipated forces that should have been employed elsewhere. It was aimed against the Greek emperor, who is said not to have fulfilled promises he made to Reginald to induce him to be his ally against Thoros.

In 1155, accordingly, Nureddin was at perfect liberty to pursue his scheme of conquest against the sultan of Iconium. Mas'ud had recently died (1155) and been succeeded by his son Kilij Arslan⁴. The time was the more opportune because Kilij Arslan was already involved in war with Ibn Danishmend. While he was thus occupied in the summer of 1155 Nureddin captured several of his castles and towns⁵. They were principally those which Mas'ud a few years before had gained from the Latins. Next year Kilij Arslan retaliated, having made alliance

¹ Tyre xvii. 26 (who dates the event by the siege of Ascalon).

² Tyre xviii. 10; Michael i. 349 (*anno grac.* 1466, commencing 1st October 1154); Barheb. 353 (*anno grac.* 1467).

³ The position of Tyre's narrative, xviii. 10, points to a date in A.D. 1155 or 1156; Michael i. 350 implies *anno grac.* 1467 (or 1468?) and Barheb. 355 gives 1468.

⁴ Barheb. 351.

⁵ Abu Ya'fa in A.S. Cairo 100; cf. Barheb. 351 and Gregory i. 182, who name 'Ain Jab and Barzuman (cf. Gregory i. 185). Kem.'s list Blochet 16 L=iii. 524 f. along with 'Ain Jab names several places, of which Mar'ash at least was not gained until 1159 (p. 182, n. 3) and all are represented as conquests from the Latins. Ra'han and Kaqun were unsuccessfully attacked this year (Gregory i. 185). I.A. L 497 puts the surrender of Tell bashir in A.H. 549 or A.H. 550 (i.e. 1154 or 1155). See however p. 169, n. 1.

with the Armenians and the Latins¹. The only recorded movement is a Latin attack on the district near Aleppo early in 1156. But this can only have been one of several. Nureddin had spent the winter in Damascus. He started north again in the third week of April². On the way news reached him that the Latins had been repulsed. He seems himself to have made an attack on Harim³. The Latins soon bought a cessation of hostilities by surrendering part of the revenues of the district. Nureddin had another care than military operations. On the 13th of May the first of a series of earthquake shocks was felt in the north. They caused much destruction in Aleppo, Homs and Hama and were especially frequent from October onwards. They did not affect Damascus until the beginning of 1157⁴. Nureddin was actively employed during this time in rebuilding operations and in taking precautions against the surprise of defenceless posts. A settlement was made with Kilij Arslan⁵. Nureddin returned to Damascus in Ramaḍan, before the middle of November 1156. In the following month he renewed peace with Baldwin as already described.

Almost immediately after this, however, Nureddin came to blows with the southern kingdom for the first time. In the beginning of February 1157⁶ Baldwin broke the treaty which he had just concluded. William of Tyre says that want of money drove him to the step. He heard that herds and large droves of horses were pasturing in the neighbourhood of Banyas, relying on the security of the recent truce. The temptation was too great. Baldwin fell unexpectedly upon them.

Nureddin's first move was to occupy Ba'albek, at the end of April⁷. It had remained in the hands of an independent emir

¹ Gregory i. 181.

² 24th Ṣafer 551 (Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 103, Recueil iv. 83, where 18th March is an error for 18th April).

³ This is inserted on the authority of I.A. i. 501 (Kem. Blochet 20 f.), but A.S. Cairo 101, line 7 f. suggests that the year is uncertain.

⁴ These particulars are from Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 103 f.

⁵ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 83.

⁶ A.S. iv. 83 f., Cairo 103, line 15 (last 10 days of Dhu'l-Hijja 551).

⁷ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 85, Cairo 107 (soon after 13th Rabi' i 552); cf. I.A. i. 508 (A.H. 551). A.S. himself prefers a date in A.H. 550, i.e. after the 7th March 1155. He relies apparently on Ibn abi Tal (Cairo 99).

since the occupation of Damascus in 1154¹. Very probably the threat of attack from Tripolis, as much as the prospect of war with Jerusalem, suggested this preliminary step. While Nur-eddin was still in Ba'albek news came from two quarters of successes gained by his lieutenants. Shirkuh defeated a band of Latins in the north, doubtless those who were raiding the territories of Homs and Hama². Naṣir ed-din, the sultan's brother, surprised and routed a train of the knights of St John on their way to occupy Banyas for its greater security. Shirkuh joined Nureddin at Ba'albek and it was resolved to attack Banyas. Some time was spent in preparation. Nureddin left Damascus to undertake the siege on the 11th of May³. Across the valley on the hills to the west, looking down on Banyas, was the strong castle of Hunain. Shirkuh's victory in its neighbourhood was probably a check administered to its garrison. The little town of Banyas was occupied, but the strong castle on the heights to the east held out⁴. A relieving force approached from the south. Nureddin burned the captured town and raised the siege of the castle. Baldwin repaired the damaged walls, left provisions for the garrison, and started homeward. In the valley between Banyas and Tiberias he was surprised by Nureddin. Many of the Latins were slain and taken prisoners in the battle (19th June)⁵. The king escaped to Ṣafed and Nureddin resumed the siege of Banyas. Baldwin at once gathered a fresh army, which included troops from Tripolis and Antioch, but Nureddin would not offer battle. In the end of July he received information regarding Ibn Mas'ud's movements which showed that there was need of his presence in the north⁶. The Latins would not conclude a truce, so he left troops to

¹ Although Ayub had been Muḥir ed-dīn's governor a certain Ḍahak held the citadel and so probably was able to retain the town (A.S. Cairo 99).

² Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 86 in combination with the notice iv. 85. Rühricht 288 following Wilken, Bk. iv. 42, says the victory was gained beside the Euphrates ("am Euphrat").

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 86 (end of Rabī' I 551, a Saturday, therefore May 11th).

⁴ The account of Ibn abī Ṭal in A.S. iv. 91 is to be read in the light of Abu Ya'la's narrative in A.S. iv. 87. The particulars which follow are mainly from Wm Tyre, whose account is the clearest.

⁵ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 88; Tyre xviii. 14 (13 Kal. July).

⁶ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 92.

check their movements and started northwards (11th August). It was some time after this that Shaizar was occupied by one of Nureddin's emirs. Until now it had been independent. But its walls were ruined by an earthquake, apparently in the latter part of the month of August¹, and it was easily seized in its defenceless state².

Nureddin's departure seems to have put an end to operations in the south. But the Latins only changed the point of their attack. They advanced from Tripolis against the exposed valley of the Orontes. They were encouraged by the damage which the earthquakes had done and by the arrival in Beirut of crusaders under Dietrich of Flanders. There is no record of what Nureddin had been doing since he left Banyas. But as soon as the Latins began to attack Er-ruj he advanced against them with forces gathered in Homs and the neighbourhood. The besiegers at once retired to Antioch. Just after this, early in October, Nureddin fell ill at Sarmin. His illness was so serious that he made arrangements for the event of his death. He nominated his brother, Nasir ed-din, emir of Harran, to be his successor. There were disturbances when this prince entered Aleppo as heir-designate. Apparently he was opposed by the governor, Ibn ed-daya. Possibly his conduct was not judicious and exposed him to the charge of disloyalty. But there was no breach, as yet, between the brothers. Nureddin recovered and Nasir ed-din returned to Harran³. The news of Nureddin's illness encouraged the Latins to resume operations. They made an attack on Shaizar. The town was captured but, just as in the year 1138, the citadel at its upper end defied every attack. There were also disputes regarding the future lordship of the town. Baldwin desired that it should be given to Dietrich as a reward for his zeal, Reginald claimed at least overlordship⁴. William of Tyre represents this quarrel as the real cause of

¹ A.S. Cairo 104.

² Ibn abi Tal in A.S. iv. 95. Cf. I.A.

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 93 f., Cairo 109; Ibn abi Tal in A.S. iv. 95, Cairo 110. Cf. Tyre xviii. 19. Ibn abi Tal's allusion to the nomination of an heir in place of Nasir probably anticipates the events of 1159. Regarding Shirkah see p. 180, n. 4.

⁴ Dietrich was the husband of Baldwin's sister Sybil. He had been a crusader previously in 1139 and 1148 and returned again to the Holy Land during the crisis that followed Baldwin's death.

failure. Abu Ya'la relates that the Latins were driven away by a force chiefly Ismailian. From Christmas day 1157 to the beginning of February of the following year the Latins besieged an important castle not far from Antioch. It is difficult to suppose that the castle was Ḥarim, for that seems to have been in their hands already. On this occasion, at last, their enterprise was rewarded by success. Nureddin could bring no help and the castle surrendered¹.

In the south little use was made of the period of Nureddin's absence and illness. In November or December 1157 a Moslem castle was captured in the Ḥauran². In March of the following year an expedition ravaged the same district and penetrated as far as Dariya near Damascus. Nureddin returned to Damascus on the 7th of April, fully restored to health. At once he proceeded to retaliate on the Latins. Shirkuh made an inroad on the territories of Sidon. Nureddin conducted operations in the district of Suwad from May to August³. Baldwin hastened to defend his borders. The principal incident was a battle by "the wooden bridge" which crossed the Jordan just below the lake of Tiberias (15th July)⁴. Nureddin's emirs lost courage and fled. Only a small band of personal attendants and devoted followers held their ground round the sultan. They kept the enemy in check and drew off safely, exasperated at the desertion of their comrades.

During 1158 the activity of Egypt, which had been provoked by the fall of Ascalon, continued to manifest itself. From March to May there were a whole series of inroads at different

¹ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 96 gives the name Ḥarim and Wm Tyre also, although in the chapter heading only (Alligne's text xviii. 19). The latter says the castle was within 12 miles of Antioch. According to xxi. 19 Ḥarim was 12 miles, according to xvii. 10, ten miles from Antioch. The two late chronicles quoted by Wilken, Bk. iv. 52, note 74 are of no additional weight. The date of the beginning of the siege is from Wm Tyre, of the conclusion from Abu Ya'la.—Ḥarim was a Christian stronghold in 1156, if therefore it was besieged and captured by the Latins in 1158 it must have been lost by them in the interval. As this loss is not recorded possibly the name Ḥarim as given by the sources is an error. Wilken iv. 51 is wrong in saying that the castle had been Moslem for nine years for it was not captured by Nureddin in 1149 (see p. 165, n. 7). He is besides inconsistent with himself (iv. 41).

² Tyre xviii. 19.

³ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 97 ff.

⁴ Tyre xviii. 21 ("Idibus Julius").

points in the southern territories of Jerusalem¹. They were renewed later in the year (September—October) and were stimulated by Nureddin's attack on the other side². The Egyptians endeavoured to make alliance with Nureddin but nothing came of their proposals.

Nureddin passed the winter in Damascus. He was alarmed by the course of events in the north but serious illness detained him³. Again as in the preceding winter he nominated a successor. This time he passed over Naṣir ed-din and chose another brother, Kuṭb ed-din of Moṣul. He was sufficiently well to start for Aleppo about the middle of March. His presence there was urgently required⁴.

During 1158 Reginald was the ally of Thoros against Ibn Mas'ud of Iconium. For some time the Greek emperor Manuel had used the ruler of Iconium as a check on the growing power of the Armenian prince. Reginald took the other side. In the end of the year Manuel intervened in person. The Cilician towns quickly yielded to his arms. Thoros ventured no resistance. The emperor passed the winter in Cilicia. Reginald with difficulty obtained pardon after a humiliating submission. Baldwin also appeared in person before the emperor. Through his influence and by representing to Manuel the value to the Latins of the Armenian alliance he brought about a reconciliation. Thoros was permitted to hold his possessions as a vassal of the emperor. These events made the Greek empire a factor in Syrian politics once again. Its influence on the whole was favourable to the Latins. Reginald's feelings certainly were not very cordial but his part in Antioch was almost over. Baldwin's relation to the emperor was principally of importance and he

¹ I.M. iii. 471 f. Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 97 mentions one of these.

² I.M. iii. 471 f.

³ Possibly he fell ill after 23rd January 1159, for Abu Ya'la's narrative is under A.H. 554. If so it must have been immediately after that date.

⁴ Full particulars are given by Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 122. Ibn al-Jal's account (A.S. Cairo 122 f., Recueil iv. 103 f.) confounds this illness with that of 1157. I.A. i. 517 f. also has a narrative in which the events of 1157 and 1159 are combined. His account of the illness describes that of 1157. It represents Shirkuh as leaving Aleppo for Damascus in order to secure that town in the event of Nureddin's death. According to Abu Ya'la he was however sent by Nureddin himself. Kem. Blochet 23 f.=iii. 531 f. copies I.A.

stood on a different footing. In September 1158 he had married Manuel's niece and from that time he enjoyed his particular favour. The advantage to the Latins consisted not so much in any direct assistance they ever received as in the mere influence of his friendly attitude. The prospect of a conflict with the Greek emperor was a check on Nureddin's policy and well calculated to restrain him from pressing the Latins too hardly. In 1158-59 it appeared as if the borders of the empire were approaching Nureddin's own and he was ready to make sacrifices to secure that the emperor should depart.

In the spring of 1159 the emperor Manuel entered Antioch and remained there until an agreement was made with Nureddin in the beginning of June¹. It scarcely required the threat of an attack on Aleppo to secure the release of a large number of Christian captives. Amongst them was Bertram, who had been captured in 1148, and the Master of the Temple, who had been made prisoner in the battle beside lake Hule, north of Tiberias, in 1157². It appears that Joscelin of Edessa, after a captivity of nine years, had died in prison just the month before³. By these surrenders Nureddin gained exemption from attack and acknowledgment of the position he had already won. His northern policy for some years past had aimed at nothing further. All he desired was granted when the Latins consented to give him peace.

Nureddin had still to deal with other complications. Events connected with his recent illness led him to an expedition against Harran. When his life had seemed in danger some of the principal men of Damascus had sent messengers to his brother Naṣir ed-din and that prince had actually set out for Damascus in the hope of securing the succession to the sultanate. The action was regarded as disloyal⁴ and Nureddin proceeded

¹ Abu Ya'la in A.S. iv. 105; cf. Tyre xviii. 25.

² Kinnamos i. 278; Tyre xviii. 25 names only Bertram. Wilken, Bk. iv. 65, speaks of the battle "by the Dead Sea." He has been misled by the expression "Salt sea" and gives the locality correctly on page 44.

³ Barhebr. 344 says he was a prisoner for nine years before his death and his capture took place in May 1150. But Barhebræus himself gives the date of capture as 1149 (p. 267, n. 5) and in any case the ninth year may not have been complete.

⁴ Abu Ya'la in A.S. Cairo 122; cf. Gregory i. 193, who says Naṣir ed-din was accused falsely.

now to inflict punishment for it (20th June)¹. Harran was besieged for two months and when the city surrendered it was handed over to Kutb ed-din. Naṣir ed-din fled to the Latins². A campaign against the sultan of Iconium followed these events. The former dependencies of Edessa were still Nureddin's objects of desire. Mar'ash, Beḥesna and Ra'ban are named among the captures made at this time. According to one of the sources, however, these conquests were restored when peace was made³. The operations cannot have lasted beyond the first month of 1160.

While Nureddin was thus employed Baldwin in the south took the opportunity to make an incursion into the territories of Damascus. Nejm ed-din Ayub was governor there. He secured peace for three months by the payment of 4000 pieces of gold and the release of certain captives⁴. When the truce expired Nureddin was still occupied in the north and Baldwin again took the offensive. But before he had accomplished anything Nureddin was back in Damascus⁵. Both sides were prepared for attack, but all summer neither took the offensive. When winter came truce was made for two years⁶. The war so ended had been commenced by Baldwin and the attack throughout came mostly from the Latin side. Nureddin had maintained his ground without himself making progress or gaining any great advantage. It almost appears as if now he judged it best to acquiesce in the boundaries of his southern emirate as he had done already in the case of his northern territories. More than

¹ This is the date of his leaving Aleppo, 1st Jmāda ii 554 (A.S. Cairo 1133).

² He seems to have been their ally for some years. He was still on the Latin side in August 1164 (Ibn abi Tal in A.S. Cairo 1136). But at the siege of Banyas in October 1164 he fought against them (I. A. i. 541).

³ Michael i. 353 (who does not however distinguish and possibly confuses the events of 1155 and 1159). He names Beḥesna, Ra'ban and Mar'ash; Tyre xviii. 27 Mar'ash, Kaṣun and Beḥesna; Gregory i. 194 Edessa and Raḳqa taken from Naṣir ed-din and Ra'ban, Kaṣun, Mar'ash and Beḥesna from Ḳilij Arslan.

⁴ Tyre xviii. 27. This truce made by Ayub may be identified with that of four months which Gregory i. 193 says Nureddin made with the king of Jerusalem before he started to attack Harran. He mentions also that the Latins invaded the territory of Damascus after the expiry of the truce.

⁵ Before 10th February (Gregory i. 194).

⁶ All this is from Gregory i. 194. The French translation of i. 198 reads as if peace had not yet been made at the date of Reginald's capture (end of November).

one influence may have strengthened his desire for peace. No doubt he was already resolved to perform the pilgrimage to Mekka when the next pilgrimage season came. But unexpected events in the north demanded immediate attention from both sides. Reginald was a prisoner in Aleppo.

Two notable prisoners were made this year (1160) by Mejd ed-din ibn ed-dayn, governor of Aleppo. In July Joscelin the younger, governor of Hārim, was captured¹. In the end of November² Reginald himself was taken prisoner. Reginald was tempted by prospects of plunder to make a raid into Joscelin of Edessa's old country. As he returned laden with spoil he was intercepted and captured by Ibn ed-daya. When the news reached Baldwin he immediately proceeded to Antioch to give his sanction and support to the arrangements which the safety of the principedom demanded. Nureddin also hastened north. He ravaged Tripolis on the way and advanced in the direction of Hārim. But the Latins were prepared and no great advantage was to be gained. The capture of a single castle is reported³. Baldwin was assisted by Thoros of Armenia and by Greek troops. An attack on the territories of Antioch by the Latin governor of Bagras may be dated in this campaign⁴. He was defeated,

¹ Rajab 555 (Kem. de Saey); Kem. Blochet 25 gives Rajab 550 (= 1155) but A.D. 1160 is confirmed by Barhebr. 357, Michael i. 333 and Gregory I. 195 (who speaks of "the son of the count"). Barhebraeus says he was put in the prison where his father had been. Röhricht 318, note 3 argues that Joscelin was not captured until 1165.

² Tyre xviii. 28, ix Kal. December (23rd November) following the events of 1159, *non multo interjecto tempore*, and in the year (*annus effluxit*, xviii. 31) before that which ended with Maria's marriage in December 1161. The identification of the year as Baldwin's 18th permits of no certain inference but may denote 1160 (see appendix). Kem. Blochet 25 (Rev. Or. Lat. iii. 533) gives the end of November 1161 (beginning of Dhul-hijja 556) and Gregory I. 198 autumn 1161, the latter in conflict with his statement that there was then no truce in the south and both contrary to the evidence that 1161 was the year of Nureddin's pilgrimage (Chron. der Stadt Mekka, edit. Wüstenfeld II. 225 (text), iv. 225 (trans.)). In 1161 the pilgrimage month commenced on the 21st of November and Nureddin would not have time to perform the pilgrimage after visiting Aleppo. I.A. I. 476 relates Reginald's capture without any date immediately after telling of the death of Raymond. In Kem. Reginald is not named but is called "the second prince." In Wm Tyte the place of his capture is given as Comui, in de Saey's Kem. as El-juma, in Blochet's as El-huma.

³ Gregory i. 199 ("Arzdkhan").

⁴ Barhebr. 358 (in *anno gratie*, 1472, commencing October 1160). Michael i. 354 f. has most particulars, giving his name as Gerard originally of Sidon and saying that he

taken prisoner and executed. It may be conjectured that the two years peace concluded with Baldwin in the south was now made applicable to the north also¹. There was a longer pause than usual in the contest between Moslem and Christian. Nureddin was doubtless influenced by his desire to perform the pilgrimage to Mekka. For once the call of religion counselled peace. Two illnesses in successive winters were a warning to the sultan that he must not delay to perform this duty of the faithful. The pilgrimage month in 1161 fell at the close of the year. With peace before and with peace following Nureddin paid his debt of piety.

This time of peace was acceptable to the Latins also. In Antioch the Queen Mother and the Patriarch took the conduct of affairs. Baldwin shared their responsibility until Bohemond, the young son of Constance and Raymond, became nominal ruler. The bonds of friendship with the Greek emperor were strengthened by the marriage of the young prince's sister, Maria, with the emperor in December 1161². It was unfortunate that this alliance involved a slight to the sister of Raymond III of Tripolis, which made that prince an enemy of the Greeks. The death of Baldwin followed not long after. The general ruin caused by an earthquake in northern Syria and negotiations connected with Maria's marriage occupied him in Antioch during the latter part of 1161. He was there when his mother died (11th September)³, and there his own fatal illness overtook him. After a time he moved south. He died at Beirut on the 10th of February 1162⁴, only thirty-two years of age. His brother Amalric was chosen his successor; he was twenty-seven.

was defeated by the king of Jerusalem. I.A. i. 522 f. simply calls him governor of Sidon and dates in A.H. 566 (commences 30th December 1160).

¹ Possibly the truce for two years made in the winter of 1160 (p. 182, n. 6) is identical with the present truce and was concluded in the north for north and south alike. Michael i. 357 says peace was made before Baldwin returned south and does not mention the earlier truce. He supposes however that Baldwin's death took place immediately after this (i.e. confuses the events of 1160 with those of 1161).

² Tyre xviii. 31. The marriage took place in Constantinople on December 25th (Kinnamos i. 289).

³ Tyre xviii. 32. The earthquake occurred in August (letter of Amalric in Migne 155, page 1272), and probably explains the rebuilding of the castle at "the Iron bridge" during Baldwin's visit (Tyre xviii. 32).

⁴ Tyre xviii. 34 and xlx. 1 in harmony with the narrative of xviii. 31-34, which

Amalric's reign opens a new period in the history. A complete change comes quickly over the aspect of affairs. Events move more rapidly. The petty incidents of recent years give place to movements on a larger scale and with more of epic interest. The destinies of the Latin states hurry on and Moslem victory comes more clearly into sight. Amalric's share in the change is not easily estimated, for it was subordinate to the initiative of others. But his personal character must have largely affected the issue. Fired by youth and ambition his attitude to the kingdom was very different from that of Baldwin. He was not satisfied with the condition of the Latin states. He aimed at extending his dominions and indulged in far-reaching dreams of conquest. He sought help from Europe and from the emperor Manuel to realise his plans. He married a Greek, daughter of a nephew of Manuel's, and so continued to enjoy the emperor's favour. The mere fact of Amalric's succession to the throne tended to originate a new policy and to create a new situation in Jerusalem. But other events anticipated his action with the same effect.

Nureddin's truce with Baldwin expired at the end of 1162. As warfare was not resumed in 1163 it may be inferred that peace was renewed for another year, both in north and south¹. Nureddin was indisposed to take the aggressive and Amalric waited for some response to his appeals for help. Meantime, however, the Latin prince embarked on an enterprise without parallel since the early days of the Latin conquest. In the autumn of 1163 he invaded Egypt. The domestic history of

makes the date the February after Maria's marriage in December 1161 (p. 184, n. 2). If the year of the earthquake referred to in p. 184, n. 3 could be determined it would fix the year of Baldwin's death. There were a series of earthquakes in northern Syria during 1156-63 (Kem. Blochet 22). The view that Baldwin's death took place in February 1163 also finds support in the statements of Wm. Tyre. Assuming that Baldwin died in his 30th year (xviii. 34) and that Amalric died in his 12th (xx. 33) and reckoning Baldwin's accession year as 1143 (p. 147, n. 1) and Amalric's death year as 1174 (p. 213, n. 3) the death of the former and the accession of the latter would fall in 1163. Further Tyre xix. 5 dates in the first year of Amalric's reign events which seem to fall in September 1163 (p. 186, n. 1) and so presumably implies that Baldwin died in February 1163. The fact is, however, that the statements about regal years are no more reliable than the Christian years associated with them.

¹ Under A. II. 557 I.A. i. 535 relates a fruitless attack by Nureddin on Hama. As A. II. 557 ends 9th December 1162 this might be a single movement after the expiry of the peace and before its renewal for another year.

that country was passing through a crisis. In September 1161 Ṭalāi' ibn Ruzzik, wazir of the Egyptian caliph, and sultan, as he was even called, died. In 1163 the contest for his position resolved itself into one between two emirs, Dirgām and Shawir. Shawir was compelled to flee from the country and finally betook himself to Damascus seeking help from Nureddin. It was now that Amalric, by his invasion of Egypt, gave the first outward evidence of the spirit by which he was animated (September 1163)¹. It seems that tribute had been paid to the Latins and was now withheld by Dirgām. The Hospitallers, whose chief strongholds were on the south-western borders, contributed largely to the expedition, and their Master, Gilbert d'Assailly, was an energetic supporter of the enterprise. Amalric himself, before his accession, had been count of Ascalon from the time of its capture in 1153, and this no doubt, in part, explains his policy and the closeness of his association with the Hospitallers. It was anticipated that Egypt might be conquered and annexed. The Latins boasted of a victory gained over Dirgām's troops near Bilbais. But when the dams of the Nile were broken and the country flooded they were compelled to retreat. The invasion was really a complete failure. Of still greater novelty and of more importance was an expedition sent by Nureddin in the following spring. The year 1164 is a landmark in the history of the period, for in it was taken the first step towards a union of Moslem Syria and Moslem Egypt.

It was towards the end of October 1163 that Shawir reached Damascus². He is said to have promised a third of the revenues of Egypt in return for help sufficient to place him in

¹ Tyre xix. 5; the year is that of Shawir's flight from Egypt, which is determined by note 2. I am indebted to the courtesy of M. Hartwig Derenbourg for the information that his *Vie de Ouarn* proves that there was an invasion of Egypt by Amalric during the wazirate of El-mallik en-nayir Ruzzik (September 1161—December 1162). Either this expedition was prior to that of Tyre xix. 5 or the two are identical and should be dated in September 1162 as M. Derenbourg supposes. Amalric had already invaded Egypt as count of Ascalon (Barheib. 357, *anno græc.* 1472; cf. Michael i. 353) in the spring of 1161 (Derenbourg, *op. cit.* 153).

² Ibn Kh. iv. 484 according to whom he fled from Egypt in Ramiḍān 558, August 1163 (cf. Abulfida iii. 586), and reached Damascus on 23rd Dhu'l-ḥa'tha (23rd October). Tyre xix. 5 agrees closely with both dates. I.A. ii. 215 simply names the year (A.11. 558); I.A. i. 533 the month Rabi' i, apparently in A.11. 559. Kem. Blochet 28=iii. 536 (Rabi' ii 559) probably depends on I.A. and possibly A.S. iv. 106 (6th Rabi' 558) is derived from the same source.

power¹. Nureddin hesitated. The territories of Jerusalem intervened between Damascus and Egypt and the hostility of Amalric had to be reckoned with. The credit of having rightly judged the situation and determined Nureddin's policy at this critical moment belongs once more to Asad ed-din Shirkuh². The Egyptian people could be counted on to prefer a Moslem sultan to Latin domination, and Shirkuh saw that no possible Egyptian ruler was a serious rival. Doubtless he urged the advantage which the possession of Egypt would bring Nureddin in his prosecution of the holy war. With Egypt and Moslem Syria under one ruler Jerusalem would lie between two fires. From the Delta Nureddin might employ a fleet against the Syriac sea-coast and interrupt communications with Europe. It seems clear that personal ambition also had a place in the number of Shirkuh's motives. In spite of his eminence and his abilities he had hitherto played a subordinate part. Without doubt he recognised that he would be more independent as the ruler of Egypt and might if circumstances were favourable establish there an independent dynasty. Throughout the whole history of the attack on Egypt Shirkuh was the moving spirit. It was he, more truly than Nureddin, who brought about a decisive change in the strength and composition of the Moslem forces which were arrayed against the Latin states.

Shirkuh was given command of the Moslem troops which were sent to Egypt in April³. Nureddin made an incursion into the territory of Jerusalem to draw attention from the expedition as it passed the Latin borders. The march was accomplished in safety and Shawir was restored without difficulty to his former position.

¹ More exactly one-third after deduction of the expenses of the army. Shirkuh was also to remain in Egypt as Nureddin's representative and with Syrian troops under his command (I.A. i. 533).

² I.A. ii. 216.

³ Jumada i 559, commencing 27th March 1164 (I.A. ii. 216, Kcm. Blochet 29 = lii. 537). The month agrees with Tyre xix. 6 and with the date given by Beh. lii. 43 as that of the arrival in Egypt (2 Jumada ii which in A.H. 559 was 27th April). A.S. iv. 108 wrongly quotes I.A.'s month as Jumada ii. As to the year 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 108 agrees with I.A. Beh. lii. 43 gives A.H. 558 (A.D. 1163) but the text may not be in order. Wm Tyre's date is the second year of Amalric's reign (xix. 7; cf. p. 188, n. 1).

Events now take the course which might be anticipated. The Syrian emir was in no haste to depart. Shawir saw that his independence was threatened by the power which had restored him. His rash promises when a fugitive in Damascus were quoted against him. To shake off this yoke he needed assistance and he turned to Amalric of Jerusalem. The opportunity suited the schemes of the Latin prince and he quickly responded to the appeal (July). Shirkuh fought at great disadvantage against the allies. Although he stubbornly maintained himself for three months in Bilbais (Pelusium), at the end of that time he was glad to accept Amalric's terms. They were that Latins and Syrians should both evacuate the country (October 1164). The real gain of this year was not made in Egypt but in Syria.

Amalric was induced to make terms by the news of disaster in Antioch and of attack on the borders of his own territory. His absence had given Nureddin a favourable opportunity for a more serious attack on the Latin states than he had made for years. The importance of the effort is marked by the co-operation of the emirs of Upper Mesopotamia. The object of the allies was probably to narrow the limits of the Latin territories by the conquest of frontier castles. The principality of Antioch was selected for the first attack¹. Nureddin left Damascus not long after Shirkuh's departure. As he passed the outskirts of Tripolis and the fields of Ḥiṣn el-akrad his soldiers gave notice of their presence by their forays. The plain at the foot of the hills, El-buḡai'a, was the scene of one of the narrowest escapes of Nureddin's life. The knights Hospitallers of Ḥiṣn el-akrad sallied out and surprised the sultan's little camp. They penetrated among the tents as Nureddin and his men sprang to their saddles. Nureddin's horse was still fastened by its tether. A faithful Kurd cut the rope and fell a victim to his devotion as

¹ The following account is taken principally from Ibn abl 'Fal in A.S. iv. 123 f.; cf. 'Imad el-din in A.S. iv. 109. The latter calls the fight at Ḥiṣn el-akrad the battle of El-buḡai'a and dates it three months before the capture of Hama, therefore about the middle of May 1164. I.A.'s narrative regarding the battle of this name is dated a year earlier, in A.H. 558=A.D. 1163 (l. 530), but probably in the year of the capture of Hama which he makes A.H. 559 (cf. l. 537). Tyro xix. 8 implies a date in the second year of Amalric's reign (see appendix).

the Latins dashed up, just too late¹. Mejd ed-din and the allied troops were joined at Artah and siege was laid to Harim. The northern states made a united effort to save the fortress. Bohemond was joined by Raymond of Tripolis. There were also with them contingents of Armenian and Greek troops. The presence of such numbers added to the importance of the signal victory which Nureddin gained. Both Bohemond and Raymond were amongst the numerous prisoners. Within two days Harim was captured (12th August 1164)². It had been the object of many attacks and was an important gain. The fortress guards the approach to Antioch on the way from Aleppo. As the Christian occupation of Atharib had once threatened the Moslem town, so now from Harim the Moslems threatened Antioch. Nureddin's next step might well have been an attack on Antioch itself. He was restrained from this by fear of the emperor Manuel. Greek troops had just been engaged against him, the emperor was friendly to the Latins, and there was a danger that he might occupy Antioch itself³. After an interval, therefore, he struck a blow at the frontiers of Jerusalem by laying siege to Banyas. There was a special reason for the selection of this point of attack. Shirkuh was hard pressed in Egypt just then, and Nureddin desired to effect a diversion in his favour⁴. The undertaking was successful in every respect. Shirkuh was relieved and the castle was captured after a few days siege (18th October 1164)⁵. Amalric arrived from Egypt too late to render assistance. From Banyas south to Tiberias

¹ The particulars of Nureddin's escape are from I.A. Rührich 316f. relates the battle as if it took place in the neighbourhood of Harim. "Harem" on page 316 should rather be Iḥṣān al-akrad.

² 21st Ramaḡān 559 (I.A. II. 223). In Tyre xix. 9 "iv Idus Augusti" (10th August) may be the date of the battle which preceded the surrender. 'Inad ed-dīn (in A.S. Cairo 133 and iv. 109) and I.A. I. 537 give simply the month. Regarding Tyre's year see appendix.

³ Nureddin's reason for not pressing his advantage according to I.A.

⁴ Ibn al-Jaf.

⁵ 15th Kān. November (Tyre xix. 10) in the second year of Amalric's reign. The year 1167 is obviously an error (cf. xix. 9). I.A. I. 541 (cf. Abulḡida III. 592) dates the capture in Dhul-hijja 559 which commences 30th October; A.S. Cairo 139 quotes I.A.'s narrative under A. II. 560 (commencing 28th November 1164) no doubt wrongly. Annales A and B II. II. 432 (where "Belinas" = Banyas) has the same day as Wm Tyre (St Luke's day) under the wrong year 1166; Geste 7 makes the year 1169 and Annales B records the capture again under 1167.

the valley was now exposed to Moslem attack. The advance marked by the occupation of Banyas was recognised on the Latin side by the surrender of a portion of the revenues of Tiberias to secure peace.

The scene of negotiations now changes to Antioch and Aleppo. Both Amalric and Nureddin left for the north. Nureddin's troops had just met with a reverse at the hands of the Armenian prince Thoros (October). He had invaded the district of Mar'ash, defeated the army of Aleppo and made numerous prisoners. His demand that Nureddin should release the Armenian prisoners who were in his hands had previously been refused; now it was granted¹. After this, in the early part of the summer of 1165, Bohemond also was released for a ransom. William of Tyre suggests two motives: fear of the emperor, and the consideration that Bohemond was so youthful as not to be a formidable enemy. Raymond of Tripolis was not released and Reginald of Chatillon continued still a prisoner.

In 1165 the only operations against the Latins of which there is a record were conducted by Shirkuh, who seems to have commanded the troops of Damascus². Nureddin was probably in the north, and may have been at war with Kilij Arslan ibn Mas'ud of Iconium³. The year 1166 appears to be a complete blank in the original records⁴. Plans and preparations for a double campaign, in Egypt and in Syria, may have occupied Nureddin's attention.

Shirkuh's experience in Egypt in 1164 had confirmed him in the view of the situation which he had urged on Nureddin before the expedition started. His expectations were not extinguished, but rather kindled afresh. His attack had not been successful but he was confident it would be so if only it were persevered in. He persisted therefore in advocating another attempt, and Nureddin yielded to his representations⁵. Early

¹ Michael i. 360.

² Tyre xix. 11. He relates that "Siracous" captured a stronghold near Sidon, "cavea de Tyrum," and another east of Jordan which was garrisoned by Templars. The year is given as the third of Amalric.

³ I.A. i. 544 f.

⁴ The statement of *Annales fl. ll.* 432 that "Crac de Mont Royal" was captured by the Moslems in 1166 is certainly erroneous. See also p. 189, n. 5 and 191, n. 6.

⁵ I.A. i. 546 f.; Ibn abi Tai in A.S. iv. 128. Cf. Tyre xix. 12.

in 1167, in January¹, at the head of 2000 picked men he set out once more. As before he passed the territories of Jerusalem without encountering the Latins; only a severe sandstorm delayed his progress very much². The united forces of the Egyptians and the Latins were waiting for him in Egypt. Shirkuh conducted his operations with the utmost boldness and confidence. He had some supporters amongst the enemies of Shawir and they in March put him in possession of Alexandria. Shirkuh set his nephew Saladin there as governor and returned to Upper Egypt where his earlier operations had been conducted. Neither before nor after this acquisition was anything decisive accomplished by either side. The siege of Alexandria by the allies dragged on for three months. Finally both Shirkuh and Amalric were glad to listen to Shawir's proposals for peace. The news of Nureddin's operations in Syria made the Latins anxious to retire. Both parties agreed to evacuate Egypt and both received an indemnity from the Egyptian treasury³. Alexandria was evacuated in the beginning of August. Shirkuh reached Damascus on the 5th of September⁴. His second attack also had failed, but once more Nureddin had made progress in Syria during his absence.

In 1167 Nureddin continued his campaign against the castles on the Latin border. The Mesopotamian princes again furnished a contingent to his forces. Their meeting-place was Hama⁵. The territories of Tripolis were the object of attack on this occasion. Nureddin on his way from Damascus surprised and captured Munaifera, west of Ba'albek (April—May)⁶. Then

¹ 15th Rabi' i 562 = 6th January 1167 (Beh. iii. 44 and in A.S. iv. 110). This agrees with the date he reached Egypt, 9th Rabi' ii, 12d February (A.S. Cairo 142). I.A. i. 546 loosely says that Shirkuh set out in Rabi' ii (if the text be correct). Tyre xix. 13 states that Amalric left Ascalon for Egypt on the 30th of January.

² Tyre xix. 15.

³ A.S. iv. 133. I.A. i. 550 says that the Latins were to receive an annual payment and left a detachment of the army in Cairo to secure their interests.

⁴ Both dates are from I.A. i. 550.

⁵ I.A. Beha ed-din's mention of Homs (iii. 45) belongs to a later point in the campaign.

⁶ Beh. iii. 45 (Rajab); the same month in A.S. (Cairo 144, iv. 111) is apparently from Beh. I.A. i. 561 relates this separately under A.H. 561 = A.D. 1166 and is followed by Kem. Ibn Kh. iv. 487 agrees with Beh. According to de Slane's note Munaifera was 20 miles south of Tripolis on one of the heights of Lebanon.

the united forces swept through the plain at the foot of Ḥiṣn el-akrad and down the valley which is the gate through the hills into Tripolis. The invaders probably split into bands, acting in concert. The land round 'Arka was laid waste, the fortresses of Ṣafitla and 'Araima in the same district, northwards of 'Arka, suffered and were perhaps dismantled'. The expedition returned to Ḥomṣ before the 21st of June¹, and there spent Ramaḡan. After the expiry of the month the allies set out for the territories of Jerusalem². Opposite Banyas, disputing the command of the upper valley of the Jordan and guarding the entrance into the south of the Biḡa', stood the castle of Hunain. As soon as it was threatened by the Moslem army it was deserted by its garrison. Nureddin left it in ruins (July—August)³. After this success the allies parted from one another. It was in the following Moslem month that Amalric and Shirkuh returned from Egypt.

A full year now passed without, it seems, any incident in the contest between Nureddin and the Latins. Bohemond III of Antioch in January 1167 or 1168 transferred Famiya and the fortress of Abu ḡobais to the knights Hospitallers. He pledged himself to observe their treaties with the Moslems and admitted that his own treaties should not be valid unless they had received the approval of the order⁴. In the latter part of 1167⁵ Nureddin went north to spend the winter in Aleppo. In the early spring he was engaged on an expedition in Upper Mesopotamia⁶. He was still in residence in Aleppo in the autumn of

¹ These fortresses were again in Latin possession at least as early as 1170 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 154). Their "capture" now cannot therefore have been permanent. Perhaps only the suburbs and not the castles were destroyed. The authority here is I.A. (see note 2).

² Ramaḡan 561 (I.A. i. 551). Beh. is silent regarding this attack on Tripolis and I.A.'s narrative is made doubtful by its coincidence with the account of events in 1171.

³ Beh. iii. 45 is not to be understood as if operations commenced in Ramaḡan.

⁴ Shawal 562 (Beh. iii. 45 quoted apparently by A.S. iv. 111, Cairo 144).

⁵ Leroux, Cartulaire l. no. 391 (= Pauli l. no. 45). In Tripolis 'Arka and Ḥiṣn 'Akkar were granted to the Hospitallers by Amalric in 1170 (Leroux l. no. 411). Regarding the difficulty that Famiya was now a Moslem town see p. 147, n. 3.

⁶ In A.H. 563, i.e. after 17th October 1167 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 149).

⁷ Against the ruler of Mamlj ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 150). He returned to Aleppo in Rajab 563, after the 11th of April (A.S. 151).

1168. Affairs on the Euphrates seem to have occupied his attention¹. In November important news came from Egypt.

Amalric's ambition to be lord of Egypt had led to a change in the situation there. He was not content with the payment of tribute by the Egyptian "sultan"; he aimed at entire possession of the country. Although he requested help from the emperor Manuel and received a favourable answer he did not wait for the arrival of his Greek allies. We can only marvel at the folly of the whole undertaking. It could not fail to cast Egypt into the arms of Damascus². Some, the Templars for instance, refused to join in the expedition because they disapproved. The charges of faithlessness against Shawir were a mere excuse or rested on suspicion³. The Latin army set out towards the end of October 1168. Bilbais was occupied without difficulty (3rd November)⁴ and the army turned against Cairo. It does not seem that the siege was pushed with much vigour. Time was spent in negotiations. At first they may have been sincere on Shawir's part⁵. He knew Shirkuh's temper and the danger of alliance with Nureddin. But in the end the negotiations were only a means of gaining time until relief should come. Nureddin was in Aleppo and Shirkuh in Homs when the caliph's request for help reached them⁶. It was the 17th of December before their troops were ready to start from Ras

¹ Operations against Ja'har, which was captured in October, occupied some time (Beh. lil. 46, I.A. i. 553 f.). It is not clear that Nureddin took any personal part in the campaign.

² Wilken, Bk. iv. 21 rightly estimates Amalric's policy, but on page 80 he has some very misleading remarks regarding the importance of Egypt to the Latins. I.A. i. 554 includes Amalric amongst those who disapproved personally of the undertaking and thought the Latins should be satisfied with the concessions already made to them. But Tyre xx. 5 is better evidence that Amalric was personally responsible for the policy adopted (A.S. iv. 113, Cairo 154, is apparently a quotation from I.A.).

³ Cf. Tyre xx. 5.

⁴ Tyre xx. 6 says the capture took place within three days of the arrival and dates either the capture or the arrival on November 3rd (iii Nones of November). A.S. iv. 113, Cairo 154, says they reached Bilbais on the 1st of Šafar (calendar date November 4th). The passage seems to be from I.A., whose text in Recueil i. 554 gives 1st Šafar as the date of the capture of the city (so I.A. ii. 247).

⁵ Perhaps the actual decision of the caliph to ask Nureddin's help was not in accordance with the inclination of Shawir at the time (cf. A.S. iv. 138). Possibly he would have delayed somewhat longer before taking such a step.

⁶ I.A. i. 557.

el-ma in the Hauran. When Amalric heard that Shirkuh was on the way he set out from Bilbais (25th December)¹, with the intention of encountering him before he was joined by the Egyptians. His plan failed and the Latin king at once retreated, taking with him the troops he had left to guard Bilbais (2nd January)². It was a feeble ending to a foolish attempt; and yet perhaps it was well Amalric did not risk a battle. Shirkuh had with him 8000 of Nureddin's choicest troops and the Egyptians were his allies. The Syrian emir entered Cairo in triumph on the 8th of January 1169³. In ten days more Shawir had been 'done away.' Shirkuh stepped into his place as the caliph's wazir and the real ruler of Egypt. Without a blow being struck a conquest was achieved which was to bring ruin on the Latin states. Shirkuh's service to the Moslem cause deserves to be written in letters of gold on the pages of history. Within twenty years of the occupation of Egypt the city of Jerusalem and almost all that had been Latin territory passed once more into Moslem hands. The final triumph was happily granted to one who was of Shirkuh's blood and owed his elevation to the bold Kurdish leader who established the fortunes of his house.

Shirkuh did not live long to enjoy the reward of his sagacity and his bravery. It is here, just after the crowning achievement of his life, that history must take leave of him. "When they rejoice in what they have received, We take them away⁴." He was taken by his Lord on the 23rd of March 1169. Nureddin and the Moslem East owed much to him. He was a restless fighter all his days, farseeing and persistent in his plans and bold in the execution of them. His death six months earlier would have been a grave calamity to his prince and his people. But now his great work was done and a kinsman of his own was ready and able to enter into the heritage he had created⁵.

¹ Tyre xx. 10.

² *Altera post Kal. Jan. die* (Tyre xx. 10).

³ 7th Rabi' ii 564 (I.A. ii. 231). In I.A. i. 538 (followed by Kem.) 7th Jumada i (8th March) is an error, as is clear from the date of Shirkuh's death given in i. 360, Ibn Kh. iv. 490, 17th Rabi' i 564 (quoting Beh.), contains a double textual error. In Beh. iii. 46 only the month appears [Rabi' i 564].

⁴ Koran vi. 44 quoted by Ibn el-nathir.

⁵ There is a full and interesting account of Shirkuh's person and character in Tyre xix. 3.

Shirkuh's nephew, Şalah ed-din Yusuf, Sultan Saladin of the "third crusade," was accepted and acknowledged by the caliph as his uncle's successor. Years after, in the mood of a man who feels that he has been in the hands of destiny, Saladin told his intimates how entirely against his inclination he accompanied Shirkuh on his third campaign¹. Being on the spot, however, he was marked out for promotion by his relationship to the Syrian leader and by the prominent and successful part he had already played in his service. The title *El-malik en-naşir*, the conquering prince, conferred upon him by the caliph was not an empty compliment, it was justified by the promise and the fulfilment of the past. He was about 32 years of age and fitted for his new position by all his previous training and experience. His capacity had been shown in the second² and the third at least of the expeditions against Egypt³. Ibn el-athir's statement that he was chosen by the caliph because he was the youngest and so probably the weakest of the Syrian emirs cannot shake these facts. Modern historians have combined the statement with the incident of Saladin's unwillingness to accompany Shirkuh on this third expedition and inferred quite unwarrantably that his character hitherto had been effeminate⁴. Doubtless he lacked devotion to Shirkuh's Egyptian policy. But the very fact that Nureddin and Shirkuh required him to join in the third campaign is a testimony to his worth. And still more is the fact that Saladin's relatives and friends made him their candidate for

¹ I.A. i, 503 f.; Beh. iii, 46.

² See page 191.

³ Beha ed-din says he took part in the first campaign also but without particulars and perhaps wrongly. I.A. mentions his sharing in the second and third expeditions only. Kem. (as interpolated in I.A. ii, 215) seems to imply he was in Aleppo in the summer of 1164 during the siege of Hama, i.e. when Shirkuh was still in Egypt.

⁴ The fact of Saladin's reluctance to accompany Shirkuh on his third expedition is one which lends itself obviously to exaggeration and legendary accretions. Beha ed-din's representation that Saladin's refusal to go to Egypt was made and overruled on the occasion of each of the three expeditions is too dramatic to be trustworthy. On the other hand his alleged desire (expressed in August 1164) to be made governor of Egypt after his conquest (Kem. as in note 3) is too slight evidence to prove that he did not seriously object to join the second expedition. I.A. represents him as giving the hardships of the siege of Alexandria as the reason of his unwillingness to join the third expedition. Even granting that this report is reliable it does not necessarily imply effeminacy or lack of ambition.

his uncle's vacant post. The caliph's "choice" was more nominal than real.

Saladin's character is to be read in the decisive measures which he took to secure his position. The caliph and his favourites cherished hopes that the new master set over them might not possess the ability of his predecessor. Enmity also was stirred by Saladin's policy of transferring important offices from the Egyptians to the Syrians. Communications were exchanged with Amalric and schemes of revolt were planned. When Saladin discovered the plot and executed the prime mover in it, the caliph was reduced to humble obedience (beginning of August). He was compelled to remain a puppet whose sovereignty was merely nominal.

In this same year the Latins made their only attempt to dispossess the new wazir and Saladin again showed himself worthy of his position. The assistance which the emperor Manuel had promised to the ill-fated expedition of the previous year was at length available. The fleet which he sent numbered 200 sail. But the impetuosity of the Latins had changed to timidity and sluggishness. Delay followed delay and weeks passed before Amalric's forces were ready, in the middle of October. It was decided to besiege Damietta. Already the stores of the Greek ships were running down. The season of the year was unfavourable. Saladin had been allowed ample time to make his preparations. The Latins displayed insufficient energy and the siege dragged on for fifty days and then came to an inglorious end¹. Greeks and Latins blamed one another for the failure. From now Amalric restricted himself to the defence of his own territories. Gilbert d'Assailly was discredited. The attack on Egypt had failed. Saladin was its master.

The immediate effect of the Syrian occupation of Egypt was less prejudicial to the Latins than it might have been, because of the policy which Saladin adopted for his own personal advantage. If Egypt had been under Nureddin's complete control Jerusalem would now have been exposed to a crushing attack on two sides at once. But Saladin aimed from the first

¹ Tyre xx. 17 says "*occulis quibusdam conditionibus foedus initur.*" Michael i. 370 says that Saladin continued for a time to pay the Egyptian tribute.

at independent sovereignty and close co-operation with Nureddin was apt to injure his prospects. In all probability his plans were a continuation of those of his uncle Shirkuh and embodied the ambition of his family, for he was supported strenuously by his father Ayub who joined him in Egypt early in 1170. His policy towards the caliph and towards Nureddin is to be understood in the light of his intention to found an independent dynasty.

The Egyptian caliph, although he was a Fatimite and although the Syrians acknowledged the caliph of Bagdad, was allowed by Saladin to retain his nominal position for two years and a half. It would have been hazardous to depose him. The step was too apt to rouse the religious and national feeling of Egypt. So at least Saladin replied when Nureddin urged him to satisfy the demands of orthodoxy. There may have been another reason, as Ibn el-athir suggests¹. The caliph was actually a support to Saladin's position and capable of rallying help in Egypt if it became necessary to measure arms with Nureddin. In September 1171 there was an agitation which brought matters to a crisis. Fortunately at that moment the caliph died (13th September). Next Friday public prayers in the mosques were said in the name of the caliph of Bagdad. Saladin's position was much stronger by this time, and the change appears to have been accepted with wonderful quietness.

After this event Saladin's only nominal superior was Nureddin. The young emir postponed an open breach as long as possible. He did not covet the name of independence, when he had the reality. Nureddin regarded Saladin, of course, as an officer of his in charge of Egypt. His letters were significantly addressed to "Şalah ed-din and all the emirs in Egypt." Shirkuh's nephew was one amongst a number of subordinates. But gradually Saladin's policy became unmistakable. He avoided even meeting his former lord. Nureddin found that he did not co-operate heartily against the Latins nor show any zeal in breaking down the barrier which lay between Egypt and Damascus. In the year before Nureddin's death the situation could be disguised no longer. It was clear that Saladin would

¹ I.A. I. 578f.

yield to force only. Nureddin was preparing for war when he died in July 1174. The last period of his life extends from 1169 to 1174.

During 1169 Nureddin's attention was occupied by the course of affairs in Egypt. He loyally supported Saladin by sending him reinforcements when he was threatened by conspiracy in the summer and by the Greek and Latin alliance in the autumn and winter. At the same time he created a diversion in his favour by raiding Latin territory¹. Only one aggressive movement of the Latins is recorded, on the borders of Tripolis in December 1169 or January of the following year².

When Saladin was firmly established Nureddin naturally expected that he would act with him in concert against the Latins of Jerusalem. The dispatch of Ayub to Egypt in March 1170³, at Saladin's request, is probably evidence that Nureddin was quite unsuspecting of rivalry at that date⁴. To the east and south of the Dead Sea were a number of Latin castles which seriously disturbed communication with Egypt. These he decided should be destroyed in the first place. When Ayub's caravan was passing through the danger zone Nureddin acted as his escort. Afterwards, on the 20th of April⁵, he left his camp at Ras el-ma to undertake the siege of Kerak⁶, one of the castles in the district. His attack lasted four days only. Being threatened by a relief force he advanced against it. The Latins retired without offering battle and Nureddin then withdrew to pass the month of Ramaḍan in his own territory. The fast commenced on the 19th of May and was marked this year by an event which caused the sultan much grief. Mejd ed-din Ibn

¹ I.A. i. 569.

² They captured Iḥṣān 'Akkr in Rabi' II 565 (Ibn Kh. iv. 493, probably from Beh., and Beh. iii. 50, where January 1169 is incorrect; cf. Beh. in A.S. iv. 149).

³ He arrived in Cairo 24th Rajab 565 (13th April 1170) and so may have started on his journey in Jumada II (ends 20th March). Beh. iii. 51 names Jumada II as the month of his arrival (rejected by Ibn Kh. iv. 493).

⁴ Beha ed-din's statement that when Sīrkūh died Nureddin took ḥoms from his representatives is not to be regarded as counter evidence.

⁵ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 153 f., 1st Sha'ban 565; cf. Beh. iii. 50 and I.A. ii. 260. I.A. i. 570 names the preceding Moslem month but that is because he dates the movement from the time when Ayub started and Nureddin's troops escorted him.

⁶ This name is also applied to the castle of Iḥṣān el-akrad on the borders of Tripolis.

ed-daya died¹. He had been governor of Aleppo for twenty-three years and was one of the sultan's most faithful and trusted friends. Nureddin remained in the Ḥauran until the end of June, when news came that a severe earthquake had caused extensive damage in the north. Ruined towns had to be repaired and measures taken to secure them against surprise. But the Latins were equally affected, and neither side was free to attack the other. The shocks continued at intervals for three or four months². A new distraction presented itself before they ceased. Nureddin's brother Ḳuṭb ed-din of Moṣul died on the 6th of September³. Nureddin was just then at Tell bashir and he immediately started to secure his brother's inheritance. In this he was most successful. Some of the towns he occupied he retained. Others he left to his nephew, Saif ed-din Ġāzi II, who succeeded Ḳuṭb ed-din in Moṣul, and acknowledged Nureddin's overlordship. These affairs occupied the sultan until the spring of the following year⁴.

In the beginning of December 1170, Nureddin being in the north, Saladin made an attack on the south-western territory of Jerusalem. The invasion lasted only a few days. Darum was besieged. It was a small castle built a few years previously by Amalric in the neighbourhood of Ġāza, of ruins found there. Amalric himself advanced to its relief. Saladin took the aggressive but was beaten off. Then he made a dash against Ġāza and destroyed its suburbs. After that he returned to Egypt⁵. In the same month after a brief interval an expedition was sent by Saladin against the seaport of Aila on the Red Sea. The town was captured in the third week of December⁶.

Amalric was now thoroughly alarmed by the situation. His two enemies were striking at him from opposite sides. When

¹ A.S. iv. 150.

² Tyre xx. 19.

³ Beh. lii. 51 (22nd Dhū'l-hijja 565).

⁴ Behn ed-din says he entered Aleppo in Sha'ban 566, April—May 1171. In de Sacy's *Kem.* Sha'ban 567 should be Sha'ban 565 (correctly given Blochet 43 = lii. 551). I.A. i. 577 shows he left Moṣul in the latter part of February.

⁵ The strength of Saladin's army may be estimated from that of Amalric which Wm Tyre says consisted of 250 knights and about 2000 foot. 40,000 is an absurdly large figure. The various movements are related by Wm Tyre at great length (xx. 10—22). I.A. i. 577 f. shortly mentions the incident and says the Latins were defeated.

⁶ I.A. i. 578 (first ten days of Rabī' ii 566).

Egypt was occupied he had realised the gravity of the situation and had sent an embassy to Europe (1169). But the kings of France and England and the emperor of Germany were all too much occupied with national affairs to pay much attention to his requests. In 1171¹, accordingly, he went to Constantinople to consult Manuel and to ask help from him. He was most cordially received and was promised assistance. He was absent from his kingdom from March to June. During that time there seems to have been no actual attack by either of the Moslem leaders. But when the king returned Nureddin was threatening the northern borders of Jerusalem. He lay near Banyas for some weeks. Amalric posted himself at Şaffuriya ready to advance in whatever direction might be required. There was no engagement². Perhaps Nureddin expected the co-operation of Saladin and was disappointed. He was drawn for a moment in another direction by an incident which happened on the coast of Antioch in September³. Two Egyptian merchantmen were seized at Laodicea in violation of an existing truce. Nureddin retaliated by incursions into the territories of Antioch and Tripolis. He himself accompanied the troops which entered Tripolis. The country was raided and full advantage doubtless taken of the fact that its castles had suffered severely from the earthquakes of the preceding year⁴. It does not, however, appear certain that any permanent acquisitions were made⁵. Ibn el-athir⁶ notes that after this date Nureddin established a pigeon-post throughout Syria by which he might at once receive news of impending attacks from the borders. But the use of carrier pigeons is frequently referred to before this date.

These operations cannot have lasted long and may not have been distinguished by the Latins from the forays to which they

¹ In Tyre xx. 24 the 7th year of Amalric's reign, but the narrative of the 7th year commences with xx. 19 and this is "the following year." See appendix.

² Tyre xx. 27.

³ The date is inferred from Beh. iii. 53 who says 'Arka was taken in Muharram 567, which ends 3rd October. Cf. also the date of Nureddin's return south, page 201.

⁴ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 154.

⁵ 'Arka is said to have been captured (Beh. iii. 53, I.A. l. 584). I.A. ll. 280 is the only authority for the capture of 'Araima and Şafitha also. Such "captures" do not always imply permanent acquisition (cf. p. 192, n. 1).

⁶ l. 585.

were continually exposed. Amalric also was in the north, if not during these raids, at least within a few days of their taking place. He joined an expedition against Malih, successor to Thoros of Armenia, who was an ally of Nureddin and owed his position to help received from the Moslem prince¹. News of Nureddin's return south appears to have been what led to Amalric's return also².

In 1171, as in the preceding year, Saladin made his attack on the Latins when Nureddin was safely occupied in the north. In response to Nureddin's representations he laid siege to one of the castles by the Dead Sea, Shaubak or Mont Royal. He started from Cairo on September 25th³. Nureddin was overjoyed and hastened to join his lieutenant. But Saladin did not await his arrival. It is said the castle was on the point of surrendering when he gave up the siege⁴, probably before the end of October⁵. The statement that he had sustained severe losses⁶ is of course consistent with the allegation. On the other hand it may simply be a story current to explain his sudden departure. Nureddin was much annoyed and scarcely satisfied with Saladin's excuse that there were signs of a conspiracy in Egypt which demanded his personal investigation. The serious

¹ Tyre xx. 28 (regarding whose date see appendix), Barheh. 370 (*anno grace*. 1481 = A.D. 563, i.e. A.D. 1169-70). Thoros died in Kanun 1479 (Barheh. 363, Syriac text 358), i.e. probably January 1168 or rather 1169 (*anno armen.* 617, Sempad i. 613) and Malih, his brother, established himself within the same year. In Jumada i. 568 (commences 19th December 1171) Nureddin's troops helped him to gain a victory over a Greek army (I.A. i. 588; cf. Kem. Blochet 45 f.). He was assassinated *anno armen.* 625, A.D. 1175 (Sempad i. 614) or in A.D. 1174 (Michael i. 380).

² Tyre xx. 28 says it was because he heard that Nureddin was attacking "Crac." This may be his reference to Saladin's attack on Shaubak, which is near "Petm." Or is there confusion here with "Crac" in Tripolis so that the reference is to the expedition just described? Wilken, Bk. iv. 150 on the authority of Wm Tyre's statement assumes a siege of Kerak by Nureddin some months before Saladin's siege of Shaubak. This is chronologically impossible. Wilken further confuses this supposed siege with that in 1173.

³ 22nd Muharram 567 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 156) or 20th Muharram = 23rd September (I.A. ii. 286) or 17th (? 17th) Muharram (Maqrizl viii. 501). The statement of I.A. i. 581 that he left Egypt in Safar (commences 4th October) is consistent with this date. In the Atabeks he calls the besieged castle Kerak not Shaubak (cf. note 2).

⁴ I.A. as cited in note 3.

⁵ He was back in Cairo by the middle of Rabi' i. 567, early in November ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 156).

⁶ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 155 f.

position of affairs may be inferred from the fact that Saladin and his advisers discussed the expediency of revolt. Their decision was to avoid an open breach¹ and Saladin sent the most solemn assurances of good faith and sincerity to his nominal lord. Nureddin professed to be satisfied. He had received no doubt promises of earnest co-operation against the Latins.

Information about the events of 1172 is very indefinite. It leaves the impression however that Saladin devised occupations in Egypt and persisted in avoiding compliance with Nureddin's wishes. Nureddin, on his part, at least during the latter part of the summer, was in the Ḥauran² obviously prepared to attack the castles by the Dead Sea and desirous of so doing. In October or November³ the Latins made an incursion into the Ḥauran but they did not face an engagement with Nureddin. On the other side a Moslem expedition into the district of Tiberias secured a large amount of plunder. If Saladin actually spent a few days this year in again attacking Shaubak his half-heartedness must only have exasperated the relations between himself and Nureddin. But the evidence that he did so is uncertain⁴.

In 1173 Nureddin was involved in war with Kiliġ Arslan. He was engaged in the quarrel of his ally the ruler of Malaṭiyya. This occupied him during the greater part of June and July⁵.

¹ In I.A. i. 382 f. Ayub is represented as a strong advocate of this policy. In Beh. iii. 55 Saladin is represented as saying that he alone was its advocate.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 156, in Dhu'l-ka'da 567=July. The incidents of the following months are recorded by the same author under A.H. 568 which commenced 23rd August (A.S. iv. 158).

³ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 158 f. (later than the end of Šafar 568).

⁴ One authority is Tyre xx. 29. The year is certainly 1172 and in the chapter-heading the castle is called Monā Kegalis (=Shaubak). But Wm Tyre does not mention Saladin's attack on Shaubak in 1172 and this may be his account of that put in the wrong year (cf. however xx. 28 and p. 201, n. 2). Beh. iii. 53 f. relates Saladin's "first expedition from Egypt" under A.H. 568, which commences 23rd August 1172, and describes it as an attack on Shaubak. This also may be understood of the expedition of 1172 and if so should be placed under A.H. 567.—Assuming that there was only one siege of Shaubak the question may be raised whether 1172, as given by Wm Tyre and Beha ed-din, should not be preferred to 1171, the date of 'Imad ed-din and I.A. Against 1172 is the fact that Nureddin was in the Ḥauran only a short time before the date when Saladin's siege would then necessarily fall.

⁵ He captured Mar'ash in the middle of June (I.A. i. 592) and Behesna in July—August (Beh. iii. 54, Dhu'l-hijja 568).

By a coincidence, that was not of course accidental, this very time was chosen by Saladin for a renewal of his attack on the castles of "Syria Sobal'." Kerak was besieged. Amalric posted himself on the hills to the west of the Dead Sea. His aid was not required for the relief of the castle. Just as in 1171 Nureddin's approach was sufficient to bring about Saladin's retreat. The inference was unmistakable. Nureddin was not deceived by the excuse that Ayub was ill. He withdrew to make preparations for war with his disobedient vassal. It is idle to speculate what might have been the result of the conflict. Saladin was never called upon to measure his strength with that of his great rival and nominal lord. Nureddin died at Damascus in the month of May 1174. He was 56 years of age¹.

There were domestic troubles in Egypt and a foreign invasion in 1174, which would have been a serious complication in Saladin's position had Nureddin still been alive. They originated in a conspiracy to restore the Fatimite caliph. The danger did not end with the execution of the principal conspirators (6th April)². The Latins had been invited to give their assistance. Those of Jerusalem did not move when they heard of the failure of the plot but a fleet from Sicily attacked Alexandria some months later. The danger proved insignificant. The attack lasted from a Sunday to the following Thursday (28th July to 1st August)³. After sustaining an assault for two

¹ According to I.A. i. 593 f. he left Egypt early in Shawal 568, which commenced May 16th, and returned soon after the 8th of August (when Ayub died). Tyre xx. 30 says his operations lasted from July to September. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 156 and Beh. iii. 53 only give A.H. 568, which however ends on the 11th of August 1173. Ayub was thrown from his horse when out riding on Monday 18th Dhu'l-hijja 568 (30th July) and died after much suffering on Wednesday 17th of the month (Ibn Kh. i. 246; I.A. i. 594 has the second date without the day). In Makrizi viii. 509 (Wednesday 18th Dhu'l-hijja 568) 18 is a textual error for 17.

² Born 10th Shawal 511 (13th February 1118), died Wednesday 11th Shawal 569 (15th May 1174), according to I.A. ii. 294. For the former date Ibn Kh. iii. 341 gives Sunday 17th Shawal 511 (10th February 1118, calendar date 11th February).

³ Makrizi viii. 511 (Saturday 2nd Ramaḡan 569); I.A. i. 599.

⁴ Sunday 26th Dhu'l-hijja 569—1st Muḡarram 570 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 164). The events of each day and the names of the days are specifically given in a letter of Saladin's quoted by A.S. iv. 164 ff. Cf. I.A. i. 612 who also gives the date of the arrival of the fleet. Tyre xxi. 3 says "about the beginning of August" "for five or six days." Beh. iii. 57 speaks of an attack of three days commencing 7th Ṣafar 570 (=7th September 1174).

days the Moslems took the offensive and many of the enemies' siege engines were burned (Tuesday). On Wednesday the sallies from the town were continued. In the afternoon news arrived that Saladin was advancing. This encouraged the Alexandrians to sally out in the darkness. The Latins were completely routed and next morning they sailed away.

There was still an actual revolt to deal with. One of the discontented emirs established himself at Aswan (Assouan). He was defeated on September 7th¹ by a force under the command of one of the sultan's brothers, El-malik el-'adil Suif ed-din.

Saladin was now ready to enter on Nureddin's inheritance in Syria and affairs there were soon ripe for his interference. Although he had been so lately just on the point of rebellion it was to him that Nureddin's principedom now passed and by him that Nureddin's mission in the holy war fell to be continued and triumphantly completed.

¹ 7th Şafar 570 (Beh. lil. 57).

CHAPTER V.

ŞALAH ED-DIN YUSUF.

AMONGST Nureddin's most distinguished emirs were two brothers of Kurdish extraction and probably of humble origin, Nejm ed-din Ayub and Asad ed-din Shirkuh. They were the father and the uncle, respectively, of Şalah ed-din Yusuf. Having all the advantage of their training and example and being still more highly gifted than they, Saladin owed to them also the splendid opportunities of his first emirate. The history of Shirkuh's conquest of Egypt and of Saladin's succession to his uncle's position has been narrated in chapter IV. Saladin was already 32 years of age. His recent close association with Shirkuh in the execution of his schemes must have saved him from many mistakes. It may in fact be assumed that he inherited the policy as well as the position of his farsceing kinsman. For some years longer he enjoyed the benefit of his father's counsels (1170-73). When Nureddin died in 1174 Saladin was fully equipped by his past experience for the tasks and opportunities which presented themselves. Although up to this time his aim had simply been to retain his hold on Egypt without sacrificing his independence of Nureddin, this did not exhaust his ambition nor exclude much wider hopes for the future. According to his own assertion he was resolved to reconquer Syria from the Latins and cherished the belief that God had chosen him to be an instrument in the deliverance of Jerusalem. Even this intention was only part of a wider plan. He regarded all Latin Syria and all Nureddin's dominions as his proper inheritance. His action after Nureddin's death needs no defence. He was the ablest and the most powerful of the late

sultan's emirs. Without his interference Nureddin's dominions would simply have fallen to pieces. He wrote to the caliph practically claiming to be the sultan's successor and announcing that as such he would take possession of Latin Syria also. These projects were not easily realised. Thirteen years passed before Saladin was fully master even of Nureddin's possessions. During that period the Latins escaped the full brunt of his attack. Twice at least he commenced the Latin war only to draw back until a more favourable opportunity should present itself. But he never lost sight of the goal he had set before him and in the end he accomplished his double purpose.

The conquest of Damascus and of a large part of Syria was easily achieved in the years 1174-76. After this Saladin seems to have thought that he might try conclusions with the Latins, but a severe check at Ramla warned him not to be precipitate (1177). Some later conflicts with the Latins were more successful (1179) and vindicated the new sultan's superiority over them, although Moslem wars still occupied most of his time (1180-81). Even in 1182 when Saladin again invaded Palestine other schemes divided his attention. It was only now that Aleppo and the remnants of Nureddin's former dominions in Mesopotamia were added to his sultanate. This accomplished he judged that at length the time had come for a strenuous attack on the Latin states (1183). But again after a year and a half of successful warfare the situation in Mesopotamia became such that the attack in the south had to be relinquished. Peace was concluded for four years (1185). A shorter period would have sufficed and the Latins actually broke their treaty in 1187. Saladin was now prepared to devote himself entirely to the holy war. It was the most glorious part of his career. In two brief years the Latin power crumbled everywhere before his attack. Then came the "third crusade" and the long struggle which imperilled all his victories (1189-92). The crisis passed and left him again substantially victorious. Peace was made with Richard of England in September 1192. In the following March the great sultan's death took place.

It is not difficult to name the qualities which contributed most to the success of Saladin's career. In the execution of his

schemes he needed to make use of subordinate emirs over whom his authority was by no means absolute. Probably he was helped by a persuasive manner, certainly he possessed in a high degree the gifts of conciliation and tact. He quickly gauged the strength of any opposition to his plans and did not hesitate to make sacrifices for the sake of the best attainable. His own untiring energy and perseverance were striking features in his character. He never spared himself in the accomplishment of his plans and he never seemed to lose heart in the face of adverse circumstances. His judgments were sound and he struck decisively when once he had resolved on a course of action. These qualities served him well both as a statesman and a soldier. In conversation with one of his sons a few months before his death Saladin sought to impress upon him some of the principles which had animated his own career. "Fear God," he said, "for that is the beginning of all prosperity and do what God commands, for He will be the cause of your success. Abstain from shedding blood, much or little, for blood never sleeps. Keep the affections of your subjects and watch over their affairs for you are a steward of mine and of God over them. Keep the affections of the emirs, the ministers and the nobles, for I have accomplished what I have by conciliation and tact. Do not cherish hate towards anyone, for death is sure. Guard your relations with men, for God does not pardon except they are propitiated." These words express a character as well as a policy. Saladin had none of the elements of the tyrant in his nature. He never stood on his dignity, he was extremely courteous to guests and strangers and he made himself popular by his lavish generosity although he himself lived and dressed most simply. He was accessible to his subjects and always ready to hear their complaints. He was chivalrous in the sense that he was quickly touched to compassion by the weak and the helpless and readily moved to generous actions. He was certainly humane although quite destitute of that abstract respect for human life which now prevails so widely. His execution of the knights Templars after the battle of Hattin is a notable example of his treatment of obnoxious enemies. But Saladin was not ruthless in war and he always kept his promises. His

mildness often tempered what strict justice would have permitted. He was not lacking in culture, being well informed and having the interest of the educated man in many things. He was not so pious, probably, as Nureddin, but he supported religion and patronised its devotees. He trusted in providence and sought to shape his life in accordance with the divine will. He was punctual in the discharge of his religious duties and his devotion to God's service in the holy war was no doubt sincere. Altogether he compares most favourably with the kings of France and England who led the third crusade. Christendom did not excel Islam in the type of the heroes whom it nurtured.

Nureddin left an heir in the person of his son El-malik eş-şaliḥ Isma'il, a boy 11 years old. He was proclaimed sultan by the various governors of his father's cities. Even Saladin acknowledged his position. But he was simply a puppet in the hands of those who had him in their power. At his father's death (15th May 1174) he was in Damascus and so under control of the emirs there. At their head was Shams ed-din Muḥammed ibn el-muḥaddem. But the governor of Aleppo, Shams ed-din 'Ali ibn ed-daya, brother of Mejd ed-din, wished to have the young prince to oppose to the pretensions of Saif-eddin of Moṣul, son of Kuṭb ed-din and Nureddin's nephew¹. Sa'ad ed-din Kumushtakin was his emissary to the emirs of Damascus. After some negotiations and fighting they allowed him to take Eş-şaliḥ to Aleppo. Possibly they hoped that Kumushtakin had become their agent. When he reached Aleppo he deposed Ibn ed-daya (3rd August)², and then proceeded to act as ruler of Aleppo, and sole guardian of the young prince. In this way things did not turn out as Ibn el-muḥaddem desired. Being now afraid of Kumushtakin the emirs of Damascus wrote to Saifeddin of Moṣul offering him their city, and when he made no response they repeated the offer to Saladin of Egypt³.

This was Saladin's opportunity. He had already prepared his way by letters and dispatches. His delay in Egypt was

¹ Kem. Blochet 51=iii. 559.

² Bch. iii. 58 (2nd Muḥarram 570).

³ Kem. Blochet 52=iii. 560 says they were afraid of an alliance between Aleppo and Moṣul.

partly due to the troubles of the year¹, partly no doubt also to his knowledge that it was better to wait until he was sure of a welcome in some Syrian town. He set out for Damascus professing the most disinterested motives. He came, he said, to help Eş-şalih against Saifeddin of Moşul who was depriving the rightful heir of his inheritance. He claimed to be the proper guardian of Nuriddin's son and said it was only the sudden death of the late sultan which had prevented his formal nomination. In letters to the caliph he professed to be the champion of Islam against the Latins, recalled his past services to the faith and emphasised the importance of uniting Syria and Egypt in the holy war. He represented those who might be his rivals in Syria as neglectful of the holy war and as allies of the Latins². All this in itself was well calculated to justify Saladin's action and win him support in Syria. Besides it was seed sown in ground prepared to receive it by the lifelong labours of his father and his uncle.

It seems to have been on the 28th of October that Saladin entered Damascus³. He remained there about a month before he set out for northern Syria. Having found, of course, that Kumush-takin would not surrender his guardianship of the young prince, Eş-şalih, he proceeded to enforce his claims by waging war with Aleppo and its dependencies. His opponents called the Latins to their help and employed the sect of the Assassins to dispose of their formidable enemy. After some delay they also asked assistance from Saifeddin of Moşul. Meantime they remained within the shelter of their walls and gave Saladin no opportunity of striking a blow in the open field. For more than four months he had no choice but to engage in a series of slow sieges. Aleppo resisted his attack successfully but all its chief dependencies to the south were captured⁴. At last a formidable

¹ Chap. IV, page 203 f.

² For Ibn el-muqaddem's Latin policy, which is specially referred to, see page 113; Saladin gave him Ba'albek in compensation when Damascus surrendered (I.A. i. 633 f.).

³ Monday 29th Rabi' I 570 ('Imad ed-din and El-faḥil in A.S. Cairo 136, adopted by A.S. 135; Maḥrizi viii. 317). This same date is given by I.A. i. 614 where the French translation wrongly has September. Tuesday the last day of Rabi' II (=Tuesday 26th November) in Beh. iii. 59, quoted in A.S. Cairo 136, is only a day later if Rabi' I be read for Rabi' II.

The chronicle of events is as follows: first siege of Hama commenced December

army under 'Izz ed-din Mas'ud, Saifeddin's brother, advanced against Hama, which was now in possession of Saladin's troops. After some negotiations¹ a battle was fought at the "horns of Hama" on the 13th of April² and the allies were defeated. Saladin immediately threw off the mask, disowned allegiance to Is-salih, proclaimed himself sultan and advanced for the second time to attack Aleppo. The Alepines were disheartened by recent events and without much hope of outside help, so they readily conceded terms of peace. In addition to the galus he had already made Saladin received Ma'arat en-nurman and Kafr tab. Before the end of April³ the Latins withdrew from the borders of Tripolis where they had been posted since the beginning of the year. Saladin granted them the release of certain hostages whom he had found in Homs and paid them also a sum of money. To crown his triumph the caliph now acknowledged him to be sultan of Egypt and of Syria. The envoys reached

8th, 11th Jumada I 570 (I.A. I. 617, Makrizi viii. 517); the town was captured but not the citadel and Saladin moved on to Hama on December 20th, 23rd Jumada I (Makrizi viii. 518); Hama surrendered on December 28th, 1st Jumada II (I.A. I. 618); the first siege of Aleppo lasted from 30th December to 26th January, 3rd Jumada II to 1st Rajab (I.A. I. 618f., Makrizi viii. 518; Ibn abi Tai (?) in A.S. Cairo 238 also gives the first date and Beh. iii. 59 the second; for the first Beh. gives Fikhiy 30th Jumada I, i.e. 27th December); during this siege the first attempt to assassinate Saladin was made; movements of Raymond of Tripolis led to the breaking up of the siege (I.A.) Beha ed-din says the approach of troops from Mosul; Raymond had been invited by the emirs of Aleppo to assist them; when he appeared before Hama, 1st February, the inhabitants would not receive him; to judge from Tyre xxi. 8 they would not accept the conditions which the Latins imposed in return for their assistance; besides they did not feel absolutely dependent on the Latins; Saladin reached Hama on the following day and when Raymond heard of his approach he retired to Hish el-akrad; Saladin again besieged Homs and captured the citadel on March 17th, 21st Sha'ban ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 245, I.A. I. 610, where the translation gives March 16th); Ba'albek was surrendered to him on March 29th, 4th Ramadan ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 247, Kem. Blochet 55=iii. 563).

¹ Saladin is said to have offered to surrender Hama, Hama and Ba'albek if he were allowed to retain Damascus (Ibn abi Tai in A.S. Cairo 249f.; cf. Kem. Blochet 56=iii. 564 and 'Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 248). The negotiations at one point at least were merely for the sake of gaining time and it is difficult to suppose that Saladin meant them very seriously at all. At the same time it may have appeared for the moment that the allies were the stronger party.

² Sunday 19th Ramadan (Ibn abi Tai in A.S. Cairo 250; Makrizi viii. 519). The same date is given by Beh. iii. 60 and Kem. Blochet 56=iii. 564; 19th Ramadan in I.A. I. 611 is a textual error.

³ Tyre xxi. 8.

him as he was returning south, in Hama, shortly after the 5th of May¹. Soon afterwards he took the castle of Barin, formerly a Latin stronghold, from one of Nureddin's emirs². When he reached Damascus before the end of May or in the beginning of June³ he found that the Latins of Jerusalem had been in motion and he prepared for an expedition against them. Within a short time, however, they proposed a truce and Saladin accepted the proposal (before the 21st of August)⁴. He dismissed his Egyptian troops to their homes and spent the autumn and the winter quietly in Damascus.

Affairs in the north were not left in a stable position by the occurrences of the year 1175. Saifeddin of Mosul apprehended danger from Saladin and believed that he would best further his interests by striking a blow at Aleppo. In the spring of 1176 accordingly he invaded northern Syria with an army in which the horsemen numbered 6000⁵. Saladin recalled his Egyptian troops and took the offensive. He advanced beyond Hama on the way to Aleppo and encountered his rival at the Sultan's hill (Tell es-sultan)⁶. Saladin was again victorious (22nd April)⁷. But his attempt to follow up the victory was not very successful. The Latins of Antioch supported the troops of Aleppo and the allied forces made 'Ezaz their base of operations⁸. Saladin, accordingly, having occupied Buza'a and Mambij⁹,

¹ This is the date Saladin entered Hama on his way south, Monday 12th Shawal 570, calendar date 6th May 1175 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 250).

² During the last days of Shawal ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 250). Makrizi viii. 531 gives the date of the capture as the 10th of the month [Shawal], 13th May 1170; he also says that Saladin revisited Hama after this before proceeding to Damascus.

³ Dhu'l-ka'da 570 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo 251).

⁴ In Muharram 571, ending 10th August (I.A. i. 625; cf. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 181). In this same month a fleet from Sicily is said to have attacked Alexandria and been repulsed (Makrizi viii. 524), but the events of A.D. 1174 are probably referred to (cf. p. 203, n. 4).

⁵ I.A. as cited in n. 7.

⁶ I.A.; Beh. again names the horns of Hama.

⁷ Thursday 10th Shawal 571 (Beh. iii. 62 and Ibn Kh. ii. 442; without the weekday I.A. i. 622, Recueil wrongly 23rd April, and Makrizi viii. 532). Saladin left Damascus on 1st Ramadan, 14th March (Makrizi).

⁸ Cf. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 182 f. and Ibn Wasil quoted by Blochet, Rev. Or. Lat. viii. 522, note 2.

⁹ I.A. i. 613 and Makrizi viii. 523; Makrizi dates the capture of the latter on Thursday 24th Shawal 571, May 6th (cf. Beh. iii. 62).

besieged the castle of 'Ezaz (15 May—21st June)¹ and postponed his attack on Aleppo until that was captured². Finally he invested Aleppo itself for several weeks without gaining any further success. Peace was made on the 25th of July³. Terms were arranged with Saifeddin and Kumush-takin. It is perhaps significant that 'Ezaz was restored to Aleppo although the historian tells the pretty story that it was a gallant present made to Eş-şalih's sister. She was asked by the sultan what present he could give her. She had been taught beforehand and said "the castle of 'Ezaz".

During the siege of 'Ezaz the Assassins had made a second attempt on Saladin's life. In consequence he now attacked their settlements in the Jebel Anşariya, to the west of the Orontes valley⁴. Maşşaf their principal stronghold was besieged for a week. But their position was strong and they were dangerous enemies to provoke. Besides Turan shah, Saladin's brother, just then suffered a reverse at the hands of the Latins in the Biqa' (beginning of August). So a promise of submission was readily accepted from the Assassins⁵. After this Saladin remained in Syria less than a month. Early in September he returned to Egypt leaving Turan shah governor of Damascus⁶. Two campaigns had reduced all Moslem Syria with the exception of Aleppo.

¹ The commencement of the siege is determined by Makrizi ix. 54 (Saturday 4th Dhu'l-ka'da 571) and its duration, 38 days, is given by 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 182 f. I.A.'s dates (i. 623 f.) are 3rd Dhu'l-ka'da—11th Dhu'l-hijja (calendar date 21st June); the latter is also given by 'Imad ed-din and Makrizi. Jch. iii. 62 f. gives 4th Dhu'l-ka'da—14th Dhu'l-hijja (quoted also by Ibn Kh. iv. 507).

² Beh. iii. 63, I.A. i. 624.

³ 16th Muḥarram 572 (Kem. Blochet 58=iv. 146). I.A. i. 625 gives 20th Muḥarram 572, which may be supposed to be the date when Saladin left Aleppo (see note 6).

⁴ I.A. i. 625.

⁵ The Assassins seem to have established themselves in this district during the wars of Zanki. They occupied the castle of Maşşaf about A.D. 1139-40. See also pages 75 and 128 f.

⁶ I.A. i. 626. Makrizi viii. 524 says Saladin left Aleppo on the 10th of Muḥarram and laid siege to Maşşaf on the 23rd; no doubt the 10th is here a textual error for the 20th (cf. note 3). As Saladin seems to have been in Hama on the 10th of August, 2nd Şafar (Makrizi), the attack on Maşşaf must have lasted less than nine days.

⁷ Saladin left Damascus 4th Rabi' i 572 and reached Cairo on the fourth last day of the same month, 3rd October (Makrizi viii. 5251 cf. Beh. iii. 63).

During the years 1174-76 when Saladin was thus establishing his power the Latins had an opportunity of which they made little use. Amalric, indeed, as soon as he heard of Nureddin's death assembled his forces and besieged Banyas. After fifteen days however he accepted the terms offered him by Ibn el-muḥaddem of Damascus, the payment of a sum of money and the release of certain captives¹. It was now the early part of June, before the 14th². The king was indisposed and this perhaps decided him to discontinue his attack. His illness lasted some weeks. He died on the 11th of July³, and his death was a great misfortune for the Latins. Baldwin IV, his son and successor, was a boy twelve years old and a leper. The struggles for the possession of Ḥiṣ-ṣaliḥ, the boy prince over the border, were paralleled by the jealousy and the contests of the Latin chiefs. But amongst them there was no strong man able to reduce the others to submission. In autumn, after the assassination of the first regent, Milo of Plancy, Raymond III of Tripolis became the young king's guardian. He had been released after nine years captivity⁴ on payment of a ransom shortly before Nureddin's death⁵. He was responsible for the part the Latins played during Saladin's campaign in 1175. His leadership was culpably weak. In December 1174 the Latins of Jerusalem saw that if they were to strike a blow against Saladin it must be at once before his position was secured by further success. The army of Jerusalem and of Tripolis was

¹ Tyre xx. 33 makes Nureddin's wife the person with whom peace was concluded.

² Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 161.

³ Tyre xx. 33; the year 1174 is established by its being the year of Nureddin's death, which occurred in May 1174 (cf. Tyre xxi. 33); regarding the year (1173) given in our texts of William Tyre see appendix; Wilken wrongly follows it and puts Nureddin's death in 1173 also. El-faḥl in A.S. iv. 163 gives the evening of Thursday 5th Dhū'l-hijja 569 (calendar date 7th July) in which there is presumably a textual error as the day of the week and the day of the month do not agree. July 11th was a Thursday, so that the day of the week is correct. Probably the month date was originally 9th Dhū'l-hijja. Imad ed-din in A.S. Goergens 59 says Amalric died towards the end of A.H. 569 (ends 1st August 1174). Gestes 7 gives 1174.

⁴ I.e. in the 10th year of his captivity (cf. p. 189); in Wm Tyre the 8th.

⁵ A.S. iv. 168; cf. Tyre xx. 30 where "per idem tempus" indicates a date before the spring of 1174 and apparently in 1173 (see appendix). I.A. relates Raymond's release under A.H. 570 (commencing 1st August 1174) and attributes it to Sa'ad ed-din Kumushṭakin. Ken. Blochet 55=iv. 563 follows his authority.

put under Raymond's command about the beginning of January with the intention that he should attack Saladin from the side of Tripolis. For four precious months while Saladin was making progress every day, Raymond did practically nothing. If his army was weak he ought to have strengthened it. He spent time in foolish bargaining with Saladin's enemies instead of making them his allies on any terms. He made timid movements here and there until his best opportunities were past. Then he made peace for the release of some captives and the payment of a sum of money. During the same time, in the harvest season, an expedition from Jerusalem spent a few days plundering the territory of Damascus. They advanced as far as Dariya, four miles from Damascus. Then they returned, and when Saladin came south it was the Latins who proposed a truce. Saladin could have desired nothing more favourable to his plans. It is interesting to note that in the end of 1174 William of Tyre became chancellor and in June 1175 he was consecrated archbishop of Tyre¹.

During the summer of 1176 there seems to have been some co-operation between Antioch and Aleppo against Saladin. But no particulars are recorded and it does not appear to have been very effective². The year is specially notable because of the reappearance of a Latin chief who had spent fifteen years and a half in a Moslem prison. It was Reginald of Chatillon. He owed his release to the temporary friendship between Antioch and Aleppo³. Since Bohemond III was now prince of Antioch Reginald went south to Jerusalem and there soon rose to prominence. Captivity had not dimmed his fiery zeal nor abated his high spirit. In these last days of the kingdom he is the old crusading hero reincarnate; full of restless energy and reckless daring, not

¹ Tyre xxi. 5 and xxi. 9.

² See page 211.

³ Michael i. 381; before the second defeat of Saifeddin which was in April 1176 and after the first which was in April 1175. Tyre xxi. 11 puts it in the second year of Baldwin's reign, i.e. some time after July 1175. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 283 might be understood to say that the release of the Latin "prince" was during the siege of 'Ezaz, which lasted from 15th May to 21st June 1176. Perhaps however it was earlier. The beginning of 1176 seems the most probable date. It is almost certainly the date indicated by Ibn Wapil as quoted by Binchiet, Rev. Or. Lat. viii. 522, note 2.

perhaps a wise counsellor yet able to supply a spirit of enterprise sadly wanting in the Latins of this later day. He at least was for aggression and not for timid peace. If he accomplished little and irritated as much as he injured, the Latins were still strengthened by his return. In the summer of this same year an expedition was planned which probably was Reginald's first opportunity of avenging his long imprisonment. It was a mere raid into the Biḡa' and lasted only a few days (beginning of August)¹. There were two parties. One consisting of the forces of Jerusalem started from Sidon, crossed the hills of Lebanon and spread devastation in the southern part of the Biḡa' round 'Ain jar'. It was joined by Raymond of Tripolis, who started from Jubail and entered the Biḡa' by way of Munajira. Shams ed-daula Turan shah had just returned in July from a prolonged absence in Yemen and he led the troops of Damascus against the invaders². The Latins drove him off and then separated to return home. It was probably on their way home that a party of them was defeated by Ibn el-muḡaddem of Ba'albek. Between the eastern and the western accounts it is not easy to decide whether this Moslem success really counterbalanced the result of the previous engagement³.

Baldwin's weak state of health made it imperative that a successor should be provided without delay. It was resolved accordingly to invite William of Montferrat to come to Palestine (1175). He landed in Sidon in the beginning of October 1176 and six weeks afterwards married Baldwin's sister Sybil. Three months later William himself became ill and he died in the following June (1177). Except that Sybil now had a little child, afterwards Baldwin V, the situation was the same as it had been before William's arrival. A "procurator" was again required

¹ Tyre xxi. 11 says it started on August 1st and it must have been over by the 10th ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 184).

² Amegarra in Wm Tyre (Migoe's text). He supposed it was the same as Palmyra, and Wilken, Bk. iv. 168 f. follows him in his error.

³ Beh. iii. 63. Wilken, Bk. iv. 168 wrongly puts this after Saladin's return to Egypt in the time when Turan shah was governor of Damascus.

⁴ Wm Tyre only says without particulars that a few Latins were lost on the way home. I.A. l. 627 and A.S. iv. 183 f. might be understood to say that Ibn el-muḡaddem's victory was previous to Turan shah's defeat.

and Reginald of Chatillon was chosen. He married the lady of Kerak and so became lord of the castles by the Dead Sea.

About this time the emperor Manuel sent a fleet of 70 galleys to co-operate with the Latins in an attack on Egypt. An agreement had been made to this effect some time previously. It was anticipated that Philip of Flanders would assist the expedition. He landed in 'Akka in August with large forces and was joyfully received. He was offered practically the regency of the kingdom but refused. His conduct soon met with disapproval. He raised the question of Sybil's remarriage to one of his knights and objected to the continuance of Reginald's procuratorship. Finally he refused to take part in the Egyptian expedition. As a result of his opposition the Greeks were told that nothing could be done until the following April. This meant giving up the expedition altogether. From the battle of Myrokephalon (1176) until his death in 1180 Manuel was fully engaged in wars of his own against the sultan of Iconium. Philip desired however to undertake some enterprise and when it was proposed to attack the Moslems on the borders of Antioch or Tripolis he agreed. There was a truce in force but the terms expressly provided that the Latins might declare it at an end on the arrival of any crusading prince from the west¹. Baldwin sent troops from Jerusalem to co-operate, and from Tripolis a descent was made on the valley of the Orontes. Hama was attacked on the 14th of November². But the allies remained there only four days³. They received news which seemed to promise them speedy success if they attacked Harim. The intrigues in Aleppo against Sa'ad ed-din Kumushtakin had induced Iş-salih to arrest him and assert for himself a more independent position. Harim belonged to Kumushtakin and the garrison would not acknowledge the new régime. Thus it was isolated from its natural supporters and might have yielded to a vigorously conducted attack. Nevertheless the Latin siege dragged on four months without success. Antioch and its pleasures were too

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 191 f. It is instructive to note that other historians blame the Latins for their faithlessness. For a similar condition see page 295 f.

² Monday 11st Jumada I, calendar date 15th November (El-fajil in A.S. iv. 192) ; 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 191 calls it 20th Jumada I ; Beh. iii. 64 wrongly gives Jumada II.

³ I.A. i. 630.

near for the virtue of the knights. Finally in the third week of March 1178 the garrison admitted reinforcements from Aleppo¹. The Latins recognised that their prospects of success were ended and they accepted Eş-şalih's payment to withdraw. After Easter Philip sailed home from Laodicea.

During 1177 Saladin remained in Egypt. He was well aware of the Latin plans to invade that country with the assistance of the Greeks and he was prepared to resist their attack. Towards the end of the year, after he received news that the Latins were engaged in the north, he made an incursion into southern Palestine to effect a diversion. On the 23rd of November² while the siege of Harim was in progress he arrived before Ascalon. The king had entered the city a few days previously with forces which had been collected to resist the invasion. The knights Templars were for the most part in Gaza. As the Latins did not venture to attack next day (24th November), the Moslems scattered in bands over the country. Ramla, which was deserted, was burned. In Jerusalem preparations were made for retreat into the citadel in case of need. The Moslems felt perfectly secure. On the 25th³ the king, seeing his opportunity, came out from Ascalon. After he was joined by eighty Templars the Latin knights numbered three hundred and seventy-five and the foot-soldiers were correspondingly numerous. They came upon Saladin's main body while it was crossing a stream and obstructed in its movements by the baggage⁴. The Moslems were already in confusion and were easily routed. The pursuit was kept up for twelve miles. Those who saved themselves did so at the cost of a trying journey back to Egypt with scant

¹ In the last ten days of Ramaḡān 573 (Beh. iii. 64), I.A. i. 631 represents Eş-şalih as besieging and taking the castle after the Latins retreated. But all agree that Eş-şalih secured the withdrawal of the Latins and this probably implies that he negotiated for the garrison and that it already acknowledged his authority.

² 'Imād ed-dīn in A.S. iv. 184 ff. (Wednesday 19th Jumādā i 573) from whom particulars are taken; I.A. i. 628 f. is less definite. Possibly the beginning of Jumādā i in Beh. iii. 63 (also quoted A.S. iv. 188) is the date when the sultan left Cairo (cf. Makrizi viii. 326); it may however be a textual error.

³ Tyre xxi. 23; so A.S. iv. 184, Friday at the commencement of Jumādā ii 573 and Makrizi viii. 326 f. (Friday 2nd Jumādā ii). In Tyre's text the "3rd year of Baldwin IV" (instead of 4th) is presumably a textual error (cf. xxi. 14 and 26).

⁴ I.A. i. 628 and A.S. iv. 184. Belā ed-dīn on Saladin's own authority says he was engaged in a turning movement and was attacked in confusion.

supplies through rain and cold¹. Saladin himself shared in the experience. He reached Cairo on the 8th of December². The extravagant joy of the Latins was scarcely justified by the extent of their victory. But it was an unusual reverse to be inflicted on Saladin³.

In 1178 Saladin returned to Syria. From Egypt to Damascus is thirty days easy march⁴. On this occasion Saladin did not take so long. Cairo was left on the 23rd of March, Aila was passed on the 2nd of April, and Damascus was reached on the 16th of the month⁵. Saladin's intention was to relieve Hama⁶ but that he now learned was unnecessary. He spent the summer months in Homs or its neighbourhood. But the Latins were apparently more aggressive than himself⁷. Possibly the state of affairs in Aleppo occupied the sultan's attention. There faction and intrigue continued rampant. Some of the emirs favoured Saladin, but as yet they accomplished nothing. In the autumn a quarrel with Ibn el-mukaddem of Ba'albek led to hostilities with

¹ Full particulars of the invasion are given by Tyre xxi. 20-24.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 188.

³ The Moslem historians console themselves by a reference to the victory of Hattin and the comparison shows the serious character of the defeat. The numbers engaged and the fierceness of the battle may be estimated from the statement that the Latin losses were 1100 killed and 750 wounded (Master of Hospital's letter in Röhricht, Beiträge II. 128). Wm Tyre's total number of the Latins engaged, "vix 375, quotquot erant promiscue conditionis" (xxi. 23), includes of course only the knights or those who fought as such (cf. Anon. Rhen., Recueil v. 517, 370 hommes and a small number of foot-soldiers). Sicard, Muratori vii. 603, gives the total at 7000 men; in Benedict i. 130, 20,000 may be a textual error for the 10,000, which is the reading of Hoveden II. 132. A large part of the army of Jerusalem was engaged in the siege of Hama. The Latin estimates of Saladin's army are no doubt greatly exaggerated (16,000 in Tyre xxi. 23, 12,000 Turks and 9000 Arabs in Anon. Rhen. v. 517).

⁴ El-fadil in A.S. iv. 218.

⁵ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 193. Weil III. 361 and apparently Wilken, Bk. iv. 191 wrongly have 1179; in Goergens, page 20, A.D. 1177 seems to be a misprint.

⁶ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 193.

⁷ In Rabi' i 574, commencing 17th August 1178, while Saladin was encamped beside Homs, the Latins made an expedition against Hama (I.A. I. 633). Previous to this and perhaps before Saladin's arrival Homs had similarly been attacked (I.A. I. 632 f. in A.U. 573, ending 18th June 1178, more probably after the siege of Hama than before it). Sometime in A.U. 574 Shaizar was attacked by the Latins of Antioch and some Turkomans were defeated by Raymond of Tripolis (Makrizi viii. 531). In A.U. 573 (which ended 18th June 1178) the Latins of Jerusalem were moving on their southern frontiers (Makrizi viii. 528).

him. It is said that Turan shah desired to have Ba'albek and that Ibn el-muqaddem would not surrender it. In the third week of September Saladin invested the town¹. The siege was prolonged for three months without success. In the beginning of January² Saladin returned to Damascus. Some time later Ibn el-muqaddem accepted Kafr jab and several places in its neighbourhood in exchange for Ba'albek³. The town was handed over to Turan shah⁴.

The Latins of Jerusalem still hoped for an opportunity of attacking Egypt but they were not sufficiently strong⁵. The building of Castle Jacob⁶, by the Jordan north of Lake Tiberias, was their only undertaking of importance this year. Perhaps the troops of Damascus had harassed the Latins from Banyas and Damascus although Saladin was absent in the north. In any case the Latins had reason to be apprehensive because of the weakness of their northern border. It would have been a bolder policy to attempt the recovery of Banyas. But the site of the new castle was well chosen for its purpose. It was built just beside a ford on the Jordan known as Jacob's ford. It guarded the sea road from Damascus, the *via maris*, along which the Moslem invaders swept westward to harry the lowlands of Galilee. From it also a watch could be kept on the horsemen who came from Banyas down the open Jordan valley. It was a considerable undertaking. The building commenced in October and six months were spent on its construction. The castle was

¹ In the first ten days of Rabi' li, which commences 16th September.

² In the last ten days of Rajab ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Calro il. 5).

³ I.A. i. 633f. agrees generally with this account and seems to imply that operations continued for some time after the sultan left Ba'albek before the agreement was made. Makrizi viii. 530 gives the date of Turan shah's occupation as Shawal 574 (later than 12th March 1179).

⁴ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 196 says that Turan shah went to Egypt in the last ten days of Dhu'l-ka'da 574, i.e. in the beginning of May 1179, leaving representatives in charge of Ba'albek (Recueil wrongly understands the year to be A.H. 573). Makrizi viii. 531 explains that he took part of Saladin's army to Egypt because there was a scarcity of food supplies in Syria (16th Dhu'l-ka'da 574, 5th May 1179). According to I.A. i. 640 he resigned Ba'albek and received Alexandria in Dhu'l-ka'da 575 (which commences 29th March 1180) and Ferukh shah then received Ba'albek. Possibly this is I.A.'s account of the events related by 'Imad ed-din and Makrizi. If so the date should be A.H. 574.

⁵ El-fadil in A.S. iv. 193, who mentions a raid after Saladin's departure.

⁶ By the Arabic historians called Beit el-alzan.

stored with provisions and suits of mail and weapons of every kind. It was intended to be not only a post of defence but also a base from which attack might be made. It was given into the charge of the Templars. On all the borders the castles were now held by the military orders. The building was completed without interference¹. Soon afterwards the presence of large flocks in the neighbourhood of Banyas tempted the Latins to make an expedition. They marched by night in the hope of effecting a surprise. But their preparations had been made on such a scale that the Moslems were well aware of their approach. The sultan's nephew, 'Izz ed-din 'Icrukh shah, was ordered to watch their movements at the head of the troops of Damascus. His instructions were not to engage the enemy until they had advanced well into Moslem territory. His advance guard however drew him into a general engagement and he gained a brilliant victory (10th April 1179). King Baldwin was with the army and during the fight was in great peril. He was saved by the devotion of his followers, notably of Humphrey, constable of the kingdom. Humphrey's wounds were so severe that he died twelve days later at Castle Jacob (22nd April)².

These events drew Saladin again into war with the Latins. It appears that he offered them 60,000 dinars on condition that they should destroy Castle Jacob, and that when they refused this offer he increased it to 100,000 dinars³. Such offers can only be explained on the hypothesis that Saladin would have preferred to pursue his plans elsewhere as long as the Latins remained inactive. But he judged it unwise to allow them to strengthen their position as they were attempting to do. From the end of May⁴ through all the summer he engaged in hostilities against them. He took up his quarters at Banyas and from there his troops made incursions in every direction. They penetrated westward as far as Sidon and Beirut as well as southwards.

¹ On the 21st March (1179) a small band of robbers, as Wm Tyre calls them, were intercepted on a road and severely defeated (Tyre xxi. 26).

² The dates are from Tyre xxi. 27; 'Imad ed-din's date (beginning of Dhū'l-ḥajja, calendar date 21st April) is the day of Humphrey's death, which he supposed took place on the day of the battle.

³ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 205, Ibn al-Ḥai in A.S. iv. 197.

⁴ The attack on the castle on May 25th (Tyre xxi. 27) cannot have been of the nature of a siege.

The Latins could not do otherwise than attempt to dislodge their enemy. Raymond of Tripolis joined the army of Jerusalem. From Şafed the Latins marched to Tibnin and then into the Marj 'ayun, the valley of the sources of the Jordan. They numbered 1000 lances¹. As they approached Saladin's camp it happened that a detachment of Moslems under 'Izz ed-din was setting out on an expedition. It was a Saturday night, the 9th of June. At once the Moslem chief retired or was driven back. But when Saladin led out his forces in the early morning he inflicted on the Latins a crushing defeat. Many of the leading knights were slain and many taken prisoners. 'Imad ed-din, the future historian of these events, was in Saladin's camp. He wrote down the names of the prisoners by torch-light in the early morning (10th June). There were over seventy of them².

This second victory was followed up two months later by the siege and capture of Castle Jacob itself. On a Saturday Saladin's army arrived, on the following Thursday, August the 30th, the fortress was taken³. The first mines under the walls were ineffectual. But the miners returned bravely to their work. On the night of the 29th, Wednesday night⁴, the beams supporting the tunnels were set on fire for the second time. As the wall crashed down the shooting flames caught a store of wood within and the fabric of the interior itself was set alight. "That night the fire kept watch round the castle walls as well as the Moslem troops." "The flames spoke a language that all understood and none required to ask the news⁵." At dawn on Thursday the castle was stormed (30th August)⁶. One hundred Moslem captives were released. Seven hundred prisoners, it is

¹ Ibn alī 'ai in A.S. iv. 101. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 200 says there were not less than 10,000 men in the Latin army. Makrizi viii. 532 combines these two statements into one.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 199. The total number of prisoners is given by El-fadil in A.S. iv. 203 as 160. In A.S. iv. 199 the number 270 may be an error for 70; it is also given by Makrizi viii. 532.

³ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 203 f. says the attack lasted from the 19th to the 24th Rabi' i. I. A. L. 638 gives the day of capture as 23th Rabi' i and this agrees with the calendar date for Thursday.

⁴ It is to be remembered that what we call Wednesday night is Thursday night according to Arabic reckoning.

⁵ El-fadil in A.S. iv. 206, 207.

⁶ See note 3.

said, were taken, but many of them were slain on the way to Damascus. The Moslems were engaged for some days in destroying the castle. The dead bodies were so numerous that plague broke out and caused considerable loss in Saladin's army. By this time the Latins were assembled at Tiberias to bring help to the castle, but when they heard of its capture they retired without attempting anything. Saladin now resumed his attacks from Banyas with impunity. Within the range of his movements the Latins were safe only behind the shelter of their towns and castles. At length in the spring of 1180¹ Baldwin and his council asked for peace. Saladin accepted the proposal and peace was concluded for two years². The treaty included neither Antioch nor Tripolis. In the previous summer Saladin had found it necessary to strengthen his forces in Homs and Hama³. Now he took the aggressive with a brief attack on the territories of Tripolis. While the Latins kept close in their castles he plundered the plains in the direction of the capital. An Egyptian fleet sailed along the coast and troops landed from it and ravaged the neighbourhood of Anṭarṭus (beginning of June 1180). A few days later Raymond also made peace⁴. Antioch may have continued to be the ally of Saladin's Moslem enemies⁵. But internal dissensions greatly weakened its power. Bohemond provoked the condemnation of the church by the character of his domestic life and the quarrel spread until there was serious discord between himself and many of his subjects⁶.

¹ After the capture of the castle the districts of Sklon, Beirut and Tyre were ravaged ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 209); on the night of October 13th an Egyptian fleet made a successful attack on Akka (El-faḥl in A.S. iv. 210); in April 1180 'Izz ed-din governor of Ba'albek attacked the district of Ṣafed (I.A. i. 640); about this same time, perhaps earlier, Tiberias was threatened (Tyre xxii. 1).

² Tyre xxii. 8; it may be assumed that the reference is to the peace concluded in 1180. There does not appear to be much reality in the remark "*quodque nunquam antea dicitur contigisse, paribus legibus foedus initum est, nihil præcipul nostris sibi in ea pactione reservantibus*" (xxii. 1).

³ Taḳī ed-din was posted in Hama and Naṣīr ed-din in Homs ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 198). Previous to this there had been an attack from Tripolis on certain Turkomans (I.A. i. 635, in A.H. 574, ending 7th June 1179).

⁴ Tyre xxii. 2-3 gives particulars.

⁵ The only recorded movement at this period is a raid against Shaizar mentioned in A.H. 574, ending 7th June 1179 (I.A. i. 635, 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 198).

⁶ Wm Tyre gives particulars.

Antioch had long ceased to be the most important of the Latin states.

In 1180 an event took place which was the beginning of much evil in the history of Jerusalem. Baldwin's sister Sybil and her son were still the nearest heirs to the kingdom. The proposals for Sybil's remarriage had come to nothing. Suddenly in Lent, contrary to all custom, she was married in haste to Guy of Lusignan. Sybil was only 21 years of age and the marriage was in accordance with her wish. Yet it was an unfortunate choice for the kingdom. Guy was a knight of no particular ability and with nothing substantial to recommend him, since good looks will not save a kingdom. Many were alienated, and particularly Raymond of Tripolis. An opposition party was created. Raymond kept away from Jerusalem altogether during the next two years and when he announced his intention of visiting Tiberias in 1182 the king at first forbade his coming¹. The incident exemplifies the attitude of the parties to one another. Such occurrences embittered feeling and kept alive old jealousies². The schism continued to work its evil effects until the kingdom was overthrown.

During the remainder of 1180 Saladin occupied himself in northern Syria. It does not appear that the death of Saif ed-din Ġazî of Moṣul on the 29th of June had any influence on his doings. Another brother, 'Izz ed-din Mas'ud, succeeded him. Eṣ-ṣalîḥ of Aleppo still continued to hold his precarious position³, but Ra'ban and the district round was Saladin's possession and this was threatened by the extending power of Kîlij Arslan of Rum. In the summer of 1179 there had been a battle in which Taḳî ed-din 'Omar commanded Saladin's army and gained a victory⁴. But negotiations more than fighting now occupied

¹ Tyre xxii. 9.

² Maḳrîzî viii. 345, without an exact date but apparently referring to the end of Dhu'l-ḳa'da 577 (1st week of April 1182), says that Saladin concluded a treaty in Egypt with an envoy of the count of Tripolis. Possibly this agreement was a direct result of the quarrel spoken of above. It may be noted, however, that Maḳrîzî says nothing of Raymond's treaty with Saladin in June 1180. Raymond joined in the operations against Saladin in May (Tyre xxii. 14).

³ Beh. iii. 64 f.

⁴ About the time when Castle Jacob was destroyed (I.A. i. 639 f.).

Saladin. Peace was made on the 2nd of October (1180)¹. In the month following he led an expedition against Rupen the Armenian. Peace with him was made in November². Saladin on his way south reached Hama towards the 20th of the month³.

In January 1181 Saladin returned to Egypt. He remained there until May 1182. It was the last visit which he paid to Egypt⁴. During the years which follow, until his death, he was occupied with little intermission in the Latin war. It is noteworthy that during this year in Egypt he pushed on a scheme of great fortifications round Alexandria. He apprehended an attack from Europe at this point and was resolved to be prepared. His peace with the emperor Alexius II in the autumn of 1181⁵ was a guarantee that no Greek fleet would assist in the attack. From this time onwards his relations with the Greeks were friendly. While thus occupied Saladin was hopeful that he might be able to join in the next pilgrimage to Mekka (April 1182). His plans in this respect were frustrated. The truce with the Latins was broken before the appointed time expired. Each side accuses the other of breach of faith. Perhaps the doings of Reginald of Chatillon, governor of Kerak, were the first and chief cause of the rupture. His position commanded the caravan road between Syria and Egypt and he made the way insecure for travellers⁶. About the commencement of December 1181⁷ he went so far as to plan an expedition into Arabia. He was closely tracked by 'Izz ed-din and the troops of Damascus and compelled to return without having accomplished anything of consequence. On the other hand a pilgrim

¹ Beh. lil. 66 (10th Jumada I 576).

² I.A. i. 645 (Jumada II 576); the citadel of Beheisan was burned and left in ruins by the invaders (Maḡrizi viii. 536). Rupen is usually called Ibn Lauḡ by the Arabic historians.

³ End Jumada II ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 212); he arrived in Damascus on 1st Rajab, 21st November (Maḡrizi viii. 536).

⁴ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 217.

⁵ Jumada II 577 (Maḡrizi viii. 539); in the preceding summer (Ṣafar 577) there was an embassy from Constantinople in Cairo negotiating peace.

⁶ Ernoul 54 f. records an attack on a Damascus caravan in 1180 or 1181 (whilst Saladin was in "Yemen," i.e. perhaps during his northern campaign in 1180). What may be another version of the same incident is given on p. 96 f. as if it occurred shortly before the invasion of 1183. The earlier date may be preferred since the attack could not be a breach of faith in 1183.

⁷ At the time of the death of El-malik ʿaṣ-ṣāliḥ ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 214).

ship with 1500 passengers on board¹ was wrecked near Damietta and the passengers and their property were seized by Saladin². So both sides felt themselves aggrieved. Saladin had other reasons for returning to Syria in the beginning of 1182, but retaliation on the Latins was one of the objects he had in view and this guided his first movements.

The sultan left Cairo on the 11th of May and reached Damascus on the 22nd of June³. Many merchants and civilians were glad of the convoy and accompanied him. These made the march slower than usual. Besides, dread of the occupants of the castles by the Dead Sea imposed precaution and led to the choice of a circuitous route. Reginald was soon informed of Saladin's approach and persuaded the king to endeavour to intercept him. It is said that the enterprise was mismanaged⁴ and certainly the Moslem caravan reached Damascus quite unharmed. Moreover the absence of the army of Jerusalem

¹ Tyre xxii. 14. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 217 gives the prisoners as 1676 in number, which corresponds with sufficient closeness. He says however there were 1500 persons on board (iv. 216). I.A. i. 653 evidently refers to this shipwreck but dates it next year when Saladin was attacking Beirut.

² As it was a pilgrim ship the date probably falls before Easter 1181. This agrees with Tyre's indefinite date (xxii. 14). A.S. simply gives A.D. 1177. Wm Tyre makes it clear that Saladin seized the ship as a means of putting pressure on the Latins to remedy the grievances which he had against them. It may be assumed that Reginald's acts were the chief burden of the Moslem complaint. Wm Tyre indicates the Latin answer to the sultan's demands when he says that they were "almost impossible" to satisfy and when he remarks of Reginald "*quod Ambra quosdam...cepisse diceretur.*" Ernoul 54 f. says that the king endeavoured without success to get Reginald to make reparation. Another charge against the Latins was that they had seized Moslem merchant ships against the terms of the treaty ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Goergens 30). Makrizi viii. 539 mentions the capture of one off the Egyptian coast in Rabi' 1 577 (commences 15th July 1181) but for this the Latins of Syria may not have been responsible.

³ 5th Muharram 578 (I.A. i. 651, 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 217, Makrizi viii. 547) and 17th Šafar ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 218, Beh. iii. 68, Makrizi viii. 548). I.A. i. 651 gives 11th Šafar as the date of the arrival in Damascus.

⁴ Tyre xxii. 15 says that the Latins instead of occupying "Gerba" and "Ras el-rasit" where there were abundant supplies of water allowed Saladin to reach first the one and then the other without molestation. The original position of the Latins was at Petra (Tyre xxii. 14). Saladin raided their territories at the head of his troops for several days, whilst the civilians and the impedimenta under his brother Taj el-muluk Buri made their way safely past at some distance to the east ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 217 and I.A.). The sultan rejoined his brother in a week's time (*ba'ad 'ašbu'*, translated by Recueil "*quelques semaines après*"). For identifications of places on the line of march see Clermont Ganneau in the *Revue Biblique*, 1906, pp. 464 ff.

had left its territories defenceless and given 'Izz ed-din of Damascus his opportunity. It is not said whether he crossed the Jordan to the north or to the south of lake Tiberias. Either way led to the district round Tiberias and the great central plain Marj ibn 'Animar which were traversed and ravaged by his troops. Even the neighbourhood of 'Akka was reached and the little town of Daburiya on the northern extremity of the plain was plundered. On the way back the cliff fortress of Ḥabīs Jaldek was captured¹. It was one of the few strongholds which the Latins still held in the district of Suwad east of the Jordan². It was taken by storm within five days of the first attack and many believed that the loss was due to treachery. When Saladin reached Damascus his nephew was able to report this capture and also that he had found his way to the very heart of the enemy's country. It was decided to repeat the attack at once on a larger scale.

When the Latins at Petra found that Saladin had slipped past them they hurried back and took up their position at Ṣaffuriya. The spot was well chosen. From it they could advance to meet attack by whichever way the enemy approached from Damascus; by the road from Banyas, by the "sea road" north of Tiberias, or through the Wadi Jalut past Baisan. They were often to meet there in the hurrying years that follow. They were not mistaken in thinking that Saladin would attack them now. His nephew's experience drew him on. Some weeks later he crossed the Jordan south of lake Tiberias and encamped before the city of that name on the night of the 19th of July³. From there detachments were sent in various directions. The outskirts of Baisan were plundered and the valley of the Jordan. Jinin and the plain as far as 'Akka were

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 218; I.A. i. 631 (in Ḥafar 378, beginning 6th June); Tyre xxii. 15. Makrizi viii. 547 calls the fortress Shaḥīf.

² It was sixteen miles from Tiberias, Tyre xxii. 15.

³ El-Ṣaḥīl in A.S. iv. 219 says Saladin started from Damascus on Monday 7th Rabi' i (11th July, calendar date 11th July) and reached Tiberias on the night of Tuesday 19th Rabi' i 578. As the day of the week and the day of the month do not agree in the latter case 19 is probably a textual error for 15 (=20th July, calendar date 19th July). The night of the 20th in Arabic reckoning is however what we call the night of the 19th. Makrizi viii. 549 dates Saladin's return to his own territories on 10th Rabi' i; this must be a textual error for 10th Rabi' i.

raided¹ for the second time that summer. The Latin army now advanced to repel the invader. A battle was fought in the valley between Tiberias and Haisan under the walls of the newly built castle of Kaukab or Belvoir. Neither side could claim a decisive victory. Probably the result was a check to the sultan's army², although his secretary El-faḍil sent a letter to the caliph announcing victory in glowing terms³. It would not however have brought the Moslem campaign to an end had not Saladin's interests in the north called him in that direction. As he left the south, accordingly, he covered his departure and alarmed the Latins by a movement in another quarter. In the Biḡa' he learned that the Egyptian fleet had fulfilled his instructions to attack the coast⁴ and was now lying before Beirut. He moved at once in the same direction, laid waste the district round and even threatened the town itself (beginning of August)⁵. On the evening of the third day he retired satisfied with the alarm he had caused⁶. The movement had indeed been sufficiently alarming. After the battle of Kaukab the Latins in uncertainty fell back on Şaffuriya. When they heard of the attack on Beirut they marched at once to its relief and a fleet was fitted out in Tyre. Then came the news that Saladin was gone and after this the Latin army dispersed.

After Saladin's departure the Moslem attack slackened

¹ I.A. i. 652.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 218 and I.A. i. 653 are not effusive in their account of the "victory" and the letter to the caliph (iv. 218 f.) is singularly lacking in details. Tyre xxii. 16 gives a more reliable account, frankly acknowledging Latin losses but describing the battle as drawn.

³ Even the battle of Ramla was announced in Egypt as a victory. An extract from William of Tyre's account of the battle of Kaokab (xxii. 16) may be given because of its reminder of newspaper reports in the earlier part of the South African war: "we have not been able to ascertain exactly the number of the enemy slain. The reason is that they carried away their dead so as to hide their casualties from us. They buried their dead secretly on the following night in their camp to prevent the knowledge of their loss being an encouragement to us. Their total losses may be estimated at about 1000."

⁴ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 223.

⁵ Tyre xxii. 17.

⁶ I.A.'s statement (i. 653) that he was resolved to capture Beirut is quite inconsistent with the situation. Tyre xxii. 18 has a similar statement and supposes that Saladin retired because he heard of the Latin preparations against him. But there is no evidence of his making such preparations as a siege required.

although peace was not renewed. The Egyptian fleet was troublesome, especially in the spring of 1183 when the pilgrim season came again. El-'adil was governor of Egypt but in that direction neither side was very active¹. The Latins regarded Saladin's absence as giving them a favourable opportunity for operations against the territories of Damascus. They felt insulted, indeed, as William of Tyre the chancellor of the kingdom expresses it, that he should have gone away without first making a truce with them. It was a mark of contempt for their power which they desired to show was unmerited. In September 'Izz ed-din of Damascus died and was replaced by Shams ed-din ibn al-muqaddem². Possibly it was after this that their first expedition was made. It was against the district of Bosra and was merely a plundering raid. Moslem horsemen watched their movements but did not attack them³. On the way back they besieged Habis Jaldek in the Suwad and recaptured it within three weeks (October)⁴. A second expedition, in December, before Christmas, consisted only of mounted men. They crossed Jacob's ford and advanced towards Damascus. They reached Dariya and from there inflicted what damage they could. But the troops of Damascus were stationed in front of the orchards and Moslem horsemen swept round and round the camp cutting off stragglers, so that finally the Latins turned back from this point⁵. Reginald of Kerak won the credit of conceiving a more daring and effective plan. He built ships and had them transported on camel-back to the Red Sea. There he divided his expedition. The Moslem garrison of Aila had caused him considerable annoyance. He therefore left two ships and part of his forces to attempt the capture of the town. The rest of the expedition sailed south to attack the holy cities of Arabia. El-'adil sent ships from Egypt in pursuit of them.

¹ In August 1182 El-'adil attacked Darum (Tyre xxii. 17) and in the spring of 1183 there was an encounter between some of his troops and the garrison of Darum ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 239; Makrizi ix. 6 f.).

² I.A. i. 659 (Jumada i 578) in agreement with 'Imad ed-din iv. 223. Rojabb 577 in Beh. iii. 68 must be regarded as an error.

³ Tyre xxii. 20. I.A.'s one reference to an expedition (i. 655) agrees in date with this (September or October 1182) but the mention of Dariya shows confusion with the second expedition (Tyre xxii. 22).

⁴ Tyre xxii. 21.

⁵ Tyre xxii. 21.

The Latins were overtaken and defeated (February 1183)¹. They disembarked from their ships in order to escape by land. After being pursued and harassed for some days they finally succeeded in escaping northwards.

Meantime Saladin was adding to his dominions those parts of Nureddin's sultanate which had hitherto remained in other hands. On the 4th of December 1181² El-malik eş-şalih had died. Saladin was then in Egypt and lamented his absence from Syria at such a crisis, for he claimed that he was the only rightful heir. In spite of his protests Aleppo passed into the hands of 'Izz ed-din of Mosul. On the 27th of February of the following year (1182), however, that prince agreed to hand it over to his brother, 'Imad ed-din³. This roused Saladin's hopes afresh, for he had now a less formidable rival to deal with. When he left Egypt in May 1182 the conquest of Aleppo was what he principally had in view. He announced to the caliph that his purpose was to engage in the holy war, and he did actively devote himself for a time to this end. The opportunity was good and he did not allow it to pass. But he furthered thereby his ulterior plan also, for his zeal commended all his interests to the caliph. His main object for the moment was revealed when he proceeded north in the end of August. He passed Aleppo on the 22nd of September⁴, marching slowly towards the Euphrates, for he was negotiating all the time with the caliph and the emirs of Mesopotamia⁵. His intention was to strike first at Mosul rather than Aleppo. Throughout the winter of 1182-83 he made continuous if not rapid progress and when he turned back to Syria a long list of conquered cities stood to the credit of his victories⁶. He laid siege to Aleppo

¹ Shawal 578, commencing 18th January ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 230). Further particulars are given by Makrizi viii. 551.

² Friday 25th Rajab 577 (Makrizi viii. 545 and, without the day, Beh. iii. 66). I.A. i. 647 gives the month only; Kem. Blochet 67, Friday 20th Rajab 577.

³ 21st Shawal (Beh. iii. 67).

⁴ 21st Jumada i 578 (Beh. iii. 69). He arrived at Aleppo on the 18th and spent three days in the neighbourhood. The same dates are given by Makrizi viii. 549.

⁵ El-şadil in A.S. iv. 217.

⁶ Most particulars are given by Kem., who now seems to become again a valuable source; cf. also Makrizi viii. 550.

itself on the 21st of May 1183¹. After the siege had lasted to the 11th of June the city was so reduced that 'Imad ed-din agreed to hand it over in exchange for some of Saladin's recent conquests². On the 22nd of June Harim also passed into Saladin's possession³. He remained in Aleppo until the 14th of August⁴. Bohemond of Antioch surrendered to him the Moslem prisoners in his possession and was granted peace⁵. There was little now to fear from the knights of Antioch⁶. In order to get money Bohemond sold Tarsus in Cilicia to the Armenian prince Rupen⁷.

Saladin's was now a proud position. All Nureddin's possessions in Syria and beyond its northern borders were his; besides these he ruled Egypt and exercised authority in Arabia itself. He was the most powerful Moslem prince of his time. With pardonable exaggeration his chancellor El-fa'il declares that there was no Moslem land that was not subject to him. All this power he was resolved should be devoted to the holy war. He declares his intention in a letter written about this time in these words: "in gratitude for the divine favour we must

¹ Saturday 26th Muharram 579 (Makrizi ix. 7 and, without the day, Beh. iii. 71, Kem. Blochet 76 = iv. 164); 16th Muharram in Ibn Kh. 's text of Beh. was accordingly a textual error (iv. 309).

² Saturday 18th Šafar (Makrizi ix. 7) or 17th Šafar (Beh. iii. 72, Kem. Blochet 78 = iv. 166). I. A. I. 662 gives 18th Šafar as the date of the evacuation. Beh. who is fuller and more exact says it was the 23rd before Saladin took possession.

³ 29th Šafar 579 (Beh. iii. 73), a Wednesday (A.S. iv. 238) and 20 June 22nd not 23rd. In the text of Ibn abi Tal (in A.S. iv. 237 and Cairo ii. 26, line 33) 19th Šafar is evidently a textual error, for the narrative continues; Saladin after spending two nights there returned to Aleppo on the 3rd Rabi' I (= 26th June). This agrees exactly with the reading 29th Šafar, Rabi' I being the following Moslem month. (The Kewall editor has mistaken the year and makes Harim surrender on June 24th and Saladin return to Aleppo on 7th July 1182.) A.S. iv. 238 quotes Beha ed-din for the reading 19th Šafar, but gives the day as Wednesday in accordance with the correct reading.

⁴ 22nd Rabi' II (Beh. iii. 73, Kem. Blochet 80 = iv. 168, Makrizi ix. 8).

⁵ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 239 (cf. Tyre xxii. 24).

⁶ Their only recent recorded movement was against Harim after Es-şalih's death, probably in the beginning of 1182. The Alepins endeavoured without advantage to secure them as allies against Saladin ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 214). In 1184 the ruler of Antioch made an expedition against Harim and gained a success over some Arabs at "the iron bridge," possibly about the time of Saladin's withdrawal from the neighbourhood of Kerak in September (Barhebr. 399 f., where the date A.H. 588 is a misprint for A.H. 580; cf. Syriac text, p. 392).

⁷ Tyre xxii. 24 (after the peace with Saladin).

expend our power and redouble our resolution and employ every weapon against the accursed Franks." He was pledged by his promises to the caliph and by the recognition he had received from him. But his own deepest desires also drew him to the enterprise. Success was not a foregone conclusion, yet the promise of victory was bright. Even the united power of the Latins was inferior to his resources. If Europe allowed him time success was almost certain. It is a superficial view, however, that brands the Latins of the period as a degenerate race. The charge of degeneracy brought against them by William of Tyre, *laudator temporis acti*, has become a commonplace of the historians who follow his guidance. But in the actual struggle there was no falling off in the valour and the zeal that were displayed. The knights fought as bravely as ever. They were still the devoted soldiers of the Cross, whose "precious wood" they carried into battle even more constantly than of old. There was disunion, indeed, amongst them, and want of competent leadership hurried them to their ruin. But when were these blemishes ever wanting in their history? The faction and the strife that paralysed their efforts had been there from the beginning. Some of their leaders, at least, were probably equal to those who had led them to victory in times past. Yet the situation was greatly changed. They had now an enemy who was sure to take advantage of their dissensions and their mistakes; the Moslems were stronger and more united than they had ever been before. The Latins, in short, were too few for the enemy they had to encounter. Their power to offer a permanent resistance to Saladin's attack depended on the amount of support that came from Europe. The Syrian Latins by themselves were like men fighting with destiny. They took counsel together in the way men always do when the evil is beyond their control; they talked and wrangled and knew in their hearts that there was no real remedy. A council was held in Jerusalem in February 1183 to discuss the position of affairs. The only practical result is of some interest in itself. An income tax was imposed. The proceeds were to be devoted to the defence of the kingdom and to no other purpose. It was a graduated tax like its modern representatives. It was also

announced as temporary and exceptional. After this the knights of the kingdom waited until Saladin should return. Their uncertainty was soon set at rest. Saladin had decided to attack Jerusalem, and the Latin army assembled again at Şaffuriya.

Saladin arrived in Damascus on the 24th of August, having spent ten days on the journey from Aleppo. He was resolved to invade Palestine at once. He lay for some days by "the wooden bridge" gathering his forces and he left the territories of Damascus on the 28th of September. A day's march brought him close to the Jordan, where he rested. He crossed next morning early (29th September) and advanced on Haisan, which he found deserted. A day was spent in ravaging the Jordan valley (El-ğor). Next day the army moved up the Wadi Jalut and camped by the fountain at the head of the valley ('Ain Jalut). On the march a band sent out to reconnoitre encountered the troops of Kerak and Shaubak on their way to join the main army. An engagement followed in which many of the Latins were killed or taken prisoners. The news caused great joy in the Moslem army and was hailed as an omen of further victory (30th September)¹. On the following day the Latins advanced from Şaffuriya. They took up their position at El-fula², within a mile of Saladin's position, beside another fountain. It seems that the Latin army numbered thirteen hundred knights and fifteen thousand foot soldiers³. The oldest men did not remember the gathering of such a host. A fresh crusade had recently arrived and even the crews of the Italian ships which carried it swelled their numbers. It is unlikely that Saladin's army was equally numerous. But

¹ All these facts and dates are from Beh. iii. 73 ff. Other authorities agree. Tyre xxii. 26 supposes that the Moslems first encamped at Tubania (El-fula), but he has been misled by the fact that the Moslem troops skirmished there with the Latins as they advanced (Beh. iii. 75). Ernoul seems to combine two accounts of the Latin advance (cf. note 2). "The wooden bridge" is supposed by the *Recueil* editor to have been at El-keswa, a few miles south of Damascus.

² Beh. iii. 75. Wm Tyre calls the place Tubania. Ernoul 98 f. makes the Latin advance in two stages: on Friday (30th) they reached "le Feve" (El-fula) and then on Saturday (1st October) "le Fontaine de Tubanie." Ken. Blochet 81 = iv. 169 says the Latin camp was at 'Ain Jalut, which was Saladin's camping-ground.

³ Tyre xxii. 27; 'Imad ed-din agrees closely (1500 knights, as many Turkopoles and 15,000 foot).

the Latins were resolved to remain on the defensive. Sybil's husband Guy was their nominal leader. William of Tyre does not positively assert that it was jealousy of his advancement and dissension among the chiefs that prevented the Latins from taking the offensive, but, plainly he inclines to this view. The strength of Saladin's position was given as a reason for not moving and the probability of his having a greater number of troops with him than appeared. The Latins entrenched themselves on the hill-slopes¹ and refused to be drawn from their defences. There was skirmishing with the outposts of the enemy and Moslem detachments scoured the country in all directions. They disturbed the monastery of St Elias on Jebel eṭ-ṭur (mount Tabor) and the citizens of Nazareth were alarmed by soldiers who looked down into the town from the neighbouring hills. "With the sword as their pen they wrote ruin on the Latin towns" is the picturesque but exaggerated report of El-faḡlī². For a week the Latins declined to engage in battle, until Saladin at last withdrew (6th October)³. It was more difficult for him to obtain provisions than it was for his opponents⁴. By their defensive policy the Latins forced Saladin to retire and so far they had been successful.

Saladin was not discouraged by the issue of his invasion. The weakness of the Latins was as manifest as their strength. When the Moslems retreated they did so only to change the point and manner of their attack. Saladin reached Damascus on the 13th of October⁵; he left it nine days later⁶ in order to attack one of the castles by the Dead Sea. The siege of Kerak was commenced about the beginning of November⁷. After a short time

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 245, El-faḡlī in A.S. iv. 247.

² El-faḡlī in A.S. iv. 246.

³ Thursday 16th Jumada ii ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 245). Similarly El-faḡlī iv. 247. I. A. i. 663, Kem. Blochet 81=iv. 169 and Beh. iii. 75 call it the 17th. Tyre xxii. 27 says that the enemy spent seven or eight days in Latin territory and retired "on the eighth day or rather the ninth."

⁴ Wm Tyre, Beh. and Kem. all refer to this as the cause of retreat.

⁵ Thursday 24th Jumada ii 579, calendar date 14th October (Beh. iii. 76; without the day of the week Kem. Blochet 82=iv. 170, and Makrizi ix. 9).

⁶ Saturday 3rd Rajab 579, 22nd October (Makrizi ix. 9; without the day Beh. iii. 76).

⁷ Scarcely a month after the retreat from Palestine (Tyre xxii. 28). Besides the siege lasted a month (xxii. 30) and is known to have ended on December 4th.

the suburbs were occupied and the whole population crowded into the castle. The siege was pressed with the help of eight siege engines and the defence was maintained with difficulty. El-'adil of Egypt joined his brother with reinforcements on the 22nd of November¹. The hopes of the besieged depended on the army of the kingdom. Throughout November the strife of parties in Jerusalem prevented help being given, but finally on the 4th of December a relieving force arrived². Saladin recognised that the relief was effectual and withdrew his troops.

El-'adil did not return to Egypt. He desired to be governor of Aleppo and northern Syria. Possibly the sultan wished to have him there to protect his interests and to gather levies for the Latin war. Taqi ed-din 'Omar went to Egypt and El-'adil accompanied him as his adviser; they started together from Kerak. El-'adil journeyed without delay by Damascus on to Aleppo³. During the winter there were embassies and negotiations concerning affairs in Mesopotamia and in March (1184) El-'adil had an interview with the sultan in Damascus⁴. Finally both he and the new governor of Egypt received instructions to bring forces to join in a renewed attack on Kerak. There was considerable delay before troops from such a distance could be assembled. The northern levies reached Damascus in the first week of July. Taqi ed-din joined the sultan near Kerak on the 30th of the same month. It was not until the 13th of August that the fortress was invested⁵. On this occasion only the castle

¹ Beh. iii. 76 (4th Sha'ban 579). Kem. Blochet 82=lv. 170 notes a special attack on the castle on this same date.

² 16th Sha'ban (Beh. iii. 77). According to Kinnul 105f. Saladin made an expedition into Palestine before he returned to Damascus (see p. 235, n. 3).

³ Taqi ed-din left for Egypt the day before Saladin left for Damascus (Beh. iii. 77). Saladin and El-'adil reached Damascus on December 12th (14th Sha'ban), the latter started for Aleppo on the 20th (2nd Ramaḍān) and arrived there on the 30th (assuming that Friday 22nd Ramaḍān [579] in Kem. Blochet 82=lv. 170 should be read 12th Ramaḍān). Beh. iii. 77 makes 2nd Ramaḍān the day that the governorship was conferred on El-'adil. He afterwards paid a short visit to Damascus on the 19th of March (4th Dhu'l-hijja) and then returned again to Aleppo (Beh. iii. 79).

⁴ Beh. iii. 78f.

⁵ Beh. iii. 80f. gives these particulars. The *Recueil* text omits the date when the sultan left Ras el-ma (and Rabi' li, 13th July, as quoted from Beh. by A.S. iv. 250). In the quotation from Beh. by A.S. iv. 250, 14th Jumada I is a textual error for 4th Jumada I (13th August). Makrizi ix. 23 contains the same error.

was defended by the Latins. It was separated from the houses lower down the hill by a deep ravine which was more formidable than any moat. After a few days' attack Saladin resolved to fill up this chasm so as to be able to deliver a direct assault upon the walls (Thursday 16th August)¹. This was accomplished and at the same time the siege engines bombarded the castle with terrifying effect. There was hope in the Moslem camp that success would soon crown these efforts. But when news was brought that a Latin army was advancing from Jerusalem Saladin judged it prudent to meet them on the way. He found them posted at El-wala, a spot very difficult of access, and accordingly took up his position just opposite them at Heshban. After some days he drew back on Ma'in and this gave the Latins an opportunity to escape him. By a night march they reached Kerak (3rd September)². The Latins had in a measure outwitted Saladin but they had forgotten that Palestine was now exposed to his attack. A detachment of Moslem troops at once crossed the Jordan with orders to carry fire and sword into the heart of the country. Nablus, Sebastiya and Jinin were attacked and plundered. The expedition rejoined Saladin at Ras el-ma on the haj road³; it had been absent less than a week⁴. The whole

¹ Thursday 7th Jumada I, calendar date 17th August, 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 253.

² The account here is chiefly from 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 254 ff.; the names Heshban and Ma'in are from Beh. iii. 81 and the notes of time from I.A. l. 667. The exact date, 3rd September (Monday 26th Jumada I, calendar date 4th September), is from Makrizi ix. 12. It is correctly given by Beh. (26th Jumada I) but wrongly quoted from him in A.S. iv. 251, as 26th Jumada II. Possibly the date when Saladin withdrew from Kerak is given by Makrizi ix. 12 as Thursday 15th Jumada I 580 (23rd August, calendar date 24th August); the translation appears to be inexact and the date Thursday 25th Jumada I certainly contains a textual error. The date assigned to El-'adil's arrival at Kerak (19th Jumada I) which is suspicious in the light of Beh. iii. 80 f. (cf. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 249) becomes impossible if this corrected reading be accepted.

³ The representation follows Beh. iii. 82. I.A. and 'Imad ed-din almost imply that Saladin led the invasion himself. So Ernout 103 f. who relates the expedition as a continuation of the siege of 1183 (he does not speak of the siege of 1184). Makrizi ix. 12 says Nablus, Jinin, Zar'in and Jalut were plundered and burned, that Nablus was stormed on Friday the last day of Jumada I (7th September) and that the expedition recrossed the Jordan on Sunday 2nd Jumada II (9th September).

⁴ Benedict I. 341 f. under the year 1185 has an account of an invasion of Palestine which may be identified with this. In 1185 there was peace. The leader of the expedition according to his account was a renegade Templar, Robert of St Albans. He dates the event before the Feast of St Peter ad vincula (1st August).

army reached Damascus on the 15th of September¹. The Latin forces having spent some time strengthening Kerak returned to Jerusalem.

About this time Saladin received news that his possessions in Mesopotamia were again in danger. He decided to make peace with Jerusalem that he might be free to deal with the situation in the north. When Raymond on behalf of the Latin king made overtures to him peace was arranged for a period of four years² from the following Easter (1st April 1185). Of course the intervening months until Easter were also included in the duration of the truce³. Saladin left Damascus some time in February⁴ and he was absent in the north for fifteen months.

Although it suited Saladin's plans to have peace with his opponents, the first overtures seem to have been made by the Latins. The experience of the years 1183-84 had shown how fatal the dissensions within the kingdom might prove to be at any moment if the war with Saladin were continued. The causes of the discord have been already stated. Baldwin struggled bravely to discharge his duties and accompany his troops in the field. But in spite of this every campaign raised afresh the question who should take the king's place. Guy's marriage with Sybil had given him a strong claim. In 1182, during the later opera-

¹ Saturday 7th Jumada II (Beh. III. 82 and Makrizi ix. 13).

² Ernoul 124 is here the authority. The confused narrative of Benedict I. 341 and 359 is inconsistent with his representation and yet supplies a certain amount of confirmation of it. Benedict makes the truce consist of two terms, the second an extension of the first. The first was to last until "next Easter," i.e. Easter of 1186 (seeing the year in question is 1185); the second for three years longer. This agrees with Ernoul in making the truce commence in 1185 and last in all for nearly four years. It is however impossible that Guy should have renewed the truce, for he was not king in April 1186, and the date of the arrangement of the truce is given in the wrong year 1185 (6-9 months too late). The second error is a consequence of the mistake of dating the Moslem invasion of 1184 in 1185 (see p. 235, n. 4).

³ It is obvious from Saladin's movements that the peace must have been concluded at the end of 1184 or the very commencement of 1185 (note 4). Ernoul apparently puts it later than the death of Baldwin IV, but that must itself be determined in part by the date of the treaty. For the practice of dating the duration of a truce from Easter and including the intervening months as additional to the years of the treaty compare Richard's treaty with Saladin in 1193 (Chap. V, p. 286).

⁴ Dhu'l-ka'da 580, ending 4th March 1185, Kem. Blochet 85=iv. 173. Makrizi ix. 14 says he arrived in Hama on the 20th Dhu'l-ka'da (22nd February) and remained there until the end of the year 580 (ends 3rd April 1185). Hama may be regarded as a textual error for Kem.'s Halep (Aleppo) or *vice versa*.

tions at least, Raymond of Tripolis seems to have been leader. But in the camp at Şaffuriya in September 1183 Baldwin committed the direction of affairs to Guy. In fact he almost abdicated in Guy's favour and this mortified Raymond and estranged his friends. But Guy was not strong enough to assert his position and this seems to have been the principal cause of the inaction which the Latins displayed on that occasion. As Baldwin had not long to live the further question of the succession to the throne was involved in the arrangements that were made. As early as November 1183 Baldwin saw the impossibility of a settlement on the lines of his first attempt. After a dispute he had with Guy he was still more inclined to listen to other proposals. Towards the end of November he announced his intention of resuming his former power. At the same time he permitted his nephew, a child scarcely five years old, to be crowned his heir (20th of November)¹. This change, by itself, was not sufficient. It was no great advantage to have a boy king co-regent with a dying prince. A few days later, accordingly, on the way to Kerak, Baldwin made a further concession to Raymond's party. The count was recognised as leader of the expedition. The estrangement between the king and Guy was now accentuated. Baldwin desired if possible to annul his marriage, but this could not be accomplished. At a council held in 'Akka the patriarch, the Master of the Temple and the Master of the knights of St John all spoke in Guy's favour and when they were not listened to they left the assembly. After this Raymond was declared regent with the approval of most of those present. On certain conditions his regency was to last ten years². It was he who relieved Kerak in the summer of 1184 and in the following winter made peace with Saladin for four years. For a time all went well. The spirit of faction seemed to be hushed. Even the death of Baldwin IV early in 1185³ did not disturb the

¹ Tyre xxii. 29.

² At this point Wm Tyre's narrative comes to an abrupt conclusion. He does not name the conditions of the regency. The chief western authority subsequently is Ernoul. He gives particulars of the arrangement (p. 116 f.) but dates it at the time of the coronation of Baldwin V (November 1183). See p. 238.

³ Apparently before the conclusion of the four years' truce with Saladin which was made before Easter 1185 and probably at the beginning of the year if not earlier

situation. But unfortunately the young king Baldwin V also died, during the summer of 1186¹. The contingency had indeed been provided for. According to the agreement Raymond was to remain regent until a new king had been chosen by the Pope, the emperor of Germany and the kings of France and England. But this did not please those who were opposed to Raymond, amongst others the Templars and Reginald of Kerak. They cleverly seized Jerusalem and claimed the throne for Guy on the ground that his wife was the nearest heir. Raymond and his friends were then at Nablus. Reginald having joined Guy in Jerusalem the patriarch announced that he was willing to crown him king. After the ceremony was performed Guy took possession of the royal treasure. The boldness of the proceedings and the refusal of Humphrey, husband of Sybil's only sister Isabel, to make a stand against Guy, his practical acceptance, indeed, of the situation, worked strongly on the minds of Raymond's supporters. One after another they dropped away from him and acknowledged the new king. Raymond betook himself to his fief in Tiberias in the bitterest anger. Guy was preparing to attack him there when he learned that his rival had asked and had been promised the assistance of Saladin. The sultan was at Banyas watching the course of events and Guy's principal supporters, the Templars, were unpopular. For these reasons no attack was made on Raymond and perhaps his Moslem allies did not actually draw their swords on his behalf against his fellow-Christians². The knowledge that Saladin's forces would join in the fray prevented a conflict. At the same time it greatly intensified the animosity with which Raymond was regarded by his opponents and for a time the situation was most critical.

(p. 236, n. 3). 'Imad ed-din in A.S. Goergens 59 (under A.H. 582) says he reigned about ten years; since Amalric died in A.H. 569 this is an underestimate. The statements of the western sources on the subject are given by Köhricht 415, note 2 (for A.D. 1185 *quid Gestis 10* and *Annales* ii. ii. 433).

¹ The references to the (western) sources are fully given by Köhricht 416 note 1. They mention only the year but the chronology of subsequent events points to the summer as the most probable portion of the year.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 258 implies that Raymond actually came to blows with the Latins but does not expressly say that the Moslems were engaged. I.A. i. 675 might be so understood.

The history of Saladin's doings since the spring of 1185 may be briefly told. His purpose was to settle, once for all, his relations with Mosul. 'Izz ed-din and others were still disposed to cause him trouble in Mesopotamia. After a brief pause in Aleppo Saladin's campaign commenced about the beginning of April¹. Active and successful operations occupied all the summer; but still Mosul itself remained unconquered. Whilst it was being attacked for the third time Saladin became seriously ill (October)². His death was actually reported in Aleppo. But by the end of February he was convalescent and envoys came from Mosul to make an agreement with him regarding the boundaries of his sultanate and that of 'Izz ed-din. On the 3rd of March (1186)³ the terms of a permanent treaty were definitely agreed to. On the 6th of April Saladin returned to Aleppo, completely restored to health, and on the 23rd of May he entered Damascus again⁴. The great popular rejoicings in both cities were evidence of the attachment of his subjects to their sovereign. No doubt Saladin's illness and recovery impressed him with a deeper sense than ever of his obligation to pursue the Latin war. It may then perhaps be put to his credit that he remained faithful to the terms of his treaty with the Latins of Jerusalem when their situation offered so favourable an opportunity for him to attack them. But no doubt he prepared for eventualities, especially after Raymond appealed to him for support. Probably the return of El-'adil to Egypt was directly connected with the plans he was now devising. Taqi ed-din seems to have proved himself less competent and was recalled⁵.

¹ Kem. Blochet 85=iv. 173 (cf. p. 236, n. 4); Beh. iii. 83 says he reached El-bira on the Euphrates on the 15th of April (12th Muharram 581).

² Particulars of the campaign are given by Beh. iii. 83 ff. The date Sha'ban 581 (commences 18th October) is given by Kem. Blochet 86=iv. 174. Beh. seems to date the illness not very long after 19th Jumada I, August 18th. If we may suppose here an error for 19th Jumada II, i.e. 27th September, the dates of the two sources nearly coincide and the Christian month may be given as October (Beh. iii. 85 says the heat was excessive).

³ 9th Dhu'l-hijja, Beh. iii. 86.

⁴ Beh. iii. 86, Makrizi ix. 18.

⁵ Beh. iii. 88. I.A. i. 671 states that Taqi ed-din did not get on well with Saladin's son to whom he was atabek and that Saladin came to suspect him of desiring independence. Taqi ed-din received Ilama and other dependencies. Aleppo was entrusted to El-malik ez-zahir, Saladin's son. I.A.'s statement (i. 673 f.) that

El-'adil's acceptance of office took place at Damascus in the end of July¹. When affairs were quiet in the north and war was imminent in Palestine a capable governor was more needed in Egypt than in Aleppo. El-'adil returned to his former province in the autumn of 1186².

When Guy became king after the death of Baldwin V the peace with Saladin was still in force. It was an important safeguard to the kingdom for it alone restrained the sultan from seeking to deal his adversaries a crushing blow. Yet powerful influences were at work against it in the ranks of the ruling party. The peace had been concluded by Raymond, who was now an enemy of the king. In the quarrel between Raymond and Guy the Moslems had taken a side and that against the established government. Thus the peace assumed the character of something personal to Raymond, and Guy stood already in an attitude hostile to the sultan. It is easy to understand the growing feeling of a party that war with the Moslems was natural and inevitable and that the peace was the act of a suspect and almost a traitor. Under these circumstances it was scarcely to be expected that the Latins would wait for the expiry of the four years' truce before resuming hostilities³. It was Reginald of Kerak in the spring of 1187 who finally ignored the treaty obligations by which he was bound. But the responsibility of this breach of faith has been too exclusively apportioned to Reginald himself. He may have been extreme in his views and just the man likely to precipitate the conflict. But he did not stand alone and his action may reasonably be

El-'adil was also suspected by the sultan and therefore removed from Aleppo in absentia, since he was given a still more important charge.

¹ Beginning of Jumada i, Beh. iii. 88.

² Beh. iii. 90. He left Aleppo in the early summer, on Saturday 24th Safar (Makrizi ix. 11) or 24th Rabi' i 583 (Beh. iii. 88) and reached Cairo after a prolonged stay in Damascus on the 5th of Ramadan (19th November 1186). It may be noted that in February 1186 Bohemond III of Antioch confirmed the transference of Marqab and Balanyas to the knights Hospitallers and again recognised their right to be joint parties in all treaties with the Moslems and to make separate treaties of their own (Leroux, Cartulaire i, no. 783=Pauli i. 77 ff.) Cf. Chap. IV, p. 191.

³ It has been assumed on the authority of Benedict i. 359 that Guy renewed peace for three years when he became king. But the date of renewal there given is Easter 1186 before Guy was king, and besides if the peace had been made for four years its term had not yet expired (see p. 236, n. 2).

viewed as the practical outcome of the feeling of a party. Reginald struck the first blow chiefly because he occupied the most favourable position for so doing.

His castles commanded the roads to Egypt and to Mekka and from them he had been accustomed to plunder the passing caravans. He was on good terms with the Arabs of the district¹ who acknowledged no allegiance to Saladin and paid little respect to the faith of Islam. There were no treaties binding them and it is not surprising that Reginald should have been tempted to emulate their depredations. It was probably early in March 1187² that a richly laden caravan at last provoked him beyond restraint. He seized the property it carried and imprisoned all its voyagers. Saladin, having addressed expostulations to him in vain, swore to put him to death if ever he made him captive. He decided forthwith to gather his armies in the Ḥauran. He started from Damascus about the end of March³ and busied himself with preparations at Ras el-ma. Throughout his dominions troops were summoned to join in the holy war. Meantime Reginald threatened to attack the pilgrims returning from Mekka, and Saladin moved towards Kerak to protect them. He encamped at Ḳṣr es-salama in the vicinity of Boṣra with a body of chosen troops until the pilgrims had passed in safety (beginning of May)⁴. Whilst waiting there he wasted the fields round Kerak and Shaubak; the wolf was aware that the lion was abroad and he dared not stir. The army of Egypt now approached and Saladin met it at Ḳaryetain. Shortly afterwards he stationed himself at Tell 'ashtera (27th May)⁵. Already news had reached him that

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 259.

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 259 says that after the news Saladin remained in Damascus to the end of the year 582 (ends 12th March). This implies that Reginald's attack took place before the 12th of March. Beh. iii. 91 says that Saladin at the beginning of Muḥarram 583 decided to leave Damascus to undertake military preparations and that he left about the middle of the month (27th March). It may be inferred that it was the news of Reginald's action that led to the sultan's decision.

³ Beh. iii. 91 (as in note 2) and Kenn. Blochet 88 f. = iv. 176 f. 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 261 gives Saturday 1st Muḥarram (14th March) and so Maḳrīzī as quoted by Blochet 89 = iv. 177, note 1. The origin of this date is clear from Beh. (see note 2).

⁴ End of Ṣafar, which ends on May 10th, 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 261.

⁵ 17th Rabi' i (Beh. iii. 91); most of the particulars in what precedes are from 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 261 f. Ḳaryetain is probably Ḳurnā (Clermont Ganneau in *Revue Biblique* 1906, p. 467 f.).

the first blow in the campaign had been struck. The troops gathered in the Hauran had been raiding Palestine in bands¹ and one of these had gained an exceptionally important victory.

While Saladin thus made his preparations the Latins were not idle. They realised the seriousness of the attack which threatened them. Raymond hung aloof in his castle of Tiberias but the king saw the need of securing his help and a deputation of leading nobles was sent to beg him to lay aside his anger. It so happened that on the very day of their journey a plundering expedition crossed the Jordan from the Hauran (Friday 1st of May)²: The knights heard of this at El-fula in the plain of Ibn 'Ammar where they spent Thursday night³. They hastily summoned all the soldiers they could gather in the neighbourhood, and having collected a force of about one hundred to one hundred and forty knights and from three to four hundred foot-soldiers⁴ they attacked the enemy near Şaffuriya⁵. The Moslems, being probably much superior in numbers, gained a victory in which many of the knights were slain and most of the survivors were taken prisoners. The incident encouraged the one side as much as it alarmed the other. It may have influenced Raymond to lay aside his feud with the king. A reconciliation took place and all the forces of the kingdom assembled at Şaffuriya. But the leaders were still divided. Real harmony and mutual confidence are not to be restored in the course of a few days.

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 262.

² Ernoul 148, Benedict ii. 21, and *De expugnatione* 217; similarly I.A. i. 678 (end of Šafar 583, ends 10th May). Ernoul represents the expedition as sent with the cognisance of Raymond, who imposed the condition that it should be for one day only. Probably Raymond's territory was spared, but the expedition was one of a number ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 262). Michaud dates it wrongly and makes it a breach of treaty on Saladin's part.

³ Ernoul 148. *De expugnatione* 210 f. shows that the Moslems crossed the Jordan on Thursday night or very early on Friday morning. But the author is presumably in error in saying that the deputation spent the night at Nazareth (cf. Ernoul).

⁴ *De expugnatione* 213 gives about 130 knights and 300-400 foot-soldiers. Other authorities vary slightly.

⁵ 'Imad ed-din, I.A. and Benedict ii. 21. *De expugnatione* mentions the valley of Şaffuriya as the camping-ground of a part of the Moslem force, but the scene of the battle is not definitely named (p. 213). Ernoul locates it two leagues past Nazareth on the way to Tiberias beside the fountain of "Cresson," Gesta 12 at "castr Robert" (i.e. Kafr kenna) near Nazareth.

Raymond was suspected of being secretly in league with the Moslems. The suspicion was unjust but the results were fatal¹.

Tell 'ashtera, where Saladin's troops now assembled, lies a short distance west of the haj road, on the way into Palestine by the south of lake Tiberias². The last arrivals were the troops of Aleppo and Mosul, which had been delayed by operations which they were ordered to undertake in the beginning of April³. They had been engaged in movements against Antioch and against the Armenians of Cilicia. These movements are explained in part by Saladin's desire to prevent the north from contributing to the defence of the south and in part by the recent death of Rupen of Armenia⁴. In the beginning of June however Taqi ed-din received orders to make peace and he did so. In the third week of June⁵ he reached Tell 'ashtera and was welcomed with much satisfaction, for the army was now ready to advance. On the 24th⁶ a council of the emirs was held and their decision was to invade Jerusalem. On the same day a grand review of the troops took place; the number of those raised by levy, the regular troops, was 12,000⁷, and the auxiliaries numbered perhaps as many more⁸. Two days later the camp was broken up; it was a Friday and the hour was the hour of prayer (26th June)⁹. According to Saladin's pious custom his most important undertakings were begun on the day of worship at the hour of prayer. On Saturday he crossed the Jordan just south of lake Tiberias and fixed his base not far from the river

¹ Wilken, *Ilk.* iv. note 28, thinks the suspicions were justified.

² Due east of lake Tiberias and north-west of El-muzerli.

³ End of Muharram 583 (*Kem. Blochet* 89=iv. 177). Beh. quoted by A.S. iv. 281 gives 9th Safar, 10th April, as the date of their leaving Aleppo for their northern campaign.

⁴ Both are suggested by Beh. The text of *Recueil* iii. 91 is in error. The attack was against Antioch and the territories of Armenia as Beh.'s text in A.S. iv. 281 shows. Cf. *Kem. Blochet* 89=iv. 177. Rupen is spoken of by Beh. as Ibn Laun, the son of Leo; he was succeeded by his brother Leo the Great (1187-1199), whom Beh. calls his nephew.

⁵ Beh. iii. 91.

⁶ 15th Rabi' ii, Beh. in A.S. iv. 281.

⁷ I.A. i. 679 ("horsemen"); 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 263 ("fully armed," i.e. regulars).

⁸ The lowest total given by western sources is 25,000 and may be approximately correct. The highest appears to be 700,000!

⁹ Friday 17th Rabi' ii, Beh. iii. 91 f.

banks (at Uḫḫuwana or Eṣ-ḡannabra¹). A day or two passed and the Latins still remained at Ṣaffuriya. Then Saladin moved his actual fighting force to Kafr sabt and from there his skirmishers endeavoured to provoke the Latins to an engagement during the two following days². Still they made no movement, so another plan was tried. On Thursday the 2nd of July Saladin left the main part of his army on the plateau west of Tiberias which he had chosen for his battleground, and towards evening he descended to attack Tiberias itself with a body of chosen troops³. An hour's vigorous assault sufficed for the capture of the town; Raymond's wife and the little garrison retreated into the citadel. But Saladin had already accomplished his purpose.

That very night a council of war was held at Ṣaffuriya in which two policies were discussed. Raymond was for remaining on the defensive, Reginald and the Master of the Temple urged attack. Raymond's view was that the Moslems could do no permanent injury and would soon retreat as they had done before. If they did attack the Latins at Ṣaffuriya they would do so at a disadvantage, away from their base and distressed by scarcity of water. Let them take Tiberias, the loss was his and he would suffer it gladly for the sake of the country; the town could be recovered afterwards. As for the policy of attack the

¹ 'Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 286, 'Imad ed-din iv. 263, and I.A. i. 679 give the former, Beh. iii. 93 the latter.

² The narrative here follows 'Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 286. Beh. iii. 93 agrees and says that the day of the movement to the "plateau on the hills west of Tiberias" was Wednesday July 1st (Recueil 30th June, which is the calendar date of 21st Rabi' II). As however his identification of the following days is in error it may be that the day of this movement was Tuesday. 'Imad ed-din iv. 263 and I.A. i. 681 say that Saladin continued all the time (five days) at Uḫḫuwana. In fact his headquarters remained there ('Abd-alla). But 'Imad ed-din iv. 264 represents Saladin as daily attacking the Latins and this may imply that he was posted nearer to them than at Uḫḫuwana.

³ Beh., 'Imad ed-din and I.A. all make the character of this movement clear. As to the date the authorities are De expugnacione 220 (Thursday 2nd July) and I.A. i. 681 (Thursday 23rd Rabi' II 583). Cf. Kem. Blochet 90=iv. 178. Regarding 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 265 see p. 245, n. 5. 'Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 287 and Ernoul 158 name the day, Thursday; Beh. has no date. I.A. alone mentions that the attack was in the evening; the time when the news reached the Latins (De expugnacione 221, Ernoul 158) agrees with this. Kem. Blochet 90=iv. 178 says Tiberias was captured at one o'clock on [Friday] morning.

numbers of the enemy made it dangerous, and particularly the difficulty of obtaining water between Šaffuriya and Tiberias¹. The arguments were weighty and they commended themselves to a large majority of the assembled barons. When the council broke up towards midnight it was supposed that Raymond had persuaded the king to follow his advice. But the Master of the Temple and Reginald of Kerak were of another mind and they had special influence with the king. By all three Raymond was suspected of treachery, the Latin army was stronger than at any time in recent years² and as for the numbers of the enemy Reginald contemptuously said: "much wood does not hurt the fire³." Before Guy retired to rest his consent to advance was won and next morning he gave the necessary orders without further consulting anyone.

The opposing armies met in the morning two or three hours after sunrise⁴. Saladin awaited the Latins on the hills above Tiberias, on the ground he had already chosen. Once more it was the Moslem day of prayer and worship, Friday the 3rd of July⁵. The history of the first day's fight is simple. The

¹ His arguments are given by De expugnacione 221 f., Ernoul 159 f. and I.A. i. 682. Possibly the stress laid by the two former on the argument from the want of water has been coloured *post eventum* by the actual experiences of the Latins. 'Imad ed-din iv. 265 is presumably in error in supposing that Raymond urged advance. But the same statement is made in a Genoese letter to the Pope which is one of the earliest accounts of the battle (Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde xlii. 278).

² Probably therefore it was at least 20,000 strong. The lowest figure known to Alm Shama is 25,000. The estimate of It. Ric. 17 (MSS. A.G. in note 7) is more than 1000 knights and more than 20,000 foot-soldiers; that of the De expugnacione (p. 218) 1200 knights, more than 18,000 foot-soldiers and very many Turkopoles.

³ If the words are not authentic they still admirably express Reginald's spirit. They are reported by Ibn el-atbir and may come from a good source.

⁴ The news of the Latin advance reached the Moslems at the hour of morning prayer, i.e. just before sunrise ('Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 287).

⁵ Quite explicit for Friday are 'Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 287, Ernoul 168 and De expugnacione 222 (Friday 3rd July). 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 265, Cairo ii. 76, line 29, if he does not refer to Saladin's attack on Tiberias, makes the advance of the Latins take place on Thursday. But the same passage as given by Landberg, p. 23, with some textual variations, gives the date as Friday 14th Rabi' ii. (In any case 13th Rabi' ii and 14th Rabi' ii are textual errors for the 23rd and 24th respectively.) Beha ed-din sets the advance and the battle both on Thursday. It may be noted as a possible indication of the use of different sources that Beha's month date (22nd Rabi' ii) does not agree with his earlier reckoning of the dates of this month, according to which it would denote Wednesday, 21st July, but with the date quoted

purpose of the Latins was to cut their way through to Tiberias and in this they failed. As they advanced they were completely enveloped by the Moslem army¹. In spite of every effort their advance gradually came to a stand. The decisive factors no doubt were the excessive heat of a July day and the almost entire lack of water. Evening fell without a definite result having been reached but the issue was no longer doubtful. Both parties camped as they had fought², the Latins being so hemmed in that a cat could not have escaped through the Moslem lines³. The Latin soldiers were tired and dispirited, Saladin's troops were exultant and confident of victory. On the one side the hours of darkness passed wearily, on the other the triumphant repetition of the great watchword of Islam seldom died away; "God is great, God is great, there is no god but God" sounded again and again through the stillness of the night. "Malik was watching and Ridwan rejoiced⁴." Next morning the battle was not long continued. Saladin pressed the attack with vigorous decision. The Latins were already beaten and exhausted men. Their foot and horse, which should have protected one another, parted company⁵. The infantry retreated up the hill side almost overpowered by thirst. The horsemen were completely exposed to the arrows of the enemy, who closed round both divisions of the army. At this point⁶ Raymond and his soldiers cut their way through and escaped. It is quite unlikely that his recent allies even favoured his escape⁷. Most of the other leaders now drew back on the hill of Hattin (or Hittin). There the last

p. 244, n. 2 (Wednesday = 21st Rabi' ii). J.A. so runs the events of Thursday and Friday together that it is not possible to say what he assigns to each.

¹ 'Abd-alla in A.S. iv. 287.

² Beha ed-din (iii. 93) makes the battle next day take place on the outskirts of Lubyā; De expugnatione 223 calls the place where the advance was checked Marescalcin, which is obviously Ambrose's Mareschaucio (line 2565) for which Il. Ric. 14 has Marescallia.

³ Ernoul 168.

⁴ 'Imad ed-din; these are the angels of hell and of paradise respectively.

⁵ De expugnatione 224 f.

⁶ Before the grass was set on fire.

⁷ Of course this escape is made the occasion of fresh charges of treachery by later writers. But there is no support in the Arabic sources for their assertions. Raymond's share in the history ends at this point. He died within three months of the battle in Rujab 583, 6th September—5th October 1187 (Kem. Blochet 91 = iv. 179); cf. Benedict ii. 20 f., soon after the capture of Jerusalem (i.e. 2nd October 1187); Ralph de Diceto ii. 56 says 15 days after the capture of Jerusalem. For some time after his escape he

fight was fought round "the precious wood of the cross." The dry grass was set on fire by some unknown Moslem auxiliary. The smoke and fire completed the exhaustion of the Latins. They became like sheep given over to slaughter. The slain and the prisoners numbered thousands. The crusading colonies never recovered from the blow they received on this fatal day (Saturday 4th July 1187)¹.

Saladin's first care was to give thanks to God for his crowning victory. A large tent was pitched and there in the presence of the faithful he knelt down and returned thanks to "God all powerful and glorious who had made him sultan and given him power to do His will." Then the chief prisoners were brought in and seated for a short time beside him. Reginald was reproached for his treacherous conduct and defended himself by appealing to the customs of war. When refreshments were presented an ominous incident occurred. Guy handed Reginald the cup from which he had been drinking and Saladin at once said to him through the interpreter: "you did not receive permission from me to give him drink so it does not entitle him to his life from me." Saladin followed the Arab custom according to which a prisoner's life was safe after he had partaken of his captor's hospitality. For some time the sultan was occupied in making military arrangements. Then Reginald was summoned to a tent and Saladin himself put him to death as he had sworn. According to the barbarous custom of the time his head was cut off to serve as a trophy. His body was shown to the king and then thrown out². Of the other captives the more important were made prisoners of state while the rank and file were left at

remained in Tyre (letter in *Hist. Patr. Alex.* as quoted in *Rev. Or. Lat.* ix. 27); nothing else is recorded of him in the interval. For his successor see p. 298.

¹ Saturday 25th Rabi' ii ('Imad ed-din iv. 268, I.A. i. 683). Cf. Kern. Blochet 90=lv. 178 who dates the second day's battle five days before the end of Rabi' ii (in line 25 "jeudi" is obviously due to an error in the Arabic text or too misprint; cf. line 10). I.A. has no clear description of the events of Friday. Beh. describes two days' battle and expressly names Thursday and Friday as days on which there was fighting (iii. 93). His narrative might be understood to imply that the battle ended on the day following Friday, but more probably he so elaborates his description of the two days' fighting that it appears to cover three days.

² The account follows 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 273 f. as probably the most exact. Beh. and I.A. represent the execution as taking place in Guy's presence. Beh. says Reginald was offered his life if he would become a Moslem.

the disposal of their captors. An exception was made in the case of the knights of the Temple and of the Hospital. They were publicly executed in the presence of the army on the Monday after the battle. About two hundred were put to death in this way¹. The fact itself is indisputable but the explanation of it is obscure. The act may be regarded as almost the only blot on Saladin's fair name, and yet of course the lives of all the captives were forfeit, according to the custom of the time, and Saladin had given no pledge to spare them.

The defeat of the Latins at Hattin was the preface to what can only be described as the utter collapse of the kingdom of Jerusalem. With startling rapidity all Palestine excepting only the border castles fell into the victor's hands. Before the end of the year every important town in the kingdom, with the one exception of Tyre, was occupied by Saladin's troops. From July to October Saladin swiftly moves from conquest to conquest. Never was his energy more signally displayed nor more triumphantly rewarded. In the explanation of the events of these months Saladin's genius must receive a foremost place. He saw his opportunity, he knew how to use it and he devoted himself untiringly to the work. Therein lies the achievement of every great leader. But the utter failure of the Latins to offer any measure of resistance has a particular explanation. The whole army of Jerusalem was destroyed at a single blow on the field of Hattin. Not only so, every town and castle had been denuded of its best defenders and the troops that were left had lost their leaders. Thus the Latins were without an army, without adequate garrisons and without their natural leaders, and all was the result of the same fatal day. No wonder there is yet more to add. A mood of despair, which had long been gathering, descended on them for a time with paralysing force. Their army was lost, their king was a prisoner, but worst of all their God for their sins had forsaken them. The cross, their pledge of victory, was taken away. They were unworthy to possess it for they had

¹ 'Imad ed-din, an eye-witness, is the principal authority (quoted in A.S. iv. 277). L.A. i. 688 gives the same number and seems to follow him. Others of the two orders seem afterwards to have been put to death but the Master of the Temple was spared ('Imad ed-din iv. 278). For the statements of other sources regarding the number executed see Röhricht 441, note 10.

lost their faith in the Saviour who was crucified upon it. "O precious wood and sweet, sprinkled and washed by the blood of the Son of God! O kindly cross upon which our salvation hung, by which the handwriting of death is blotted out and the life that was lost in Adam is restored! Whither shall I now betake myself to live when the tree of life is taken away?" So one laments who shared in the misfortunes of the time¹.

To understand the significance of the battle of Hattin and the energy which Saladin displayed in following up the advantage of his initial victory it is only necessary to trace his progress from day to day in the weeks that follow. On Sunday the 5th of July, the day after the battle, Saladin re-entered Tiberias. Not a blow was now required to secure the surrender of its formidable castle. Here Saladin swiftly made his plans. Clearly he judged that the towns on the coast should be the first objects of his attack. They were the most important, for Jerusalem alone of the inland towns was of equal size; they were besides most accessible to help from Europe and most valuable for securing communication with Egypt. The nearest to Saladin at present was 'Akka, just across the great plain by which it was easily approached. For this town he set out on Tuesday; on Wednesday he was encamped before the walls; on Thursday the terms of surrender were arranged; and on Friday, most auspicious of all days through the whole campaign, the Moslem banners floated over the town (Friday, 10th July)². According to the terms of surrender the inhabitants were allowed to depart unmolested or, if they chose, to remain dwellers in the city subject to the usual tax. Those who departed forfeited their houses and all fixed property and probably also provisions, arms, and beasts of burden, which were confiscated as contraband of war throughout the campaign. But all other movable property might be taken away. This was the price Saladin was willing to pay for the speedy surrender of the towns he attacked. The terrified inhabitants of 'Akka fled, nevertheless, leaving a rich booty behind for the Moslem soldiers. They counted loss of property a small

¹ De expugnatione 226 f.

² In the Arabic historians generally referred to as 1st Jumada i, calendar date 9th July, in Makrizi ix. 24 f. called 2nd Jumada i.

sacrifice to make for their lives and they did not yet realise how safe they were when Saladin's word was pledged.

All the smaller towns on the coast just south of 'Akka', and all those south and north of the great plain¹ now eagerly accepted the same terms. Detachments of troops were sent out in every direction to demand and accept surrenders. The land is so small that all central Palestine is within a day's ride of 'Akka and all was occupied within a week. The country population was principally Moslem and welcomed the banners of the faithful. But even strongholds like the castle of the Templars at El-sula surrendered. El-'adil's troops advanced from Egypt into south-western Palestine and began the occupation of the country there. Castles as far nway as Safed and Kaukab were invested. 'Imad ed-din piously inscribed "God's own words" as the heading of a letter describing the progress of the conquest²; "we have written in the psalms...behold the land (earth) is the heritage of my righteous servants³."

If Saladin was previously in any doubt the fall of 'Akka and the eventful week that followed must have shown him clearly the opportunity that was now before him. Truly the land seemed given to him as he walked "in the path of God." He moved northward to attack the great cities and fortresses on the coast. His energy and judgment were rewarded. At the end of three weeks more only Tyre of all the towns as far as Jubail remained in the hands of the infidel⁴. Two short sieges of seven

¹ Haifa, Kābariyya (Caesarea) and Arsuf.

² Nablus, Sebastiya, Naṣara (Nazareth), Ṣaffuriyya; also the castle of Iskanderan on the coast between 'Akka and Tyre. Some western writers put the occupation of certain of these before the capture of 'Akka, but the Arabic sources are unanimous.

³ Jaffa was the principal capture ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 300; Georgens 74 translates wrongly). Cf. also A.S. iv. 301 f.

⁴ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 304.

⁵ Koran xxi. 105.

⁶ The chronicle is as follows: left 'Akka 16th July, reached castle of Tibnin Sunday 19th (Sunday 11th Jumada I in 'Imad ed-din 37 (A.S. iv. 306) and I.A. I. 692; Sunday 12th Jumada I in Beh. iii. 98), took possession on Sunday the 26th (all authorities); Sarafand (Sarepta) and Sidon surrender in turn, the latter on the 29th of July (Wednesday 21st Jumada I in I.A. I. 692 and Beh. quoted A.S. iv. 307; Wednesday 20th Jumada I in Kem. Blochet 94=iv. 182); Beirut after seven days siege was captured on Thursday August 6th (29th Jumada I in I.A. I. 693, Beh. iii. 98 and 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 308; 27th Jumada I in Kem. Blochet 94=iv. 182; a Thursday according to 'Imad ed-din); during this siege Jubail surrendered on condition that its lord, who had been captured at Haffin, should be released.

days each had been sufficient to overcome the resistance he met with. Tyre was differently situated from all its neighbours. It was in itself the most important of them all and the liberated populations of the conquered towns crowded into it and added to its strength. But above all it had found a leader to defend it. Just after the capture of 'Akka' a crusading ship came sailing towards the harbour. Those on board missed the welcome of the Christian bells and observed the altered dress of those on shore. Being thus warned they kept away from land, learned what had occurred and made for Tyre. So Conrad of Montferrat landed there. He had ability and wealth and soldiers. He put new heart into the defenders of Tyre and was readily accepted as their leader. Saladin passed him by as he marched from 'Akka northwards and on his return south he simply left troops to watch the town¹. His reasons are clear. It was his policy to make such conquests as were plainly within his grasp. Delay, and still more failure at any point, might lead to reaction. Ascalon and Jerusalem were now to be attacked and he prepared to co-operate with the Egyptian troops of El-'adil². First he sent to Damascus for the king and the Master of the Temple and discussed with them the surrender of certain towns as the condition of their release. They accompanied him southward³. El-'adil had already commenced the conquest of the south and other places were now occupied before siege was laid to Ascalon. But even the bride of Syria, which had been defended for seven months in 1153, surrendered after only a brief resistance. The attack began on the 23rd of August⁴, on the 4th of September terms were arranged⁵ and next day⁶ the yellow banner of the

¹ According to William of Newburgh l. 262 three days after the surrender, i.e. on 13th July.

² Of the writers 'Imad ed-din, I.A. and Beh. only the last named countenances in the slightest the view that Saladin actually attacked Tyre. It is unlikely that the sultan himself did more than rest a night in its neighbourhood on his way south.

³ I.A. l. 696. So De expugnatione 236.

⁴ 'Imad ed-din iv. 312, I.A. l. 696.

⁵ Sunday 16th Jumada ii (I.A. l. 696, 'Imad ed-din iv. 312 and Beh. quoted by Ibn Kh. iv. 518). Beh. iii. 99 incorrectly reads 16th Jumada ii and Kem. Blochet 94=iv. 182 contains a double textual error (Sunday 16th Jumada i).

⁶ De expugnatione 238; Gestas 13 calls this the day of the surrender.

⁷ Saturday, last day of Jumada ii, i.e. 5th September ('Imad ed-din iv. 312 and Beh. in Ibn Kh. iv. 518); similarly I.A. and De expugnatione 238.

sultan was hoisted in the town. Guy himself had urged the citizens to surrender for the sake of his own release.¹ Saladin granted the same favourable terms as to other places and promised besides that Guy and some other captives should be set at liberty². The king was not to obtain his freedom immediately but at a future specified date which the sources leave uncertain³. He was actually released in July of the following year⁴. Many of the inhabitants of Ascalon left for Jerusalem. Only a fortnight was now required for the occupation of all the south and the south-west of Palestine. There were several strong Templar castles on the exposed Egyptian border. These surrendered on condition that the Master of the Temple should be released. He was probably set at liberty about the same time as Guy.

At last the way was open for an advance on Jerusalem. Again an army of true believers marched to deliver the holy city from the hands of infidels. The same feelings of religious privilege and duty, the same devotion and high confidence animated the followers of the prophet as those which 88 years before had inspired the soldiers of the cross. In the glowing words of the Moslem historian Jerusalem was to them "the holy city where stood the throne of Solomon and the temple of David, the object of pilgrimage and the place of prayer, where the Prophet ascended to heaven and where men will be gathered on the day of resurrection."

It was the 20th of September when Saladin's army approached the walls. For some days his attack was from the west and made no impression. On the 25th he planted his siege engines on the north side where the wall was weaker. Soon a breach was made and the garrison sent out envoys to ask for terms of surrender. But Saladin declared⁵ that Jerusalem should not

¹ I.A. I. 696 f. (names only Guy and the Master of the Temple), II. Ric. 20 (Guy with fifteen others), Ernoul 184 f. (Guy with ten whom he should choose), De expugnatione 238 (Guy with fourteen others). 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 313 refers vaguely to Guy's release being a condition.

² 'Imad ed-din iv. 331 refers to it as having been postponed without naming the date. Ernoul puts it at the end of March. II. Ric. says that the agreement was for immediate release but that Saladin did not observe the terms granted. Ambrose 2607 ff. ignores the interval between the agreement and the release but does not completely exclude its existence.

³ See page 257.

⁴ I.A.

receive the favourable conditions granted to other towns¹. The scenes of blood which had marked the crusaders' conquest were well remembered. Saladin threatened to take vengeance now for the pitiless massacre by the Christian host. It was only when Balian, the stout lord of Nablus, announced what the defenders were then resolved to do that Saladin relented. He did not desire to see the sacred places ruined, everything of value destroyed and a slaughter by the defenders themselves of every woman and child to prevent them falling into his hands. Policy and humanity counselled moderation and Saladin was well endowed with both. Sums were fixed as the amount of ransom to be paid for each man, woman and child respectively. Thirty thousand pieces of gold were accepted in composition for a specified number of poor². With the exception that this ransom had to be paid permission was given as in other cases for the removal of all property. Even the treasures of the churches were stripped and carried away by the orders of the patriarch. When Saladin's chancellor protested to him he proudly replied that he would not gainsay the Christian interpretation of the agreement; he would not have his word thought untrustworthy. It was Friday 2nd October 1187 when the exodus from the town began and the Moslems took possession. The sacred buildings were purified and restored. The crosses and the bells were cast down. 'Imad ed-din claims to have written seventy letters on the following day announcing the happy news³. Men thanked God and hastened to pay their vows in the city which had so

¹ It seems possible, however, that twice already he had actually offered them terms, once when Ascalon was taken (Ernoul 185 f.), and again when he pitched his camp before the city (Ernoul 112). These offers are consistent with Saladin's policy throughout this whole period but nothing is said of them in the Arabic sources.

² Ernoul 213 says 7000 and the number is decisively confirmed by a letter of Saladin's in the Hist. Patr. Alex. (quoted Blochet, Rev. Or. Lat. ix. 31). Two women and ten children were however each reckoned one, and the total number set free seems to have been increased by the release of some without payment (Ernoul 227 f.). 'Imad ed-din iv. 329 simply says that the payment was "for the poor" (followed by I.A. I. 702). He says however that 18,000 were actually released and that these were not all who might have got their liberty under the agreement (iv. 340); 15,000 remained captives and were distributed as slaves. 'Imad ed-din himself received some women and children as his share (iv. 339). Ernoul 229 says that 11,000 were left over without being ransomed.

³ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 335, Goergens 86.

long been under the yoke. The town filled rapidly. On the following Friday (9th October)¹ divine service was celebrated once more according to the Moslem rite in the mosque of El-aḡṣa and prayers were said under the famous dome of the rock, built by the caliph 'Omar. It was a memorable day for the assembled worshippers. The ḡaḡl of Aleppo, Muḡi ed-dīn Muḡammed ibn Zakḡl ed-dīn, was the preacher at El-aḡṣa. A report of his sermon on the occasion is still preserved².

For six weeks after the capture of Jerusalem there was a pause in the military operations. The campaign had been arduous and there were questions of organisation which demanded attention and settlement. The evacuation of Jerusalem by the Latins occupied time. Forty days were allowed for the payment of the ransom³. Considerable numbers were permitted to leave without any payment, others escaped by bribing the officials or by other means⁴. Saladin showed himself magnanimous far beyond the practice of the princes of his time and beyond even its ideals. The Latins were protected by an escort of troops on their way to the Christian towns. The women and the children were more kindly treated by Saladin than by their Christian brothers. Conrad would not cumber himself and weaken his power of defence by receiving them in Tyre. The Italian ships in Alexandria refused to take home the fugitives except for payment until they were compelled to do so by the Moslems.

Saladin left Jerusalem on the 30th of October with the intention of besieging Tyre. He took up his position near the town on the 12th of November. The siege actually commenced on the 25th. The interval was spent in waiting for siege engines and for the arrival of fresh troops from Aleppo. Tyre was probably the best fortified town in Syria and the defence was brave and skilful. The blockade of the harbour proved to be the weakest part of the Moslem investment. Ten ships watched

¹ So 'Imad ed-dīn, I.A. and Kern. Friday the day of the capture (2nd October), given by Beh. iii. 101, is inaccurate and is explicitly corrected by A.S. iv. 319.

² Ibn Kh. ii. 636f. Muḡi ed-dīn was afterwards ḡaḡl of Damascus. A brief account of his life is given by Ibn Kh. ii. 633 ff. It is said that when Saladin captured Aleppo in June 1183 Muḡi ed-dīn composed a poem in which he predicted that the capture of Jerusalem would take place in the month of Rajab (as it actually did).

³ 'Imad ed-dīn iv. 319; De expugnatione 148; Ernout 223.

⁴ 'Imad ed-dīn iv. 330f.

the entrance to the port¹. Five only it seems were on duty on the night of the 29th December². In the early morning, about dawn, their crews were surprised asleep by the Latin ships. One Moslem vessel alone escaped³. The rest were captured or sunk or run ashore. Saladin would have persevered in the siege but his troops did not respond to his wishes. The emirs were weary of the campaign, they were discouraged by the resistance of the town, and it was the season when universal custom suspended military operations. Besides it was true that without a blockading squadron success was impossible. Three days later the camp was broken up⁴. Saladin retired reluctantly, knowing better than others the measure of his failure. But he could not tell that he was never to resume the siege.

There need not be any hesitation in saying that Saladin's own policy and plan of campaign were largely responsible for his failure to capture Tyre. He had consistently released his prisoners and allowed the garrisons and inhabitants of the captured towns to go free. For the most part they simply reassembled in Tyre. In this way the Latin power was concentrated in one of the most advantageous positions it could occupy. The policy which so resulted has been sharply criticised by modern and by older historians. Saladin's error, if he erred at all, did not consist simply in the postponement of the attack on Tyre. Granting that an earlier attack would have had more chance of success, and supposing Tyre could have been captured, some other city, such as Ascalon, would still have played the part of Tyre. The essential matter to be considered, therefore, is the policy of releasing captives in exchange for the surrender of towns and

¹ 'Imad ed-din iv. 343, I.A. l. 708; Ernoul gives the number as fourteen (pp. 237 and 247).

² According to the Arabic reckoning the night of December 30th, 27th Shawal (Beh. iii. 103); It. Rile. 14.

³ 'Imad ed-din iv. 343. Ernoul 241 f. gives a detailed narrative which leaves an impression of accuracy although differing somewhat from the Arabic account followed in the text above. He says five ships were captured, seven were run ashore and two escaped to Beirut.

⁴ Ernoul 243 f. (the engines were burned on the evening of January 1st; Saladin was in the neighbourhood until next day). I.A. l. 711 and 'Imad ed-din iv. 344 give the last day of Shawal (January 1st), Beh. iii. 103 and Kem. Blochel 96 = iv. 184 give 2nd Dhu'l-ka'da (calendar date January 3rd).

castles. What this accomplished must not be forgotten. Practically the whole country except Tyre was gained within a few months. Would any other policy have gained as much? Military operations would certainly have prolonged the struggle and the risk of a check and a turn of the tide long before the end was considerable. Saladin deliberately persisted in his policy long after it was clear what the result must be. That in itself forbids any rash condemnation of it. Besides we may easily exaggerate the influence which the failure to capture Tyre exercised on the course of events. The determining factor in the contest was the intervention of the west. The issue of the struggle between Saladin and the third crusade was little affected by the fact that Tyre was a Latin stronghold when the crusaders landed. It was of vital consequence that almost the whole country was in Saladin's possession and this result was largely due to the policy which he adopted.

January and February 1188 were spent for the most part in 'Akka. The fortifications were strengthened and increased. The two following months were spent in seeking to bring to a conclusion the siege of the Hospitaller castle of Kawkab el-hawa, the star of the air. At the end of 1187 the frontier castles of Jerusalem, as well as Tyre, still resisted the Moslems. During all his movements Saladin kept troops round them. Hunain was captured on the 26th of December¹, before the siege of Tyre was raised. Of those remaining Kawkab was specially noxious, for it commanded the direct approach from the Hauran to the plain of Ibn 'Ammar. Its garrison, too, had been emboldened by some success gained over its besiegers. Hence no doubt Saladin's resolve to superintend the siege in person. It was still in progress, however, when spring called him away to prepare for a new campaign. Antioch and Tripolis presented a wider field of enterprise than the fragments of the Latin power in the south. Saladin entered Damascus on the 5th of May; five days later his departure was hastened by a rumour that Jubail was in danger². At once he set out to the rescue; the

¹ Beh. iii. 102 (13rd Shawal).

² Beh. iii. 105, also quoted by A.S. iv. 349. I.A. i. 716 says loosely that Saladin left Damascus in the middle of Rabi' i (hence Recueil has too exactly 15th May).

Latins were actually moving but they retired as he approached. A fortnight or more was now spent in the neighbourhood of Homs, waiting the first arrivals of the troops which were to take part in the summer campaign. On the 30th of May the sultan pitched his camp east of Hışn el-akrad on the borders of Tripolis. El-'adil remained in Palestine to watch over Mnslem interests there. He took up his position at Tibnin so as to hold the Latins of Tyre in check¹.

During the ninth of June Saladin's headquarters were stationary. His operations were directed against the towns and castles of Tripolis. Probably his forces were not large; at any rate nothing permanent was accomplished. The country was ravaged and the Latins did not dare to stir from their strongholds. But not one capture seems to have been made. The little state of Tripolis suffered least of all from the catastrophe of the Latin power².

It was in June 1188 that Beha ed-din, Saladin's future biographer, entered his service. Throughout the remainder of the summer he and 'Imad ed-din were both in the sultan's camp. About the end of the month Saladin gave orders that Guy should be brought from Damascus previous to his being set at liberty. His release took place at Anşartus in the first week of July³. It is said that Saladin unwarrantably imposed upon him the fresh condition⁴ that he should leave the country and not again take up arms against his captor. The promise was actually made although Guy, whatever his excuse, did not observe it. Queen Sybil had been in Tripolis for some time and there her husband joined her. Conrad refused to give up

¹ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 381.

² 'Imad ed-din iv. 392. Even Hışn el-akrad was not regularly besieged (Beh. iii. 107). There were two organised raids through the county (Beh. iii. 107; cf. 'Imad ed-din iv. 352).

³ The date is determined by the fact that Saladin was beside Anşartus from the 3rd to the 11th July (p. 258, n. 1). The place of the release is given by Ernoul 252 and Kem. Blochet 105=iv. 193 (cf. also Ambrose 363). Beh. iii. 121f. may be understood to the same effect, but the Arabic sentence is awkward and there may be some error in the Recueil text. The French translation is certainly inaccurate. It. Ric. 25 wrongly puts the release about the beginning of May.

⁴ It. Ric. 20 and 25; Ernoul 252f. says only that the knights released with the king swore not to take arms against Saladin; Ambrose expressly adds that Guy was afterwards released from his promise.

Tyre on the ground that he had saved it and was entitled to be its lord. Guy was powerless to enforce his claims and meantime remained in Tripolis.

The summer campaign really commenced when the camp at Ḥiṣn el-nkrad broke up on the 1st of July. The wonderful record of the previous year now finds a parallel in Saladin's achievements against the towns and castles of Antioch. The immediate surrender of towns like Jabala and Laodicea may be accounted for by the impression which had been produced by the events of last summer and by the presence of disaffected elements in the population, Moslem and native Christian. After the surrender of Laodicea no large town was attacked. There were actually none in Antioch except the capital itself. But two months were spent in an unbroken series of operations against its strong castles and towers. Saladin's ability in the conduct of siege operations and the skill of his engineers must not be ignored. But some surrenders at least were made from mere faintheartedness when the prospects of the Moslems were by no means bright. The longest siege lasted less than a fortnight. In addition to Anṭarṭus, Jabala and Laodicea, some ten fortresses or castles were taken from the Latins. The last was Bağras, which surrendered on the 26th of September¹.

¹ The chronicle is as follows: the camp broke up on July 1st. Anṭarṭus was besieged 3rd-11th July; it was plundered, ruined and set on fire but one of its towers held out. Marakīya was not defended (I.A. i. 718 and 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 356; see below). The Hospitaller castle of Marḳob was passed by. Jalma was occupied on July 16th. Bīkīrīyīn, a castle in the hills, had been taken from the Latins some years previously by the mountaineers themselves. Its occupation by Saladin now opened communication across the hills to Hama. Laodicea surrendered without a siege, the town on Thursday July 21st (A.S. iv. 359 quoting Beh. has the textual error 14th Jumada I for 24th Jumada i), the two or three castles which were its protection on the following Saturday. During the next two months the castles of Antioch were occupied with or without a siege one after another in unbroken succession as follows: Şahyun (besieged 26th-29th July, a Friday), 'Id or 'Aid (Saturday), Fiha (Beh.) or Jamahiriyyīn ('Imad ed-din, Sunday), Balatunna (Monday), Bakas (besieged 2nd-8th August), Şuḡr (12th August), Sarmaniya (19th August), Barzaya (besieged 20th-22nd August), Darḥassak (besieged according to I.A. 8th-19th Rajab, 2nd-13th September, according to Beh., after correcting Friday 18th Rajab into Friday 8th, 2nd-16th September, i.e. 8th-22nd Rajab), Bağras (26th September). According to a letter of Saladin's in the Hist. Patr. Alex. (Rev. Or. Lat. ix. 36) Marakīya was captured by assault on Tuesday 27th Jumada ii 584 (23rd August 1188). It is difficult to reconcile such a statement with those of I.A. and 'Imad ed-din. It appears to imply that the castle was invested and captured whilst Saladin was

All this time Bohemond of Antioch did not make a single movement. His inaction hastened the surrender of some castles, at least, which would have prolonged their resistance if he had given them any expectation of relief. At the end of September it seemed likely that Antioch itself would be besieged. Bohemond then sent envoys asking for a truce. Saladin agreed on the condition that all Moslem prisoners should be released. He knew how strong Antioch was and his army was again tired and anxious to disperse. It was arranged that the truce should last until the end of the following May. It is said to have been agreed that Antioch should then surrender unless help had previously arrived from Europe. The condition could not be of much importance in the eyes of anyone¹. Bohemond would certainly not surrender without resistance and of course crusaders from the west were sure to come, and actually did so.

But Saladin's own energy was not exhausted. He proceeded, indeed, leisurely southwards, for it was some time since he had been in the northern towns, and it was the 1st of Ramaḍān (24th October) before he reached Damascus. But although the fast month had thus commenced he recognised that there was important work for him to do in Palestine. There were Latin castles still unconquered which were points of disturbance and centres of danger. Şafed and Kaukab in particular were like thorns in the flesh of Moslem territory. Kerak had just surrendered, probably while Saladin was on the way from Aleppo to Damascus², being driven to the step by starvation. This paved the way for the surrender of the other castles by the Dead Sea³. About a month's

engaged in operations beyond Antioch.—When Frederick of Germany was in Cilicia (in June 1190) the Moslem deserted Bağras ("Gaston") and it was occupied by a relative of Leo's who held it for 10 years in spite of the claims of the Templars that it should be restored to them (Eracles ii. 136f.). Cf. Chap. VI, p. 299, notes 1 and 2.

¹ Mentioned only by Beh. iii. 117 of the three Arabic sources. Cf. also It. Ric. 27. The silence of I.A. and 'Imad ed-din shows at least that the condition was not of consequence and Saladin evidently counted on having to undertake the siege of Antioch.

² An inference from 'Imad ed-din iv. 38; particularly from the fact that El-'adil negotiated the surrender and not Saladin. Beh. iii. 119 dates in Ramaḍān. If this is correct the date was probably at the very beginning of the month, just after 24th October.

³ After some months however. The date of the surrender of Shaubak is set in the

vigorous attack by the sultan on Şafed, and one of the same duration on Kaukab, pressed through inclement winter weather, secured at last the surrender of these two castles¹. The remaining castles by the Dead Sea were now isolated and comparatively harmless, the others which the Latins still held were on the new borders, so to speak, of their actual territory.

The year 1189 was not far advanced before it became clear that Saladin in turn must stand on the defensive. He spent the early months in a tour of inspection of the towns he had gained in 1187. Jerusalem, Ascalon and 'Akka were visited in turn. It was not simply that the administration of these towns and districts required attention; their fortifications needed to be seen to. There were signs already of the coming storm and preparations had to be made. The Latins of Tyre under Conrad and those of Tripolis under Guy were growing bolder. Already they had begun to take the offensive. All through the past year crusading bands had been arriving from Europe in Italian ships. News came, besides, that for the third time in crusading history Europe had been roused to a mighty effort. During the years before Ḥaṭṭīn embassies from Jerusalem and the appeals of the Pope had prepared the way for a general crusade. The fall of Jerusalem acted as a spark to a train which had been laid and all Christendom was aflame again. The quarrels of France and England delayed the crusade for a time but finally it was jointly organised by Philip of France and Richard of England. Frederick of Germany completed his preparations and started first. More truly than ever before Christendom and Islam armed to do battle with one another, each for the faith that was in them.

In the very beginning of 1189 it still seemed possible to Saladin that he could undertake, when the season came, a further campaign against Antioch and Tripolis². Before the

month ending 19th May 1189 (Beh. iii. 122), apparently about the 5th of May, 17th Rabi' I 585, a little earlier or later.

¹ Saladin left Damascus on November 7th. Şafed surrendered on the 30th (8th Shawal, 'Imād ed-dīn iv. 384) or a week later, December 6th (14th Shawal, Beh. iii. 119 and Kem. Blochet 102=iv. 190). Kaukab surrendered about January 5th, 15th Dhu'l-ḥi'dja 584 (all the Arabic sources).

² A.S. iv. 390, 392, where quotations are given from Saladin's letters.

year was far advanced he understood that his presence was required in the south. When spring came he led the troops which he had assembled near Damascus¹ to a camp in the Marj 'uyun (5th May). From there he kept a watch on the enemy, waiting to see at what point their stroke would be delivered. Conrad still refused to acknowledge Guy's authority. The king however posted himself this spring just outside the walls of Tyre, into which Conrad refused him entrance. As his forces increased he began to take the offensive against the Moslems. In July, particularly, several skirmishes of minor consequence took place and in one of these Saladin lost 180 men. While thus lying in the Marj 'uyun Saladin was in a position to press toward the surrender of Shaḫif Arnun, Arnold's castle on the banks of the Leontes². Its owner had been known as Reginald of Sidon. He agreed in the month of May to surrender the castle by the 13th of August³. But when the time came he would not hold to his agreement, if he ever intended to do so. Saladin accordingly, having Reginald already as a hostage, began the siege of the castle. Shortly afterwards a decisive movement on the part of the Latins called Saladin away to meet them before 'Akka⁴.

The siege of 'Akka was the first attempt of the Latins to recover their lost ground. It commenced on Monday 28th August 1189⁵ and lasted until the 12th of July 1191. Guy and his

¹ Beh. iii. 121. Saladin was in Damascus from 21st March to 21st April (1st Šafar to 3rd Rabi' I 585). Cf. Kem. Blochet 103=iv. 191.

² The representation that Saladin devoted himself from May to August principally to the siege of Shaḫif is quite erroneous.

³ Both Beh. iii. 131 and 'Imad ed-din iv. 398 give 18th Jumada ii (August 3rd). This date may be safely corrected into 28th Jumada ii (13th August) because (a) 'Imad ed-din says the day was a Sunday which the 18th is not, while the 28th is; (b) Beh. iii. 129 defines the date as "towards the end of the month," properly applicable only to the 28th. Landberg's 'Imad ed-din 179 either gives various readings or recognises textual error.

⁴ Troops were left to continue the siege of Shaḫif. It was surrendered on the 22nd April 1190 ('Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 441 and Beh. iii. 151, where the editor mistakes the Moslem year and so gives the date as 3rd May 1189). Reginald was released as one of the conditions of surrender.

⁵ Beh. iii. 133 says it was a Monday (i.e. August 28th). He calls it 13th Rajab 585 (calendar date 27th August) while I.A. Kamil ii. 6 calls it 15th Rajab (calendar date 29th August). It. Ric. 62 dates "die sancti Augustini" = 28th August. I.A. ii. 6 says the Latins started for the siege on the 8th Rajab; hence Kem. Blochet 105=iv. 193 gives this as the date of the commencement of the siege. If 8th Rajab is textually

troops began the siege, afterwards he was joined by Conrad and soon the steady inflow of the third crusade multiplied the besiegers into a great host. King Philip landed in April 1191 and Richard of England in the following June. Only the outstanding features and a sketch of the general progress of the siege are contained in the following pages.

Guy's forces when he reached 'Akka were not such as to enable him to invest the city. He simply pitched his camp against it on the northern side. When Saladin arrived two days later he found no difficulty in reinforcing and provisioning the town. Even after the Latins had been strengthened by numerous crusading bands and had completely invested the city (Thursday 14th September)¹ Saladin two days later broke the cordon and maintained communication by land with the defenders of the town. But still an unending stream of fresh arrivals swelled the Latin army. Saladin's one determined effort to drive them away was made some time after he had restored communication with 'Akka. It was unsuccessful. On the 4th of October the Latins, in their turn, being reinforced by Conrad's troops and others, made a determined attack on Saladin. Saladin's centre and left drove back those opposed to them and the Master of the Temple was killed. But the rout of the Moslem right wing and their panic-stricken flight to the Jordan and even beyond it must have shaken the confidence of Saladin's troops. Other causes, however, are chiefly accountable for the sultan's failure to hold his forces to their task, so that the Latins without further difficulty cut off all access to the town on the landward side. Ramaḡan commenced on the 13th of October. That was an excuse if not a reason for suspending operations. The northern emirs and their levies were also anxious to return home. When Ramaḡan was over winter would be upon them. To crown all Saladin was disabled by fever². He urged that the offensive ought boldly to be taken, but he could not resist the voice of the emirs

correct it corresponds to 23rd August, since the day was Wednesday (Kem.). For further details of the course of the siege see especially the poems of Ambrose and Haymarus Monachus.

¹ Beh. iii. 134 (last day of Rajab, calendar date 13th September).

² I.A. Kamil ii. 14.

and finally gave orders to retire¹. The Latins now completely invested the town on the side of the land and fortified their position by entrenchments². Saladin bitterly contrasted the devotion of the "infidels" with the lukewarmness of the "true believers" and sent letters and envoys in every direction to stir men to the holy war. Through the winter he remained on guard with a fresh body of troops from Egypt³. His only actual achievement was the provisioning of the town, to which there was still access by sea. On the other side the Latins suffered greatly from scarcity of food and the inclemency of the weather.

Operations on both sides commenced again about the end of April (1190)⁴. As soon as Saladin's first reinforcements arrived he resumed his old position at Tell kisan (25th April)⁵. Two days later (27th April)⁶ the closer character of the Latin attack was signalled by the advance against the walls of three great siege towers which had been constructed during the winter. They towered high above the ramparts of the city and the citizens were in despair at their failure to effect anything against them. Saladin drew closer to the Latins (2nd May)⁷ and constantly harassed them in the hope of causing a diversion. Things had reached a critical point when a young coppersmith's assistant from Damascus declared that he could destroy the towers. The experts had all failed but this unknown and inexperienced youth "had God's counsel and help." His appliances proved completely successful. Every one of the three towers was burned to ashes (5th May)⁸.

¹ The baggage was sent away on October 12th (Beh. iii. 146), the army followed on the 15th (Beh. iii. 147, 3rd Ramaḍān) or the 16th ('Imad ed-din iv. 427, I.A. Kamil ii. 14, 4th Ramaḍān).

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 428.

³ According to 'Imad ed-din iv. 430 and I.A. Kamil ii. 15 they reached 'Akka about 26th November, Shawāl 15th. They had rested since the previous year (I.A. ii. 10). Beh. iii. 147 makes the date of their arrival 12nd October (=10th Ramaḍān).

⁴ The affair of the 10th of March was no more than a skirmish such as many others which are unrecorded (Beh. iii. 149f., 'Imad ed-din iv. 440f.).

⁵ Beh. iii. 153, 'Imad ed-din iv. 443.

⁶ I.A. Kamil ii. 18.

⁷ Beh. iii. 153 (In the quotation in A.S. iv. 444 there is a textual error, 15th Rabi' i for 15th Rabi' ii).

⁸ 'Imad ed-din iv. 448 (Saturday 28th Rabi' i); It. Ric. (Saturday after Ascension Day); Beh. iii. 156 probably agrees (cf. iii. 154) and I.A. Kamil ii. 19 at least dates

For three succeeding months the town was narrowly invested. Even the harbour was blockaded, though not so closely as to prevent occasional communications and relief from the outside¹. The Latins seem to have left Saladin himself undisturbed. As the summer passed the German section of the third crusade was expected and was on its way. Saladin sent back the northern levies to watch the frontiers by which the route of the expedition lay. The walls of Sidon and Jubail were destroyed and the inhabitants were removed to Beirut². Frederick came overland through Greece and Asia Minor. The policy of the emperor Isaac Angelus was not more favourable to the crusaders than that of his predecessors had been. In fact he was an ally of Saladin's and kept him informed of what was going on in western Europe. Nevertheless Frederick crossed safely into Asia Minor. There he was more fortunate than the first crusaders had been. Kilij Arslan of Rum being Saladin's inveterate enemy was inclined to treat with Frederick and offered very little opposition to the progress of the crusade. But in Cilicia, just when the goal was at hand, misfortune overtook the German expedition. Frederick was thrown from his horse and drowned when crossing the river Salef (11th June 1190)³. It is not improbable that this event changed the whole course of the

the conclusion of this series of attacks on the 28th of Rabi' I (5th May). Hay. Mon. § 56 specially refers to the assault made on Ascension Day (3rd May) and the following Saturday, but mentions the advance and burning of the siege towers separately and without any date. Ambrose describes particularly the attack on Ascension Day (p. 370) but need not be understood to put the destruction of the towers on that day. Very possibly some lines of the poem have been lost between lines 3428 and 3429.

¹ On June 14th Egyptian ships defeated the Latin fleet and got safely into the harbour ('Imad ed-din, Thursday 8th Jumada I, calendar date 13th June; Ech. iii. 158, 9th Jumada I, where Recueil 11th June is an error).

² 'Imad ed-din in A.S. iv. 461, without exact date and with a list of other towns whose walls were also destroyed. But of these Jaffa and Caesarea were dismantled later (see p. 176, n. 1) and presumably Arsuf and Tiberias also, considering their geographical position. Anon. Rhen. v. 523 names Laodicea, Jubail, Anjartus, Beirut and Sidon, with the limitation that the citadels and towers were left.

³ Eracles ii. 127 f. and Gesta 13. Annales ii. ii. 433 and Benedict ii. 148 also give the name of the river, the geographical position of which is exactly defined in Benedict ii. 193. According to Anon. Rhen. Recueil v. 523 the emperor was drowned whilst bathing at "Fretum" on St Barnabas Day (11th June). Stubbs (Benedict ii. 148) gives the date as June 10th but without stating his authority.

contest with the Moslems. The German army soon almost completely melted away. Some returned to Europe, others were defeated by the troops which Saladin had sent to act against them, the main body arrived in Antioch but only to be decimated there by plague. A mere handful reached 'Akka under the leadership of Duke Frederick (7th October)¹.

Other sections of the crusade had already arrived in greater numbers. Before the end of July² amongst other chiefs came Henry of Troyes with large reinforcements. He became the principal leader of the besieging army. The slowness of the operations had been a cause of widespread popular discontent³. But from now until the beginning of winter the siege was pressed with energy and fresh zeal. Saladin quickly drew back, feeling no doubt that his position had become unsafe (1st August)⁴. But the garrison of 'Akka maintained its defence vigorously and successfully. By means of carrier pigeons and of swimmers it continued to communicate with Saladin. There was difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies of food but occasionally ships ran the blockade. An attack on the harbour tower was repulsed (24th September). The Latin engines were kept at a distance by sallies and by the use of burning arrows. About the middle of October two new engines, the ram and the spit⁵, which the Moslems

¹ He left Antioch 28th August (25th Rajab, Beh. iii. 180), reached Tripolia shortly before 11th September (Tuesday 8th Sha'ban, Beh. iii. 182, calendar date 10th September), there he remained until the end of September and then proceeded by sea to Tyre. After a pause there he reached 'Akka 6th Ramadan (Beh. iii. 186).

² Just before the beginning of August (Ambrose, line 3507); from I.A. Kamil ii. 28, apparently on 28th July (cf. ii. 26 and 27).

³ The attack made on the 25th of July is represented by western writers as a popular movement rather than as one planned by the leaders. It was largely successful against Saladin's Egyptian troops on the right wing but finally was beaten off.

⁴ Beh. iii. 172, I.A. Kamil ii. 28. 'Inad ed-din iv. 469 practically says that the sultan did not wish to be too close to the enemy; similarly Beh. who also asserts that Saladin desired to entice the Latins into the plain and so improve his opportunity of attacking them.

⁵ *saffid* (Beh. quoted by A.S. iv. 481); in Beh. iii. 187 the textual variant *sinmur* "cat" is given. Both names seem to have been applied to the same engine, the cat being properly the cover of the "spit." II. Ric. 280 shows however that there was also an instrument in use called a "cat." Beh. iii. 187 attributes the construction of one or both engines to the Germans who arrived on October 7th, but this seems to be an error (Ambrose, p. 375=II. Ric. 281 f.).

had never seen before, were brought into use. The defenders were greatly perplexed by their manner of attack but they succeeded in burning both on Monday October 15th¹. Two days later another attack on the harbour tower, from a ship with a drawbridge on board, was also repulsed.

Winter now approached and the activity of the besiegers was relaxed. Saladin withdrew to his winter quarters on the 20th of October. He was anxious that his troops should not disperse, for he knew that the situation was critical and that every assistance he could give might be needed by the town early in spring. But the emirs murmured at his proposals, and about the middle of November he dismissed the ruler of Sinjar, and then others, one after another. There was some slight skirmishing in November before hostilities quite ceased. During December and January the Latins suffered very much from famine. Duke Frederick died in January². After the Latin ships withdrew from the entrance to the harbour because of the severity of the winter storms Saladin set about reprovisioning the town. The garrison was quite worn out by the siege and Saladin decided that it should be replaced by fresh troops. El-'adil was commissioned to carry out the necessary arrangements. A sufficient number of willing recruits could not be obtained. Those chosen for the duty made excuses and delayed entering the town as long as possible. The blockade of the harbour was resumed before the strength of the new garrison had been raised to equal that which was previously in occupation. 'Imad ed-din is of opinion that the change was unfortunate for two reasons: the original defenders had become familiar with the situation, and those who replaced them did so unwillingly³.

¹ 'Imad ed-din iv. 486 (13th Ramaḡan, calendar date 14th October); Beh. iii. 188 (quoted A.S. iv. 484) has 3rd Ramaḡan, which is a textual error for 13th (cf. iii. 190 where 15th Ramaḡan follows immediately). It is Beh. who names Monday.

² On the 10th or the 20th (14th Dhu'l-hijja, 'Imad ed-din iv. 459 and 521, or 22nd Dhu'l-hijja, Beh. iii. 208).

³ 'Imad ed-din's account of these events is found in A.S. iv. 519 ff. With it may be compared I.A. Kamil ii. 31 ff. Very probably the latter is dependent on the former so that his representation is of less weight. He blames Saladin for carelessness and excessive trust in others (ii. 33). Goergens' translation of A.S. (p. 164 f.), according to which 'Imad ed-din and El-'adil both advised a change of garrison, is erroneous (cf. A.S. iv. 519).

While these arrangements were in progress it was found necessary to dismiss some of the troops which had been on duty through the winter. Taḳī ed-dīn 'Omar led away those who started on the 2nd of March¹. He never returned. Through the summer he was occupied in guarding the sultan's interests in Mesopotamia. He died on the 11th of October². He had been one of Saladin's most faithful emirs and was much lamented.

The last stage of the siege of 'Akka began in the spring of 1191. The French king landed on Saturday the 20th of April³. The soldiers he brought with him were less numerous than had been expected⁴ but other reinforcements continued to arrive. It was the 30th of May before the siege was actively resumed⁵. After this Saladin drew closer to the Latin camp. 'Akka was now hard pressed and all the sultan's attempts at diversion effected little. On Saturday the 8th of June king Richard of England sailed into sight with 25 galleys⁶. He was welcomed with lighted bonfires and with great joy. The Latins were now full of confidence and the Moslems much discouraged. The burning of a great four-storied siege tower on the 10th of June⁷ cheered the defenders somewhat, and Richard's illness about this same time kept him inactive for some weeks. Philip continued his assaults until he also became unwell⁸. Richard wished to have

¹ Beh. iii. 204; 'Imad ed-dīn in A.S. Goergens 168; Beh. iii. 210 represents him as still with Saladin in Rahl' I (April).

² Beh. iii. 281 (Friday 19th Ramaḍān 587, calendar date 10th October); cf. Beh. iii. 30 which describes Saladin's receipt of the news near Kanila. In Makrizī as quoted by the editor of I.A. Kamil ii. 41, 9th Ramaḍān must be a textual error for 19th Ramaḍān.

³ 23rd Rahl' I (Beh. iii. 212). 11th Rahl' I in I.A. Kamil ii. 41 and in 'Imad ed-dīn as quoted by A.S. Goergens 169 is a textual error for the 22nd Rahl' I. It. Ric. 181 and Benedict ii. 161 give the date as Saturday in Easter week. Similarly Haymarus 110.

⁴ According to Ibn el-nathir he had only six ships, but they were very large.

⁵ Beh. iii. 214 (4th Jumada I 587).

⁶ 13th Jumada I (Beh. iii. 220, I.A. Kamil ii. 42 f.); Kem. Bioelict 111=iv. 199 says 21 galleys; Ambrose 383=It. Ric. 214 f. shows that all Richard's ships did not arrive at this time. 'Imad ed-dīn in A.S. Cairo ii. 184, line 18, Goergens 171, dates 10th Jumada I, and gives the number of the vessels at 25.

⁷ Benedict ii. 170; Beh. iii. 220 (16th Jumada I, calendar date 11th June).

⁸ Beh. iii. 222 f. (attacks on Friday 14th June and Monday 17th). If *post* be corrected to *ante*, following Stubbs, It. Ric. 215 agrees with Beh. The date 1st July is unlikely or impossible. The published text of Ambrose contains no date but reads as if there may have been one originally between lines 4623 and 4624.

an interview with Saladin and may have thought that in this way terms might be arranged. But Saladin asked for an indication of the nature of his proposals and nothing came of the suggestion. Philip resumed his attacks with emphasis on the 2nd of July¹ and already there was talk of surrender in the town². Next day fierce attempts were made to storm the city, especially when part of the wall subsided owing to undermining³. During both days Saladin continuously assaulted the ramparts of the Latin camp in order to create a diversion. The strain on the defenders became so severe that the emirs in chief command, Saif ed-din 'Ali el-meshṭub and Beha ed-din Karaḡush, in person and on their own responsibility, made overtures to the Latins. But their offer to surrender on condition that the garrison should be allowed a free exit was rejected⁴. Saladin now proposed that they should cut their way through the besiegers at night with his assistance (Thursday 4th July). Preparations were made for the attempt, but on Thursday night the garrison was not ready and by Friday the Latins knew of their plan and were on the alert at every point⁵. A great breach was made in the wall on Friday night as the result of mining operations during the day⁶. On

¹ Beh. iii. 229 (7th Jumada ii); Ambrose 385 f. and It. Ric. 220 f. without date.

² Beh. iii. 230.

³ Ambrose 386 = It. Ric. 221 ff. (next day); Benedict ii. 173 f.; cf. Beh. iii. 231 f. (8th Jumada ii).

⁴ Benedict ii. 174 (cf. 173) dates the embassy on Thursday July 4th. Beh. (as quoted by A.S. Cairo ii. 187, line 3, cf. Recueil iii. 233) implies that it was on Wednesday (evening) seeing it was followed by desertions from 'Akka that night, which is spoken of as Wednesday night (i.e. Thursday night, 9th Jumada ii, according to Arabic reckoning; explicitly so given in the Cairo text of Beh.). 'Imad ed-din 351 f. is equally distinct. It. Ric. 229 (without date) says that Philip would have accepted the emirs' terms but that Richard refused them. Benedict's assertion that Saladin was consulted is against the clear statements of Beh. and It. Ric. Ambrose 390 f. represents the embassy as simply for the purpose of requesting a safe conduct for the defenders in their communications with Saladin. Here the poem is less exact than the Latin translation (It. Ric.) but possibly something is wanting in the published text.

⁵ 'Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo ii. 187, line 21 ff. (Goergens 174) is here the chief source (cf. also Landberg's text 355 f.). The first night fixed for the attempt is referred to only as "that night" but in the context it is clearly Thursday (Landberg 355). Beh. iii. 234 says the attempt was planned for Thursday night (Friday 10th Jumada ii) but also remarks that Saladin's troops were under arms on the following night. Benedict ii. 174 mentions an attempt on Thursday night only. 'Imad ed-din, Beh. and Benedict all say that the Latins were warned by a communication from the town.

⁶ Benedict ii. 174.

Saturday the 6th, just as the Latins were preparing to resume their assault, the emirs in the town demanded a truce and again made overtures of surrender. It was agreed that Saladin should be invited to share in the negotiations and a representative of his discussed terms with the Latins¹. But the utmost concessions which the sultan would make did not satisfy his opponents². The garrison made a brave defence for a few days longer, during which Saladin already anticipated the worst. On the 8th he destroyed the walls of Haifa and on the following days other places in the neighbourhood³. On the 11th the emirs in 'Akka again opened negotiations with the Latins and this time they arranged terms for themselves⁴. Saladin was powerless. The crusaders planted their banners in the town on Friday the 12th of July.

The conditions of surrender are not altogether clear. The Latins required, besides surrender of the city, (1) payment of a certain ransom (200,000 pieces of gold), (2) the liberation of

¹ 'Imad ed-din and Beh. commence their narrative of Saturday's negotiations with a communication of the Latins to Saladin. Benedict ii. 175 shows this had been preceded by overtures to the Latins from the emirs in the city. Jleh. iii. 134 f. says further that envoys were sent by Richard with a message to Saladin on Thursday and that three envoys discussed terms of peace with El-malik el-'adil on Friday. It is possible that the alleged interview on Friday owes its origin to a duplicate narrative of what took place on Saturday. Saturday's negotiations are in fact dated on Friday by 'Imad ed-din's *el-barq* and this author mentions that the Moslem negotiator on the occasion was Najib ed-din el-'adil. Benedict, Beh. and 'Imad ed-din's *el-fath* (Landberg 356 and in A.S. Cairo ii. 187, line 31) all give Saturday. The Latin negotiator had been governor of Sidon (Beh. and 'Imad ed-din in A.S. Cairo ii. 187). The Recueil text of Beh. confuses him with the Moslem representative El-'adil.

² The Moslems offered the surrender of the city and of everything in it, an exchange of prisoners man for man and finally the restoration of the holy cross ('Imad ed-din in A.S. Goergens 174; cf. I.A. Kamli ii. 45). The Latins demanded the surrender of other towns and the release of all Christian captives ('Imad ed-din). Benedict's statement of Saladin's terms is quite impossible (ii. 175 f.).

³ Benedict ii. 177 f. Arsuf and possibly Tiberias may have been among the places not mentioned by name (see p. 264, n. 2).

⁴ Benedict ii. 178 f., Beh. iii. 237 f. Ambrose 389 = It. Ric. 231 f. is accordingly wrong in supposing that the emirs acted with Saladin's consent. On the other hand Ambrose knows nothing of the negotiations of Saturday which were sanctioned by Saladin. Benedict ii. 179 states that afterwards Saladin "professed that this had been done at his instigation," i.e. assumed responsibility for the arrangement. "Cumque Saladinus audisset quod pagani sui fecissent pacem cum regibus, dissimulavit hoc per se factum."

certain prisoners, (3) the restoration of the holy cross¹. In return they promised to respect the liberty, and perhaps the personal property², both of the garrison and of the inhabitants. It rested of course with Saladin to fulfil the conditions. He undertook the obligation and received permission to discharge it by three successive payments at intervals of a month each³. The first instalment became due on the 11th of August, exactly

¹ Beh. iii. 237 and in A.S. Cairo ii. 183, 'Imad ed-din 357 f., I.A. Kamil ii. 46, Ifaymarus 115, Benedict ii. 178, Ambrose 340=It. Ric. 231, Kinoul 274. The number of the prisoners to be released is given by these sources in order as (1) 1500+100 of distinction to be named by the Latins (Recueil text wrongly 500+100), (2) 1500 "unknown" prisoners+100 "known," (3) 500 prisoners of distinction (?text), (4) 1500+100 chosen knights, (5) 1500+100 knights chosen by the Latin kings, (6) 2000 Christians of distinction +500 of inferior rank, (7) a number equal to the number of Moslems released. Barhebr. 424 also agrees with (1), (2) and (4) which may be accepted as giving the figures correctly, although a letter of Richard's in Hoveden iii. 131 speaks of 1500 captives only. In addition to the sum of 100,000 dinars, 10,000 were promised to Conrad and 4,000 to some of the official members of his household ('Imad ed-din 358 and Beh. in A.S. Cairo ii. 183, line 11 f.). This was in recognition of his services as intermediary (Beh.). The Recueil text of Beh. is defective at this point. Cf. also I.A. Kamil ii. 46.

² So the Arabic sources but not Ambrose 390=It. Ric. 232.

³ Beh. iii. 241. At the end of the first term he was to surrender the holy cross, to pay 100,000 dinars and to release 600 captives (Beh. in A.S. Cairo ii. 189, line 19; the Recueil text iii. 241 reads 1600 in place of 600). It may be inferred that the 100 prisoners of distinction were included in the first batch to be released but this is not definitely stated, nor is the division of the remaining obligations between the second and third terms. It may be assumed that this three term arrangement was a modification of the original agreement made by the emirs. It was Saladin's proposal (Beh.) and therefore not part of the first agreement. 'Imad ed-din, who does not, however, mention any alteration in the terms, explicitly states that the emirs had agreed that half the money, all the prisoners and the holy cross should be handed over "at the end of the month" and that the other half of the money should be paid at the end of the following month (Landberg 358 f.). This agrees with I.A.'s statement that two months were allowed for the discharge of the Moslem obligations (Kamil ii. 46). Against 'Imad ed-din and I.A. is to be set Benedict ii. 179, which makes the time fixed in the original agreement for the complete discharge of all obligations 40 days. This period however may have been got merely by calculation of the interval between July 11th and August 20th (unless, indeed, for XL we should read LX). It may be assumed that the date of the release of the Moslem captives was fixed both in the emirs' agreement and in Saladin's. 'Imad ed-din 371 possibly implies that all were to be released at the end of the first month in the original agreement. I.A.'s accusation against Richard, that he would only release part of the prisoners at the end of the first term (p. 272, n. 1), presumably implies that he was pledged to release them all then. It may be observed that the expression *primus dies peremptorius* in Benedict ii. 187, need not be a recognition of the three term agreement but may denote August 9th in contrast to August 20th (cf. p. 271, n. 2).

thirty days after the capture¹. When the term expired Saladin declared that he was ready to do his part as soon as the Latins gave him hostages that they would afterwards fulfil their engagement. Alternatively, if they released their prisoners at once, Saladin offered to give hostages that he would complete the discharge of his obligations on the dates that had been fixed².

¹ 18th Rajah (Beh. iii, 241). This is confirmed by It. Ric. 232, who says that the conditions were to be fulfilled in a month. But he supposed that this month was the month of July (It. Ric. 236 and 242). Benedict ii. 187 gives the date as 9th August, i.e. possibly a month of 28 days after the capture. The evidence of Ambrose is indefinite and indirect. He dates the execution of the captives about the middle of August (line 5570) and makes this two or three weeks after the expiry of the fixed term (lines 5373-4, 5490). He may therefore have dated the expiry of the term at the end of July.

² Beh. iii. 242 and 'Imad ed-din 371. It appears likely that on the 11th of August the prisoners of distinction chosen by the Latins for release had not all been brought to the Moslem camp near 'Akka (Beh.). But the fact is not decisive on the point of Saladin's ability to fulfil his obligations when it became necessary, especially if the date of the first term had already been extended at Richard's request from the 9th (or 11th) to the 20th of August (Benedict ii. 187). It is equally true that Richard was not in a position to release all the Moslem prisoners on the 11th of August. Some were still in the custody of Conrad of Tyre and it was even doubtful if the English king could get possession of them at all (Benedict ii. 187). The question whether Saladin finally, on the 20th of August, was in a position to fulfil his obligations is not easy to answer definitely because of the conflict of testimony between the eastern and western sources. The probabilities of the case depend largely on the extent of the obligations to be discharged on that day. Saladin's chief difficulty no doubt was the collecting of the prisoners whom the Latins named for release. If the 100 were to be set free all together in the first batch (see p. 270, n. 3) it is conceivable that Saladin did not succeed in gathering them completely or at least that the Latins might plausibly allege that he had not done all he was bound to do. Assuming however that he exerted himself to do his part, as he really did, it is unlikely that more than a very few of those still alive were wanting and one would suppose that even they would in the end be traced. 'Imad ed-din 371 definitely asserts that the prisoners were all assembled and presumably Saladin negotiated on the basis of this assumption (cf. Beh.). The statement of Benedict ii. 189 that on the 16th of August Saladin acknowledged that he could not fulfil his part of the compact certainly demands qualification and may be as unfounded as the following statement that Saladin executed his captives on the 18th. The allegation that Saladin asked for an extension of time on the 15th (Benedict ii. 188) is not indeed incredible, but may simply be the western way of putting Saladin's proposal as reported by Beh. and 'Imad ed-din. Ambrose speaks in general terms of the Moslems demanding "terms and respites that they might seek the Cross" (lines 5398-99) and represents Saladin's conduct as a consequence of his bad faith and unwillingness to fulfil his engagements. This representation is sufficiently accounted for by the extensions granted at Saladin's instance (p. 270, n. 3) and at that of Richard himself (Benedict ii. 187) and by Saladin's ultimate failure to fulfil the treaty of the emirs (p. 272, n. 1). The Latin translation of Ambrose in It. Ric. 241 perverts the evidence of the original by making it

His proposals were refused. It is difficult to understand why. Not only were they reasonable, it would have been absurd for Saladin to commit himself without some such arrangement. The honour of a Christian king was not to be so lightly trusted¹.

In any case the Moslems did not fulfil the conditions which were agreed to when 'Akka was surrendered. The contingency, however, must have been foreseen and provided for. Neither the emirs nor the Latins could suppose that Saladin was bound to carry out their agreement. Beha ed-din says that the lives of the garrison and of the citizens were guaranteed in consideration of the surrender of the town². If so Richard was guilty of a dastardly act of ill faith when he led out 2600 prisoners to execution on Tuesday the 20th of August³. Even if their lives

appear as if the requests for an extension of time were made after the expiry of the term fixed and just before the execution of the prisoners. Besides the evidence of the translator is weakened by his misapprehension of the date when the term expired (p. 271, n. 1). Ermoul 276 says that Saladin twice asked for an extension of time and was twice granted it. No doubt it was currently reported in the Latin camp that the sultan either could not fulfil his obligations or was unwilling to do so.

² According to I.A. Kamil ii. 47, Richard demanded that Saladin should discharge his obligations (i.e. those of the first term) and trust to receiving in exchange a part of the Moslem captives selected by the Latins themselves. Beh. agrees that Richard expected Saladin to surrender the instalment of the first term without any guarantee that the Latins would give anything in return. There can be little doubt that Richard's answer was due at first to his being unable to guarantee the release of the Moslem prisoners (cf. Benedict ii. 187, and p. 271, n. 2). But after the 12th of August all the prisoners had come into his hands (Benedict) and this difficulty was removed. May it then be supposed that having once given his answer he adhered to it from motives of personal feeling rather than of public policy? The first-rate evidence of the Arabic sources (Beh., 'Imad ed-din and I.A.) seems to establish beyond dispute that the negotiations were broken off because Saladin was dissatisfied with the manner in which the Latins proposed to perform their obligations, and was in fact suspicious of their good faith. The explanation of the western sources, that Saladin was unable to fulfil the terms of the treaty within the time fixed, apart from the question of fact, which is more than doubtful (p. 271, n. 2), is in itself less plausible. The extension of the first term beyond the 9th or the 11th of August was in any case not caused by Saladin's inability to discharge his obligations (Benedict ii. 187), and it is very improbable that mere unreadiness on Saladin's part would have put an end to the negotiations. The 16th of August is the latest date for which an exchange of messages is recorded (Benedict ii. 188 f.). In Richard's own letter (Hoveden iii. 131) the only comment on the breaking off of the negotiations is contained in the words "*termino expirato et pacisne quam pepigerat [Saladinus] penitus infirmata.*"

¹ Beh. iii. 242; cf. p. 273, n. 1.

² Benedict ii. 189; Beh. iii. 242, I.A. Kamil ii. 47 (Tuesday 27th Rajab). In It. Ric. 243 Friday after the Assumption (i.e. 16th of August) appears to be given as

were not expressly safeguarded¹, the circumstances of their surrender gave them a certain claim to be spared. There is not much support for the view that Richard wished to retaliate for the execution of the Templars and the Hospitallers after Hattin. But if this was his motive, he much surpassed the example which he followed. The curse of such vendettas is that they invariably lead to the shedding of more blood. Saladin now systematically executed the crusaders whom he captured.

The capture of 'Akka cannot be regarded as a great achievement. The efforts of the crusade and of the Syrian Latins were confined to this one enterprise for two whole years. A better policy would have been to employ the strength and the enthusiasm which poured without stint into Palestine directly against Saladin himself. The Moslems would surely have been beaten in the open field and then the reconquest of the country would not have been so difficult. After all, the Latins had gained only a single town and were faced by an almost unbeaten enemy. It was not indeed too late to adopt a resolute and well-planned course of action. But what hope was there of this being done? Saladin in fact had only to stand aloof until the influences in his favour within the enemy's ranks had worked out their disintegrating effects. The combination of different nationalities in the crusading host was a guarantee that there would be jealousy and hatred, discord and strife amongst them. The presence of Philip and of Richard in the same camp made this assurance doubly sure. They brought with them the memory of old quarrels and rival interests. Their respective claims of superiority were certain to create division. Guy and Conrad were another pair of rivals. After the siege of 'Akka had lasted for some time the throne of Jerusalem became the object of their contentions.

the date of the execution but may be explained as by Stubbs to be the day the execution was decided upon. It was then negotiations with Saladin were broken off (p. 272, n. 1). Röhricht 378, note 3 enumerates the conflicting statements of the sources regarding the number of those executed; 2600 is taken from Richard's letter in Hoveden iii. 131; Beh. gives 3000. Benedict ii. 189 f. names amongst the leading men who were spared El-meshjuh, Karakush and others.

¹ Benedict ii. 179 says explicitly that their lives were left at the mercy of the king in the event of the conditions not being fulfilled. Richard's letter (Hoveden iii. 131) perhaps confirms Beh. more than Benedict.

Conrad married Isabel, Sybil's half-sister, in the end of 1190 and thus acquired a certain legal title to the throne, for Sybil was now dead. Philip of France supported his claim. Guy turned to Richard to espouse his cause and of course the English king did so. Thus the rivalry between Richard and Philip was interwoven with the quarrel between Guy and Conrad. After the capture of 'Akka an agreement was made by which Guy was to be king during his lifetime, while Conrad and his descendants were to be his heirs. Meantime Conrad was assigned half the revenues of the kingdom and the lordship of certain towns. Philip now prepared to return home; he sailed from 'Akka on the last day of July (1191). His excuse was the state of his health. Perhaps he found the situation in Palestine intolerable. Probably the interests of France required his return home. The English bluntly accuse him of treachery during Richard's absence. Philip's departure did not improve the situation in Palestine. Most of the French crusaders remained under the leadership of the Duke of Burgundy. Richard was practically commander-in-chief but his authority was seriously limited. Those who sided with Conrad would take no part in his enterprises. Conrad himself remained in Tyre watching his opportunity to make fresh gains. Very soon he began to negotiate with Saladin on his own account.

The future of the crusade now depended very much on how Richard filled his position. The situation was extremely difficult but the truth is that the English king was peculiarly unfit to make the best of it. Possibly it never entered his mind that his first duty was to reconcile the conflicting elements and interests in his army. He made himself the champion of a party, which was inexcusable seeing he had not the power to secure its triumph. Nor had he any qualities of generalship to compensate for his lack of policy. He seems to have regarded war merely as a glorious fight with the enemies who crossed his path. He does not appear to have seen the importance of forcing a decisive battle with Saladin. He allowed himself to be swayed by the consideration that the main object of the crusade was the recovery of Jerusalem and yet he did not devote himself strenuously to accomplish even this. He seems to have vacillated between the

views of others and the demands of his personal circumstances. It was not lack of enthusiasm among the crusaders that prevented his undertaking the siege of Jerusalem but his own dilatory actions. Richard's desire to return to England was the final ruin of the enterprise.

Ascalon, it seems, was selected as the first point of attack after the fall of 'Akka. Its usefulness as a base of operations against Jerusalem commended the choice. But a terrible experience awaited the crusading host on the road. From 'Akka to Jaffa is a distance of eighty miles. The soldiers of the first crusade covered the ground in some ten days, inclusive of halts. Richard's soldiers entered Jaffa on the seventeenth day after starting. Several days were spent in waiting for the ships which were to convoy them down the coast¹. But afterwards it was probably the exhaustion of the soldiers that necessitated frequent rests. The heat was almost unbearable and the means of transport were insufficient. Men had to carry what baggage animals usually convey and the ships were only a small measure of relief. Even food was scarce. Lightly-armed Moslem troops hung on the flanks, cutting off stragglers and increasing the strain by occasional dashes on the line of march. Twice at least the Latins had to fight a serious engagement with Saladin's troops. In each case they were further crippled by a serious loss of horses. It was the 25th of August when they left their concentration camp on the outskirts of 'Akka². When they reached Jaffa on the 10th of September the chiefs of the army were nearly unanimous that they should proceed no further but should fortify Jaffa as a base of operations against Jerusalem. Richard objected but was overruled. Jaffa was the grave of the crusade.

Saladin's policy after the capture of 'Akka was of necessity

¹ The start may be reckoned from Sunday 25th August; the ships came into touch with the army at Caesarea (Ambrose 398 = *Il. Ric.* 256) which was entered on Friday 30th August.

² Ambrose 395 = *Il. Ric.* 249 (the Latins leave their camp on the Sunday after St Bartholomew's Day, which was a Saturday, having already moved a short distance on Friday). In *Beh.* iii. 244, and *I.A. Kamil* ii. 48, the date is: Sha'ban (calendar date 24th August) probably also denotes 25th August. Various earlier dates which are given in the sources are to be understood of preparatory movements.

defensive. It is doubtful if he could have mustered an army capable of doing successful battle with the crusaders even had his emirs been less dispirited than they were. Some time previously Haifa, Caesarea, Arsuf and Jaffa had been dismantled¹. This deprived the Latins of depots and resting places on the road to Jerusalem. The attack on their rearguard on the day they started, before they had reached Haifa, was made by a portion only of Saladin's troops and he was not himself present during the engagement. Saladin moved southwards in front of the Latins and twice, where the ground was favourable, attacked them more boldly than usual, as they left Caesarea on the 1st of September² and as they entered Arsuf on the 7th. In both cases he was repulsed. In the second engagement his army was completely routed by a charge of the Latin knights; but they did not venture to follow up their success³. When the Latins entered Jaffa Saladin took up his

¹ Aoon. Rhen. v. 324 names Haifa, Caesarea, Jaffa and Ascalon as if they had been destroyed together some time after Richard's execution of his prisoners. Regarding Haifa see p. 269, and regarding Ascalon see page 277.

² According to Beh. iii. 252 the attack was continued on the following day (Monday 9th Sha'ban) when the Latins advanced a short distance further south. The narrative of It. Ric. 256 at this point (from Friday 30th August onwards) loses clearness for a few days. The date of the battle is given only as "quandam die." From the date given on page 258 (Tuesday after St Giles' Day) it may be calculated however that he makes the Latins leave Caesarea on Sunday, rest on Monday without moving, advance in the face of serious opposition on Tuesday and then rest again on Wednesday. Beh.'s account is to be preferred: the Latins left Caesarea on Sunday and marched a short distance further on Monday. On both days there was fighting. At their second halting place they remained during Tuesday and Wednesday. From it, according to both authorities, they marched on Thursday. A.S. Goergens 180 gives Monday 9th Sha'ban (2nd September) as the day of the battle (calendar date 1st September). Ambrose 398 f., taken by itself, is even more misleading than It. Ric. since the exact dates of the translator (It. Ric. 258 and 259) are not in the original poem. The discrepancy between It. Ric. and Beh. originates, however, with Ambrose.

³ The engagement on the 7th is known as the "battle of Arsuf." It was hotly contested and the Moslems, especially, suffered severe loss. It is very questionable, however, if it should be represented as an attempt by Saladin to bring matters to a decisive issue or as an occasion when he exerted his full strength to check the progress of the Latin army. Certainly the effects of his repulse or defeat were insignificant. His army was effectively the same before and after the battle. It is to be remembered that the highly-coloured description of It. Ric. 260 ff. is now known to be a translation from a poetical source (Ambrose). The account of Richard's letter in Hoveden iii. 131 is much more modest. Even It. Ric., however, shows that the Moslem rout was only temporary.

position at Ramla (10th September)¹. There it was decided that Ascalon must be destroyed. It was understood to be the objective of the Latin march, its occupation by the enemy would supply them with an excellent base of operations against Jerusalem and would break the direct line of communication with Egypt. Saladin would have preferred to defend Ascalon against attack² but the temper of his cmr's compelled him to recognise that this was impossible. From the 12th to the 23rd of September he was engaged in superintending the work of destruction. Then he dismantled Ramla and Lud and retired to En-naṣṣrūn (4th October)³. He was resolved to concentrate all his strength on the defence of Jerusalem. The conflicts with the crusaders at this time were mere skirmishes between scouting and foraging parties.

Meantime the Latins completed the fortification of Jaffa and of some castles in the neighbourhood. Richard found it difficult to get the soldiers of other nationalities to support him even in this. He actually journeyed to 'Akka to urge the crusaders there to join him. His principal concern at this time, however, was the conduct of certain negotiations with the Moslems. It may have prevented more active military operations. El-'adil was the negotiator on the Moslem side. He seems to have had his first interview with the English king, at Richard's request, on the way from 'Akka to Jaffa (5th September)⁴. As soon as it was decided that the Latin advance should stop at Jaffa Richard renewed his overtures (about September 11th or 12th)⁵. There is no doubt he desired to leave Palestine in the following spring if possible, and probably he hoped that Saladin would come to terms without further fighting. His experience on the way south, his knowledge of the time that had been consumed in the siege of 'Akka and the divisions which diminished the efficiency of the crusade, all strongly prompted him to negotiate.

¹ Tuesday 17th Sha'ban (Beh.). A.S. Goergens 180 gives 19th Sha'ban, calendar date 11th September (for which 19th September must be a misprint).

² I.A. Kamil ii. 51; cf. Beh.

³ 13th Ramaṣān 587 (Beh. iii. 270, I.A. Kamil ii. 52). Whilst the Moslems were encamped at Ramla Saladin visited Jerusalem (5th-8th Ramaṣān, Beh. iii. 268f.).

⁴ Beh. iii. 256 f. (Thursday 12th Sha'ban, calendar date 4th September).

⁵ Beh. iii. 265.

Richard's view of satisfactory terms at first included the restoration to the Latins of all the country that Saladin had conquered. It was only to gain time that El-'adil kept up discussion on the point. The negotiations were part of the Moslem defence. They postponed the attack on Jerusalem and increased the chance of the crusade breaking up. Richard may not have understood the language of oriental diplomacy. It appears, in any case, that he acquired a genuine liking for El-'adil and found pleasure in cultivating his friendship. Interviews and exchange of messages went on until about the 8th of October. Then a journey of Richard to 'Akka took place and interrupted the negotiations. When they were renewed they almost immediately took the form of an interesting proposal from Richard that El-'adil and a Latin princess, Richard's own sister, should jointly rule the whole kingdom of Jerusalem¹. Both Richard and Saladin were to surrender their conquests to these representatives of east and west. Certain villages were to belong to the military orders. The holy cross was to be restored to the Latins (20th October). El-'adil treated the offer seriously and was personally favourable to it. Even Saladin expressed approval, but only, according to Beha ed-din, because he did not think Richard was in earnest. In fact Richard ultimately announced that his sister's unwillingness to wed a Moslem was fatal to the project. Still he added that if El-'adil would become a Christian he thought the proposal might be carried through (23rd October). It may be assumed that the scheme commended itself to Richard as a good solution of his difficulties, but no doubt it was opposed by others than his sister and so became impracticable. For a short time the negotiations came to a standstill.

Richard was not alone in making overtures to Saladin. As early as the 4th of October an envoy came from Conrad offering to break with Richard if Beirut and Sidon were given him in

¹ This visit may be identified with that above referred to which is related by Ambrose 409=Il. Ric. 286. Beh. iii. 271 reports that it was supposed in the Moslem camp that Richard had gone to have an interview with Conrad because he was treating with Saladin. That may be regarded as an error. Beh. iii. 276 confirms the identification and explanation here given of the visit.

² Beh. iii. 277 ff. Rührich 597 says that Eracles ii. 198 is the only western source which alludes to the project.

addition to Tyre¹. Saladin was quite prepared to welcome such an ally and returned a favourable answer. In the beginning of November communications with Conrad again come to light². It appears that El-'adil was opposed to making terms with him and urged that a treaty should be made with Richard. Richard soon ascertained that Conrad was negotiating with the Moslems and doubtless this increased his desire to come to an understanding. On the 8th of November³ he renewed his overtures and Saladin found himself in the agreeable position of being solicited from two quarters at the same time. He was personally inclined to accept Conrad's proposals. But El-'adil's influence seems to have turned the balance in favour of Richard. Conrad's advances were not encouraged and the discussion of terms with his representatives appears to have gone no further⁴. Richard now made yet another concession. He was willing that the land should be divided between the Moslems and the Latins. Alternative modes of settlement were proposed: either that the coast-towns should be wholly Latin and the interior Moslem, or that some equal division of the whole country should be arranged⁵. The former alternative offered the more likely basis for a permanent settlement. There is no good evidence to show that the latter was seriously discussed. But the exact point of disagreement between the negotiators is not stated. Probably Saladin insisted now, as indeed afterwards, that Ascalon should not remain in the hands of the Latins. No doubt the privileges to be conceded to the Latins in the holy city also presented difficulties. The issue of the negotiations and the rock on which they split cannot be definitely ascertained⁶.

¹ Beh. iii. 270 f.

² Beh. iii. 283, 287; iii. 271 suggests that the negotiations with Richard had in the interval put a stop to the communications with Conrad.

³ 18th Shawal 587 (Beh. iii. 286).

⁴ Beh. iii. 290. Later on, before Conrad's death, when the negotiations with Richard had ceased and there was a report that Conrad was on the point of being reconciled to the English king, Saladin actually intimated acceptance of his proposals (beginning of April). By this time however it was too late (Beh. iii. 297).

⁵ Beh. iii. 289.

⁶ Ambrose 413 = It. Ric. 297 says that the point of disagreement was a demand of Richard's that "Crac de Montréal" should be demolished. There is nothing to support this statement in Beh. It would imply a discussion on the lines of the second alternative named in the text (cf. perhaps Benedict ii. 180). Beh. introduces again at

It is however to be noted that Saladin himself did not desire peace. He was inclined to continue the contest with the crusaders until they were forced to leave the country. It would not as yet have suited his personal views had the negotiations been successful. They were largely a concession to the feeling of the emirs¹.

It was just after this that the Latins occupied Ramla (22nd November)². Their action has the appearance of being a consequence of the breakdown of the negotiations with Saladin. It was the first stage of an advance on Jerusalem. The Templars and the Syrian Latins were opposed to an immediate attack on Jerusalem but many of the crusaders hailed the movement with enthusiasm. Richard seems to have temporised. The next advance, on December 22nd, to a line along the foot of the hills a few miles further on³ can only be regarded as a concession to the enthusiasts. By this time it was impossible to accomplish anything, because so many were opposed to the undertaking and because the rainy season had already set in. On the 8th of January⁴ the crusaders fell back on their old lines at Ramla. There was the greatest murmuring and sorrow amongst those whose hearts were set on the reconquest of Jerusalem. The French in great anger left the army and returned to Jaffa and to 'Akka⁵.

this point a reference (iii. 290 f.) to the marriage proposal. Apparently the alliance was now to be supplementary to the division of the country. The latest date given by Beh. for these negotiations is 15th November (Friday 25th Shawal; in iii. 291, 15th Shawal is a textual error for 25th Shawal, just as 11th Shawal in iii. 289 should be 21st Shawal).

¹ Beh. iii. 289. Stubbs in his introduction to *It. Ric.* several times speaks of Saladin's "panic." There is no foundation for the representation. It is not even correct to say that Saladin was anxious for peace.

² I.A. Kamil ii. 54. There is a considerable gap in the *Recueil* text of Beh.'s narrative at this point (iii. 292). The narrative on this page is based on I.A. and *It. Ric.*

³ To En-najrun according to I.A. Kamil ii. 54. Ambrose 415 = *It. Ric.* 303 names *Balt nuba*, which is slightly to the north-east.

⁴ I.A. Kamil ii. 55. This agrees with the date of *It. Ric.* 308f., between Epiphany (6th January) and the festival of St Hilary (13th January). It follows that the discussion on St Hilary's Day mentioned by Hoveden iii. 179 probably did not take place at "Turun as chevalers" (En-najrun). Ambrose 417 seems to date the retreat on St Hilary's Day, but if so is corrected by *It. Ric.* 309.

⁵ Ernoul 178 ff. makes it appear that the French were the authors of the retreat.

Richard and the Syrian Latins now thought that his original plan of fortifying Ascalon might be carried out. The undertaking was left very much to them. The French gave some help conditionally. Conrad still refused to have anything to do with the English king. Richard reached Ascalon on the 20th of January. Before very long news reached him that the partisans of Guy and Conrad had been fighting in the streets of 'Akka. Conrad actually began to besiege the town. Richard hastened to 'Akka, where he spent more than a month endeavouring to pacify the combatants (20th February—31st March). Tranquillity was restored in the town, but an interview which Conrad had with Richard came to nothing. Once more negotiations with El-'adil came to light. They were still on the lines laid down in November. The point of discussion that emerges is the control of Jerusalem¹. The interesting notice² that Richard knighted one of El-'adil's sons on Palm Sunday, the 29th of March, may be connected with these negotiations. It is evidence of Richard's friendly disposition towards El-'adil.

On the 31st of March Richard returned to Ascalon and there continued the work of fortification as best he could himself. Just after Easter (5th April) disquieting news came from England which decided him to leave Palestine. When he intimated this to the Syrian barons he found that they objected to being left with Guy as their king and that Conrad was the ruler they preferred. Richard wisely yielded the point and Conrad and he were reconciled. Only a few days later the newly-elected king was assassinated³ (28th April 1192)⁴ and then Henry of Troyes became the choice of the barons. Richard accepted this nomination also and as compensation to Guy gave him Cyprus, which the English had conquered

¹ Beh. iii. 293 f. It is no doubt wrong to understand the communications reported by Beh. as if they fully expressed the terms which their senders would regard as satisfactory. They refer only to the points under discussion at the time.

² It. Ric. 325.

³ There is no reason to suspect either Richard or Saladin of complicity. Conrad had incurred the displeasure of Sinan, the chief of the Assassins (the "old man of the mountain"). Röhricht 615 f., gives fully the statements of the sources with references.

⁴ Beh. iii. 297 (Tuesday 13th Rabi' ii 588); I.A. Kamil ii. 58 (Recueil 29th April).

while on the way to Palestine. Throughout the month of May Richard was occupied with unimportant movements in the vicinity of Ascalon. Probably he hoped that before he left for England the Syrian Latins would agree to a settlement with Saladin. About the beginning of June, however, the chiefs of the army informed him that they would besiege Jerusalem, whether he accompanied them or not. Richard was perplexed. He wished to return home but he could not endure that the siege of Jerusalem should be undertaken without his sharing in it. Finally he promised (4th June) to remain until the following spring and to lead the crusaders against Jerusalem. The advance began at once. The district of En-naṣrun (9th June) and Hattin (11th June) was occupied again as the starting-point of a further advance. But the Latins never moved beyond this point. Insignificant skirmishes and raids occupied them for a time. The presence of the English king was the ruin of the undertaking.

Whatever exactly Richard's motives were it is clear that he was unwilling to undertake the siege of Jerusalem and that his unwillingness is directly responsible for the abandonment of the project. The difficulty of the enterprise may have influenced his attitude towards it. He emphasised the want of a sufficient supply of water as a serious obstacle. Saladin had been careful to cut off the supplies usually available in the district. Perhaps this and the other precautions which the Moslems had taken gradually impressed Richard as he lay making preparations, gathering soldiers and obtaining siege machines. Still his conduct before and after this time makes it practically certain that he was personally anxious to get rid of his obligation to besiege Jerusalem. He would not have the dishonour of turning his back on the crusaders as they advanced and so he strove to induce them to retire. He was willing to approve of anything but the siege of Jerusalem, an attack on Damascus or Beirut or the invasion of Egypt. He was supported by the Italians and by the Syrian Latins, especially by the military orders. They may have been influenced by the motives which Richard professed, but probably they served their own interests also. Accordingly when Richard proposed that the matter should be

left to the decision of a council of twenty he had no difficulty in nominating it so as to secure the decision he wished. It was agreed to invade Egypt! Richard was now at liberty to return home.

No decision could have been more satisfactory to Saladin. His recent policy had been to await Richard's attack in Jerusalem. With this intention he had strengthened the town and made all his preparations. But his emirs were thoroughly dissatisfied with the plan. They disliked being shut up in the town. They remembered the fate of 'Akka. They did not understand that much less resistance than that of the garrison of 'Akka would now suffice to break up the crusade. They proposed that Saladin himself should share in the siege. They wished to risk all on the fortune of a pitched battle. Beha ed-din's description of events just before the crusaders retired has all the detail of a photographic picture¹. In vain Saladin sought to encourage his emirs. On July 2nd they actually sent a formal message giving it as their opinion that a battle was preferable to a siege. Affairs had now come to a crisis. All that night Beha ed-din remained in attendance on the sultan. They spent it together "in the path of God." Next day was a Friday. During divine service as the sultan knelt at prayer Beha ed-din noted how his tears rolled down on the carpet. He knew that he was casting his burden on the Lord and he prayed Him to pity and to answer him. That very night the answer came. The scouts brought word of unwonted movements in the enemy's camp. Next day spies told them of the discussion between Richard and the French, and on the same day, July 4th, the Latins commenced to break up their camp².

At once negotiations were resumed. Envoys came from Richard and from Count Henry also. The interchange of messages continued until the 20th³. The general principle that the coast should belong to the Latins and the interior to

¹ Beh. iii. 311 ff.

² Beh. iii. 315 (1181 Jumada i). It. Ric. 397 puts the retreat on the 5th, but Beh. clearly makes the movement begin the day before.

³ Beh. iii. 322, [Monday] 7th Rajab, calendar date 19th July.

the Moslems was accepted. It was agreed that Jerusalem should be a Moslem city but that Christians should enjoy the right of pilgrimage to it and should hold possession of the Church of the Resurrection. It was over Saladin's demand that Ascalon should be dismantled and belong to neither party that the negotiations split. It seemed too hard to Richard that his labours should be thus undone. Besides the Italians and the Syrian Latins were no doubt also strongly against the proposal.

Saladin was now in a position to take the offensive once again. He left Jerusalem on the 23rd of July. His troops skirmished round Jaffa on the 27th, and his camp was pitched before the town on the 28th¹. Early in the morning of Friday the 31st² after two days vigorous attack a breach was made in the wall. In a short time the garrison retreated to the citadel, hostilities were suspended and negotiations regarding capitulation began. Early however on Saturday morning, whilst the arrangements for a surrender were being completed, Richard arrived by sea from 'Akka. He had heard of the attack and at once set out to the rescue. The Moslems posted on the beach were unable to prevent his landing. The garrison sallied from the citadel and the enemy within the walls of the town were driven headlong out. Saladin hastily broke up his camp and retired to a safe distance. Richard pitched his tents outside the walls to avoid infection from the dead bodies within³. The Latins numbered fifty-five knights and 2000 foot-soldiers⁴. Three days were spent in hastily repairing the fortifications of Jaffa⁵. On the fourth day the last battle of the war was fought. The details,

¹ Tuesday 13th Rajab (calendar date 27th July). All the dates are from Beh. Ambrose 448 = *It. Ric.* 401 is to be read in the light of Beh.'s narrative, which presumably describes the Moslem movements more exactly.

² *It. Ric.* 401; Beh. iii. 326 (Friday 18th Rajab, calendar date 30th July); *I.A. Kamill* ii. 64 (20th Rajab, calendar date 1st August).

³ Ralph 43; Ralph 42 says Richard had only three ships with him; similarly Ralph de Diceto ii. 104 (three galleys and ten knights); Beh. speaks of 35 or 50 vessels, but these were not all galleys and may have included other ships than those which came with Richard from 'Akka.

⁴ Ambrose 453; reproduced in *It. Ric.* as "serme LV." Beh. iii. 337 puts the infantry at less than 1000 and says that other accounts give 300. Ralph 44 gives 80 knights and 400 archers.

⁵ Ambrose 453 = *It. Ric.* 412.

which are fully preserved, exemplify the warfare in which Richard delighted and excelled. The numbers engaged on each side were trifling and so were the results involved. From beginning to end everything turned on the valour of a single knight, Richard the lion-hearted.

The day opened with an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Richard in his tent in the early morning. When the plan miscarried Saladin ordered a general attack. The English king marshalled his troops in front of the city. A line of men armed with lances and shields were a wall of defence against attack, and at close intervals amongst them were the balistae, each worked by two men. The first attack of the enemy was resolute, but in the end it was beaten back. Then Richard took the offensive; at the head of ten knights who alone had horses¹ he actually charged out on the enemy and cut through their ranks. In recognition of the king's bravery El-'adil is said to have sent him two Arab steeds for use in the battle. After this, in spite of Richard's valour, the Moslems for a time succeeded in closing in. The Italian sailors fled to the galleys on the shore and a party of the enemy penetrated into the town. The king, leaving the rest of the army to hold its own, accompanied by his archers and two knights² cleared the city, brought back the sailors from the ships and resumed his post in the fighting line. His return put fresh spirit into his men. When he charged again into the Moslem ranks the enemy drew back and ventured only to shoot their arrows at him. His armour and that of his horse are described as covered with arrows like the spines of a hedgehog³. The Moslems completely failed to break their opponents' line and after a last attack about midday⁴ they abandoned the field (Wednesday 5th August 1192)⁵.

¹ Ambrose 454 = It. Ric. 415. Ilich. iii. 337 estimates the horsemen at 9-17. Ambrose 453 = It. Ric. 413 says there were not more than fifteen horses of all kinds. Ralph says six and a mule.

² It. Ric. 420 ("secum ducens ballistorios"); according to Ralph 45 with six knights. The text of Ambrose is defective just at this point (page 456).

³ The particulars are from Ambrose 456 = It. Ric. 420 ff.

⁴ Ralph 48; Ambrose line 11633 says the battle lasted "jusqu'à l'avespre" (It. Ric. 423).

⁵ It. Ric. 414.

Three weeks now pass during which both parties reviewed their strength and made preparations for a renewal of the conflict. Richard was still unwilling to concede the possession of Ascalon, which was Saladin's condition of peace. But circumstances proved too strong for him. He fell ill, the French abandoned him and Saladin was preparing to attack Jaffa again. When the Moslems advanced to Ramla on the 27th of August Richard sent a message to El-'adil requesting him to secure peace by whatever means he could. He was now prepared to yield the point of Ascalon. On Wednesday the 2nd of September Richard formally swore to observe the terms of the treaty. On the following day Saladin did the same¹. Ramla and Lud² were assigned to the Latins as dependencies of Jaffa in return for their concession regarding Ascalon. The coast from Tyre to Jaffa thus became their portion of the country. No duties were to be imposed by either of the contracting parties on the merchandise of the other. Peace was to last three years, but as the term dated from the following Easter and expired at Easter 1196 its actual duration was almost three years and eight months³. In terms of the arrangement the walls of Ascalon were at once completely destroyed. The town was not to be occupied by either party till the expiry of the truce. Richard

¹ Wednesday 22nd Sha'han 588 and the following day (Beh. iii. 346f.).

² Although the revenues of the surrounding districts were to be shared by the Moslems and the Latins.

³ 'Imad ed-din 436 gives the most exact information: three years and eight months, dating from Tuesday 21st Sha'han 588 or its equivalent 1st Ailul (September). This goes a few days beyond Easter 1196 (21st April 1196). Cf. It. Ric. 429, three years from the following Easter; I.A. Kamil ii. 65, three years and eight months; Ambrose 458 and Beh., three years; Makrizi ix. 61 (containing obvious textual errors), three years and three (*sic*) months, commencing 11th (*sic*) Shawal (*sic*) or 1st Ailul; Hist. Patr. Alex. as quoted by Blochet ix. 60, forty months, commencing with Sha'han 588; Ralph de Diceto ii. 103, three years three months three days and three hours (periods of this description are usual in treaties of the 13th century). In 'Imad ed-din as quoted by A.S. Cairo ii. 203, line 28 (Gourgen 187) three years and three months is also due to textual error. I.A. ii. 85 says that after Saladin's death the treaty was renewed and the period extended. The extension was no doubt to some date in 1197. Hostilities seem to have recommenced in August of that year (chap. VI, page 194). Hist. Patr. Alex. says further regarding the treaty that it did not provide for the release of prisoners, that the Syrian Latins were bound to take arms against any western crusaders who might attack the Moslems during the peace and that (the revenues of?) Beirut, Sidon, Jajala and Julail were divided between the contracting parties.

left for 'Akka on the 8th of September¹. On the evening of the 9th of October he sailed for England².

Saladin remained in Jerusalem until he learned of Richard's departure. He was occupied in dismissing his troops, taking farewell of their leaders, confirming fiefs and making arrangements for his journey to Egypt. He was inclined for a time to join the pilgrimage to Mekka. But some of his advisers strongly urged that he ought not to leave the country exposed to the risk of Latin faithlessness. So he put off his last opportunity of performing this sacred duty. Before starting for Egypt he intended to visit Damascus, from which he had been absent nearly four years. He spent twenty days on a tour through the conquered territory, making the arrangements that were required (15th October—4th November)³. At Beirut he met Bohemond of Antioch and made peace with him also, as previously agreed upon.

There was no doubt much business to transact in Damascus and the season was bad, so finally the sultan postponed his intention of visiting Egypt. In Jerusalem on the 29th of January Beha ed-din received a letter announcing this decision and summoning him to Damascus. Probably the reaction from the continuous strain of several years had now set in. Saladin spent much of his time in hunting and also in "hearing the truth" in the assemblies of the learned. His last public act was to welcome the pilgrimage home on Friday the 19th of February⁴. That evening he had an attack of fever. He was ill for only twelve days before he died. Towards the end his brain was affected and he was mostly unconscious. On the 2nd of March

¹ The night before 29th Shu'ban, Beh. iii. 350.

² It. Ric. 441. Beh. iii. 355 calls it 1st Shawal, calendar date 10th October (Recueil wrongly 10th August).

³ Beh. iii. 355, 357 (Thursday 6th Shawal to Wednesday 26th); 'Imad ed-din 443, 447 (Thursday 5th Shawal to Wednesday [15th]; so also I. A. Kamil ii. 67 without the weekdays). The fullest account of the incidents of this period is given by 'Imad ed-din, who accompanied the sultan on his tour (Landberg 443 ff., Goergens 193 ff.).

⁴ Friday 15th Šafar 589 (Beh.), calendar date 20th February. 'Imad ed-din 454, quoted also by A.S. Cairo ii. 111 (Goergens 197), does not decisively identify Monday 21st Šafar, 25th February (calendar date 16th Feb.), with the date of the arrival of the hajj.

the end was obviously approaching. Some were taking the oath of allegiance to El-aḡḡal as his successor. At night the ḡaḡḡi of Damascus remained with him to administer the consolations of religion. It was Muḡḡi ed-dīn Muḡḡammed, who had preached in the mosque of El-aḡḡa on the Friday after the capture of Jerusalem. On to the early morning he continued solemnly chanting "the words of God." As he came to the sentence "there is no God but He, in Him I have set my confidence," the dying sultan awakened from unconsciousness, "he smiled and his face brightened and so he rendered his soul to his Lord" (3rd March 1193)¹. "The last of his conquests was the gain of Paradise." He was only fifty-five years of age.

¹ The details are from Iḡḡ. The calendar date of 27th Şafar 589 is the 4th of March, but that was a Thursday. The sultan's death occurred on Wednesday morning, the twelfth day of his illness, after the hour of morning prayer.

CHAPTER VI.

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, AN EPILOGUE.

AT every stage in the history of the crusading colonies their very existence depended on the amount of support they received from the west. In the early part of the 13th century the reinforcements which reached Syria from Europe were meagre in the extreme, in the latter part of the century they dwindled away to almost nothing. The fate of the Latin colonies was thereby sealed. For forty years the Moslem sultans on the borders abstained from pressing their advantage, and for the sake of peace restored a number of the places Saladin had won. With the advent of the Mamluk sultans about the middle of the century the situation was profoundly altered. The movements of the Tartars in western Asia stirred the neighbouring Moslems to fresh activity. The Latins were again attacked and their weakness became conspicuously evident to themselves and to everyone. They did not venture to contest a single battle in the open field. One after another their towns and fortresses yielded almost without resistance when they were seriously attacked. The end of the Latin colonies in the year 1291 was like the ruin of a house of cards. Such in broad outline is a summary of the last chapter of the history of the crusaders in the east.

The crusading spirit of the west was not extinguished, nor for a time appreciably diminished, by the meagre success and indeed practical failure of the "third crusade." The old religious enthusiasm still burned among the people, the popes still called the faithful to the deliverance of the Holy Land, and princes recognised their duty as soldiers of Christ and Holy Church.

Twice at least a pope was chosen by the cardinals in order that he might give a fresh impetus to the cause of the Latin states. But many influences combined against it. Other crusading enterprises claimed and partly diverted the enthusiasm of the soldiers of the Cross. A mighty force started for Syria in 1202 and spent itself on the conquest of Constantinople and the Byzantine empire (1202-4). From that time, for sixty years and more, much of the spirit of adventure and much of the zeal for religion on which the crusading movement depended were drawn away to Greece. In Prussia and in Spain also there were infidels to be fought and a duty to be performed which discharged crusading vows. The Teutonic order of knighthood, which was established in Syria in 1198, fulfilled its mission chiefly by serving the church and nation in Germany itself. These European crusades, as they may be called, were not the only hindrance to the dispatch of much needed reinforcements to the east. The resources of the church and of the empire were taxed to the uttermost in a struggle between the Pope and the emperors of Germany. Frederick II might have restored the power which Saladin destroyed had not his whole career been one perpetual struggle with the Pope (1220-50). This struggle reached its height after Frederick's death, just when the need of the Syrian states was greatest, when in fact their fate depended altogether on the amount of help they received from Christian Europe. In the latter part of the century one of the most powerful monarchs of Christendom, during the greater part of his reign, was Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily (1262-85). In his case the hereditary quarrel between the Normans of Sicily and the Greeks, and schemes for the conquest of Constantinople, prevailed over the needs of the Syrian colonies. He diverted one crusade to an attack on Tunis, and all through his reign his influence was unfavourable to the cause of the Syrian crusades.

Undoubtedly, also, as the century passed and nothing was accomplished for the Holy Land, when it was seen that popes and emperors, time and again, subordinated its interests to other causes, when great expeditions were prepared and after all diverted to other enterprises, it became inevitable that the

crusading spirit even of the most pious and the most ignorant should gradually fade away. It could not be concealed that the Syrian Latins themselves were unworthy of support. They quarrelled and fought when the enemy were at their gates. They were unfaithful to the common cause for the sake of their private possessions. They were blind to the folly of the course they pursued. At length their appeals roused no more sympathy, and in the end Europe learned of their fate almost with indifference.

Saladin's contest with the Latins suggested to him the idea of a counter invasion of Europe by the Moslems. Beha ed-din reports a conversation with the sultan in which he said that if by God's help the Latins were expelled from Syria in his lifetime he would then cross the sea in order to conquer them in their own lands. Such a spirit of devotion to the holy war was not inherited by Saladin's immediate successors. His brother El-'adil (1198-1218) and El-'adil's son and successor El-kamil (1218-38) were greatly influenced by other motives. Wars with Moslem rivals engaged their attention to some extent. But both deliberately pursued a policy of peace with the Latins. They do not appear to have cherished much animosity to Christians as such. They recognised the benefits of commercial intercourse with the west, and perhaps regarded the Latin towns chiefly as important commercial centres. For the sake of Egypt they were willing to leave the Latins in undisturbed possession of the Syrian coast-towns, and to make concessions regarding the occupation of the holy places of Palestine. This attitude of theirs finds its parallel in the policy of Frederick II, with whom consequently El-kamil was always on friendly terms. The comparatively short reign of Ayub (1240-49) was much occupied with Moslem wars. But the Kharismian Turks, in alliance with the sultan, swept the Latins once more out of Jerusalem and opened their eyes to what the future might have in store. The concessions of previous sultans were never afterwards renewed. A son of Ayub's was the last of Saladin's family to be sultan of Egypt. The mamluk or slave guard of the sultans supplanted their master and chose one of their number to take his place (1250).

At first the new dynasty was involved in Moslem wars and menaced by the Tartar invasion of Syria. Rukn ed-din Baibars (1260-77) was the first after Saladin to wage serious war with the Latins, and the roll of his triumphs bears comparison with that of his great predecessor. Jaffa, Arsuf and Caesarea in the south, Hîṣn el-akrad, Ṣafitha and other castles in Tripolis, Antioch and most of its dependencies in the north are all included in the list of his conquests. The sultanate of Ḳalawun (1279-90) was the next of considerable duration after that of Baibars. Ḳalawun was at first disposed to maintain peace with the Latin towns. But in the end Tripolis and the surrounding district were conquered by him and he was making ready for the siege of 'Akka when he died. His unfulfilled intentions in this respect were carried out by his successor without delay. The capture of 'Akka in the following year (1291) was the death stroke of the Latin colonies. Within a few weeks all the towns that still remained surrendered without resistance.

The recovery made by the Latin towns in the early part of the 13th century conveys a wrong impression of prosperity and strength until its causes are examined into. Undoubtedly a large proportion of Saladin's conquests were surrendered by his successors. One after another Beirut, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ṣafed, Tiberias and even for a short time Ascalon were restored to the Latins. But not one of these places was captured at the sword's point. Beirut and Ascalon were deserted or in ruins when they were reoccupied, the others were surrendered in terms of treaties made by El-'adil, El-kamil and the sultans Isma'il and Ayub (1198, 1204, 1229, 1240-41). The fact is significant. Even the western crusaders of the period won no great victories and made no permanent acquisitions by force of arms. The crusades of 1217-21 and 1249-50 were numerically the most important. Both attempted the conquest of Egypt, and both in the end accomplished absolutely nothing. The minor crusades were more successful; that is to say, they escaped disaster and brought about or led up to the treaties above mentioned. But this was their good fortune rather than their achievement. The crusade of Frederick II (1228-29) is

the best example of its class. Frederick secured concessions by negotiation and because of his reputation, not because of any victory that he won or could have won with the forces at his disposal. These minor crusades at the beginning of the 13th century represented to the sultans the armed force of Europe, which might at any time be hurled against them. No doubt one motive influencing them to make concessions was the desire to avoid the risk of a European invasion on a large scale. The inherent weakness of the Latin towns and the possibility of a great European crusade justify to a large extent the policy of Saladin's successors. The Syrian Latins by themselves were almost powerless. Practically their only hostile movements were made when they were reinforced by the arrival of European crusades. For the most part they gladly agreed to live at peace with their Moslem neighbours. In truth they held their possessions upon sufferance merely. They had not strength to defend themselves successfully against attack. As early as the reign of Ayub, in the middle of the century, this was perfectly evident. The fact that they could not put an army into the field was clear proof of their fatal weakness. Besides, they were distracted by internal feuds and civil war. Contests between rival claimants for the throne, the military orders, and the Italian states, consumed their strength. The remnant of the kingdom of Jerusalem seldom had an effective ruler of its own. The royal title was held nominally by the kings of Cyprus, or the Emperor Frederick, or his son Konradin, or some other descendant of former princes. In reality almost every town and castle acknowledged simply the authority of its own lord. Every district and every city made separate treaties with the Moslems. The military orders defended the border castles and were the principal stay of the kingdom. But their very existence and rivalries increased the elements of division in an already sorely divided state.

Saladin's dominions when he died were divided between three of his sons. El-malik el-asfal Nur ed-din 'Ali became ruler of Damascus and southern Syria, El-malik el-'aziz 'Imad ed-din 'Othman of Egypt, and El-malik ez-zahir Gıyath ed-

din Ġāzi of Aleppo and northern Syria. The division weakened the aggressive power of Islam, and tempted the brothers to engage in civil war. El-malik el-aḡḡal was the least popular, and war soon broke out between him and the sultan of Egypt. Their uncle, El-malik el-'aḡil Saif ed-din Muḡammed, Saladin's brother, gave his support finally to El-'aḡiz, and acting as his deputy became ruler of Damascus in 1196¹. In this position his independence was as great as he chose to make it, and when the Latins attempted to retrieve their situation somewhat it was El-'aḡil who took the lead against them.

The rivals for the throne of Jerusalem did not long survive the arrangement made regarding them (chap. V, p. 281 f.). Guy of Cyprus died in 1194 and was succeeded by his brother Amalric II. Henry of Champagne met his death by an accident in September 1197, and he also was succeeded by Amalric (October 1197). By this time the truce with the Moslems had expired² and the preparations for a fresh crusade had borne fruit in Europe. Henry VI of Germany, "the mightiest of the emperors," was the inspiring force of the movement, and the crusaders who reached Jerusalem in the autumn of 1197 were chiefly Germans. In the latter part of August, before the arrival of most of the pilgrims, El-'aḡil besieged Jaffa, and having captured it destroyed the fortifications and left it in ruins³. After this success he followed a purely defensive and rather timorous policy. When the crusaders moved against Beirut in October he ordered the town to be evacuated and the fortifications to be destroyed. His attack on the crusaders as they approached Sidon on the evening of the 22nd was in no way serious and ceased at nightfall. Next day the Latins occupied Beirut without resistance. The emir of the town had agreed, and indeed proposed, that the castle on its outskirts should be defended, but as soon as the Latins came in sight he and his garrison deserted their posts (23rd October). The crusaders remained in the town for a fortnight, whilst El-'aḡil further ruined the walls of Sidon and laid waste the country

¹ Sha'ban 593 = July 1196 (I.A. Kamil ii. 146).

² The truce as made with Saladin expired at Easter 1196 but was extended by El-'aḡiz after Saladin's death. See p. 286, n. 3.

³ I.A. Kamil ii. 84 ff. The capture was on a Friday in Shawal 593 and Röhricht 670, note 8, calculates it must have been on September 31st.

round Tyre¹. The following month was spent in Tyre itself and then Tibnin was besieged in December and January. Its defenders were so hardly pressed that they even negotiated regarding terms of surrender. Finally, however, the approach of considerable Moslem forces, gathered from various quarters, induced the Latins to break up the siege (2nd February)². Some of the German crusaders sailed home at once, having received news of the death of the emperor, which had taken place in the preceding September. In March, before the departure of the others, a Teutonic order of the knights of the Hospital was established. It was intended to be a German counterpart to the older orders, which were chiefly French and Italian in character. Both sides were now anxious to have peace. The Latins were too weak and the Moslems too divided to continue the war with advantage. It was agreed in June³ that there should be peace until the spring of 1204⁴, unless before that a crowned king came as a crusader to the Holy Land⁵. Both sides recognised the *status quo*. Jaffa remained a ruin, and the Latin occupation of Beirut and Jubail was formally acknowledged⁶. The revenues of the district of Sidon were

¹ Particulars are given by I.A. Kamil li. 86 and by a letter in the *Annales Colonienses* (Mon. Germ. xvii. 805).

² Festival of the Purification of the Virgin (Oliver in Eekhart li. 1395); 23rd Rabi' i 594 (A.S. v. 117, Goergens 220, according to whom the siege began on 16th Muharram, i.e. 28th November).

³ Sha'ban 594, ending 6th July (I.A. Kamil li. 89). Roger Hoveden iv. 68 dates the truce from the festival of St John (June 24th), A.S. from 14th Sha'ban = 21st June (Wilken v. 58 and Recueil v. 153) or 24th Sha'ban = 1st July (Goergens 220, note 2).

⁴ The duration of the truce as given by A.S., five years and eight months, may be accepted as correct (Recueil v. 153, Goergens 220, note 2). It is supported by Roger Hoveden's "six years" (iv. 68) and by the statement of Eracles li. 247 that the truce was in force in the spring of 1203. Abulf. iv. 166 f. and Makrizi ix. 97 give three years.

⁵ Roger Hoveden iv. 68; cf. Eracles li. 247.

⁶ Eracles li. 228; I.A. Kamil li. 89 mentions Beirut only. Jubail had been surrendered to its Latin owner shortly after Saladin's death (Eracles li. 217 = Emoul 305). Makrizi ix. 73 f. mentions negotiations which imply its being a Latin possession early in 1194 (Rabi' i 590). Possibly A.S. v. 153 gives the date of its recovery as the beginning of Šafar 590, i.e. end of January 1194. The sources which speak of its capture in 1197 are accordingly in error (*Annales* li. li. 434 f., Geste 15, Haithum i. 497). The fortifications of Sidon remained in ruins, although it may have had a Moslem population. The division of its revenues (I.A. Kamil li. 96) was also

partitioned between the contracting parties, and altogether the Latins had reason to be satisfied with the terms of the agreement. El-'adil's advantage was more personal to himself. The peace gave him an opportunity of becoming in reality Saladin's successor. After the death of El-'aziz (November 1198)¹ he made himself practically ruler of Syria and of Egypt. In the year 1200 he assumed the title of sultan, and after a brief war with Ez-zahir of Aleppo (1201) obtained acknowledgment of his dignity from him also (beginning 1202).

When Innocent III (1198-1216) became pope, in the beginning of 1198, a fresh impulse was given to the crusading movement throughout Europe. Under his inspiration the enthusiasm of the days of the first crusade revived again. Preparations were made for the transport to Palestine of what promised to be an overwhelming force. But just at the last moment, without any consultation with the Pope, the whole enterprise was diverted to war with Greece and to the conquest of Constantinople (1202-4). The long-standing feud between the Greeks and the Latins and the commercial interests of the republic of Venice led to this result. The crusaders were dependent on the Venetians for ships and Dandolo, doge of Venice, spoke the decisive word. Except a Flemish fleet only a comparatively insignificant portion of the crusade reached Syria at all (1203). None of its leaders were of sufficient rank to entitle Amalric to break his truce with the Moslems². Some went north to join in the war which was being waged between Bohemond of Antioch and Leo of Armenia³. Others were still in Akka when

provided for in Saladin's treaty (p. 286, n. 3). The statement of Roger Hoveslen iv. 28 that Sidon was captured during the crusade may refer to its occupation on the march to Beirut or to some modification of the arrangement regarding its revenues. He is equally misleading in other statements regarding this crusade (see p. 300, n. 1).

¹ Sunday night 20th Muharram 593, i.e. Saturday night 22nd November 1198 (A.S. v. 119, Cairo II. 234, line 16; El-'adil in A.S. Cairo II. 234, line 30; cf. Goergens 221 f.). In agreement with this date Makrizi ix. 101 calls the following day Monday 21st Muharram, although he dates the death itself on the night of the 27th Muharram (ix. 99, obviously from another source and in agreement with Abulf. iv. 168). There is presumably a textual error in the date of Ibn Kh. II. 196 (the night preceding *Wednesday* 21st Muharram 593).

² Eracles II. 247.

³ See pages 299 and 300, note 2.

the capture of two Latin ships off the coast of Cyprus, by Moslem galleys from the neighbourhood of Sidon, gave the king an excuse for commencing hostilities¹. Amalric and the troops in 'Akka began to raid the territories within reach of the town. Then, suddenly, pestilence broke out and further operations during that summer became impossible. Next year (1204) the news of the fall of Constantinople caused a perfect exodus of crusaders and of Syrian knights to Greece. In the circumstances it was the obvious policy of the Latins to make peace again. El-'adil was willing and ready to make concessions. No doubt he was alarmed by the fall of Constantinople and apprehensive of a fresh crusade. Jaffa was restored to the Latins and Nazareth again handed over to them. The division of the revenues of Sidon and of other districts was modified in their favour². The terms were agreed to in September 1204³ and the truce was to last until the summer of 1210⁴.

Early next year Amalric II died (1st April 1205). Hugh, his son, succeeded him in Cyprus, but the heiress of Jerusalem was a daughter of his wife, queen Isabel, by Conrad of Montferrat. In 1208 the young queen, whose name was Maria, was betrothed to John of Brienne. Their marriage took place in 'Akka in September 1210 and soon afterwards John was crowned king by the patriarch in Tyre. When the truce with El-'adil expired in the summer of 1210 the Latins refused to renew it even for a few months, until John's arrival, as the sultan proposed⁵. But the

¹ Eracles ii. 259 f. = Ernoul 354 f.

² I.A. ii. 96 (Nazareth and the revenues of Sidon); Abulf. iv. 212 f. and Makrizi (Jaffa and the revenues of Lud and Ramla).

³ Eracles ii. 263 = Ernoul 360 = Sanutus ii. 204 f. (most of the crusaders left in September and peace was made because of this); I.A. Kamil ii. 96 (beginning of A.H. 601, which commences 29th Aug. 1204). Makrizi ix. 129 and 134, has what may be regarded as a double reference to the same peace under A.H. 600 and A.H. 601 respectively. The former is inconsistent with p. 133. The most notable undertaking of the Latins in 1204 was a bold descent on Egypt near Damietta made by a fleet of twenty ships sent from 'Akka.

⁴ It is known that it expired in the summer before king John reached Palestine (note 3) and that his leaving home was timed by its expiry (Eracles ii. 308). Possibly the period was one of five years and forty days, reckoning the years to Easter 1210; Eracles ii. 309 refers to the forty days. Peace was temporarily broken in the spring of 1207 by the Latins of Cyprus seizing Egyptian ships. The prisoners were afterwards released by "the ruler of 'Akka" (I.A. Kamil ii. 106 f.; cf. Abulf. iv. 218).

⁵ Eracles ii. 309 = Sanutus ii. 203 f.

new king was not in any better position to wage war than his predecessor had been. His boldest undertaking was the landing of 1100 men near Damiatta for a few days in May 1211¹. The raids of the Latins in Palestine merely served to reveal how impotent they really were. El-'adil stationed some troops at Jebel et-tur, under his son El-mu'azzam of Damascus, and these sufficed to keep the garrison of 'Akka in check. The Latins were compelled to recognise the futility of their efforts to make war without assistance from Europe. In the spring or the summer of 1212 peace was renewed for another period of five years².

The history of Antioch continues to be largely independent of the course of events in southern Syria. Conflicts with the Armenian king Leo the Great are more prominent than wars with the Moslem states. The alteration in the balance of power produced by Saladin's attack may be measured by the success with which Leo dominated the policy of Antioch for many years. In pursuance of his plans he seized Bohemond III and made him a prisoner in the year following Saladin's death (1194). Bohemond soon accepted Leo's terms and a marriage was arranged between his eldest son Raymond and Leo's niece. After Raymond's death (1197) it was further agreed that Rupen, a child of this marriage, should inherit both Antioch and Armenia, Leo having no sons of his own. But Bohemond's second son, afterwards Bohemond IV of Antioch, who had been ruler of Tripolis since 1187, objected to the arrangement. He asserted his own claims and when his father died, in 1201,

¹ Hist. Patr. Alex. quoted by Blochet ix. 148 (Monday 24th Dhu'l-ka'da 607=8th May 1211, calendar date 9th May); A.S. v. 158 (Dhu'l-hijja 607); *Annales il.* 436 (A.H. 1211; the leader of the expedition was "Gautier de Mombeliard").

² The Moslems encamped there in Dhu'l-hijja 607 (Sibî in A.S. v. 158) and commenced to build a castle on the hill on Sunday, five days from the beginning of the month, i.e. 22nd May 1211 (Berchem, *Inscrip.* 460; cf. Makrizi ix. 146). I.A. Kamil ii. 108 speaks of the construction as in progress in A.H. 609 and it was completed in that year (Makrizi ix. 150). El-mu'azzam's headquarters were at Nabîns in Rabi' i 607 (=August 1210) according to Sibî in A.S. v. 156 ff. (where the *Recueil* dates are misprinted).

³ The date of the conclusion of peace is given by Sibî in A.S. (quoted in Berchem, *Inscrip.* 513) as towards the end of A.H. 608 (ends 2nd June 1212). The date of its expiry is determined approximately by the arrival of the crusade of 1217, which was timed to coincide with it.

successfully established himself in Antioch. This was the commencement of a long-continued struggle. Leo endeavoured to enforce the rights of his grand-nephew Rupen. Antioch was besieged and changed hands more than once. The knights Templars were on Bohemond's side, the knights Hospitallers on Leo's. Ez-zahir of Aleppo was a faithful ally of Bohemond's, so that the Armenians waged war with a combination of Latin and Moslem enemies¹. Leo's greatest triumph was gained in the beginning of 1216², when the Armenians occupied Antioch for the second time. Rupen was now maintained in power for nearly four years. After Leo's death, however, in 1219, he failed to make himself king in Cilicia and so lost Antioch also. Bohemond now ruled Antioch and Tripolis for fifteen years longer (1219-34), at peace with the Moslems for the most part, but still carrying on a bitter feud with the knights of the Hospital. The practical independence of the Hospitallers and their territorial claims, especially in Tripolis, multiplied occasions of conflict and dispute³. If there was no longer civil war, there was almost no co-operation against the neighbouring Moslem states. The earlier civil war in Antioch and the later divisions

¹ In A.H. 599 (ends 9th September 1203) Antioch was threatened by Leo (Makrizi ix. 125; cf. Gestes 16, Leo occupies Antioch for four days in 1203); in September 1204, Muharram 601, and also later in the year, Leo attacked Antioch and Ez-zahir came to Bohemond's assistance (Kem. Blochet 141 f.); in December 1206, Jumada I 602, Leo attacked the neighbourhood of Darlusaak which was a dependency of Aleppo (Kem. Blochet 142 f.); in the spring of 1206, Shawal 602, there was war between Leo and the Moslems of Aleppo; in the summer an eight years' peace was made in which Antioch was included (Kem. Blochet 143 f.; A.S. v. 134 f. gives some particulars of the same war); according to Kem. Blochet 145 Leo was compelled by the sultan of Rum in alliance with Aleppo to surrender Bagras to the Templars and to make peace with Antioch in A.H. 605 (16th July 1208—5th July 1209); perhaps the eight years' peace should be dated from this year. Regarding Bagras see note 2.

² Annales ii. ii. 436; Hattum l. 483; Ibn Wasil quoted by Blochet ix. 157 (Shawal 612, commencing 23rd January 1216). According to Ibn Wasil (ix. 157 and 159 f.) Leo now made peace with Aleppo and surrendered Bagras to the Templars. Præcles ii. 137 specifies the same date for the surrender of Bagras but is not self-consistent (see p. 258, n. 1).

³ Annales ii. ii. 439 puts Bohemond's death in 1233. Leroux 174, note 1 argues for a date in the beginning of 1234, which Annales would reckon part of 1233. Rupen's grants to the Hospitallers in Antioch were long a subject of contention with Bohemond. An agreement was at length come to in October 1231 (Leroux, Cartulaire ii. no. 1000). The rival claims of the Templars and the Hospitallers to Jabala were not settled until June 1233 (Leroux ii. 1739 and 2058). It appears that the Moslems and the Latins in some way shared Jabala all this time.

of the Latins in Tripolis combine to explain the fact that not a single conquest from the Moslems was made or even attempted in all these years.

Both Bohemond III and Bohemond IV found it to be to their advantage to maintain peace with Aleppo throughout the whole period of their government. Neither the crusade of 1197¹ nor that of 1203² affected the situation in the north, except to a very slight extent. Bohemond IV found Eẓ-zahir of Aleppo a useful ally in his Armenian wars and appears only once to have come into conflict with him, during an expedition against the castles of the Assassins in 1214³. The emirs of northern Syria, being El-'adil's vassals, were to some extent committed to his policy of peace with the Latins. Not one of them was individually powerful and everyone was suspicious of his neighbour and of their overlord, the sultan. Eẓ-zahir merely governed Aleppo and its neighbourhood. Hama was ruled by Naṣir ed-din Muḥammed (1191-1221), son of Taḳī ed-din 'Omar, and Homs by Asad ed-din Shirkuh the younger (1186-1240), grandson of Saladin's uncle Shirkuh. The Latins, accordingly, had little to fear from their Moslem neighbours in the north. In fact it was only the raids of the Hospitaller knights of Iḥṣān

¹ About the time of the Latin occupation of Beirut Eẓ-zahir ordered the destruction of the fortifications of Jabala and Laodicea, fearing that they might be occupied by the Latins. 'The alarm was groundless, and what had been destroyed was rebuilt' (Kem. Blochet 126 ff. = ix. 214 ff.; cf. *Annales Colonienses* in *Mon. Germ.* xvii. 403). Arnold of Lubek (*Mon. Germ.* xxi. 207) says Bohemond [III] visited the Latins in Beirut and he supposes that he took possession of Jabala and Laodicea on his way back, having found them deserted. Cf. *Hoveden* iv. 28 (these towns "captured" by the Christians). Bohemond was in friendly communication with the Moslems of Aleppo at this very time (Kem. Blochet 127). Regarding Jubail see p. 295, n. 6. In 1199 the Latins made an expedition against the Turkumans of El-'amk; after this Eẓ-zahir concluded peace with them (before the end of Rajab 595, Kem. Blochet 129).

² A party of 80 knights who came from 'Akka in the summer of 1203 were attacked near Laodicea by a Moslem emir and severely defeated (*Itinerary* ii. 247 f. = Ernoul 340 ff.; Kem. Blochet 138 f. under A.H. 599, ending 11th September 1203). In A.H. 600 fear of attack on Jabala and Laodicea led to Eẓ-zahir's ruining the walls of these towns. The fear was groundless and the walls were rebuilt (Kem. Blochet 140).

³ In Rajab 611 after the assassination of Bohemond's son (Kem. Blochet 148 f. = *Journal asiatique*, 1853, pp. 40-45). Troops from Cyprus, Tripolis and 'Akka were included in Bohemond's forces (Makrizi ix. 155). A.S. v. 139 mentions an expedition of someone (a "baillie") from Cyprus, who was defeated by Turkumans in the neighbourhood of Antioch in A.H. 609 (3rd June 1212-12nd May 1213).

el-akrad, Maṣkab and Ṣafītha that provoked hostilities. The emirs of Homs and Ḥama were generally glad to pay tribute for the sake of the security thus obtained. The Master of the Hospital made peace and war with them like an independent prince. Neither Bohemond nor Ez-zahir took much share in this border warfare¹. Nor did the death of the latter in October 1216² make much real change in the situation. Ez-zahir was succeeded by his son El-malik el-'aziz Giyath ed-din Muḥammed (1216-36), who was a mere child at the time. His atabek Shihab ed-din Ṭuḡril was governor of Aleppo for many years³. From 1218 onwards he acknowledged the supremacy of El-ashraf, a son of El-'adil whose possessions were chiefly in Mesopotamia⁴.

The occupation of Constantinople by the Latins and the opportunities for adventure and advancement thereby offered to the knights of western Europe undoubtedly diminished the number of crusaders to the Holy Land. But the children's crusades of the year 1212 are evidence of the strength of the religious motive which still swayed the hearts of the mass of the people. Innocent III also remained faithful to his ideals and was unwearied in his efforts on behalf of a new crusade. In 1213 he formally renewed his appeal to Christendom. Two years later the Lateran council (1215) sanctioned and enjoined

¹ During the summer of 1203 (Ramadan 599) the emir of Ḥama twice engaged unsuccessfully with the Hospitallers of Tripolis (Abulf. iv. 102, Makrizi ix. 126, 127 f.). Peace was made apparently at the end of the year (Abulf. iv. 106). In A.H. 601, ends 17th August 1205, peace expired and the Hospitallers made a raid against Ḥama before it was renewed (Abulf. iv. 112, Makrizi ix. 134 f.). In A.H. 603 (A.S. v. 153) Ḥama was attacked by the Latins and its emir received help from Aleppo (cf. Abu'l-mehasin quoted by Blochet, Kem. 142, note 1; also Makrizi ix. 135 under A.H. 601). Shortly afterwards there was an expedition from Tripolis against the territory of Jabala and Laodicea (Makrizi ix. 135). In the spring of 1207 El-'adil joined in the fray and attacked the castles and territory of Tripolis from the beginning of May onwards. Peace was made with Bohemond at the end of July (beginning of A.H. 604, Abulf. iv. 118, 120, or end of A.H. 603, Makrizi ix. 137; cf. I.A. Kamil ii. 105 f. under A.H. 604).

² On the 23rd night of Jumada II 613, after an illness lasting from the 25th Jumada I (Makrizi ix. 160). Possibly some words have fallen out of the text of Kem. Blochet 151, where 25th Jumada II appears as the date of his death.

³ For the circumstances of the accession of El-'aziz see Kem. Blochet 151 ff. and I.A. ii. 109 f. Ṭuḡril died 17th October 1233 (Monday 11th Muḥarram 631, Kem. Blochet 184, correcting 21 to 11), but El-'aziz had already assumed the reins of government in July 1231 (Kem. Blochet 180).

⁴ A.H. 615, ending 18th March 1219 (I.A. Kamil ii. 146).

the project of a crusade which was appointed to sail in the summer of 1217. Pope Innocent died in 1216 but the event did not seriously affect the numbers of those who took part in the crusade. Austrians and Hungarians were most numerous represented. They landed in Palestine in the autumn of 1217. Hugh of Cyprus and Bohemond of Tripolis joined the crusaders in 'Akka. There were the usual discussions and disagreements. Supplies of food were got with difficulty and the Syrian Latins suffered discourtesy and ill-treatment from those who came as their defenders. Several movements of minor importance were made before the end of the year. A strong force aided the dependencies of Damascus for about a fortnight. The invaders proceeded directly from 'Akka to Baisan, where they made rich booty. They then crossed the Jordan, south of Lake Tiberias and moved north-eastwards in the direction of Khisfin and Nuwa. El-'adil was watching them and fell back on Ras el-ma. Before returning to 'Akka they seem to have advanced further north and to have spent three days in the neighbourhood of Ilanyas. The inhabitants of Damascus were greatly alarmed and very apprehensive of being attacked. But the expedition was a mere raid in search of plunder¹. Soon afterwards a badly-planned attack on the Moslem fortress situated on Jebel eṣ-ṣur was triumphantly repulsed by the garrison and lasted only a week². Before Christmas an expedition of five hundred crusaders into the hill country near Sidon came to a disastrous ending³. These undertakings cannot be regarded as serious operations worthy of the strength of the crusade. But already many of the pilgrims

¹ The line of march of the expedition in the country east of Jordan is given by I.A. ii. 112 and A.S. v. 160 ff. (Wilken vi. 147, note 31). Cf. Makrizi ix. 162 f. Oliver's account is not so definite (Eck. II. 1398 = Guizot 329 f.). I.A.'s date is too late in the year (between the middle of Ramaḍān and the beginning of Shawāl).

² According to A.S. (Wilken vi. 150, notes 39 and 40) from Wednesday 28th Sha'ban to Thursday 6th Ramaḍān (29th November—7th December). Cf. Makrizi ix. 163 (ten days). In I.A. ii. 114, seventeen days should probably be seven days (length of attack). In the Recueil text of A.S. the error lies in 28th Sha'ban and the day of the week is not to be altered as the editor suggests. Oliver's account harmonises with A.S. and these writers give most particulars. Makrizi ix. 467 has a second reference to the attack on Jebel eṣ-ṣur, derived probably from I.A.

³ Most particulars are given by A.S. v. 164 f. (Wilken vi. 155, note 45). The date is Oliver's. De Vitry, Z.K.G. xv. 569 makes the object of the expedition "Belfort...apud Belinas," and Makrizi ix. 466 says Sidon and Shaḥif were both sacked.

were disinclined to prolong their stay in Palestine and spoke of returning home. The most serious defection was that of king Andrew of Hungary. In the beginning of 1218 in spite of all persuasion to the contrary and in spite of the patriarch's threat of excommunication he left 'Akka, taking with him all his ships and men and materials of war. The condition of his kingdom and the state of his health were the excuses which he gave. The king and patriarch occupied the remainder of the winter in erecting a strong tower at Caesarea and the Templars strengthened and enlarged their fortress of 'Athlith. This latter now became the principal stronghold of the order in Syria.

In the spring of 1218 the strength of the crusade was further diminished by the departure of some who returned home, but was greatly increased by a fleet of Germans who came chiefly from the province of Cologne. A council of war was held at which it was decided to attempt the conquest of Egypt. Damietta, a seaport on one of the eastern branches of the Nile, was chosen as the best point of attack. The Latins landed on the 29th of May¹. In front of the city, in mid-stream, was a tower connected with the town by a bridge and by a chain or several chains, which prevented ships from ascending the Nile. Assaults on this tower completely absorbed the attention and efforts of the besiegers until the 25th of August, when at length it was captured². News of the disaster is said to have caused El-'adil's death (31st August 1218)³. But neither the death of the sultan nor the capture of the tower exercised much influence on the course of events. El-'adil was succeeded in Egypt by his son El-malik el-kamil Naṣir ed-din Muḥammed and in Damascus by his second son El-malik el-mu'azzam Sharaf ed-din 'Isa. Both had been provincial governors for many years.

During all this time the Latin camp was on the western bank

¹ Tuesday 29th May (de Vitry, Z.K.G. xv. 573), Tuesday after Ascension Day (Oliver, Eck. ii. 1402). So also Makrizi ix. 468 and 475. In Ibn Kh. iv. 143, 12th is a textual error for 2nd (Tuesday 12th Rabi' i 615).

² The day after St Bartholomew's Day, 24th August (Oliver, Eck. ii. 1405 = Guizot 347).

³ 7th Jumada ii 615 (Abulfi. iv. 226, I.A. ii. 142, Ibn Kh. iii. 238), a Friday (A.S. v. 170) or a Thursday (Makrizi ix. 469). In Yakut 89 there is an error in the day as well as in the month (Sunday 7th Jumada i 615). Presumably death took place on the night of the 30th or the morning of the 31st.

of the Nile, separated by the river from Damietta. El-kamil lay with an army a short distance higher up and effectually guarded a bridge by which the Latins might have crossed to the eastern side. The annual rise of the river and the ravages of disease increased the difficulties of the invaders. It was not until February¹ that a fortunate circumstance secured them a footing on the other side of the Nile. El-kamil discovered a plot amongst his emirs and secretly left his camp one night. When this became known next morning the Egyptian troops retreated in a panic and left the way clear for the Latins. The city was now closely invested and slowly starved into surrender. El-kamil was reinforced by his brother El-mu'azzam and resumed his position in the neighbourhood. He made frequent and vigorous attacks on the besiegers, but without gaining any notable success. In September², when the position of the defenders became critical, he entered into negotiations with the Latins. But the terms he offered were rejected³. Finally, when the garrison could no longer offer much resistance, the town was stormed on Tuesday the 5th of November (1219)⁴.

¹ There is remarkable uncertainty regarding the date. Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1408 gives the day following the festival of St Agatha, i.e. the day after Tuesday 6th February. Makrizi ix. 475 has both Tuesday 6th Dhu'l-ka'da 615, possibly Tuesday 12nd January (calendar date 24th January) and 21st Dhu'l-ka'da 616 (calendar date 8th February in the correct year 615). The latter date supports Oliver, the former is the day after the festival of St Agnes. De Vitry, *Z.K.G.* xv. 583, "Imminente Quadragesima," also supports Oliver. Eracles ii. 336 f., the day after the festival of St John (i.e. Tuesday 13th June), may be an error either for Oliver's date or for the first of Makrizi's.

² Negotiations commence after a fight which took place on the day of the execution of St John (29th August) and continue until the day before the festival of Cosmas and Damien (Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1413 = Guizot 367 f.). These same negotiations are still referred to by Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1414 = Guizot 369 f.

³ His offers were gradually increased (Eracles ii. 338 ff.). But the alleged offer to restore the whole kingdom of Jerusalem except Kerak and Shaubak (Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1414 = Guizot 370) must be an exaggeration. De Vitry's more exact statement implies considerably less (*Z.K.G.* xvi. 74 = Guizot 393). Even at a later stage the report of such an offer is to be received with caution (see p. 305, n. 2).

⁴ Sanutus ii. 208, Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1415 = Guizot 372, de Vitry, *Z.K.G.* xvi. 77 = Guizot 395 f.; also A.S. v. 176 (Tuesday 25th Sha'ban 616) and Ibn Kh. iv. 143 (Tuesday 16th Sha'ban 616); the latter mentions as an alternative 17th Sha'ban, which is I.A.'s date (ii. 119) and Yakul's (Derenbourg 89). According to a letter to Martène's *Collectio* v. 1479 the attack began at night and the citadel held out until the middle of next day. Abulfida's date (= Kem. Blochet 161) is certainly erroneous (10th Ramaḍan = 19th November).

After this prolonged siege the invaders were in no position to continue their campaign at once. Many of the crusaders, indeed, having discharged their vows, returned to Europe. King John and the papal legate quarrelled regarding the possession of the town and the division of the spoils. When these questions were settled the king sailed to Cilicia where a war of succession was in progress. Maria was dead and John had married a daughter of Leo the Great, so that his child by this marriage had a claim to the throne. Others of the knights left for Syrin, where El-mu'azzam attempted next year to create a diversion (1220). In this to some extent he succeeded. The town of Caesarea was evacuated and laid in ruins. The castle of 'Athlith was twice attacked but unsuccessfully. During the siege of Damietta the Moslems had destroyed the walls of some of the places they held in Palestine and this work of destruction was now carried further¹. There was great alarm in Egypt and the movements of the Tartars in Mesopotamia just at this time were an additional cause of anxiety. El-kamil was still disposed to make concessions for the sake of peace. But even his most favourable offers were not accepted. They included the restoration of Jerusalem and the surrender apparently of at least the revenues of a large part of Palestine².

Meantime the papal legate urged an advance from Damietta and was supported by the enthusiasm of many pilgrims who had freshly arrived from Europe. In 1221 the importance of starting before the rising of the Nile was urged and recognised. But by

¹ Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1412 (Jerusalem, Safed and Jebel el-jur); cf. de Vitry, Z.K.G. xvi. 74 = *Gulizat* 393 (Jerusalem, Safed, Shakhif, Banyas). Jebel el-jur was destroyed before El-'adil's death (A.S. v. 165 f.), Banyas and Tibnin by El-mu'azzam in the autumn of 1218 (A.S. v. 171). The destruction of the walls of Jerusalem commenced in March 1219 (Abu'l-mahasin quoted by Blochet, *Kem.* 159, 1st Muharram 616; *Kem.* Blochet 162, beginning of A.H. 616; cf. A.S. v. 173 f.). The month when El-mu'azzam returned to Palestine for the purpose of effecting this destruction is given by I.A. Kamil ii. 119 as Dhu'l-ka'da [615].

² De Vitry, Z.K.G. xvi. 109, mentions the fact without naming the terms. I.A. Kamil ii. 122 (= Makrizi ix. 490) and Abul. iv. 304 do not appear to be independent of one another; they explicitly name Jerusalem, Ascalon, 'Tiberias, (Sidon), Jabala and Laodicea, which are not at all equivalent to their summary statement "all Saladin's conquests except Kerak and Shanjak." A large offer such as the latter statement expresses is however more comprehensible now than previously. See p. 304, n. 3.

the time everyone was ready it was nearly the middle of July¹. It was decided to march directly from Damietta to Cairo, although the route was a difficult one for an invading army at the season of the year. El-knīl was posted at Mansūra where his front was protected by the Bahṛ Ashmun, a branch of the Nile which the Latins would have to cross on their way. The emirs of northern Syria, including El-nshraf, had joined forces with the Egyptians in the early part of the year². At Fariskur, three miles from Damietta, the Latins mustered 4000 bowmen, 1200 knights and a large number of mounted men, besides infantry. Their advance from there to the Bahṛ Ashmun occupied a week. As they marched along the right bank of the Nile in close order they were only slightly harassed by Moslem attacks. On the 24th of July they encamped in the triangle that is formed by the Ashmun and the branch of the Nile that flows past Damietta. Further advance was impossible in the face of the enemy and a fortified camp was accordingly constructed. The danger of the position soon became apparent. The ships sent to Damietta for provisions were cut off on their return journey, being captured or sunk (18th August). The Moslems having gained the river at once blocked the lines of communication by land also. In a few days the Latins came to the conclusion that they must endeavour to force their way back to Damietta (Thursday 26th August)³. It was arranged to start at nightfall. "The tents were set on fire as if to inform the enemy of the retreat and to invite them to awake and pursue us⁴." It was altogether a hopeless undertaking. By next morning the main body, on the shore, was surrounded and cut off from the river and from the ships which carried most of the provisions. The sluices of the Nile were opened and the country was flooded.

¹ King John returned from Syria on Wednesday, 7th July (Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1427, the day after Tuesday "in octava Apostolorum"); on the 17th of July (16th Kal. August) the army mustered at Fariskur (Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1428, "Phariscum").

² El-nshraf joined his brother in Muharram 618, i.e. February 1221 (Ibn Kh. iii. 488). Wilken vi. 331, note 44, quotes Makrizi for 23rd Jumada ii (14th August) and A.S. for 3rd Rajab (23rd August). Cf. also Wilken, note 45.

³ 7th Kal. September (Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1434); evening of Friday 7th Rajab 618, i.e. the night of Thursday 26th August (Ibn Kh. iii. 741). The dates and particulars in this paragraph without special reference are derived from Oliver, *Eck.* 1428-37.

⁴ Abbreviation of a sentence of Oliver's (*Eck.* ii. 1434).

Although the crusaders kept the enemy at bay during the whole of Friday further retreat was impossible. They sent envoys to El-kamil on Saturday to request terms of surrender. The sultan thought it best not to press his advantage unduly. After the necessary consultations and interchange of messages exceedingly moderate terms were agreed to and embodied in a treaty, which was signed on Monday the 30th of August¹. The chief provisions were that Damietta should be surrendered, the prisoners on both sides set at liberty and the duration of peace fixed for a term of eight years² or until the arrival of a western king³. This last condition was understood to apply particularly to the emperor Frederick II. Damietta was surrendered on the 8th of September (1221)⁴.

Frederick II of Germany took the crusaders' vow in 1215, on the day when he was crowned king. During the siege of Damietta he gave energetic support to the movement in Europe but he found it inconvenient to leave his dominions at the time himself. In 1221 he sent reinforcements to Egypt and made preparations to follow them. His failure to carry out his intention was publicly reprovved by the Pope as a cause of the disastrous issue of the crusade. In 1222 it was arranged that he should marry Isabella daughter of king John of Jerusalem, who was heiress to the kingdom through her mother. The marriage was celebrated in November 1225 and Frederick thereupon claimed the title king of Jerusalem in virtue of his wife's lineage and in spite of her father's protests. Extensive preparations were commenced for a crusade which was to start in the summer of 1227. But again, at the last moment, the emperor's departure was postponed on account of the state of his health. Gregory IX

¹ Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1437; Ibn Kh. iii. 241 gives 11th Rajab (calendar date 31st August). I.A. Kamil ii. 124 gives 7th Rajab (the day of the retreat) as the date of the treaty (cf. p. 306, n. 3).

² Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1438, Sanutus ii. 210, William de Nangis in Guizot 130, Eracles ii. 351, Ralph of Coggeshale 189. According to Oliver the prisoners to be released included all taken since the time of Saladin. Cf. Maqrizi ix. 493. Similarly Eracles.

³ Oliver, *Eck.* ii. 1438. Cf. p. 295, n. 5.

⁴ Wednesday 19th Rajab 618 (Abulf. iv. 306; Maqrizi ix. 493; Ibn el-khaimi quoted by Ibn Kh. iv. 143), or 20th Rajab 618 (Kem. Blochet 164, where 618 is an obvious textual error). In I.A. Kamil ii. 125 9th Rajab is a textual error.

(1227-41), the new pope, regarded this as a mere excuse and launched a bull of excommunication against him. When Frederick protested that he was ready to start the Pope forbade him. In those circumstances the emperor sailed in June 1228, and having spent some time in Cyprus asserting his claim to the island and arranging for its government, he landed in 'Akka on the 7th of September¹.

The course of events in Syria since the peace of Damietta may be very briefly summarised. Affairs in Cyprus had been productive of much internal strife among the Latins. The jealousies of El-'adil's sons had led to frequent wars among the Moslems. Although Tripolis and Antioch were not included in the peace neither party had much leisure even for the border warfare which was usual in the north². The crusaders who left Europe in 1227, when Frederick should have sailed, did not open hostilities in Syria. Many returned home when they learned that Frederick had postponed his departure but about 800 knights and 10,000 foot soldiers remained, awaiting his arrival³. On the 28th of October it was decided to proceed at once to fortify Caesarea and, after this work was finished, to strengthen Jaffa in the same way⁴. The pilgrims seem however to have worked at several points throughout the winter. The Teutonic knights Hospitallers were occupied in building

¹ Vigil of the Nativity of the Virgin (Mt. Paris lib. 159).

² In June or July 1218 El-ashraf made an incursion into the territory of Tripolis in order to effect a diversion in favour of the defenders of Damietta. He plundered the *rabad* (suburbs) of Safitha and IJijn el-akrad and ravaged the country round. An attack on the territory of Aleppo by the sultan of Rum called him away (Kem. Blochet 155 f.; cf. Abu'l-mehasin in Blochet's note, p. 155 and A.S. v. 166). In June 1212 El-mu'azzam ("Coradinus") made an expedition against Guy of Jubail, who refused to recognise the peace. He was compelled to make a separate truce (Oliver, Eek. ii. 1450). About the same time or a little later Bohemond IV attacked some Turks who had invaded Armenia (Oliver 1450). On another occasion when Bohemond invaded Armenia (A.H. 623) the Armenians were assisted by Shihab ed-din of Aleppo (I.A. Kamil ii. 170). In A.H. 624 (commences 22nd December 1216) there were conflicts between the Templars and the Moslems followed by peace with Antioch (I.A. Kamil ii. 170).

³ Mt. Paris lib. 160 (cf. Gerold's letter to the Pope in 1227 in Mt. Paris lib. 128). The figures may include the strength of the military orders as well as of the crusaders.

⁴ Letter of Gerold (Mt. Paris lib. 129). Eracles ii. 365 makes the work at Caesarea commence a month after Easter (1228).

a new castle for themselves not far from Şafed¹. Others went to Sidon, where they fortified an island in front of the harbour by erecting a wall and two towers². This proceeding was really a breach of the conditions of the truce, for the town was jointly inhabited by Moslems and Christians, or at least the revenues of the district were divided between them, and the walls were left in ruins in order that neither side might gain undue advantage³. Jaffa was still untouched when Frederick arrived in Palestine.

Frederick's relations both with the Christians and the Moslems were now somewhat peculiar. He brought with him only a small number of his own followers. He soon discovered, if indeed he was not previously aware, that he could not depend on the support either of the crusaders or of the Syrian Latins. The Pope sent word that his leadership should not be recognised. The Templars and the knights of St John held aloof. The supporters of John of Brienne and of the recently deposed governor of Cyprus, John of Beirut, were his enemies. It is probably significant that the fortification of Jaffa was the only military operation that he undertook. This was not his own plan nor was it carried out by his authority. It occupied the Latins from the 25th of November to the beginning of March⁴. But by this time

¹ *Annales* ii. ii. 438 and *Hithum* i. 483 mention its building under the year 1226. Frederick's letter of March 1229 possibly implies that it was then still unfinished (*Mt. Paris* iii. 175). The castle is called *Kurnin* by Arabic writers.

² *Eracles* ii. 365 = *Sanutus* ii. 211. The work lasted from Martinmas (11th November) to the middle of Quadragesima (beginning of March 1226). It was complete when Frederick arrived (*Eracles* ii. 369). *Annales* ii. ii. 438 mentions the fortification of Sidon under A.D. 1227. *Abulf.* iv. 348 attributes the work to Frederick himself (*A. II.* 625).

³ *Abulf.* iv. 348; *I. A. Kamil* ii. 171. In the beginning of March 1228 (end of Rabi' i 625) the Moslems had made a raid in the neighbourhood of Tyre (*A. S.* v. 185 f.).

⁴ Frederick's letter in *Mt. Paris* iii. 173 says he reached Jaffa "xv^o die mensis Novembris." As, however, he left 'Akka about St. Clement's Day (Gerold's letter iii. 102, as cited p. 312, n. 4), i.e. 23rd November, 25th in *Mt. Paris* may be assumed to be a textual error for 25th. *Makrizi* ix. 320 says that A. II. 625 ended whilst El-kamil was still at Tell 'ajul and Frederick in 'Akka. Although this statement is inexact in either case, it tends to confirm the later date, 25th November (*A. II.* 625 ended on 29th November 1228). The date when the fortification of Jaffa was completed may be inferred from the fact that Frederick visited Jerusalem (after the work was completed) on the 17th of March. Hermann's letter (in *Mon. Germ. Legum* ii. 263) says that Jaffa had been strongly fortified by Sexagesima Sunday (18th February). Further additions to the fortifications were also contemplated (Gerold's letter iii.

Frederick had negotiated a treaty with the Moslems on his own authority and without consulting those who were generally most important in such affairs, the masters of the military orders and the papal legate, who was Gerold the patriarch of Jerusalem.

The emperor's intention to make an expedition to Palestine was well known beforehand to the Moslems. El-kamil actually sent envoys to negotiate with him in Europe. There can be no doubt that he offered concessions in Palestine at the expense of his brother El-mu'azzam, similar probably to those he was previously willing to grant to the crusaders in Egypt. Frederick seems to have thought that the sultan might perhaps restore the whole kingdom of Jerusalem as it had been before Saladin's victories. It is incredible that El-kamil should have entertained such an idea at any time and, besides, the situation in Moslem Syria immediately before and after Frederick's arrival had altered very much to the sultan's advantage. His great rival El-mu'azzam of Damascus died in the latter part of the year 1227 (12th November)¹, and Palestine was occupied by an Egyptian army in the summer of 1228². Damascus remained in the hands of El-mu'azzam's son El-malik en-naşir Da'ud, whose claims were at first recognised by his uncle El-malik el-ashraf, sultan of Euphratesia and overlord of northern Syria. About the end of November (1228), however, El-ashraf agreed that El-kamil should retain Palestine on condition that Damascus should be conceded to himself³. The assurance of the Moslem sultans that Frederick was not a serious menace to their schemes may be inferred from the fact that El-ashraf now commenced the siege of Damascus and devoted himself to this undertaking

107). *Annales* ii. ii. 438 mentions the event under A.D. 1228; also that two towers were built at Jaffa in A.D. 1230.

¹ Ibn Kh. ii. 429 (8th hour of Friday 30th Dhu'l-ka'da 624, calendar date 11th November, or the evening of 1st Dhu'l-hijja; i.e. Thursday night or Friday morning).

² Makrizi ix. 516f.

³ El-ashraf entered Damascus as Da'ud's ally in the last ten days of Ramađan 625, 24th August—2nd September 1228 (*Abulf.* iv. 346; *Makrizi* ix. 517). El-ashraf joined El-kamil near Ascalon on the 10th of November ("jour de la fête des sacrifices 625," *Hist. Patr. Alex.* quoted by Blochet, *Rev. Or. Lat.* ix. 319; cf. *Abulf.* iv. 346) and the agreement between the sultans was made at Tell 'ajul, in the neighbourhood of Ascalon and Gaza, at the end of A.H. 625, i.e. before 30th November 1228 (*Abulf.* iv. 346). El-ashraf set out for Damascus in the beginning of A.H. 626 (beginning of December 1228).

during the remainder of the emperor's stay in Palestine. The small number of Frederick's troops was necessarily known to the Moslems and so also, no doubt, was the notorious division between the papal and the imperial parties. It is not surprising, then, that the course of the negotiations between the sultan of Egypt and the emperor did not run smoothly. They commenced immediately after Frederick's arrival¹ and they lasted, with one slight interruption², for five months. During the earlier part of this time the emperor was encamped near 'Akka; from the 25th of November onwards he was at Jaffa. Possibly the proposal to fortify Jaffa was a consequence of the discovery that a settlement could not be speedily attained³. The stages of the negotiations can only be conjectured. Presumably the final agreement lay between the extreme proposals at first made by each side⁴. Frederick had no means of enforcing his demands. During the winter, also, he heard that his presence was much required in Europe, where his enemies were taking advantage of his absence. On the other hand, the siege of Damascus made no progress and there was a danger that the emperor might ally himself with El-malik en-naṣir Da'ud. A large degree of friendly feeling and mutual respect between the sultan and the emperor and their respective envoys may also have influenced the result. Both princes were eminently men of culture, and unlike most of their contemporaries remarkably tolerant of differences of religious opinion and practice.

¹ Gerold's circular letter in *Mt. Paris* iii. 180; representatives of the emperor landed before the fortifications of Sidon were complete and they had already had interviews with the sultan (*Ernoul* 160 f.).

² When the Latins began the fortification of Jaffa they seized supplies from the adjoining villages. The sultan complained of this and of the whole undertaking as being inconsistent with the carrying on of negotiations. Frederick gave compensation for what had been taken by force, but the sultan broke off negotiations for a short time and harassed the crusaders by cutting off stragglers (*Gerold's letter to the Pope* iii. 103, as cited p. 312, n. 4).

³ Cf. *Eracles* li. 372 = *Sanutus* ii. 213. El-kamil was at Nablus when Frederick arrived and it was after he had moved to Forbiya near Gaza that the emperor decided to fortify Jaffa (*Eracles* li. 369 ff.). Da'ud of Damascus was encamped at Naldus for a short time in the latter part of November and the beginning of December (*Abulf.* iv. 346-348). Hermann's statement that Da'ud was at Nablus and El-ashraf with El-kamil near Gaza whilst Frederick was at Jaffa (*Mon. Germ. Legum* ii. 263) is not to be understood of the whole period of the fortification of Jaffa (cf. p. 310, n. 3).

⁴ There are indications of this in *Reinaud's* extracts. The earliest proposals are vaguely stated in *Eracles* li. 370 f.

A treaty was drawn out and signed on the 18th of February (1229)¹. It was agreed that there should be peace for ten years², dating from the 24th of the month³. Most of the special articles embodied concessions by the sultan to the emperor.

The outstanding feature of the treaty is the provision that Jerusalem should again become a Latin town. But the mosques on the temple hill and the whole sacred area are excepted and a free right of pilgrimage is expressly provided for⁴. Bethlehem and Nazareth were also handed over to the Latins and the roads to Nazareth and Jerusalem were made secure by the surrender of certain villages on the way⁵. Other concessions were the fortress of Tibnin, the town of Sidon and part at least of the surrounding district⁶. The most important provisions yet un-

¹ Frederick's letter in Mt. Paris iii. 175; Rabi' ii in El-'aini ii. 191 is probably a textual error for Rabi' i: cf. nota 3.

² Frederick's letter in Mt. Paris iii. 175; Gerold i. 297 (as cited in note 4); Ernoul 463; de Nangis, *Univ.* 143. Renaud 430, without naming his source, gives ten years, five months and some days; Makrizi ix. 524, ten years, five months and forty days. The difference between the length of the Christian and the Moslem years explains the additional five months.

³ 28th Rabi' i 626 (Makrizi ix. 524).

⁴ Full particulars of the sultan's concessions are given in Frederick's letter (Mt. Paris, iii. 175 f.) and in a letter of Gerold to the Pope (Hilliard-Breholles, *Historia diplomat.* iii. 101 ff.). Extracts from the treaty with Gerold's comments are given in Mon. Germ. *Epistolarum*, saec. xiii, i. 296 ff. The list of surrenders in Eracles ii. 374 = Sanutus ii. 213 is: Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, villages on the road to Jerusalem, land of Toton (Tibnin), the part of Sidon which the Moslems held and the plain of Sidon. Gestes 49 and Annales ii. ii. 438 name only Jerusalem, Nazareth and Lydda (Lud).

⁵ There was a general provision that the Latins were to exercise no authority in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, but Bethlehem and certain villages on the way from 'Akka to Jerusalem were expressly assigned to them (Kem. Blochet 175 f. = Rev. Or. Lat. v. 75 f.). Besides Bethlehem two very small casalia between it and Jerusalem were granted to the Latins (Gerold's letter to the Pope iii. 105; cf. Hermann's letter ii. 264). El-'aini ii. 189, quoting the tarikhi Bahars, Makrizi ix. 525 and Gerold's comments all emphasise the fact that the casalia round Jerusalem were to be Moslem. En-nawairi in El-'aini ii. 188 mentions the surrender of the villages between 'Akka and Jerusalem and El-'amid, in El-'aini ii. 191, names particularly Lud (similarly Makrizi ix. 525). Hermann ii. 263 f. specifies Ramla and the casalia on both sides of the road between it and Jerusalem, Gerold's letter iii. 105 those on the direct road between Jaffa and Jerusalem. Nazareth is distinctly represented as a new concession by Frederick and Hermann and Eracles (= Sanutus), Gerold's letter iii. 105 says the villages between 'Akka and Nazareth were "duo casalia modica."

⁶ Tibnin and Hunain were apparently still in ruins and unoccupied at this time (I.A. Kamil ii. 171). Makrizi ix. 526 confirms the surrender of Tibnin and its territory.

mentioned are those regarding the release of prisoners on both sides¹, the fortifications that might be constructed in Palestine², and an article which bound Frederick to maintain the treaty against all parties and to abstain from assisting the knights of Tripolis and Antioch in their wars with the Moslems³.

The terms of this agreement were severely and resentfully criticised on both sides. The Christians expressed no gratitude for what they gained; they never weighed their chances of being able to obtain more by other means; they regarded the treaty as a shameful compromise and a base surrender. The Moslems gave themselves over to bitter lamentation with more excuse. They were not consoled by the reflection that they still might freely visit Jerusalem on pilgrimage, that the surrender did not greatly affect the military situation and that for ten years the Latins of the south were bound to neutrality when there was war in Tripolis or Antioch. The shameful fact remained that Jerusalem had been betrayed and that the holy places were voluntarily given over into the hands of infidels. Both the sultan and the emperor, accordingly, suffered much abuse and, in Frederick's case at least, actual insult. As soon as the emperor visited Jerusalem it was placed under an inter-

Gerold lii. 103 asserts it was not to be fortified. The revenues of Sidon previous to its recent occupation had been shared by the Latins and the Moslems (Abulf. iv. 348). The Latins were now conceded all the town and the surrounding plain (Frederick's letter). But part of the "district" may still have been Moslem, as is stated in a letter in Mon. Germ. xxvii. 461 (cf. p. 318, n. 1). This letter includes the road to the Jordan in its list of concessions.

¹ The prisoners made during the recent hostilities and also those captured at Damietta and not yet released were to be set free (Hermann's letter ii. 164, as cited p. 311, n. 3).

² Frederick's letter states that the right to fortify Jerusalem, Jaffa, Caesarea, Sidon and the Teutonic castle of Sancta Maria (p. 309, n. 1) was expressly conceded (so also Hermann with Sidon omitted). Gerold's letter iii. 103 adds Bethlehem. Article I of the treaty (p. 312, n. 4) authorises the emperor or his representatives to fortify Jerusalem. Gerold, in his letter and comments, criticises this concession as one which is personal to the emperor. Such a limitation accounts, no doubt, for the statements of the *tarikh Balbars* (in *El-'ain* ii. 189) and Abulf. iv. 350 that the wall of Jerusalem was not to be repaired; Makrizi ix. 513, who says that even the emperor was not to rebuild the walls, interprets his sources wrongly. As a matter of fact the town was not fortified until peace expired in 1239; cf. p. 314, n. 1. Frederick and Hermann and Ernoul 465 claim that the sultan bound himself not to fortify his possessions. The obligation can only have applied to some specified case or cases.

³ Gerold's extracts (p. 312, n. 4).

dict by the authority of the patriarch Gerold¹. In 'Akka Frederick had to face scenes of rioting and recrimination. Having made what arrangements he could for the government of his eastern kingdom he sailed on the 1st of May², leaving behind him a mixed legacy of benefit and of strife.

In spite of the dislike with which the treaty of 1229 was regarded on both sides it was soon practically accepted as a good working arrangement. At first, while El-kamil's authority in Palestine was not secure, Moslem discontent found vent in riotous attacks upon the pilgrims in Jerusalem and on the roads to the holy places³. But this was merely an ebullition of popular feeling, easily dealt with and quickly suppressed. After the reconciliation of the Pope and the emperor, in the summer of 1230, all parties agreed to recognise accomplished facts. Antioch and Tripolis being as usual outside the scope of the treaty, the military orders had still an outlet for their activity in this direction. During 1229-31, for a few months in 1233, and again in 1235-37 there were conflicts with neighbouring emirs, especially on the borders of Tripolis⁴. But once more internal party

¹ The emperor's visit lasted from the evening of Saturday 17th March to the early morning of the following Monday. The account of Gerold's letters (op. cit. lii. 109 ff. and Mt. Paris lii. 180 f.) is to be supplemented by the friendly account of Hermann (op. cit. ii. 165). It is difficult to understand Frederick's abrupt departure except as a consequence of the interdict. Gerold represents his departure "*summo diluvium*" (Eracles ii. 374 "*À mie nuit*") as hasty and blameworthy, but he says nothing of the interdict which, according to Hermann, had been already pronounced that very day. On Sunday Frederick discussed the question of fortifying the town and promised to announce his plans next day. He left on Monday without making any communication on the subject, and when he was overtaken and asked his intentions he was obviously not in a mood for co-operating with the party which had just treated him, as he must have felt, so shamefully.

² Gerold's circular letter (Mt. Paris lii. 184).

³ See especially Eracles ii. 383 ff.

⁴ The district of Barin was pillaged in November 1229 (end of A.H. 626, I.A. Kamil ii. 180). The knights of Iḥṣān el-akrad were repulsed by the troops of Hama in the summer of 1230 (Ramadan 627, El-'aṣni ii. 174; cf. Abulf. iv. 360). In A.H. 628 Jabala was plundered by the Latins and they were attacked in their turn by the troops of Aleppo (I.A. Kamil ii. 180). According to Kem. Blochet 179 f. the Moslems ravaged the vicinity of Marḡab in Rabī' ii 628 (February 1231) and ruined the citadel of Balanyas. There was an indecisive engagement and peace was made on 30th Sha'ban (23rd June 1231) with both the Templars and the Hospitallers (cf. p. 299, n. 3). In 1233 the emir of Hama discontinued payment of tribute to the knights of Iḥṣān el-akrad and the Latins made incursions into his territory. El-kamil and El-asraf on their way to Armenia Minor arranged a renewal of peace and tribute was again paid

strife absorbed the best energies of the Latins and overshadowed all phases of the Moslem war. Frederick's interference in eastern affairs inaugurated a period of bitter civil strife in Cyprus and in Syria. His temporary reconciliation with the Pope did not eradicate the enmity with which many regarded him. John of Beirut led the opposition. The emperor sent forces to maintain his rights under the command of Marshal Richard Filangieri. Cyprus was soon completely lost to the imperial party. In 1232 'Akka also was taken from them. In 1234 Theodoric, archbishop of Ravenna, was sent to deal with the situation as papal legate. But the Pope's relations with Frederick again took a turn for the worse and no agreement was reached. The schism in the state continued although hostilities on both sides were suspended. John of Beirut died in 1236 and was succeeded by his son Balian. Marshal Richard remained as Frederick's deputy governor of his Syrian kingdom.

During all this time the Moslem sultans took no advantage of the discord which prevailed amongst the Latins. El-mu'azzam's son El-malik en-naṣir Ṣalāḥ ed-din Da'ud was compelled to surrender Damascus to El-ashraf in the month following Frederick's departure (25th June 1229)¹. He was permitted to retain possession of the Jordan district (El-gor) and of certain territories to the east of the Jordan (El-belka, including Kerak)²,

(Eracles II. 403 ff.). In 1235 (*Annales A* II. II. 439) or 1236 (*Annales B* II. II. 439) the military orders attacked Barin. In Rabī' I 634 (November 1236) El-'aziz of Aleppo died and was nominally succeeded by his son, El-malik en-naṣir Ṣalāḥ ed-din Yūsuf, a child three years old (*Abulf.* IV. 418). In the muṭam of 1236 (in A.H. 634, which commences 4th September 1236) Bagras was besieged by the army of Aleppo in retaliation for recent incursions of the Templars. After peace was restored by the mediation of Bohemond of Antioch the death of El-'aziz brought it to an end and the Templars planned an expedition against Darbassak. In June 1237, whilst the Latins were besieging this place, the army of Aleppo attacked and defeated them very severely (*Kem. Blochet* 195 f., *Abulf.* IV. 420 f., *Mt. Paris* III. 404 ff.).

¹ *L.A. Kamil* II. 176 (Monday 20d Sha'ban 626); *A.S.* V. 190 (Monday 1st Sha'ban 626); *Maḥrizi* X. 251 (1st Sha'ban 626). Da'ud left the city on Friday 12th Sha'ban, 6th July (*A.S.* V. 190 and *Ibn Kh.* III. 488). Frederick is reported to have tried unsuccessfully to induce Da'ud to approve of the terms of his treaty with El-kamil (*Gerold's letter to the Pope*, III. 106). The letter cited p. 312, n. 6 says Da'ud was willing to accept parts but not the whole.

² *Abulf.* IV. 351 (Salṭ is named; Shaudak was at first included but afterwards surrendered to El-kamil); *I. A. Kamil* II. 178 (Nablus and Bāṣan; Ṣarkhad to a friendly emir); *Ibn Kh.* III. 488 (Nablus and Banyas; the latter may be an error for Bāṣan);

presumably on condition that he acknowledged El-kamil's authority. Even El-ashraf formally recognised his brother's supremacy and surrendered several Mesopotamian towns in exchange for his new capital¹. El-kamil thus became the most powerful Moslem prince in Syria and Euphratesia. By a series of successful wars he established his authority and rounded off his territories. Gradually the jealousies aroused by his success came to a head. El-ashraf himself was on the point of leading a general revolt when he died in the summer of 1237. This event gave El-kamil an opportunity of seizing Damascus (7th January 1238)² and thus of further strengthening his position. When, however, he himself died two months later (10th March 1238)³ there was no one capable of holding his dominions together. After several changes and vicissitudes of fortune El-kamil's brother El-malik es-šaliḥ 'Imad ed-din Isma'il of Ba'albek gained Damascus (27th September 1239)⁴ and one of El-kamil's sons, El-malik es-šaliḥ Nejm ed-din Ayub, became sultan of Egypt (17th June 1240)⁵. The history of the next five years

A.S. v. 190 (Kerak, Nablus and villages in El-ğor and El-belka); Makrizi x. 250 f. (Kerak, Shaubak, Salt, El-belka, Nablus, Jerusalem and Bait Jibril).

¹ Abulf. iv. 332.

² 11th last night of Jumada i 635 (Abulf. iv. 428). In Ibn Kh. iii. 243, 9th Jumada i may be a textual error for 19th Jumada i, which is given by Kem. Blochet 199 and would agree exactly with Abulfida's date. Makrizi x. 289 is possibly a harmonistic combination of the two dates found by him in separate sources. El-ashraf died on Thursday 4th Muḥarram 635, 17th August 1237 (Makrizi x. 286), in Kem. Blochet 196 called 5th Muḥarram 635.

³ Abulf. iv. 430 (nine days from the end of Rajab 635); Ibn Kh. iii. 244 and Makrizi x. 290 (Wednesday 21st Rajab 635, calendar date 9th March 1238); Kem. Blochet 200 (21st Rajab 635).

⁴ Ibn Kh. iv. 245 (Tuesday 27th Šafar 637, calendar date 28th September). Cf. Makrizi x. 319 (27th Šafar), and Abu'l-nichasin quoted by Blochet, Kem. 206 (Tuesday 23rd Šafar 637, where 28 may be substituted for 23). The Citadel was captured a few days later and so in the beginning of the following month Rabi' i (Kem. Blochet 206).

⁵ Sunday morning 6th last day of Dhu'l-ka'da 637 (Abulf. iv. 451), i.e. Sunday 24th Dhu'l-ka'da (Kem. Blochet 207). Ibn Kh. iii. 246 has Sunday 27th Dhu'l-ka'da (calendar date 19th June, a Tuesday). Ayub's brother and rival was arrested by his emirs on Friday night 8th Dhu'l-ka'da, i.e. on the night of Thursday 21st May (Abulf. iv. 453 and Kem. Blochet 207). Ayub was ruler of Damascus from January 1239 (Jumada ii 636) until it was seized by Isma'il whilst Ayub and his army were away in Palestine. Three weeks later, having been deserted by his troops, Ayub was made prisoner by Da'ud of Kerak, on Friday evening 1st October 1239 (i.e. the evening of Saturday 22nd Rabi' i 637, Ibn Kh. iii. 241). He was afterwards set at liberty on the evening of Saturday 27th Ramaḍan, i.e. 20th April 1240 (Ibn Kh. iii. 241).

and the position of the Latins in Syria were greatly influenced by the rivalries and contests of these two sultans.

Just in the midst of the changes and troubles that followed El-kamil's death the truce between Frederick and the sultan expired and a new crusade arrived in Syria (September 1239). Theobald, count of Champagne and king of Navarre, was its most important leader. It was considered a favourable opportunity for the rebuilding and fortification of Ascalon, which had lain in ruins since 1192. On the way a party of several hundred knights set out to surprise the Moslems in the neighbourhood of Gaza. The result was a serious disaster. The Latins were themselves surprised and practically cut to pieces (13th November 1239)¹. The main body of the crusaders arrived too late to be of any assistance. They were so discouraged by the defeat that they returned forthwith to 'Akka. Before this the Latins had commenced fortifying Jerusalem and had constructed a citadel in which the "tower of David" was included. Da'ud of Kerak, who commanded the Egyptian forces in Palestine, at once followed up the victory at Gaza by attacking this new stronghold. It was carried by assault after twenty-one days siege (7th December 1239)² and the tower of David was captured six days later. The Latins made no attempt at rescue and Da'ud withdrew after he had ruined the defences of the town. In the midst of these misfortunes the rivalry of the Moslem sultans gave the Latins a welcome advantage. As soon as Isma'il of Damascus learned that Ayub had become sultan of Egypt (June 1240) he recognised the menace to himself. Damascus had been in Ayub's hands during the early part of 1239 and had been taken from him by Isma'il³. To secure himself, there-

¹ Rothelin MS. II. 548 (Sunday after Martinmas); Sunday 14th Rabi' II 637 (A.S. v. 193, where the Recueil editor remarks "le renseignement...ne présente...aucune authenticité"!). In Makrizi x. 324 there is textual error (Sunday 14th Rabi' I 637). A very full account of the events is given by Rothelin MS. II. 538 ff. Makrizi gives the prisoners as being 80 knights and 250 men and the Latin killed as 1800. According to the Hist. Patr. Alex. quoted by Blochet x. 325 the prisoners were one count, fifteen knights and 500 men. The Latin force when it started numbered 600 knights, with bowmen and other soldiers (Rothelin MS. II. 539), but those actually engaged in the battle were considerably fewer (II. 542 f.).

² Makrizi x. 323 f. (9th Jumada I 637), with which Abulf. iv. 448 and Rothelin MS. II. 539 agree.

³ See p. 316, n. 5.

fore, Isma'il now proposed to the Latins that they should make an alliance with him for the protection of Syria against invasion. He promised to surrender Şafed and Şakîf Arnun and portions of the districts of Sidon and Tiberias¹. From the sequel it appears that the project was taken up and carried through on the Latin side by the knights Templars, and accordingly it was to them that Şafed and Şakîf Arnun were surrendered². According to agreement the allies joined forces at Jaffa, where the frontier was most exposed to attack (summer 1240). There however the knights Hospitallers initiated a policy which conflicted with that of the Templars and quickly turned the discord of the rival orders into an open breach. The prisoners taken at Gaza, including the Master of the Hospital, were captives in Egypt, and the most certain way of securing their release was to make a compact with Ayub. The plan commended itself even to many of those who had been parties to the treaty with Isma'il, amongst others to Theobald, who had also signed the treaty with Damascus. The supporters of the new alliance left the camp at Jaffa and returned to 'Akka³. In any circumstances Theobald might reasonably wish to return home at the season of the autumn passage, which was now approaching. But the difficulty of uniting the Syrian Latins in any common policy is said to have hastened his departure. Without completing a correspondence which he opened with Da'ud of Kerak, who was

¹ The most exact enumeration of the surrenders is given by Makrizi x. 340 (and App. 516 f.). Less exact are Abulf. iv. 462 (Şafed and Şakîf), Eracles ii. 418 = Geste 122 (Belfort, i.e. Şakîf, and the districts round Tiberias and Sidon; Şafed incidentally on page 435). El-'alini ii. 197 (Jerusalem, Tiberias, Ascalon) alone mentions Ascalon; it was still in ruins. The reference in Eracles ii. 418 = Geste 122 = Sanutus ii. 215 to "all the land of Jerusalem" can only mean that the previous possessions were confirmed. Its counterpart in Makrizi, Rev. Or. Lat. x. 340 ("et tout le reste du Sahel") seems quite inappropriate at the end of the preceding enumeration, and the translation in App. 517 ("et plusieurs autres endroits sur le bord de la mer") suggests some difference of text. The defensive character of the alliance is clear from a letter of the Master of the Temple (Mt. Paris iv. 65).

² This important fact is stated by Eracles ii. 419 = Geste 122 = Sanutus ii. 216; cf. Annales ii. ii. 440. On the other hand the Rothelin MS. ii. 552 f. speaks of the surrender of Binafort (Şakîf) to the seigneur of Sidon, its former owner.

³ Eracles ii. 419 f. = Geste 122 = Sanutus ii. 216. The Rothelin MS. ii. 553 explains the motive of the new treaty but makes Theobald its chief supporter and his attitude a cause of alienation from the Syrian Latins and ultimately of his departure from Syria (ii. 554).

independent of Damascus and of Egypt, he sailed from 'Akka about the end of September¹. Apparently no reply had yet been received from Ayub in response to the recent overtures for peace, and certainly no treaty with Egypt had yet been signed². Immediately after Theobald left, the arrival of an English crusade under Richard duke of Cornwall introduced fresh complications (8th October)³. Richard at first stood neutral between the rival orders and their respective policies⁴. After having brought the correspondence with Da'ud to a conclusion, without any practical result, he united all parties in favour of a proposal that Ascalon should be fortified. At Jaffa, on the way to Ascalon, the Latins were met by ambassadors from the sultan of Egypt, who declared his willingness to make peace. Richard now threw in his lot with the supporters of an Egyptian alliance, and this policy was duly sanctioned by a majority of the Latin chiefs⁵. Terms were drafted and dispatched from Ascalon on the 30th of November⁶. The envoys were detained in Egypt for nearly two months. But finally, on the 8th of February, they brought word that the sultan had agreed to their proposals and sworn to observe the treaty⁷. The concessions obtained by the

¹ Richard's letter (Mt. Paris iv. 140). "Nazer" in this letter is El-malik en-nasir Da'ud and is expressly distinguished from the sultan of Egypt. Röhrich 831 has been misled into identifying them, possibly owing to his erroneous conception of Theobald's relations with the sultan.

² The Rothelin MS. ii. 554 and Eracles ii. 419 f. = Geste 122 = Sanutus ii. 216 say that the treaty with Egypt had been concluded. Probably, however, they attribute to Theobald the final steps which were afterwards taken by Richard of Cornwall. They do not mention Richard's treaty, except in the obvious interpolation of Geste 123 f., whilst the sources which do so, Annesley ii. ii. 440 and Richard's own letter (Mt. Paris iv. 138 ff.), possess no information regarding that attributed to Theobald. It is extremely improbable that there were two treaties with the sultan of Egypt, one signed by Theobald and the other by Richard. Theobald, however, may have opened communications with the sultan before his departure, and the messengers who came from Egypt after Richard's arrival may have brought a reply to Theobald's overtures.

³ Richard's letter in Mt. Paris iv. 140 (vigil of St Dionysius). Mt. Paris iv. 71 gives the 12th day after Michaelmas (i.e. 12th October).

⁴ Eracles ii. 421 = Geste 123; cf. Richard's letter (Mt. Paris iv. 141) which shows that he was doubtful at first regarding the expediency of a treaty with Egypt.

⁵ Richard's letter (Mt. Paris iv. 141), without mention of the Templars, who were opposed to the treaty (cf. iv. 525).

⁶ Richard's letter iv. 143.

⁷ Richard's letter iv. 143. The prisoners were released in Barmahat 637, i.e. in the month commencing 25th February 1240 (Hist. Pntr. Alex. as quoted Blochet x. 342).

Latins on this occasion are nowhere clearly stated¹. Probably the most important provision of the treaty was that the prisoners taken at the battle of Ġaza (1239) should be released. The *de facto* possessions of the Latins, including Ascalon and the surrenders lately made by Isma'il, were also duly recognised. If, besides this, there was any promise to surrender Moslem territory, the places mentioned were in the possession of Isma'il and not really in Ayub's power to dispose of². So far as the new treaty confirmed and supplemented the agreement with Damascus it was clearly to the advantage of the Latins. In fact, however, it conflicted inevitably with the earlier treaty, and as the policy merely of a party it could not and did not provide a settlement of the situation. The Templars adhered to their alliance with Isma'il and the troops of Damascus were still stationed on the south-western frontier near Ascalon³. After the departure of Richard and his fellow-crusaders in the spring the balance of power between the parties was materially altered, and the vitality of the alliance with Damascus soon became apparent. Meantime the joint work of fortifying Ascalon had made good progress, and after the completion of a double wall with towers and defences the crusaders returned to 'Akka. On the 23rd of April the Master of the Hospital and the other prisoners whom Ayub had released in terms of the recent treaty reached the city. Ten days later Richard of Cornwall sailed home again (3rd May 1241)⁴.

Although the results of the crusades of 1239-41 were on the whole favourable to the Latins they contributed seriously to the

¹ Richard's letter extracts from the treaty a complete and valuable list of what were acknowledged to be Latin possessions, but does not name the places actually handed over by the sultan (cf. note 2). Hist. Patr. Alex. contains a similar list in an abbreviated form; Nablus, Itebron and Ġaza are there specified as places which were to remain Moslem.

² The revenues of the district round Ġaza seem to be the only part of Ayub's concessions which he was actually in a position to hand over. It is questionable if even these were ever paid to the Latins.

³ Eracles ii. 442 = Geste 124 = Sanutus ii. 216. It has been supposed that there was a battle with the Egyptians near Ascalon or Ġaza in the summer of 1240 which broke up this alliance between Damascus and the Latins (so Renaud 441, Wilken vi. 604, Röhrich 848). The supposition appears to rest only on a statement of Makrizi x. 341 f., regarding which see p. 321, n. 1.

⁴ Mt. Paris iv. 144 (Richard's letter).

embitterment of party strife and to the renewal of civil war between the imperialist and the anti-imperialist factions, which were now represented chiefly by the knights Hospitallers on the one hand and the knights Templars on the other. The Hospitaller house in 'Akka was blockaded once at least by the Templars and on another occasion practically besieged for six months by Balian of Beirut. In the summer of 1243 the anti-imperialist party captured Tyre and so the supporters of the alliance with Damascus gained the upper hand. By this time it was apparent that no acquisition of territory was likely to result from the Egyptian alliance and the way was prepared for the acceptance of new proposals by Isma'il. In May 1242 the knights Templars and their Moslem allies defeated an Egyptian army on the borders of Palestine. The Egyptians lost heavily and were driven back to Gaza, which was their base of operations¹. After this Ayub made terms with Da'ud of Kerak² and negotiated with the Templars also³. In the autumn an expedition from Jaffa surprised and plundered Nablus (31st October)⁴ and in retaliation Da'ud, to whom Nablus belonged, raided the neighbourhood of the Latin town at the head of troops from Gaza⁵. In 1243 Isma'il nearly came to an understanding with his rival Ayub, but suspicions of his good faith finally induced

¹ *Annales* ii. li. 240, naming "le Nasser," i.e. Da'ud of Kerak, as the Templars' ally; *Mt. Paris* iv. 197. Both passages have been wrongly understood to refer to other battles than this of 1242, which has been ignored by modern writers altogether. Makrizi has duplicate accounts of the battle, under A.H. 638 and A.H. 639 (x. 342 f. and 348 f.), without mentioning the share of the Templars in either. The correct date is no doubt Dhu'l-ka'da 639 (May 1242). There is a reference to this same battle in Abu'l-mehasin (Kem. Blochet 222, note 2) when he records the death of Kemal ed-din Ibn Šadr ed-din in Gaza in Šafar 640 (August 1242) after his defeat by the troops of Da'ud of Kemk. The letter in *Mt. Paris* iv. 289 may also contain a reference to it ("mala quae a nobis recepit" *Soldanus Babilonice*). Under A.H. 638 Makrizi x. 341 f. speaks of another battle in which Isma'il and the Latins were defeated by an Egyptian army. His narrative shows evident traces of confusion with the events of 1244, but possibly its present position, under A.H. 638, is due to confusion with the battle of 1242. The Templars are named expressly.

² Makrizi x. 343, cf. x. 349.

³ Letter of the Master of the Temple in *Mt. Paris* iv. 289.

⁴ Friday 4th Jumada i 640 (Makrizi x. 350 and *Ajup*. 517).

⁵ If the Latins of Jaffa belonged to the faction of the Hospitallers, the incident marks a breach between them and Ayub. But the part played by Egypt suggests that they belonged to the Templars' party. A period of hostilities between the Templars and Da'ud is referred to in *Mt. Paris* iv. 289.

him to offer new concessions to the Latins in order to win all parties to his side. Da'ud of Kerak preferred the friendship of Damascus to that of Egypt, and after some hesitation and delay the joint overtures of the new allies were accepted by the Latins (beginning of the summer of 1244)¹. Isma'il gave up the remainder of the revenues of Tiberias, surrendered all control of Jerusalem and acknowledged the title of the Latins to Ascalon². He also promised further concessions in Egypt if that country should be conquered³. The Latins on their part broke off all friendly relations with Egypt and pledged their support to Isma'il. Thus the policy of the Templars was triumphant.

Ayub was now faced by the prospect of invasion and threatened with the loss of his dominions. In his trouble he found allies in an unexpected quarter. The Kharismian Turks had recently been driven from their homes by the Tartar invasion and were ready to put their swords at the disposal of the highest bidder. At the sultan's invitation an army of 10,000 horsemen⁴ swept through Syria in the summer of 1244. Having ravaged the territories of Damascus they entered Palestine and swarmed over the land. Jerusalem was invested for a few weeks and fell into their hands without much resistance (23rd August 1244)⁵. All the south of Palestine was occupied and the Latin coast towns were in great alarm. The sultan of Damascus and his allies were pledged by treaty to give their help against any Moslem invader and doubly bound to play a part in this development of the struggle with Egypt. Isma'il, Da'ud of Kerak, and the emir of Homs joined the Latins at

¹ Letter in Mt. Paris iv. 307; cf. Abulf. iv. 474 (before the end of A.H. 641, i.e. 8th June 1244) and Makrizi x. 357.

² Abulfida, Recueil l. 122; cf. Makrizi, Rev. Or. Lat. x. 357. In the text of Abulfida iv. 474 there is a lacuna at this point. The Latins now rebuilt the castles of Tiberias and Ascalon. Ibn Waqil (quoted by Blochet, Rev. Or. Lat. x. 357) includes Karkab in the list of surrenders. A letter in Mt. Paris iv. 289 f. describes the Latin territory as now including "all the land to the west of the Jordan except Hebron, Nablus and Haisan"; cf. Godes 146 (excepting only Nablus and Jericho).

³ Abulf. iv. 476.

⁴ Makrizi x. 358 and App. 528; Chron. Mail, 158 says more than 12,000. Ayub as a Mesopotamian emir, previous to December 1138, Jumada I 636, had already been in friendly relations with the Khawisnians (Kem. Blochet 305).

⁵ Tuesday the vigil of St Bartholomew (Chron. Mail. 160). The attack commenced on the 11th July (Chron. Mail. 159).

'Akka in the beginning of October with a considerable army. The Turks were already united to an Egyptian force of 5000 men under the command of a mamluk emir, Rukn ed-din Baibars. The opposing forces met near Ġaza and the ensuing battle was one of the most decisive in the history of the crusading states (17th October 1244)¹. The Moslems who occupied the centre and the left wing of the Syrian army broke and fled as soon as they were attacked². The Latins on the right held their ground, but only to suffer grievous defeat. The extent of the disaster may be estimated from the fate of the military orders. Of three hundred Templars and two hundred Hospitallers engaged in the battle thirty-three or thirty-six Templars and twenty-six Hospitallers alone escaped. The others were killed or taken prisoners³. The Master of the Temple was amongst the slain and the Master of the Hospital amongst those taken captive.

The prospects of the Latins were now dark in the extreme. They had no army left and the troops of Ayub and of his Turkish allies ranged over the country without fear of further opposition. Ayub indeed was still on friendly terms with the emperor Frederick and in communication with him. But the emperor was more than ever alienated from the Pope and from those who now controlled the policy of the Syrian Latins. Ayub refused to release his prisoners or to make any compact or even to listen to any intercession except that of the emperor. Thus the only means of reconciliation were such that the Syrian Latins either could not or would not avail themselves of them. Fortunately Ayub had still to deal with his Moslem rivals Isma'il and Da'ud, and this gave the Latins a limited respite.

¹ Chron. Mall. 163. In A.S. v. 194 Monday 12 Jumada II is an error for 13 Jumada I. The vigil of St Luke's Day is the date of the Rothelin MS. ii. 366 and Mt. Paris iv. 341; Eracles II. 431 and Mt. Paris iv. 310 give St Luke's Day itself (18th October).

² The charge of treachery made in the letter of Frederick (Mt. Paris iv. 303) is not supported by Mt. Paris iv. 341 nor by Makrizi. Frederick seems to set Da'ud of Kerak on the side of Egypt.

³ The totals are taken from Frederick's letter (Mt. Paris iv. 301), those who escaped are given by it as 18+16, in the patriarch's letter (Mt. Paris iv. 342) as 33+26, and in the Rothelin MS. ii. 364 as 36+26. Makrizi x. 360 estimates the Latin prisoners at 800. Cf. p. 330, n. 1.

Immediately after the battle of Gaza the victors occupied Jerusalem and all the Moslem portion of Palestine, including such towns as Nablus and Hebron. After a six months siege, which extended over the summer of 1245, Damascus surrendered to the sultan's army (1st October)¹. Shortly afterwards the Kharismians being dissatisfied with the share of plunder which Ayub had assigned them turned against him. Isma'il endeavoured to profit by this opportunity. Supported by Da'ud and the Kharismians he attacked Damascus in the summer of 1246². But fortune still favoured his rival. The Turkish army was defeated by a relieving force which came from Homs and Aleppo. From this time neither Isma'il nor the Kharismian Turks play any important part in Syrian politics. The Latins rejoiced with good reason at the removal of a terrible scourge. But another peril from the north was already threatening them. In this same year the territories of Antioch were invaded by the Tartars and Bohemond V (1234-52)³ was forced to pay them tribute⁴.

In 1247 Fakhr ed-din Yusuf ibn esh-sheikh commanded the Egyptian army which operated in Palestine. Probably in the early part of the year he ravaged the territory of Da'ud and took possession of his strongholds with the exception of Kerak⁵. Then he turned against the Latins. His ready success measures the feebleness of his opponents. Tiberias was occupied on the 16th of June and Ascalon was captured towards the end of October⁶. Next year the approach of a new crusade and troubles in northern Syria alternately distracted Ayub's attention. Homs was besieged for two months and captured by the army of El-malik en-naşir of Aleppo. Ayub had just completed his preparations for a campaign against this rival when he learned that the French king had landed in Cyprus (September 1248). After

¹ Ibn Kh. iii. 246 (Monday 8th Jumada I 643); Makrizi x. 365.

² Abulf. iv. 482 (before and after the end of A.H. 643, i.e. 18th May 1246).

³ Annales ii. ii. 445 and Eracles ii. 440 give 1251 as the year of Bohemond's death, but that includes what is now regarded as the early part of 1252. (See p. 299, n. 3).

⁴ Mt. Paris iv. 547.

⁵ Abulf. iv. 488 (A.H. 644); Kerak was surrendered by Da'ud's sons on Monday 27th September 1249 (Abulf. iv. 502).

⁶ El-'aini ii. 200 (10th Safar 645 and the last third of Jumada II). Similarly A.S. v. 194. Annales B ii. ii. 442 gives the middle of October for the capture of Ascalon.

it was ascertained that the crusaders intended to winter in the island, Ayub set out on his expedition as already planned. He reached Damascus on the 19th of November¹. The sultan of Aleppo refused to come to terms and Ayub's emirs laid siege to Homs whilst their sovereign lay seriously ill in Damascus. When the issue of the struggle was still doubtful, in order perhaps to secure union against the crusaders or to have time to make preparations for the defence of Egypt, Ayub concluded peace with El-malik en-naṣir and left Homs in his possession. He was carried back to Egypt in a litter and arrived there in the latter part of April (1249)².

The last crusades on a large scale were due principally to the piety of one man and to the resources of the kingdom over which he ruled. Louis IX, Saint Louis king of France, took the crusaders' vow in the year 1244. It seemed for a time as if Christendom might be stirred again to a united effort on behalf of the Holy Land. Great sums of money were raised by the efforts of the clergy and the Pope, and the emperor Frederick pledged himself to support the project. But the quarrel between the popes and the emperor had gone too far to admit of any reconciliation. The crusade which actually started in the summer of 1248 was predominantly a French crusade, initiated and carried through by the devotion of the king himself. The winter was spent in Cyprus and there it was decided that the invaders should land in Egypt. A most encouraging success was gained at the very outset. Moslem troops under the command of Fakhr ed-din were stationed in a camp on the western bank of the Nile opposite Damietta and facing the shore where the Latin ships cast anchor on the 4th of June (1249). But when the crusaders landed next day the Moslems were repulsed and hastily retired in the direction of Cairo. This so discouraged the garrison and population of Damietta that the town was abandoned during the following night and the morning of the next day. Thus the Latins occupied the city

¹ 1st Sha'ban 646 (A.S. v. 194); cf. Ibn Kh. iii. 146 (beginning of Sha'ban 646).

² Commencement of A.H. 647 (Makrizi, App. 331). He left Damascus on Monday 4th Muḥarram 647, 19th April (A.S. v. 194). Most of the details of the paragraph are given by de Nangis (Gesta xx. 356 and 366); cf. Abulf. iv. 494 and Makrizi, App. 331.

practically without resistance (6th June 1249)¹. Possibly a greater and more decisive success would have been the reward of a rapid march on Cairo. But the season of the Nile floods was at hand and it was decided to wait until it was past². Five months were thus spent in Damietta to no positive advantage. The stagnation was relieved somewhat by Moslem attacks and by skirmishes in the neighbourhood of the town, but nothing of importance to either side resulted from these engagements³. Ayub's long illness terminated with his death (21st November)⁴ a few days before the Latins commenced to advance on Cairo. But the event exercised no influence on the course of the war. It was concealed, as far as possible, for three months, during which Fakhr ad-din commanded the Egyptian army in the interests of Ayub's son Turan shah, who was summoned at once from Hishn kaifa.

Starting from Damietta the Latin army followed exactly the route of their predecessors in the campaign of 1221 and the history of the two campaigns is otherwise remarkably alike. The date of starting seems to have been the 27th of November⁵, but as the triangle of the river opposite Mansura was not reached until the 19th of December⁶ there must have been

¹ Dates and particulars are given by Makrizi, App. 531 f. De Nangis (*Gesta* xx. 370) agrees in making the arrival on Friday and the landing on Saturday (cf. *Annales* ii. li. 442, arrival 4th June, capture 6th). It may be supposed that Joinville is in error in making the arrival on Thursday and the landing on Friday (99, 101). According to a letter in *Mt. Paris* vi. 158 f. the landing and the battle took place on Friday; Saturday was spent in securing the position and Damietta was occupied on Sunday. All sources are agreed regarding the day of the occupation of Damietta.

² De Nangis (*Gesta* xx. 372, Guizot 158).

³ Some particulars are given by Makrizi, App. 535. The capture of Sidon is dated now. Cf. p. 328, n. 6.

⁴ Evening of Monday 15th Sha'han 647 (1bn Kh. lii. 246, Makrizi, App. 535; calendar date 22nd November) or Sunday night, fourteen nights of Sha'han being past (*El-'alai* ii. 206, Abulfi. iv. 502).

⁵ *Eracles* li. 437 = *Sanctus* li. 218 = *Annales* ii. li. 443. Similarly Joinville 120 ("en l'entre des advena," Advent Sunday being November 28th). Makrizi puts it after the death of Ayub (App. 536). Louis' letter, on the other hand, has 20th November (*Duchesne* v. 428) and is copied by de Nangis. *Mt. Paris* vi. 191 gives 22nd November. No doubt the troops left Damietta in various detachments and the real start may have been from a camp some distance from Damietta. See p. 327, n. 1.

⁶ Sunday 13th Rama'han 637, calendar date 20th December (Makrizi, App. 537). Louis' letter (*Duchesne* v. 428, copied by de Nangis, *Gesta* xx. 374) gives Tuesday

considerable halts by the way¹. The crusaders were not wholly unmolested as they advanced², but the position which the Moslems really intended to contest was where the Latins came to a standstill, facing the Bahr Ashmun, with the Egyptian camp on the southern side. For six weeks they laboured at the construction of a causeway by which they hoped to cross the river. But the sheds in which the builders worked were burned, the river was widened at the other side by the digging down of the banks and the crusaders' camp was harassed by Moslem attacks from the direction of Damietta. Finally the Latins were informed of the existence of a ford some distance off and on the 8th of February (1250)³, in the early morning, all the available mounted men, in three divisions, were sent round this way. So far the movement was successful. The river was crossed, the Moslem camp was taken by surprise and Fakhr ed-din lost his life in the confusion of the first attack. When, however, the knights of the first division rashly charged into the streets of Mansura they were completely cut to pieces. At the end of the day the Latins had indeed secured a footing on the southern side of the Ashmun, but their effective cavalry force was greatly diminished and the Moslems joyously celebrated at least a partial victory. As in 1221 matters came to a crisis when the Egyptians deprived the Latins of their command of the Nile and so cut the lines of communication with Damietta. On the 15th of March they made an important capture of Latin ships and from that time the river was in their hands⁴. Scarcity of provisions, disease and the perpetual attacks of the enemy gradually made the Latin position intolerable. Louis proposed

before Christmas (= 21st December) and Eracles ii. 437 = Sanctus ii. 218 22nd December. In *Annales* ii. li. 443 "à xii jours de delier" xii should also be xxii.

¹ They reached Sharmesa on Tuesday 7th December and Barman on Monday 13th December (Makrizi).

² The principal fighting took place the day the Latins entered Sharmesa, Tuesday 7th December (El-'aini li. 207, Makrizi, App. 536 ff.; cf. Joinville 123).

³ Shrove Tuesday, correctly given by the western sources except Mt. Paris v. 147 ff. whose date is the beginning of April just before the retreat. So also El-'aini li. 208 (Tuesday 4th Dhu'l-ka'da 647) and Abulf. iv. 506 (Tuesday morning 5th Dhu'l-ka'da).

⁴ Makrizi, App. 540 (9th Dhu'l-hijja); El-'aini li. 209. Makrizi, App. 539 mentions an earlier capture of ships without date.

terms of peace to the Moslems, but as he demanded concessions in Palestine in return for the surrender of Damietta his overtures were rejected¹. A retreat was ordered to take place on the night of the 5th of April². The Moslems quickly discovered what was being attempted and were ready to join battle next morning. Some of the ships which conveyed the wounded and the sick escaped but most of them were destroyed or captured. The main body of the army seems to have kept up a running fight until it reached Fariskur, where the chief struggle of the day took place³. By the ninth hour, in the afternoon, they were broken up into fugitive parties and those who escaped death were compelled to surrender⁴. Only a very few escaped to Damietta. King Louis and most of his nobles were made prisoners.

The king and the sultan, and after the sultan's death the king and the mamluk emirs, came to terms without much difficulty. It was agreed that all prisoners made since the battle of Gaza, in 1244, should be released⁵; that the territory of both parties should be as it was before the Christians landed⁶; that Damietta, accordingly, should be restored; that the persons and property of the Latins in the city should be respected, and that Louis should pay the expenses of the war and a certain ransom

¹ Makrizi, App. 540; cf. Joinville 201.

² Eracles ii. 438; Joinville 203 (Tuesday in Easter week); de Nangis, *Unizot* 159; El-'aini ii. 210 and Abulf. iv. 508 (Wednesday night 3rd Muharram 648, calendar date 7th April, actually 6th April according to Arabic reckoning, i.e. 5th April according to European reckoning). Makrizi, App. 540 says the engines had been burned on 1st April (Friday 29th Dhu'l-hijja, calendar date end April); cf. perhaps Joinville's description of the withdrawal from the south side of the Ashmun.

³ Makrizi, App. 541; A.S. v. 196 names Sarnesakh as the place where the Latin prisoners were captured.

⁴ De Nangis, *Gesta* xx. 376; cf. Reinaud 461 f.

⁵ Mt. Paris vi. 196 "a tempore belli Gazmas." As the prisoners taken at Gaza in 1239 had already been released this presumably refers to the battle of 1244. On the other hand Rothelin MS. ii. 616 f. and de Nangis, *Gesta* xx. 378 (cf. Makrizi, App. 543) define the starting-point as the time of the treaty between Frederick and El-kamil, which expired in 1238-39.

⁶ Whilst the Latins were in Egypt the Moslems are said to have captured Sidon (Makrizi, App. 535, cf. Mt. Paris vi. 196) and "Canaan Turoris" (Mt. Paris vi. 196).

for himself and all the captives¹. These terms cannot be regarded as severe. Damietta was surrendered on Friday the 6th of May². According to agreement the king and the leading men were set at liberty on the same day and half the ransom money, with some difficulty, was immediately paid over. Louis and his knights sailed for 'Akka on Sunday the 8th. The rank and file remained meantime in captivity and half the ransom was still due³.

While most of the crusaders now returned home Louis resolved to remain in Palestine. The duration of the peace with Egypt had been fixed at ten years⁴. But there was so much delay in the restoration of the captives and of the property which had been left in Damietta that the Latins became suspicious of the good faith of the mamluk emirs. It was felt that peace was by no means secure and that it would greatly conduce to the fulfilment of the treaty and to the general interests of the country if Louis postponed his departure. The king allowed his brothers to return home in August and sent with them a letter to the nobles and clergy of France appealing for reinforcements to retrieve the situation⁵. The fact that war was on the point of breaking out between the Moslems of Syria and the Egyptians raised Louis' hopes and improved his position. El-malik en-nasir of Aleppo, having taken possession of Damascus (9th July 1250)⁶ attempted the conquest of Egypt during the following winter. His overtures to the Latins were neither accepted nor definitely rejected. Louis' policy was to gain what he could from the existing treaty and to secure better terms by threats of allying himself with Damascus. Envoys came and went to

¹ The best summaries are those of Louis' letter (Duchesne v. 430, cf. de Nangis, *Gesta* xx. 378) and Rothellin MS. ii. 616f. Cf. also Joinville 237f.

² Joinville 245; Abulf. iv. 512 and El-'ini ii. 214 (Friday 3rd Safar 648, calendar date 7th May).

³ These particulars are from Joinville; cf. Eracles ii. 438.

⁴ Louis' letter v. 430; Mt. Paris v. 163 and vi. 196.

⁵ The situation is most clearly described in Louis' letter. Joinville makes prominent his own influence in deciding what was done.

⁶ Abulf. iv. 514 (Saturday 8th Rabi' il 648, calendar date 10th July); A.S. v. 100 gives the following day (Sunday 7th Rabi' il) and in Ibn Kh. ii. 446 Sunday 17th Rabi' il 648 is presumably a textual error for the same. The sultan did not enter the town until Wednesday (A.S. v. 100).

Egypt discussing the matter. In October, William of Chateau Neuf, the Master of the Hospital, was set at liberty along with 7-800 others, including those who had been captured at Gaza in 1244¹. After this Louis refused to pay the second part of his ransom and boldly demanded a revision of the terms of the treaty as the price of his alliance against El-malik en-naṣir. In March 1251 he commenced the fortification of Caesarea and remained thus occupied for a year². In the last week of March 1252 Egyptian envoys brought word that his terms had been accepted³. The king's deputies were permitted to make free search in Egypt for all Christian captives and to claim their release. For those who were the slaves of private owners Louis paid compensation⁴. It was arranged that the Latins and the Egyptians should join forces by the middle of May⁵ and Louis moved to Jaffa expecting the Egyptians to occupy Gaza. In this, however, they were anticipated by the troops of Damascus and the proposed union of the allies proved impracticable⁶. For a whole year, whilst the Latins rebuilt the fortifications of Jaffa, the army of Damascus kept watch on the frontier at Gaza⁷. Finally peace was made between Egypt and Syria (April 1253)⁸.

¹ *Annales* ii. ii. 444 f. (100 knights and about 800 others) and a letter of the Master of the Hospital in *Mt. Paris* vi. 204. The date of the arrival of the Master of the Hospital in 'Akka is given by the former as viii October, by the latter as xvii October. Cf. *Rothelin MS.* ii. 623 f. which gives most details of the prisoners released (twenty-five knights Hospitaliers, fifteen Templars, ten Teutonic knights Hospitaliers, one hundred secular knights and six hundred other prisoners, men and women) and speaks of Louis' release of Muslim slaves and a further liberation of Christians as incidents which immediately followed. Perhaps however these took place in 1252.

² *Letter Mt. Paris* vi. 203, cf. *Annales* ii. ii. 445. The *Rothelin MS.* ii. 627 is the authority for the month. Probably before this Louis repaired the fortifications of 'Akka and Haifa (de Nangl., *Gesta* xx. 384).

³ *Mt. Paris* v. 282 and 307 ff.; *Joinville* 313 and 345; *Rothelin MS.* ii. 628 f. The exact date is given by *Mt. Paris* vi. 205. The statements of *Mt. Paris* v. 174 and v. 204 to the effect that the ransom was completely paid contradict one another as to date and are inconsistent with the statement of the terms of this new treaty.

⁴ *Mt. Paris* v. 342.

⁵ *Mt. Paris* vi. 206.

⁶ *Joinville* 347, cf. *Mt. Paris* vi. 206. The *Rothelin MS.* ii. 628 makes the treaty one for the surrender of all Palestine and accuses the sultan of not fulfilling it.

⁷ *Joinville* 365.

⁸ *Maqrizi* i. i. 39 (before 7th Šafar 650); cf. *Joinville* 363 (before May 1253).

and the hopes which the Moslem dissensions had kept alive turned to forebodings for the future. When the army of Damaseus on its way homewards through Syria raided the territory of the Latins they quickly realised the danger of their situation. It was resolved to fortify Sidon, which had suffered particularly at the hands of the enemy. A retaliatory expedition against Banyas had no great success. The task of fortifying Sidon occupied nearly eight months, until the beginning of Lent in the following year¹. Before its completion Louis had resolved to return to France. It was clear that no reinforcements were coming from Europe. The death of the queen-mother Blanche, who had acted as regent in France, removed the chief supporter of Louis' projects at home and made it otherwise desirable that he should return to his own kingdom. Peace was concluded with the sultan of Damascus for a period of two years, six months and forty days, dating from the 21st of February². When the king sailed on the 24th of April (1254)³ Geoffrey of Sergines, with a few knights, remained as his representative.

King Louis' stay in Palestine had lasted nearly four years. His reputation as king of France was no doubt of service to the country, but as he never had more than 1400 men under his command in Palestine⁴ he was quite unable to take the aggressive. Hence the part he played as a mere negotiator and fortifier of cities. It was very largely the discord between Egypt and Damaseus which gave him even such a part to play. After Louis' departure there was a brief renewal of the Moslem quarrel in 1255 and this led to the conclusion of a formal treaty between the Latins and the mamluk sultan, Aibek⁵. Jaffa and the neighbourhood were expressly shut out from the operation of the treaty, and the hostilities in this district led to some infraction of the peace in 1256. It was renewed, however, in the same year on the same lines as before⁶. The duration of the peace was fixed

¹ Left Jaffa 29th June 1253 (Joinville 377) and returned from Sidon to 'Akka at the beginning of Lent, 25th February 1254 (Joinville 413).

² Makrizi i. i. 54 f. (dating from 1st Muharram 652).

³ Joinville 413 (vigil of St Mark's Day); Eracles ii. 441 says "après le jour de Saint Marc."

⁴ Joinville 361.

⁵ Mt. Paris v. 521 (cf. Abulf. iv. 536 ff.).

⁶ Rothelin MS. ii. 630, 631 f.

at ten years, ten months and ten days, and it seems to have continued in force until the sultanate of Baibars¹. Probably there was also a treaty with Damascus², so that for some years the Latins were again practically at peace with their Moslem neighbours.

As so often in their previous history this interval was devoted to the waging of bitter civil war. In 1256 a quarrel broke out between the Genoese and the Venetians and soon every party in the state was involved in the struggle. The jealousy of the military orders, the personal quarrels of Bohemond VI of Antioch (1252-75) and the contest for the empty title of king of Jerusalem all embittered and complicated the strife. Whilst the war raged by land and sea thousands lost their lives, and the walls of the Latin towns were battered down by those who should have been the foremost to strengthen and build them up (1256-60).

In Egypt, meantime, the mamluk sultans firmly established their position. The household troops of the sultan Ayub, his mamluks or foreign slave-guard, discovered their power after their master's death, during the troubles which accompanied the Latin invasion of Egypt. Shortly after Louis' defeat the mamluk emirs, having assassinated Turan shah (2nd May 1250)³, openly assumed the government of Egypt. A few months later they conferred the title of sultan upon Aibek, one of their own number, henceforth known as El-malik el-mu'izz (1250-57). During their struggle with the "legitimist" claimant El-malik en-naṣir of Damascus, they strengthened their position by associating with Aibek a sultan of the house of Saladin. But this was only a temporary expedient. En-naṣir's failure to conquer Egypt has already been spoken of. In 1255 some of the mamluk emirs, including Rukn ed-din Baibars, became

¹ Presumably it was renewed after Aibek's death (1257) and again after his son's deposition (1259). Kuṣṣuz (1259-60) is definitely said to have had a treaty with the Latins which became void at his death (Rothelin MS. II. 638). See p. 335, n. 3.

² *Annales* II. II. 446 speaks of a truce with Damascus in 1255. As that of 1254 had not yet expired (p. 331, n. 2) this is either the same or a prolongation of it. El-'alini II. 217 refers to a truce between Beirut and Damascus in the latter part of the sultanate of El-malik en-naṣir.

³ *Encyclopædia* II. 438; Ibn Kh. III. 248 (Monday 27th Muḥarram 648, calendar date 1st May); *Abulf.* IV. 510 (Monday the 2nd last night of Muḥarram, i.e. the night of 3rd May according to Arabic, of 2nd May according to European reckoning).

nfraid of Aibek's growing power and took refuge in Damascus. Even then Aibek held his own, until his assassination on the 15th April 1257¹. Those emirs who still remained in Egypt thereupon acknowledged Aibek's son and twice repulsed the attacks of their former comrades, who had now transferred their allegiance to the "sultan" of Kerak, a grandson of El-kamil. Finally one of themselves, Saif ed-din Kūṭuz, deposed his nominal lord and proclaimed himself sultan of Egypt with the title El-malik el-muẓaffar (December 1259)². His brief sultanate coincides with a critical period in the history of Moslem Syria.

The great movement of the Tartars out of Central Asia in the 13th century had already profoundly stirred the interest of Christendom and shaken the seats of Islam. In 1258 Baġdad was captured and the last of the caliphs put to death by these northern invaders. In 1259 Khan Khulagu invaded northern Syria at the head of a numerous army. El-malik en-naṣir proved altogether unequal to the demands of the situation. Aleppo was captured in the beginning of 1260 and Damascus occupied on the 1st of March³. Some Moslem emirs regained the citadel of Damascus and held it from the 31st of March to the 3rd of June, but finally they also were compelled to capitulate⁴. After this all Palestine was raided by the Tartar invaders and they stationed garrisons in towns as remote as Ġaza⁵. Sidon seems to have suffered most, of the Latin possessions, and the Christians in distress asked help from the sultan of Egypt.

¹ Tuesday 23rd Rabi' i 655 (Abulf. iv. 544 and Abu'l-mehasin in Makrizi i. i. 70 note). Makrizi i. i. 71 calls the day Tuesday 24th Rabi' i 655.

² End of A.H. 657 (Abulf. iv. 570); Makrizi i. i. 86 gives Saturday 24th Dhu'l-ka'da, in which the day of the week and the day of the month do not agree. By reading Saturday 24th Dhu'l-hijja the discrepancy is removed and agreement with Abulfida is secured.

³ 16th Rabi' i 658 (Makrizi i. i. 90 and 97).

⁴ 6th Rabi' ii to 2nd Jumada i in Makrizi i. i. 99, but Jumada i in the latter date is to be corrected in accordance with the inscription in Berchem, Inscr. 466 (21st Jumada ii 658). A.S.'s date Tuesday 14th Jumada i (Berchem 515) would be 27th April (a Tuesday) but may be read in the light of the inscription Tuesday 24th Jumada ii (calendar date 5th June, really Tuesday 3rd June). According to A.S. the Tartar assault on the castle lasted only from the preceding Sunday. This suggests that the defenders had not been continuously besieged while they held the castle.

⁵ Makrizi i. i. 98 and 104. Of the Latin towns Sidon suffered particularly. Its castles were not captured but the town was plundered and the walls destroyed (Gestes 162, Annales ii. ii. 449, Menko's Chron. xxiii. 549).

Ḳuṭuz decided not to await the attack with which he was threatened. About the 10th of August¹ he entered Syria at the head of an Egyptian army. Khulagu had been called away to the north but the Tartar generals in command gathered their forces at 'Ain Jalut. After a desperate fight, in which the tide of battle was turned by the personal bravery of the sultan, and after a vain attempt of the Tartars to rally their broken forces at Baisan, a complete victory was gained by the Moslem army (3rd September)². Damascus was occupied by the victorious troops a few days later (8th September)³, and all the tributary towns which En-naṣir had governed speedily submitted to the conqueror. Not only was the victory at 'Ain Jalut decisive of the final expulsion of the Tartars from southern Syria⁴, it paved the way again for a reunion of Moslem Syria under the sultan of Egypt. But Ḳuṭuz did not live to enjoy the fruits of his success. He was assassinated by Rukn ed-din Balbars, who had entered his service when he became sultan and to whom he had now refused the governorship of Aleppo. The event took place as the sultan returned to Cairo (23rd October 1260)⁵ and that very day Balbars was proclaimed sultan by his fellow conspirators.

The accession of Balbars marks the commencement of a further stage in the history of the holy war. At last the policy of Saladin is resumed by one whose untiring energy and far-sighted statesmanship remind us of his great predecessor, however much his perfidy and cruelty set a gulf between their

¹ Abulf. iv. 594 (beginning of Ramaḍān 658, which commences on the 16th of August); Menko's Chron. xxiii. 549 "mensis Augusti imminente." According to Makrizi i. i. 103 Ḳuṭuz left Cairo on Monday 15th Shu'ban (25th July).

² Eracles ii. 444; Gestes 165; Makrizi i. i. 104 and Abulf. iv. 594 (Friday 25th Ramaḍān 658); Sanutus ii. 221 wrongly gives 3rd October.

³ Eracles ii. 444; Makrizi i. i. 107 (Wednesday, last day of Ramaḍān). Ḳuṭuz took up his residence in the citadel two days later. It may be supposed that the date of the inscription in Berchem, Inscr. 466 (Sunday 27th Ramaḍān 658, i.e. 5th September) was the day when the Tartars evacuated the town.

⁴ In the early part of December 1260 another army of Tartars seized Aleppo and Hama without meeting resistance, but were defeated by the Moslems near Homs. All this occupied about a fortnight (Abulf. iv. 610 ff.).

⁵ Saturday 17th Dhu'l-ḳa'da, calendar date 24th October (Makrizi i. i. 116 agreeing with Abulf. iv. 606). Makrizi i. i. 121 gives Monday 25th Dhu'l-ḳa'da (= 1st November); Monday 15th Dhu'l-ḳa'da on page 113 must be a textual error for the 25th.

respective characters. The new sultan was just the man to use to the best advantage the opportunities of his situation. Egyptian troops captured Damascus (January 1261) from a governor who refused to acknowledge Baibars' title. Thus southern Syria was secured and the work of organising and strengthening the military resources of the sultanate proceeded without perceptible interruption. Baibars skilfully strengthened his position by welcoming to Egypt a descendant of the caliphs of Baghdad, whose authority he acknowledged and pledged himself to support (June). In the autumn he visited Damascus and received the submission of Aleppo (October). During a few weeks stay in the north he showed his animosity to the Latins by ravaging the territory of Antioch. He encouraged the caliph to attempt the recovery of Baghdad from the Tartars, but did not find it expedient to give his expedition much support¹.

Bohemond of Antioch had been and still was on friendly terms with the Tartar invaders² so that Baibars' policy towards him was one of uncompromising hostility. His early relations to the Latins of the south are not so clear. The change of sultan coincides with a fresh outbreak of hostilities between the Moslem and Christian populations of Palestine³. At least one expedition on a considerable scale may be dated in the year 1261⁴. The knights Templars of 'Akka, Safed and other places whilst raiding the Jaulan together were attacked by Turkomans and severely defeated. Nearly all the leaders and many of the knights were taken prisoners. Their release was secured by the payment of a large ransom. But neither Baibars nor any of his emirs shared in these events nor profited by them⁵. In November,

¹ All these particulars are from Makrizi.

² Probably Antioch and Tripolis paid some kind of tribute to the Tartars when they entered Syria (Menko, Chron. xliii. 548). Cf. p. 324, n. 4.

³ Rothelin MS. ii. 639 (which expressly says that the truce with Egypt became void because of Kujūr's assassination).

⁴ El-'alini ii. 217 dates in A.H. 659, i.e. later than 6th December 1260; Gestes 163 and Annales ii. ii. 449 [=Eracles ii. 445] in 1260, but the latter after the accession of Baibars. If A.S.-v. 204 contains a reference to this expedition it gives a more exact date, Rabi' i 659, i.e. February 1261 (Recueil wrongly 1260).

⁵ El-'alini ii. 217. Cf. Gestes 163 (Moslem encampment "near Tiberias"), Annales ii. ii. 449 (the defeat near Toron). Eracles ii. 445 (gives names of those present including others than Templars).

when the new sultan returned from Aleppo, the Latins made overtures for the conclusion of peace and terms were actually drafted. An agreement with Jaffa and Beirut was signed on both sides, but the negotiations with the military orders and with the other Latin towns broke down over certain details. Doubtless in order to emphasise his resolve not to yield on the points in dispute Baibars ordered a raid to be made on the territories of the Latins whilst he himself returned to Egypt¹.

During 1262 it may be supposed that the relations of the Moslems and the Christians of Palestine remained the same as in the previous year. It was like the lull before the storm, significant to all but the most inexperienced. The sultan remained in Egypt during the whole year. He was actively engaged in diplomatic intercourse with the rulers of Europe and the Moslem east. Mention may be made especially of the friendly relations which he cultivated with the emperor Michael VIII (1259-82) who had just recovered Constantinople from the Latins (1261). In the north of Syria the troops of Aleppo joined in the Tartar war which was still raging in Mesopotamia. During the summer they also made a most successful incursion into the territory of Antioch. The seaport of the capital was burned and the ships in the harbour were destroyed².

During 1263 Baibars' movements are those of a general who surveys his field of operations and tentatively ascertains the strength and disposition of the enemy. He entered Palestine about the beginning of March with the immediate result that the count of Jaffa, who had long promised the release of his Moslem slaves, hastily executed his agreement for the sake of peace³. The sultan made his headquarters at Jebel et-ṭur (24th March)⁴ where he was speedily visited by representatives of the

¹ El-ta'rif ii. 216 f.; Makrizi i. l. 168 f. Some particulars of the points in dispute are given in Makrizi i. l. 195, which refers back to the events of 1261. See p. 337, n. 1. Baibars left Damascus for Egypt on Saturday 12th November and arrived there on the 28th of the same month (Makrizi i. l. 170).

² Makrizi i. l. 177 f.; cf. Eracles ii. 446 = Gestes 167 = Sanutos ii. 221.

³ Gestes 167; cf. Makrizi i. l. 194 (mentions Arsuf also), Eracles ii. 447, Sanutos ii. 221. This was John II of Ibelin, son of Philip who was John of Beirut's brother.

⁴ 12th Jumada I 661 (Abulf. v. 2 and Makrizi i. l. 190, where Jumada II is clearly a textual error).

military orders and by envoys from the principal Latin towns. They were given an audience only to be assailed with reproaches and dismissed with contumely¹. The much venerated church at Nazareth was now destroyed by the sultan's orders. On the 14th and 15th of April 'Akka was threatened and the neighbourhood of the city devastated². The inspection of Jerusalem and the occupation of Kerak occupied less than another month, after which Baibars returned to Egypt. The remainder of the year was devoted to the internal affairs of the sultanate. The claims of learning and religion were not forgotten. A college in Cairo known as *Uz-zahriyn*, from the sultan's official title, was completed and opened on Sunday December 9th³.

The hostilities of the year 1264 were still of a minor character. The sultan remained in Egypt consolidating his power and completing his military preparations. In northern Syria, although the Tartars were still a disturbing factor and minor conflicts with the Latins took place, the Armenians were the most active enemies of the Moslems. But the troops of Aleppo, Homs and Hama with some reinforcements from Damascus easily maintained the upper hand. In Palestine a truce was granted to the Latins whilst the harvest was being reaped in spring⁴. In April the castle of Shaḳif Tirun, which had lain in ruins since A.H. 658 (beginning 18th December 1259), was occupied and its rebuilding commenced. In July⁵ there were raids by the sultan's order in the neighbourhood of Caesarea and 'Athlith. Throughout the year the Latins also displayed considerable activity. Baisan was ruined by one of the expeditions they sent out⁶. At the same time the Genoese and the Venetians were again at war, and in September a Venetian fleet attempted to capture Tyre.

¹ It has been supposed that the military orders made a truce in 1261 and did not perform the conditions. In reality they seem never to have accepted the terms drafted at Damascus and forwarded to them for acceptance (Maḳrizi i. l. 195; cf. Gestes 167). See p. 336, n. 1. Eracles ii. 447 = Sanutos ii. 221 accuses them of breaking the treaty they had made.

² Maḳrizi i. l. 198 ff. (Saturday 4th Jumada ii and the following day); Annales ii. li. 450; Eracles ii. 447 (cf. Gestes 167, 13th and 15th April).

³ Maḳrizi i. l. 228 f.

⁴ Maḳrizi i. l. 231.

⁵ Maḳrizi i. l. 239.

⁶ Annales ii. li. 451 = Sanutos ii. 222 enumerates an expedition of the Templars and Hospitallers against "Ligon" or "Lillon" (16th January), a raid against Ascalon (15th June) and the destruction of Baisan (5th November).

In the beginning of 1265 the movements of the Tartars in northern Syria seemed at first to be the cause of the sultan's early start from Egypt. But as soon as news came south that this enemy had retreated before the troops which were sent against them Baibars in person commenced an attack on the Latin towns. Caesarea was taken by surprise on the 26th of February and the city was stormed¹. The inhabitants retired to the strongly fortified citadel, but that also surrendered a week later after a vigorously conducted siege (5th March)². Some days were spent in rasing the fortifications as completely as possible. At the same time troops ravaged the neighbourhood of 'Athlith and Haifa seems to have been deserted and ruined³. Arsuf was the next place to be seriously attacked. Its owner had disposed of it to the Hospitallers in 1261⁴ and it was now bravely defended by the knights. The siege lasted from the 21st of March to the 30th of April⁵ when at last a breach was effected and the Moslems penetrated the stronghold. The Latins who were still a thousand strong surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared, and the town was plundered and its walls destroyed. Baibars was now resolved to pursue his conduct of the holy war with as little intermission as possible, but for the next steps extensive preparations were required and the campaign was not resumed until the following year. In November an expedition of Bohemond against the territory of Homs was successfully repelled by the emir and his troops.

Next year the Egyptian levies were called out in April and the sultan left Cairo on the 8th of Mny (1266). Soon

¹ Makrizi l. ii. 7 (Thursday 9th Jumada I 663, calendar date 27th February); Abulf. v. 14. Sanutus ii. 222 (in A.D. 1264 although no doubt A.D. 1265 is intended) = Annales li. ii. 451 (under A.D. 1264) gives 26th January.

² Annales li. ii. 452; Makrizi l. ii. 7 (Thursday 15th Jumada I); so Abulf. v. 14: Gestes 171 wrongly March vii.

³ El-'alini li. 220 (town and citadel of Haifa destroyed, reconnaissance towards 'Athlith); Makrizi l. ii. 8 (perhaps exaggerated).

⁴ Eracles li. 446; Annales B li. ii. 450 (April).

⁵ Annales B li. ii. 452 (both dates; of the parallels Sanutus ii. 222 omits 21st March and Gestes 171 = Eracles li. 450 wrongly gives the 15th). The Arabic dates are 1st Jumada II (Makrizi l. ii. 8, El-'alini li. 220) to a Thursday in Rajab (El-'alini li. 220). The second date in Makrizi l. ii. 10 (Thursday 8th Rajab) is not self-consistent. Perhaps the error is due to the town having been captured on Monday and the citadel on Thursday (Nuwairi in Weil iv. 49, note 2).

attacks were being delivered all along the Latin frontier especially in the districts of Sidon, Tyre and Tripolis. In Tripolis the troops of Homs captured the castles of Kula'at, Halba and 'Arka'. The sultan himself having taken some part in the movements beside 'Akka gathered his forces for the siege of Safed. He stationed himself on the 14th of June¹ at Jacob's bridge to await the siege engines from Damascus, and the bombardment commenced on the last day of the month². Several attempts to storm the castle were unsuccessful but finally the garrison surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared (23rd July)³. Without delay and in spite of his promise Baibars ordered them out to execution on a neighbouring hill⁴. Probably he assumed that the Latins might now be so treated with impunity. After the greater part of the Egyptian army had been sent to invade the territories of Haithum of Armenia, Hunain and Ramla were occupied and fortified (August). The Latin towns now emulously strove to obtain peace, each on its own behalf, but the embassies from 'Akka and Tyre and Beirut and Jaffa seem all alike to have been rejected⁵. In October, after the triumphant conclusion of the Armenian campaign and before the sultan returned to Egypt, some skirmishes with the troops of 'Akka concluded operations for the year⁶.

In the spring of 1267 the fortress of Kaḥun was rebuilt by the Moslems, to take the place of Caesarea and Arsuf. Towards

¹ Abulf. v. 16; Annales B ii. li. 451 (Arches et Albe et le Gouliat); Makrizi i. li. 27 has Iḥṣān el-akrad instead of Iḥalba.

² Makrizi i. li. 28 (Monday 8th Ramaḍān).

³ 26th Ramaḍān 664, a Wednesday therefore the 30th June (Makrizi i. li. 28).

⁴ Friday 18th Shawāl 664 (Makrizi i. li. 30); in Abulf. v. 16, 19th Sha'ban is a textual error. El-'aīnī's dates are 8th [Shawāl] sultan encamped under the walls, on the 13th the outworks surrendered, on the 19th the capitulation took place (in ii. 222 Sha'ban is to be corrected into Shawāl). Gestes 179 and Eracles ii. 454 give 22nd July, Annales B ii. li. 451 and Sanutus ii. 222 24th July, and Berchem Inscrip. 471 Shawāl 664.

⁵ Makrizi makes some excuse for this; Abulfida has no remark.

⁶ Received during the siege of Safed (Makrizi i. li. 28).

⁷ Makrizi i. li. 37 f. (Muharram 665). The date of the most important encounter is given by Annales ii. li. 453 as 28th October 1226. Particulars are given by Eracles ii. 455 = Gestes 181 L, which says that the crusaders who took part in it landed in the preceding August (not that their defeat took place then).

the end of April the sultan posted himself at Şafed and made expeditions against 'Akka and the neighbourhood. As the Latin towns still sought peace Baibars adopted the obvious plan of granting it to some whilst he reserved others to bear the brunt of his attack. An arrangement was come to regarding Şafed and its dependencies. Peace was granted to the princess of Beirut and to the Latins of Tyre¹. A number of Moslem prisoners were set at liberty and the inhabitants of Tyre were required to pay a large sum of money (June 1267)². The Hospitallers of Hışn el-akrad and Marşab were granted a truce on condition of surrendering certain revenues which they had hitherto drawn from the territory of Hama and the Ismailian castles³. Even in such a critical year as this 'Akka was assailed by a Genoese fleet and a naval battle was fought between the Venetians and the Genoese (August). The work of fortifying Şafed which had been commenced in spring was completed in the autumn⁴. The sultan's inscription commemorating the event remains in its position on the walls⁵.

The year 1268 is notable for a series of triumphs which culminated in the recovery of Antioch. Jaffa was captured on the 7th of March, on the very first day it was attacked⁶. Şakîf Arnun was already invested, and when the sultan joined the besiegers twenty-six siege engines were employed in the attack. The last tower held by the defenders was stormed on the 15th of April, nine days after the sultan's arrival⁷. The men were retained as prisoners, the women and children were sent to

¹ El-'aini ii. 115 along with Makrizi i. ii. 42. The arrangement regarding Şafed may have been with the Hospitallers of whom El-'aini speaks immediately before and after his mention of the subject.

² Ramaşan 665, which commences 16th May 1267.

³ Makrizi i. ii. 42 f.; the account of i. ii. 31 ff. is to be regarded as a duplicate narrative wrongly placed under the preceding year.

⁴ Makrizi i. ii. 41 and 48.

⁵ It is given by Makrizi i. ii. 48.

⁶ Gestes 190 (8th) = Eracles ii. 456 (7th) = Sanntus ii. 223 (7th); Makrizi i. ii. 50 f., 10th Jumada ii, calendar date 8th March. Annales ii. ii. 453 also gives 8th March. This testimony seems too strong to be rejected in favour of 10th Rajab (16th March) which may be the date of the sultan's entry into the town or of the setting up of the inscription in which it is given (Berchem Inscript. 474). Berchem's suggestion that the date was falsified to conceal a breach of the truce seems rather unlikely.

⁷ Gestes 190 = Eracles ii. 456; Annales ii. ii. 453. Baibars reached Şakîf on Wednesday 19th Rajab and the capture was made on Sunday the last day of the

Tyre. From Shaḳif the sultan moved into the territory of Tripolis. For ten days in the beginning of May he ravaged the country and broke into the weakest of the strongholds where the inhabitants took refuge. The districts of Ṣafitha and Anṭarṭus were spared in consideration of the release of three hundred prisoners. Proceeding north by Ḥornṣ and Ḥama the Moslem army divided into scattered bands which plundered the territory of Antioch and then united for the siege of the capital. The invaders approached the town on the 16th of May¹, driving back at the same time a sortie of the garrison. One or two days were spent in fruitless negotiations. On Saturday the 19th a general assault was made, and by the fourth hour of the day the Moslems had gained the ramparts and were pouring into the town². The citadel, defended by some 8000 fighting men, was the only position which remained intact. Even it capitulated on the assurance that all within its walls would be spared (21st May)³. The population of the city was estimated at 100,000 and even if this be an exaggeration the spoil was certainly enormous. When the plunder was divided the money was measured out in cups, an infant was sold for twelve dirhems and a young girl for five. Everything left over was given to the flames⁴. Bohemond happened to be in Tripolis and so escaped the disaster which befell his capital. He had no remedy of any kind for the situation. Evidence of the new prestige of the sultan may be found in the readiness with which Haithum of Armenia now came to terms. Beḥesna, Darbassak, Ra'ban and other places which the Armenian prince had won by his alliance with the Tartars were restored as the price of

month (Maḳrizi i. ii. 51). El-'aini says that one of the two towers was abandoned on 16th Rajab and the second captured at the end of the month.

¹ El-'aini ii. 229 and Maḳrizi i. ii. 52 (1st Ramaḍan 666, calendar date 15th May; calculated in accordance with next note).

² El-'aini ii. 231 (quoting a letter of Baibars). The day is given as Saturday 4th Ramaḍan 666 (calendar date 18th May) by El-'aini and Abulf. v. 22. The date in Eracles ii. 456 is xxvii May, which may be regarded as an error for xix May given in the almost identical text of Gesta 190.

³ The date is from Röhricht 942, but the sources he cites in note 3 have no date. Eracles ii. 456 gives May 27th as the day of the capture of the town and that might be understood to be the date of the surrender of the citadel.

⁴ These particulars are from Maḳrizi i. ii. 53 f.

peace¹. Several Templar castles in Antioch were also abandoned and afterwards taken possession of by the Moslems². After the sultan's return to Damascus in June, envoys came from 'Akka with overtures for peace³. A treaty was drafted in which a partition of the territories of 'Akka, Haifa and Sidon was the main feature. But when the articles were referred for confirmation to 'Akka no agreement was found possible⁴. Before Baibars returned to Egypt at the end of July an incursion was made into the territories of Tyre⁵. It still suited the sultan's policy to maintain peace with some of the Latin towns and no doubt he did so⁶. But others such as Tyre being, as it were, marked down for conquest were given no truce.

The history of the next two years permits of being briefly summarised. In the spring of 1269 during the harvest season Moslem troops ravaged the territories of 'Akka and Tyre⁷, and Baibars himself shared in some of the movements. A truce was granted to Beirut and its neighbourhood⁸. During July and August the sultan performed the pilgrimage to Mekka. In September after the death of Konradin, son of the emperor Frederick, Hugh III of Cyprus (1267-84) was crowned king of Jerusalem in Tyre⁹. Towards the end of the year the movements of the Tartars in northern Syria induced Baibars to leave Egypt. In spite of their hasty retreat the sultan remained in Syria during the rest of the winter. His headquarters were at Hama, for the

¹ Abulf. v. 22 (Beḥesna seems not to have been immediately handed over); Makrizi i. ii. 54 f.

² Eracles ii. 457 = Gestes 191; cf. Makrizi i. ii. 54. Bagras was occupied on the 13th of Ramaḡān, 27th May (El-'aini ii. 134, Abulf. v. 22). In Makrizi i. ii. 56 the 13th of the month is apparently in Shawal but it might be in Ramaḡān (cf. next note).

³ El-'aini ii. 136, shortly after the return of the sultan to Damascus (which took place on the 9th of June). Makrizi's date is ambiguous (i. ii. 56); the 13th of Shawal is equivalent to June 16th.

⁴ Makrizi i. ii. 57 explicitly says that the treaty was not ratified because of disagreement on several points. El-'aini ii. 136 has no indication of this and Muḥi ed-din in Reinaud 515 implies that a settlement was reached. ⁵ El-'aini ii. 136 f.

⁶ A treaty with Bohemond after the fall of Antioch is referred to by Muḥi ed-din (Reinaud 513) and one with the lord of Ṣafitha and the Hospitallers, who surrendered Jabala (Reinaud 515 without naming a source).

⁷ Makrizi i. ii. 68 f.

⁸ Makrizi i. ii. 70.

⁹ His father Henry was a son of Bohemond IV of Antioch and his mother was Isabella a daughter of Hugh I of Cyprus. In Cyprus he succeeded the boy king Hugh II (1253-67), son of Henry I (1218-53).

most part, and his relations with the Assassins occupied his attention more than the Latin war¹. In the spring of 1270 he returned to Egypt to make preparations for meeting Louis IX's second crusade. The French king, however, landed in Tunis and when he died there (25th August)² the majority of the crusaders, after prolonged negotiations with the Moslems of the country abandoned the enterprise (November 1270). Baibars had been much afraid of the invasion of Egypt and Palestine and, as part of his scheme of defence, had destroyed the fortifications of Ascalon.

Next year (1271) the war with the Latins of Syria was energetically resumed. Tripolis was invaded and a serious blow was dealt to the prestige of the Hospitallers by the capture of Ḥiṣn el-akrad (besieged from 24th March to 8th April)³. Both the Templars of Antartus and the Hospitallers of Marḡab now gladly made peace. The conditions imposed were that the fortifications of Marḡab should not be strengthened, that part of its revenues should be surrendered and that some castles, including Ṣafitha, should be handed over to the Moslems⁴. After the capture of Ḥiṣn 'Akkar (besieged 29th April to 12th May)⁵ Baibars made ready to attack Tripolis itself. But the news that prince Edward of England and a portion of the recent crusade had landed in 'Akka (9th May 1271)⁶ induced him to make peace. Its duration as usual in this period was fixed at ten years⁷. After the beginning of June the sultan's headquarters were at Ṣafed and from there the neighbouring castle of Ḳurain

¹ Makrizi i. ii. 77 and Eracles ii. 458 = Annales ii. ii. 454 mention a skirmish in the plain below Ṣafed with crusaders and Syrian Latins from 'Akka on December 18th (Wednesday 22nd Rabi' ii 668 = "le mercredi avant Noël") and the former also an incursion into Tripolis in January (i. ii. 78).

² Joinville 501.

³ El-'alini ii. 237 (sultan encamped beside castle on 9th Sha'ban, outer defences captured on 20th, citadel surrendered on 24th); similarly Abulf. v. 26 f. The text of Makrizi i. ii. 85 is in confusion. Annales ii. ii. 455 = Sanutus ii. 224 makes the siege extend from 18th February to 8th April. This determines the western equivalent of 24th Sha'ban (calendar date 7th April). The inhabitants were given the choice of remaining in their homes or of going to Tripolis (Barheb. 572).

⁴ Makrizi i. ii. 85. The surrender of Ṣafitha is put by Nuwairi during the siege of Ḥiṣn el-akrad (Quatremère's Makrizi i. ii. 85, note 106). It belonged to the Templars.

⁵ 17th Ramaḡān to the last day of the month (Makrizi i. ii. 85, Abulf. v. 28). El-'alini ii. 242 gives 19th Ramaḡān and Annales ii. ii. 455 18th May for the beginning and end respectively.

⁶ Annales ii. ii. 455; Gestes 199; Sanutus ii. 224.

⁷ Makrizi i. ii. 86 f. The account of Menko xxiii. 557 is not reliable (dates after

or Montfort was attacked and captured (12th June)¹. It had been a possession of the knights of the Teutonic order and a perpetual cause of trouble to the district of Şafed. Three weeks after the capture it was decided to rase the fortifications to the ground. About the same time a fleet of sixteen vessels sent from Egypt to attack Cyprus was caught in a storm which wrecked eleven of them on the coast of the island. The crews numbering 1800 men were captured². Peace was now granted to the city of Tyre in return for concessions of territory and revenues³. Although prince Edward was still in 'Akka, the sultan thereupon returned to Egypt (July). During his absence the knights of 'Akka and the crusaders ventured to make a trifling foray in the direction of Lud⁴. From September to November Baibars moved about in Syria preoccupied with other matters than the Latin war⁵. In November when he was absent on an expedition against the Tartars the Latins of 'Akka made a successful raid in the neighbourhood of Kaḩun. But their attack on the castle itself was repulsed⁶. Hostilities were suspended during the winter and overtures for peace were made by the Latins in spring just as the sultan was leaving Egypt. After a few weeks negotiations

the vigil of John Baptist, 23rd June (1270), and says the lost castles were handed back on condition of tribute being paid).

¹ Makrizi i. ii. 87 (2nd Dhu'l-ḩa'da); El-'aini ii. 239; Gestes 199. Annales ii. ii. 445 makes the siege commence on 8th June and end "à vii jours" (where vii may be a textual error for xii). According to Nuwairi (In Quatremère's Makrizi i. ii. 87, note 108) the outworks were captured on 1st Dhu'l-ḩa'da and the citadel on the 2nd. El-'aini seems to make the attack and capture on the same day (ii. 244).

² Particulars from El-'aini ii. 240; other sources give the number of the ships differently. ³ A.H. 669, ends 8th August 1271 (El-'aini ii. 244).

⁴ Eracles ii. 461 (xii July); Annales ii. ii. 455 (xx July); Sanutus ii. 224 (22nd June, possibly a textual error). Cf. Makrizi i. ii. 92 and 100 and Gestes 200.

⁵ Makrizi i. ii. 92 ff. According to Sanutus ii. 224 Edward was in communication with the Tatars after September.

⁶ Makrizi i. ii. 101. His information that the castle was actually captured and then lost again is erroneous according to Gestes 200 f. and Eracles ii. 461 = Sanutus ii. 224. But the western sources pass over what seems to have been a decisive repulse or check following the initial success. The date of the expedition is given as November xxix (Annales ii. ii. 455), xxlii (Eracles = Sanutus), or xxliii (Gestes). Walter Hemingburgh l. 333 f. has a good account of the incidents of Edward's stay in Palestine except that his dates are very confused. He makes the Kaḩun expedition about 14th June (cf. note 4), and that against Lud about August 1st ("circa ad vincula beati Petri"). His expedition against Nazareth, dated in June, may have been of the nature of a pilgrimage.

a treaty was concluded (22nd April). It applied to the town and district of 'Akka, including the road to Nazareth, and its duration was fixed at ten years, ten months, ten days and ten hours¹. The attempt to assassinate Prince Edward, so well known to English readers, took place on the 18th of June in the following summer¹. After his recovery from his wounds he sailed home on the 22nd of September².

Baibars' wars with the Latins were now practically ended. After the conclusion of the peace with 'Akka and the treaties of the preceding year there was a truce in force with all the surviving towns and lordships of the Latins. Such agreements appear to have terminated legally with the death of either of the two contracting parties. Baibars himself died on the 1st of July 1277⁴. In the interval there seems to have been only one brief rupture of any of the agreements, namely in the year of the death of Bohemond VI († 11th March 1275)³. His successor Bohemond VII (1275-87) agreed to pay an annual tribute of 20,000 dinars and peace was thus renewed (July)⁶. In November of this same year Kūsair, a Latin castle in the district of Antioch, was taken from its owner⁷. But this was an isolated

¹ *Annales* II. ii. 455 = *Eracles* II. 461 gives date as 22nd April (so Menko xxlii. 358, "parascene" in the year 1271); *Sanutus* II. 224 has 21st April. Cf. *Maḡrizi* I. ii. 102 (*Ramaḡlan* 670). In the French translation of *El-'alān* II. 247 March and May 1271 should be March and May 1272, and in the Arabic *Shawal* is a textual error for *Sha'ban*. The length of the truce is given variously as ten years, ten months, ten days and ten hours (*El-'alān*), ten years, ten months and ten hours (*Maḡrizi*), ten years, ten weeks and ten days (*Walter Hemingburgh* I. 337). Menko xxiii. 357f. gives roundly eleven years, with the proviso that it should expire with the coming of a western king to Palestine. He states that Prince Edward was opposed to the conclusion of peace, whereas his approval seems to be implied in the letter of Hugh Revel given in Leroux, *Cartulaire* III. 330f.

² *Sanutus* II. 225, *Annales* II. ii. 455. *Walter Hemingburgh* I. 335 gives, however, Thursday in Pentecost week (i.e. 16th June).

³ *Gestes* 101, *Annales* II. ii. 456, *Eracles* II. 462, *Sanutus* II. 225. *Walter Hemingburgh* I. 337 says about the Assumption, i.e. 15th August.

⁴ *Maḡrizi* I. ii. 150 and *Abulf.* v. 40 (Thursday 27th *Muharram* 676, calendar date 30th June).

⁵ *Eracles* II. 466 (where the editor's A.D. 1274 should be A.D. 1275). So also *Sanutus* II. 226, if *Madhi* be regarded as a textual error for *Martil*. *Weil* iv. 79 gives 9th *Ramaḡlan* 673 = 8th March, apparently on the authority of *Nuwayri*.

⁶ *Maḡrizi* I. ii. 125.

⁷ 23rd *Jumād* I 674 (*Maḡrizi* I. ii. 125). For particulars see *Weil* iv. 178f. and *Reinand* 332f. (under A.H. 673).

event of no general importance. The five years at the close of Baibars' sultanate, during which he was at peace with the Latins, were principally occupied by campaigns against the castles of the Assassins, the kingdom of Armenia and the ever dangerous Tartars.

With the death of El-malik ez-zahir Rukn ed-din Baibars a notable figure in this history passes from the stage. His share in the reconquest of Syrin from the Latins was made apparently easy by the extreme weakness of his opponents, while it was in reality greatly complicated by wars with other peoples and by the difficulty of holding together his own dominions. His success must be attributed chiefly to his own personal qualities. Even the treachery and the cruelty which mark his career had their uses. His rivals never got the chance of becoming dangerously powerful. The most prominent of his better qualities is certainly his untiring energy. His swift secret movements were the wonder of his subjects. He had all the qualities of a brave soldier, a competent general and a clear sighted statesman. He was a patron of art and literature, a restorer of mosques and a builder of fortifications. It cannot be maintained that he was beloved by any class of his subjects, but his valour and success gained him respect and fear. His capture of Antioch is itself sufficient to preserve his memory, and his achievements against the Latins will always shed lustre on his name.

Baibars was succeeded by one of his sons, who made himself very unpopular and abdicated after a sultanate of two years (17th August 1279)¹. His successor was a brother who was deposed in three months by Saif ed-din Ḳalawun (26th November 1279)². The claim of the new sultan to his title El-malik el-manṣūr, the victorious prince, was soon severely tested and brilliantly established. Another emir, Sunḳur el-ashḳar, proclaimed himself sultan of Damascus early in 1280. In June Ḳalawun's forces gained a victory which gave them possession of that city. Thereupon the defeated emir called the Tartars to

¹ 7th Rabi' ii 678 (Maḳrizi i. ii. 171). Perhaps the date should be ten days later (Weil iv. 111, note 1).

² Maḳrizi (Sunday 10th Rajab 678). Quatremère ii. i. 2 gives 27th Rajab, but against this reading see Weil iv. 112. Abulf. v. 50 has Sunday 22nd Rajab.

his help and they took possession of Aleppo and its neighbourhood (October)¹. Without delay the knights of Marḳab made overtures to the invaders and raided the neighbourhood of Ṣafitha. They also gained a considerable success over the emir of Ḥiṣn el-akrad when he in turn attacked them². Whilst the Tartars delayed their advance southwards Kalawun came to terms with as many as possible of his actual or prospective enemies. Treaties were made with the knights Hospitallers of 'Akka (3rd May 1281), with Sunḳur el-ashḳar himself (end of June) and with Bohemond of Tripolis (16th July)³. Sunḳur kept the possessions he already had and received in addition Antioch, Famiya and Kafr ṭab⁴. The truce with the Latins was to be for ten years, ten months, ten weeks and ten days⁵. Having collected all his forces and completed his preparations the sultan now advanced towards Ḥomṣ (October 1281). A battle was fought with the Tartars in the plain of Ḥomṣ on the 30th of October⁶. Mangutimur, a son of Khulagu, was the Tartar commander. This was the only invasion of Syria by the Tartars during Kalawun's sultanate. The left wing of both armies was routed. But the Moslem right and centre, acting together, after a prolonged struggle gained a decisive victory.

Whilst the Latins were thus at peace with the Moslems for a full decade their domestic quarrels raged with the old persistence.

¹ They were in Aleppo from the 18th to the 30th of October, 2181 to 22nd Jumada ii 679 (Maḳrizi ii. i. 26).

² The dates are given by Sanutus ii. 228 (along with a reference to an earlier successful expedition of the knights in 1278). Abulf. v. 54 confirms the chronology generally and Annales A ii. ii. 457 gives the same years. Gestes 208 f. relates both encounters under 1279 but the rubric 1280 is wanting altogether. According to Gestes 208 f., 200 Hospitallers took part in the Latin raid and 7000 Moslems (Annales 2000 only) in the counter attack. Barheh. (*annus graec.* 1592) says the Moslems numbered 7000 and the Latins 200 knights and 500 foot.

³ Maḳrizi ii. i. 28 (where Saturday 22nd Muḥarram 680 is a textual error for Saturday 21st Muḥarram 680), ii. i. 30f. (early part of Rabi' i) and ii. i. 28 (27th Rabi' i). Reinard 540f. wrongly puts the treaties with the Latins after the defeat of the Tartars. Weil iv. 121 quotes Abu'l-mehasin for the exact date of the treaty with Sunḳur (5th Rabi' i 680).

⁴ Maḳrizi ii. i. 30.

⁵ Perhaps ten weeks should be inserted in the text of Maḳrizi ii. i. 28. The term of Bohemond's treaty is given simply as ten years.

⁶ Thursday 14th Rajab (Maḳrizi ii. i. 35, Abulf. v. 58); Thursday 30th Tishrin (Barheh. Syriac text 564; "feria tertia" in the translation 592 is incorrect).

Hugh of Cyprus never exercised much authority in Palestine, and in 1277 even his nominal title was challenged and practically usurped by Charles, king of Sicily. A quarrel between the Templar knight Guy, lord of Jubail, and Bohemond VII had serious issues. The order of the Templars became involved and the two factions waged a rancorous civil war. In 1282 Bohemond gained Jubail and Guy died in captivity. When king Charles was involved in the troubles arising from the Sicilian vespers (1282) Hugh reasserted his claim to authority in Palestine (1283)¹. After Hugh's death (1284) and that of his son John (1285), Henry II, another son, became king.

After the defeat of the Tartars at Homs, Kilawun still showed himself disposed to remain at peace with his Latin neighbours. Baibars' truce with the Templars of Anṣarṭus was renewed for another term of ten years and ten months (15th April 1282)². It was provided that the fortifications in the district should not be added to nor strengthened. When the truce that applied to 'Akka, 'Athlith, Sidon and the dependent districts came to be renewed the Latins appear to have supposed that they might secure better terms than those of the expiring treaty. But the agreement actually ratified was simply a recognition of the *status quo* (3rd June 1283)³. The Latins were debarred from adding to their fortifications except in the towns of 'Akka, 'Athlith and Sidon. Security was guaranteed to all pilgrims on the way to Nazareth, going and coming, and the church of Nazareth and four houses beside it were reserved for their use. In 1285 peace for the usual period of ten years and ten months was concluded with Marguerite of Tyre (18th July)⁴. It renewed the provisions of the treaty with Baibars and provided that no additional fortifications should be constructed in Tyre.

¹ Makrizi ii. i. 63 f. may be a reference to this and not to events connected with the Latin war.

² Wednesday 5th Muḥarram 681 (Quatremère's Makrizi ii. i. 221). The treaties spoken of in this paragraph are given in Arabic and in a French version in Quatremère's Makrizi ii. i. appendix.

³ Ten years, ten months, ten days and ten hours (Quatremère ii. i. 224 ff.). Makrizi ii. i. 60 simply says ten years (dating from 5th Muḥarram 681, 5th April 1283).

⁴ Quatremère ii. i. 213.

The only conflict between the Latins and the Moslems in this period took place in the beginning of 1285. The knights of Markab appear to have attacked a caravan of merchants and this brought them into collision with the emir of Hısn el-akrad. Kalawun gladly seized the opportunity of destroying this nest, which was always hatching trouble on the borders. The Moslem siege of the castle lasted thirty-eight days, until both sides welcomed a capitulation, the Hospitallers because they saw that their position was becoming indefensible and the sultan because he wished to preserve the walls from utter ruin (25th May 1285). The garrison were conducted under escort to Tripolis and were permitted to take with them all the property they could carry away¹. Kalawun now menaced the strong tower of Marakiya by the sea and so terrified Bohemond of Tripolis by his threats that he persuaded the governor to hand it over to the Moslems. By then it was immediately destroyed². No doubt these events contributed to induce Marguerite of Tyre to make the treaty already referred to. In the same summer Leo of Armenia (1270-89) agreed to pay an annual tribute, and peace was granted him on this condition.

The death of Bohemond VII in the autumn of 1287 (19th October)³ created a situation in Tripolis which finally resulted in a renewal of the Moslem war. Bohemond had no surviving children so that his sister Lucia was his heir. Her claim was opposed by a party whose leaders obtained assistance from the Genoese and corresponded with Kalawun⁴. A period of disturbance and almost of anarchy, although not quite of civil war, was the consequence. Possibly the treaty of 1281 expired with the death of Bohemond⁵. In any case the uncertainty

¹ Fullest particulars are given by the life of Kalawun in Reinaud 548 f. (where "25 de mai" is presumably a misprint for "23 de mai"). A.H. 684 is confirmed by the agreement between the days of the week and the days of the month in the dates. Makrizi has two accounts, one rightly under the year 684 (ii. i. 80), the other under 685 (ii. i. 86). Abulf. v. 84 line 684 (but makes siege commence too late, beginning of Rabi' I). Gestes 117 (wrongly under A.D. 1284) makes siege extend from 17th April (as Reinaud 548 f.) to 27th May. Annales A.H. ii. 458 wrongly gives A.D. 1283.

² Reinaud 551 f.

³ Sanutus ii. 119; Gestes 131.

⁴ Abu'l-mehazın in Reinaud 561; cf. de excidio v. 759 ("Inito foedere proditiionali cum soldano") and Gestes 134.

⁵ In the treaties of the period it is often expressly provided that the death of one

regarding his successor and the overtures which the Latins had made must have seemed to K̲alawun reasonable excuses for invading Tripolis¹. The year 1288 passed without fulfilment of his intention owing, it is said, to the death of his son². By the time he appeared before Tripolis, in the spring of the following year (25th March)³, the Latins had made some preparations for their defence and were united in face of the common foe. But the vigour with which the Moslems pressed the siege quickly brought it to a successful issue (26th April)⁴. Nineteen siege engines and 1500 sappers and miners were employed in the attack. When the town was stormed many lost their lives and many were taken prisoners, but many also escaped by sea as the sultan had no fleet. After this rapid success K̲alawun does not seem to have pressed his advantage. The governor of Jubail, head of the party opposed to Lucia, promised tribute and was left undisturbed⁵. Anṭarṭus was protected by special treaty. Other places which had been Bohemond's were probably

of the contracting parties should not nullify the obligations of the other. Otherwise, however, the treaty lapsed (cf. p. 335, n. 3).

¹ Makrizi li. i. 101 accuses the Latins of having broken the treaty by arresting Moslem merchants. As however the incident is dated about the end of 1288 (A.H. 687) K̲alawun was already preparing to attack Tripolis when it occurred. On the other hand Sanutus li. 229 represents the hostilities as having commenced in April 1287, before Bohemond's death, with the siege and capture of Laodicea by one of K̲alawun's emirs. But he is certainly wrong in dating K̲alawun's own preparations before Bohemond's death (note 3) and Laodicea seems to have belonged to Sunkur el-ashkar although partly inhabited and defended by Christians (cf. Abulf. v. 88). Gesta 230 relates the capture of the castle of Ṣabyun from Sunkur el-ashkar in 1287 (?) by troops of K̲alawun's which then seized Laodicea ("una ville dou prince,... la Liehe").

² Sanutus li. 229, but wrongly dating in 1287 before the death of Bohemond; the true date is given by Abulf. v. 88 as A.H. 687.

³ Friday 1st Rabi' i (Abulf. v. 90), with which Makrizi agrees (note 4). Gesta 236 (cf. Sanutus li. 229) makes the siege commence on Thursday 17th March; Jacob Aurlae, Mon. Germ. xviii. 323, on the 10th March (cf. appendix, p. 360 f.).

⁴ Gesta 237; Annales A li. li. 460; Sanutus li. 230; Annales Genuenses, Muratori vi. 596; Abulf. v. 90 (Tuesday 4th Rabi' i 688, calendar date 27th April). In Makrizi li. i. 102 4th Rabi' i is a textual error; the length of siege is rightly given as 34 days. Jacob Aurlae, Mon. Germ. xviii. 323, dates capture 27th April, Dandolo, Muratori xli. 402, "de mense Maji," Annales B li. li. 460 last day of April.

⁵ Makrizi li. i. 103 (cf. Ibn Ferat in Reinaud 563). This was Bartholomew of Jubail, head of the party opposed to Lucia and "captain" of Tripolis after Bohemond's death (Jacob Aurlae, Mon. Germ. xviii. 322).

divided in accordance with some fresh agreement¹. The maritime town of Tripolis was destroyed, but in a short time the building of a new Moslem town beside Mons peregrinus, a mile inland, was commenced². This was the spot where a Latin Tripolis was first established in the time of Raymond of Toulouse (chapter I, p. 54).

The fall of Tripolis unmistakably presaged the future. The Latin towns were evidently at the mercy of the sultan³. Their only hope was that Europe would respond to the Pope's appeal on their behalf. But such a hope was altogether vain. King Philip of France disclaimed responsibility of any kind. The kings of Aragon and Sicily, who were brothers, hastened to make an alliance with Kalawun. They signed a treaty which bound them to assist the sultan against any crusade and against the Syrian Latins if they broke the existing truce (24th April 1290)⁴. Edward I of England had dallied for some years with the question of another crusade and seemed disposed to execute his promises. But his intentions really mattered little. The great debate of east and west was over before the time appointed for his crusade. The efforts of the Pope induced some hundreds of pilgrims, it may have been a thousand or two, to cross to 'Akka in the summer of 1290, and their presence hastened the catastrophe. There was no war for them to wage, time hung heavily upon their hands, and peace with the infidels was

¹ Some one of the treaties named in note 3 may be supposed to refer to Tripolis.

² Gestes 237 f.

³ King Henry of Cyprus and Jerusalem, the military orders and others had come to the assistance of Tripolis when it was attacked and their action may have been regarded as an abrogation of their treaties with the sultan (so expressly Amadi 218). But if so the treaties were renewed, probably with some revision of conditions (cf. de excidio v. 759). A treaty made by the "captains" of 'Akka for two years, two months, two weeks, two days and two hours is mentioned in de excidio v. 759. Gestes 238 = Sanutus il. 230 says that king Henry "firmavit irrogam" before returning to Cyprus in August. Amadi 218 gives the term of his peace as ten years, ten months and ten days. Dandolo, Muratori xii. 402, records a truce for ten years between Christians and Moslems after the capture of Tripolis. It is noteworthy that Makrizi ii. l. 109 does not mention any renewal of the peace with 'Akka (as might perhaps be expected). The different durations assigned to the treaties above named point to the existence of more than one. Presumably one applied to Tripolis.

⁴ Tuesday 13th Rabi' il 689 (calendar date 23rd April). A translation of the treaty is given in an appendix to Wilken vii.

abhorrent to their minds. Some of them committed outrages on Moslems who lived securely near 'Akka under the protection of the existing treaty (August 1290)¹. When Ḳalawun was informed he demanded the surrender of those who had thus violated the truce. Some, including the Templars, advised submission. But the reply actually made was a refusal, tempered by protestations of various kinds. Ḳalawun at once commenced preparations for the siege of 'Akka. In the very midst of his activity, after a few days illness, he died on the night of Friday 10th November (1290)². The event made no apparent change in the situation. El-malik el-ashraf Ṣalah ed-din Khalil, his son and successor, rejected the overtures of the Latins (January 1291)³ and actively continued the preparations for war.

The army which assembled before 'Akka in the spring of 1291 was chiefly formidable because of its artillery. Its siege engines numbered ninety-two, more than were known to have been employed at any previous siege⁴. Probably the number of the troops was also exceptionally great⁵. On the other hand, whilst 'Akka was splendidly fortified, its garrison was hardly adequate. Yet the total number of the defenders was reckoned at from fourteen thousand to eighteen thousand foot-soldiers and from seven hundred to nine hundred knights⁶. The first detach-

¹ Makrizi ii. l. 109 (Sha'ban 689, commencing 9th August); Reinaud 567 f.; Gestes 238; de excidio v. 760; de Nangis, Gulzai 213 f.; Walter Hemmingburgh ii. 23. Sanutus ii. 230 refers to this as an incident occurring after the death of Ḳalawun when preparations to attack the Latins had already commenced. But he speaks of it as "contra fidem treugarum."

² Abulf. v. 92 (Saturday 6th Dhu'l-ḳa'da 689, calendar date 10th November); Makrizi ii. l. 110 (where Saturday night and Dhu'l-hijja 689 should read in accordance with ii. l. 112 Saturday night 6th Dhu'l-ḳa'da 689). Several of the sources convey the impression that Ḳalawun was on the march against 'Akka when he died. But he had not had time to complete his preparations for such an undertaking as the siege of 'Akka and he was certainly still in the neighbourhood of Cairo during his illness and at the time of his death. De excidio v. 761 represents him as planning his attack on 'Akka for the spring of 1291 and v. 764 (half a year's respite) agrees. De excidio v. 768 certainly shares the view referred to but this is only because it wrongly dates the sultan's death in the spring of 1291.

³ Muharram 690 (Makrizi ii. l. 120).

⁴ Abulf. v. 96 speaks of this as the sultan's intention, implying no doubt that it was fulfilled. The number is Makrizi's.

⁵ The Arabic historians give no estimate; the figures of the westerns are quite unreliable.

⁶ 18,000 foot and 900 knights (de excidio v. 765), or 14,000 foot and 700 to 800 knights (Gestes 241); later in the siege the numbers are given (see page 353) as 12,000

ment of the besiegers arrived about the end of March, the siege engines came on the 7th of April and they were put into position on the 11th of the same month¹. During the next three weeks no important events occurred. As yet the city was invested rather than actively besieged. The crisis of the siege commenced on the 4th of May. On that day king Henry arrived from Cyprus with some 200 knights and 500 foot-soldiers, to the great joy of the inhabitants². On the same day and for nine or ten successive days thereafter³ the town was bombarded so continuously and so fiercely and the results were so grave, that the defenders began to lose heart. The sappers and miners plied their work under the shelter of the bombardment and at several points the walls and the towers became a mass of ruins. Those who could send their wealth and their wives and children to Cyprus did so. Such knights and soldiers as were not legally bound to remain deserted the city in large numbers⁴. But the garrison still numbered 12,000 men, and of these 800 were knights⁵. After ten days bombardment preparations were made to storm the town. The first assault, on the 15th, was repulsed⁶.

men including about 800 knights (*de excidio* v. 770). The total population was between thirty and forty thousand (*Gestes* 241).

¹ According to Makrizi ii. i. 125 the sultan arrived on Thursday 3rd Rabi' II (5th April), the engines arrived two days later and were ready for use four days afterwards. These dates explain *Gestes* 243, which makes the sultan arrive on Thursday 5th April and commence operations eight days later; also *Sanutus* ii. 230, and Abu'l-mehasin in Reinaud 570, which give 5th April as the date of the commencement of the siege; 9th April, the date of Amadi 220, was the day when the sultan moved from his first position nearer the town (the fourth day after his arrival, *de excidio* v. 769). According to *de excidio* v. 768 there was merely skirmishing round the town from the middle of March to the middle of April, but this was before the arrival of the sultan. Abulf. v. 96 makes the troops take up their position in the beginning of Jumada I (commences 2nd May). He may refer to the bombardment which commenced on May 4th or to the latest arrivals of the besieging troops.

² *Sanutus* ii. 231.

³ *De excidio* v. 770.

⁴ *De excidio* v. 770. It seems however highly improbable that king Henry should have deserted the town on the 15th of May as this writer alleges (followed by de Nangis in Guizot 215). *Gestes* 252 and *Sanutus* ii. 231 speak of the king's escape on the 18th after the town was captured. At the same time Abu'l-mehasin, Reinaud 570, speaks of his abandoning 'Akka after only three days stay in it.

⁵ *De excidio* v. 770. Still later (v. 775) 3000 who are said to have fled with the king (note 4) and 7000 as being disabled are deducted from the total. But the statements of the speech here "reported" cannot be regarded as very reliable.

⁶ *De excidio* v. 770; cf. *Sanutus* ii. 231.

A fierce day's battle on the 16th¹ nearly ended in the capture of the town. The Moslems filled the moat at a vulnerable point and, having seized the ramparts, made a breach by which they entered the city. Accusations, against the Latin leaders, of discord and of failure to discharge their duty were afterwards current, and the walls at the captured point are said to have been imperfectly manned. However this may have been, a rally led by the Marshal of the knights of St John, Matthew of Clermont, turned the tide and drove the Moslems once more from the city. That night a temporary wall was built behind the breach and engines were posted to protect it. Next day the Moslems seem to have rested in preparation for their final effort². The last assault took place on Friday the 18th of May³. The attack began before sunrise, when the city was shrouded in mist. By the first breach and the neighbouring gate and finally at various other points the Moslems penetrated within the walls. Early in the fight the Master of the Temple was killed and the Master of the Hospital severely wounded. Many of the leaders, including king Henry⁴, escaped by the ships which remained in the harbour. But for most there was no escape. Numbers took refuge in the strongholds of the city, such as the Templar-house, and there defended themselves for ten or twelve days longer. The incidents of these closing days are left to our imagination to picture. When the last fight was over and the city had been plundered the fortifications were dismantled and the houses set on fire.

In the spring of 1291 the Latins still retained some half-dozen towns along the coast of Syria, from Anṭarṭus to 'Athlith. The fall of 'Akka sealed their fate without exception. They were dealt with in turn by one of the emirs as quickly as was convenient. Not one appears to have resisted the victorious

¹ In *de excidio* v. 770 the day after the 15th (or the day before the capture); in *Gestes* 248, Wednesday, i.e. 16th May.

² The silence of *de excidio* regarding the 17th may be accounted for in this way; it passes directly from the 16th to the day of the capture (cf. note 1). Various sources quoted by Wilken vii. 758, note 82, imply that there was fighting on both the 16th and the 17th. So *de Nangis* in *Gulzot* 216.

³ *Annales* A li. ii. 460; *Gestes* 256; *de Nangis* in *Gulzot* 215 f.; *Makrizi* li. i. 125 (Friday 17th Jumada i). In *Abulf.* v. 98 Friday 17th Jumada ii is a textual error.

⁴ See p. 353, n. 4.

enemy even for a single day. Tyre was abandoned on the evening of the 18th of May by its principal Christian inhabitants, and next day the Moslems took possession. When a Moslem fleet appeared off Sidon on the 14th of July the Latins deserted the town. The citizens of Beirut capitulated as soon as they were summoned to surrender (21st July)¹. The towns of Tripolis were perhaps the last to be taken possession of by the victorious enemy. Antartus was occupied on the 3rd of August² and the others presumably about the same time. The Templar castle of 'Athlith, which had been deserted in May, was destroyed about the middle of August³.

The news of the complete extinction of the Latin colonies was received without great interest or emotion in the west. Pope Nicholas IV during the remaining months of his life vainly tried to kindle into flame some sparks of the old enthusiasm. After his death even the project of a crusade faded gradually away. The alluring ideals of the first crusade had lost their power after two hundred years' experience of the possibilities and real character of a European occupation of Palestine.

¹ Particulars are given by Gieseler 256 ff. and Sanutus li. 231 f., but except in the case of Tyre without dates. The fall of Tyre is dated by Sanutus li. 231, *Annales* B li. ii. 460 and Makrizi li. i. 126 (where 17th Jumada ii should be 17th Jumada i; cf. li. i. 127). That of Sidon is dated by Makrizi li. i. 131 and Nuwairi quoted by Weil iv. 181 (15th Rajah); cf. *Annales* A li. ii. 460 (nine weeks after the capture of 'Akka) and Abulf. v. 98 (end of Rajah); Makrizi li. i. 126 has 20th Jumada ii (June 30th). The fall of Beirut is dated by Makrizi li. i. 131 and Nuwairi in Weil iv. 181 (13rd Rajah); cf. Abulf. v. 98 (end of Rajah). Quatremère's Makrizi mentions Haifa without any date, in Weil iv. 181 he is cited for 1st Sha'ban.

² 5th Sha'ban (Makrizi li. i. 126, Abulf. v. 98 and Abu'l-mehasin in Weil iv. 181). Codex arab. Quatremère in Weil iv. 181 puts the fall of Jubail also in Sha'ban.

³ Abulf. v. 98 and Makrizi li. i. 126 give the beginning of Sha'ban (commences 30th July), Codex arab. Quatremère in Weil iv. 181, 16th Sha'ban (14th August) in agreement with Abu'l-mehasin (a month after Sidon). *Annales* B li. ii. 460 says it was deserted like Tyre on 18th May.

APPENDIX.

A. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE ARABIC HISTORIANS.

THE Arabic histories of the period of the crusades are not bare chronicles, but they follow the chronicler's method of relating the events of each year together in a group under the heading of the year in which they occur. This method, in spite of its chronological advantages, creates and perpetuates chronological error. Every event which the historian records must be put under some year and inevitably there are cases where the evidence is insufficient and the wrong year is chosen. Besides, strict adherence to the method is often sacrificed to avoid the breaking off of a narrative at an inconvenient point. In such cases the historian may overrun the year slightly or may carry part of his narrative forward, or may recapitulate when he comes to resume it under the next year. In any case his readers are sometimes misled regarding the year in which some of the events recorded took place. Incidents which fall at the beginning or end of Moslem years are evidently most likely to be taken a year forward or set a year back (see pp. 102, n. 1 and 301, n. 1). The general result is that independent sources frequently relate the same event under different but successive years. This has a further important consequence. Such writers as Ibn el-athir, Sibṭ ibn el-jauzi, Kemal ed-din, Abu shama and Maḳrizi, for the periods anterior to themselves, are compilers from older sources. Abu shama names his sources and indicates the beginning and end of his quotations. The others as a rule transcribe without any acknowledgment that they do so. They copy their sources nearly word for word and even set down contradictory statements, from different sources, side by side, without remark or any solution of the contradictions. Such a procedure leads to the appearance

in their histories of what may be called "duplicate narratives," two accounts of the same events, taken from different sources and possibly assigned to different years (see pp. 46, n. 1, 62, n. 2, 85, n. 7, 101, n. 5, 103, n. 5, 108, n. 4, 297, n. 3, 321, n. 1). When the accounts of the earlier sources diverged considerably and were entered under different years it might easily escape the compiler's notice that he was incorporating duplicate narratives in his history. In any case his method and the conditions under which he worked produced such duplicates and, whether aware of it or not, he gave his readers no warning. The result is that battles and treaties and sieges walk again as new events when they are really ghosts, *revenants*, of what has been enacted previously. It is not surprising that modern historians should have been betrayed by these phantoms into describing events which never occurred. Even the most notable work of recent years on the history of the crusades is not free from error of this kind.

The Moslem year consists of twelve lunar months¹, which in the course of their progress through the solar year correspond in turn to (parts of) all our western months. Since the astronomical lunar month ("lunation") is not an exact number of days the commencement of these Moslem months and their duration have been fixed according to a system which keeps them as closely in touch with the phases of the moon as is consistent with their having an exact number of days in each. In every cycle of thirty years the system is ahead of actual lunar time in only a very few years by as much as 5-8 hours, whereas, roughly speaking, in 10 out of 30 years it is behind the phases of the moon by 7-16, 8-17, 9-18, 10-19 and even by 11-20 hours. The Christian dates corresponding to the Moslem months of any year are given in Wüstenfeld's tables in accordance with this system (see bibliography). These dates may be called "calendar dates" and are quite fixed (e.g. 1st Muharram 494 = 6th November 1100, and 1st Muharram 495 = 26th October 1101).

¹ Muharram...30 days

Safar29 "

Rabi' I30 "

Rabi' II29 "

Jumada I...30 days

Jumada II...29 "

Rajab30 "

Sha'ban ...29 "

Ramaḍān30 days

Shawāl29 "

Dhu'l-ḥiǧ'a30 "

Dhu'l-hiǧ'a ...29 or 30 days

But in practice this calendar system is not strictly followed. The commencement of every month is determined by observation, which varies from place to place, and may be at least a day sooner or later than the "calendar date." From the nature of the calendar actual observation should usually give dates that are earlier than the corresponding calendar dates, but the difficulty of observation in unfavourable climatic conditions is such that the divergence of actual dates from calendar dates is generally on the side of lateness. It follows from these circumstances that variations of one or two days between the dates of Arabic writers for the same event are usually caused by variations in the assumed date of the commencement of the month in which the event falls. The 13th of Rajab in one writer is the same as the 15th of Rajab in another (p. 261, n. 5). The 5th, 6th and 7th of Rabi' ii may all denote the same day (p. 151, n. 4). The Arabic historians were perfectly aware of this imperfection in their system of dating and in order to prevent uncertainty they regularly name the day of the week along with the day of the month (p. 315, n. 1). Where the week day is wanting in Moslem dates, owing to the neglect of copyists or otherwise, there is no certainty regarding the actual day and no presumption in favour of the calendar date. When the actual date is known to be different from the calendar date it is usually a day later and it may be two days. It is more rarely a day before the calendar date and seldom, if ever, two days. Apparent instances of this last variation (e.g. p. 116, n. 2) may possibly be explained otherwise. The debt which the present writer, like all students of the crusading period, owes to the great "*Recueil des historiens des Croisades*" makes it the more necessary to warn those not acquainted with Arabic that the dates of its translation must always be tested. They are only calendar dates at best, and when the editors observe discrepancies between the month dates and the days of the week they are inclined like Röhrich to correct the latter instead of the former (pp. 140, n. 6, 302, n. 2).

When Moslem dates are given in terms of the Christian calendar an element of uncertainty sometimes arises owing to the fact that the Moslem day begins at night and so includes the night of the preceding Christian day. When it is not known

that a certain event took place at night, or when being known it is not allowed for, the calculated Christian date will be a day too late (pp. 151, n. 4, 268, n. 4).

A very large number of discrepancies in the dates given by the Arabic authors are simply due to textual error. By far the most numerous class of such errors are those caused by confusion between the Arabic words for 10 and 20, the written forms of which are closely alike. This confusion affects all the compound numbers from 11 to 29 and is therefore a potential cause of error in most month dates. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the cases where two dates differ by 10 days are innumerable. The discrepancy occurs between different sources (p. 230, n. 3), and between different texts of the same source (pp. 230, n. 3, 263, n. 7). In every case the explanation is that the Arabic word for 10 has been read and written 20 or *vice versa*.

When the weekday test is available it arbitrates decisively between the readings. Sometimes the parallel dates of western sources also point out the true text (p. 267, n. 3), occasionally an Arabic source supplies a Christian date with which comparison may be made (p. 286, n. 3) and sometimes there are incidental indications of the error and of the required correction in the narrative itself (pp. 151, n. 4, 230, n. 3, 266, n. 1).

Less easily understood and yet apparently occurring are instances of the addition of the number 10 to the units so that 1 becomes 11, 2 becomes 12, etc. (pp. 151, n. 4, 234, n. 5, 329, n. 6; cf. p. 302, n. 2). Possibly such errors arise partly from the use of figures. There are certainly cases of textual error which originate in the misreading and miswriting of the Arabic figures. 5 and 9 are evidently sometimes confused owing to their resemblance (pp. 213, n. 3, 226, n. 3), and so perhaps are 5 and 0 (p. 229, n. 2). 3 and 8 are still more commonly interchanged (pp. 286, n. 3, 316, n. 4) but the resemblance of the Arabic words for these numbers may be held chiefly responsible for this. Some apparent cases of the confusion of 7 and 9 do not admit of quite decisive proof.

In the Arabic historians the names of the months are also seriously affected by textual error. It is obvious how simply Rabi' i and Rabi' ii may be confused, although the numeral is

regularly written out and not denoted by a figure (p. 350, n. 4). Similarly Jumada i and Jumada ii (pp. 235, n. 2, 333, n. 4), Dhu'l-ḥa'da and Dhu'l-hijja (pp. 333, n. 2, 352, n. 2) and frequently Shawal and Sha'ban (pp. 286, n. 3, 339, n. 4, 345, n. 1) are wrongly interchanged. In p. 194, n. 3, a clear case of Jumada i for Rabi' i is given, but this is exceptional.

The Arabic sources for the period of the crusades supply most valuable and abundant chronological data, but their liability to textual error in the case of mere month dates is so great that some verification is always desirable. The principal criterion of accuracy in such cases is the weekday test and that is usually quite sufficient in itself. In quoting Arabic dates it is always important that the week day should be included when it is named in the sources. Fortunately the names of the days of the week are textually distinct, so that they are not themselves appreciably affected by textual error. There may be cases where the week day named is inaccurate, but comparatively speaking they are very rare (pp. 296, n. 1, 303, n. 3). Where the discrepancy between a week day and a month date disappears on the assumption of a prevalent textual error in the numeral or in the month there need be no hesitation in making the correction (p. 261, n. 3). No doubt there are cases of what may be called compound errors. There may be two errors side by side in the same date (pp. 194, n. 3, 286, n. 3) and conceivably there may be successive errors, as from 9 to 5 and then from 5 to 0. Corrections of such cases possess complete certainty only when there is external evidence in favour of them.

It remains to be observed that there are frequent discrepancies between the dates assigned to certain classes of events in particular. Sieges and surrenders are typical examples. The commencement of a siege may include several distinct stages, such as the first approach of the enemy, the arrival of all his forces, the complete investment of the town and the opening of the bombardment. Each one of these stages may have a different date, which may appear in some writer as the date of the commencement of the siege. A compiler whose only available date refers properly to one of the stages naturally treats that as his date for the commencement of the siege

(pp. 144, n. 2, 261, n. 5; cf. p. 263, n. 3). The capture or surrender of a town may also include similar stages. The negotiations for surrender begin on a certain day, terms are arranged on another, the vanquished evacuate the town or citadel on a third and the conqueror's triumphant entry takes place on a fourth. The date of any of these events may appear in the histories as the date of the capture of the town (pp. 209, n. 3, 230, n. 2, 251, n. 6, 334, n. 3; cf. 212, n. 3).

II. WILLIAM OF TYRE'S CHRONOLOGY¹.

The reigns of which the chronology is here discussed are those of Baldwin I, Baldwin II, Fulk, Baldwin III, Amalric and Baldwin IV. The dates in these reigns are in terms of the years of the Christian era or of the regnal years of the kings, or are determined by reference to the sequence of events, by what may be called a system of relative chronology. There are such serious errors both in the Christian year dates and in the regnal year dates that the question whether these are due to William Tyre himself soon presents itself. Investigation shows that many dates of both classes are probably secondary additions to the original narrative. This implies that the system of relative chronology may be treated as representing throughout most certainly William Tyre's original work. Some of the difficulties of the superadded framework, as it may be called, are removable on the assumption of textual error. But this remedy is only a partial one.

It does not appear that the question of the time that is reckoned as the commencement of the Christian and the regnal years, respectively, affects appreciably the discussion of William Tyre's chronology. It may be inferred from xii. 8, which refers

¹ There is an important article by T. A. Archer on this subject in the *English Historical Review*, vol. iv. 1889, pp. 89-105. In it he elaborately discusses "the accession dates of the early kings of Jerusalem" as these are contained in the history of William Tyre. But his conclusions are weakened by his omission to investigate the character of the chronology of this history at other points. In particular he overvalues the accuracy of the regnal year dates and his suggestion of a "chronological framework" superadded to the original history has a wider application than he was aware of. A large proportion both of the Christian year dates and of the regnal year dates are apparently the work of another hand than that of the first author.

to the death of Pope Gelasius (†28th or 29th January 1119), that his new year's day was January 1st. But even if his year commenced at Easter the conclusions here maintained would not be materially affected. The case of the regnal years is more complicated. The historian's usage in the reign of Baldwin IV evidently makes the regnal year commence on the day of the new king's accession. But this does not necessarily hold good of the chronological framework in the earlier reigns. In xiii. 18 it may be held that January 1126, and only that particular month, is put, incorrectly, in the eighth year of Baldwin II's reign. But the possibility of the equation A.D. 1126 = eighth year of Baldwin's reign is not to be lost sight of and seems in fact to agree with the usage of the framework, according to which every complete Christian year is denoted by some one corresponding regnal year. In other words the first regnal year of a reign may be reckoned to commence on the 1st of January following the king's accession.

In the following detailed discussion the reign of Baldwin IV is passed over as presenting no special difficulties, and a commencement is made with that of Amalric as the next latest and as one in which William Tyre himself lived and played a part. The Christian year dates of the deaths of the kings are reserved for separate treatment together at the end.

Amalric's reign. Independently of the references to regnal and Christian years, twelve years may be distinguished in the narrative of this reign. The transitions from year to year occur in xix. 6, xix. 11, xix. 13, xx. 3-4, xx. 10, xx. 19, xx. 24, xx. 27, xx. 29, xx. 30 and xx. 32. They are sometimes expressly marked by the phrase "sequenti anno" (e.g. in xx. 24), sometimes they are only to be inferred from the mention of a season (xix. 11) or a month (xix. 6) which obviously belongs to a new year. In the following table these twelve years are denoted by Arabic numerals and the regnal years corresponding, where they are mentioned, by Roman numerals. The Christian year dates of the king's accession and death being meantime reserved, the remaining chronological data of the reign are as follows¹:

¹ In xix. 10 A.D. 1167 is a certain case of textual error, presumably for A.D. 1165. It is omitted from the table.

1 = i ^o	5	9 = viii ^o (<i>sic</i>)
2 = ii ^o = A.D. 1165	6 = vi ^o = A.D. 1169	10
3 = iii ^o	7 = vii ^o	11 = x ^o (<i>sic</i>)
4 = iv ^o = A.D. 1167	8 = vii ^o (<i>sic</i>)	12 = xii ^o

The obvious discrepancy between three of these regnal years and the others is not removed by the assumption that Amalric's regnal years commenced in February. Tested by the relative chronology of the reign vii^o, viii^o and x^o in xx. 24, xx. 27 and xx. 30 should certainly be viii^o, ix^o and xi^o. If these corrections be made the regnal years of Amalric's reign form a consistent series corresponding uniformly to the years of the relative system of dating and to the three Christian years given above¹. But since the relative dating itself is in error in the latter part of Amalric's reign (see below) these corrections can only be made with some reserve at this stage.

Any estimate of the value of the chronological framework of Amalric's reign must take account of a most damaging fact which appears at the outset. William Tyre's narrative passes in silence over the year 1166, and the system of dating by regnal years takes no account of the omission, being constructed on the assumption that the relative dating of the narrative correctly indicates the number of years in the king's reign. xix. 12 is the point at which A.D. 1166 is passed over, and the contents of the chapter heading indicate that William Tyre left this portion of his narrative unfinished with the intention of completing it during revision. The author of the framework, if he had known of the omission of A.D. 1166, would have passed from iii^o to v^o, instead of which he passes from iii^o (in xix. 11) to iv^o (in xix. 13). In other words these regnal years have not been taken from contemporary records nor from tradition, but have been inserted by calculation and in reliance on the completeness of the relative chronology.

In the latter part of the reign also the author of the frame-

¹ Whatever be the history of the insertion of these Christian and regnal year dates it is highly probable that the words "qui erat regni domini Amalrici [annus] septimus" are an interpolation. They are wanting in the Old French translation (*Recueil* text) and the use of the king's name in the sentence conflicts with the immediately following circumlocution "sepedictus rex." The elimination of this clause reduces the number of apparent textual errors in the regnal years to two.

work has been led into error by the imperfection of the relative dating. In xx. 23 the year of the death of Thomas à Becket is given as vii^o and in xx. 33 the king's own death year is xii^o. Both of these are known dates, the former event took place in December 1170 and the latter in July 1174 (p. 213). Reckoning inclusively there are parts of five successive Christian years between the two events. William Tyre's relative dating assumes, however, six instead of five, and the author of the framework, whether he be William Tyre or another, falls into the same error. It is again evident that the regnal year dates are not independent traditional data but are part of an artificial system. If this be granted the reserve with which (vii^o), viii^o and x^o were previously corrected need no longer be maintained.

The Christian year dates in the above table do not call for much comment. In xix. 9 August 1165 is certainly a mistake for August 1164 (p. 189). Conceivably it might originate by scribal error, but against this supposition stands the fact that as it is it forms a part of a self-consistent whole. It may have been derived by calculation from other parts of the framework.

Reign of Baldwin III. Here the system of relative chronology is much less clear and complete than in the reign of Amalric. Only thirteen or fourteen years are distinguished, many fewer than the actual number of the years of Baldwin's reign. At some points there is deliberate departure from a purely chronological order and the investigation is considerably complicated by the presence of errors in William Tyre's representation of the sequence of events.

There are altogether eight regnal year dates in the present narrative, viz. i^o, ii^o, ix^o, x^o, xiv^o, xv^o, xviii^o and xx^o in xvi. 6, xvi. 8, xvii. 20, xvii. 30, xviii. 14, xviii. 21, xviii. 28 and xviii. 34 respectively¹. Criticism is made difficult by the uncertainty regarding Baldwin's accession and death years, as they were in reality and as William Tyre supposed them to be. ix^o, x^o, xiv^o and xv^o seem to refer to the events of 1152, 1153, 1157 and 1158 respectively and thus harmonise with one another. It cannot be supposed that they were all obtained by calculation from the relative chronology, so that at least one of each pair

¹ Discussion of xx^o is reserved until later (p. 369 f.).

represents actual tradition. If the series of Christian and regnal years are not independent of one another it is more likely, in view of the facts already ascertained, that the regnal years are secondary. They reckon 1144 as the first year of Baldwin's reign and so support November 1143 as the date of Fulk's death (p. 147).

xviii^o is wanting in the Old French translation (Recueil text) and may accordingly be one of the latest additions to the narrative. It stands for the year of Reginald's capture, which has been assigned in chapter IV to November 1160 (p. 183), in accordance with William Tyre's relative chronology. In order to agree with the series ix^o, x^o, xiv^o, xv^o it should perhaps denote 1161, but in this reign the regnal years do not form a uniform system and of course if it is a later interpolation, as has just been suggested, it had presumably an origin different from theirs.

i^o and ii^o possibly denote the years 1145 and 1146 in harmony with the Christian year dates in xvi. 22 ff. which are referred to below. It is not possible to say with certainty whether or not they harmonise with Tyre's relative chronology, which is very inconsistent with historical facts at this point. In any case they are not part of the series ix^o, x^o, xiv^o, xv^o already referred to. They may be the commencement of an attempt to introduce a series of regnal dates which was continued by means of Christian year dates in xvi. 22 ff. or was given up because of the obscurity of the relative chronology. The narrative of xvi. 8 refers to events which took place in the spring of 1147, but cannot be used to determine the Christian year denoted by ii^o, since its position here is due to Tyre's misdating.

Apart from the years of Baldwin's accession and death there are only six Christian year dates in this reign, and of these five are certainly erroneous. In xvi. 22, xvi. 26, xvii. 2 and xvii. 9, the dates 1146, 1146 (*sic*), 1147 and 1148 should be 1147, 1148, 1148 and 1149 respectively. In xvi. 26, January 1146 may be a textual error for January 1147, unless its author included January 1147 in the year 1146. But this correction still leaves the four years in question each a year too early. In xvii. 30, A.D. 1154 is certainly erroneous (p. 171) but it may not be due to textual error, since Nureddin's capture of Damascus which took place in April 1154 is related previously (xvii. 26). If it be corrected to 1153 and

attributed to William Tyre it follows that he dated the capture of Damascus in 1153, instead of in 1154. In xvii. 20, A.D. 1152 cannot be controlled because William Tyre is the only authority for the incident related in the chapter.

The dates of the framework are not so clearly superadded to the original narrative in this reign as they were seen to be in the case of Amalric's reign. But there are so many errors in the Christian year dates and so much inconsistency in the regnal year dates that it seems hazardous to attribute more than a small proportion of them to William Tyre himself.

Fulk's reign. In this reign the chronological data are much fewer than in the reigns of Baldwin III and Amalric. Even the relative chronology is less full and exact. Notes of transition from year to year are almost wanting, except towards the close, where it is possible to trace a succession of three or four years. There are only two regnal year dates i^o and xi^o, the latter being the last year of Fulk's reign. Both are wanting in the Old French translation (Recueil text) and the second is a flagrant error (see below). They may be regarded as amongst the latest chronological additions to the text.

There is only one Christian year date besides that of Fulk's death, viz. the death year of the emperor John (xv. 23). The event is wrongly dated "anno...1137, mense Aprili" instead of on the 7th or 8th of April 1143. It may be suggested that this is a case of scribal error. "MCXXXVII mense Aprili" being a substitute for "MCXXXXIII VII mensis Aprilis." There are similar errors in xviii. 34 and xix. 9. The Old French translation in the former case has taken iv from the month date and made Baldwin III's death year xxiv^o instead of xx^o, in the latter it has dropped iv or v from the end of the year and reads MCLX instead of MCLXV.

Reigns of the first kings. In the reigns of Baldwin I and Baldwin II the relative chronology again becomes full and the Christian years are given with comparative frequency. By combining these data a fairly continuous and consistent chronology may be constructed. The passing over of A.D. 1106 between xi. 13 and xi. 14 is exceptional. The striking increase of chronological detail in the earlier reigns may be explained by the assumption that William Tyre here drew on earlier histories,

such as that of Fulcher of Chartres. It is noteworthy, however, that there are blanks in his narrative which Fulcher's history might have filled and that in his relative chronology and in his Christian year dates there are discrepancies between him and Fulcher in which the latter has the correct account. As an example of these variations reference may be made to xi. 7, where the invasion of Maudud is related in connection with the events of 1107 or 1108 instead of in connection with those of 1110.

There is not much to be said in detail regarding the chronology of Baldwin I's reign. In xi. 8, A.D. 1109 may only be a textual error for 1108 (p. 84) and in xi. 13-14 A.D. 1111¹ another for 1110 (p. 59 f.), as the relative chronology suggests. In x. 9 the Christmas referred to is certainly that of the year 1100 (cf. Old French translation), although it is spoken of as the Christmas of 1101 (p. 44). The year is wanting in the Old French translation and it may not be part of the original text. Curiously enough, however, in Fulcher ii. 5 also (Migne's text) Baldwin's coronation is dated on Christmas Day 1101. The only regnal year date in Baldwin I's reign, xviii², is that of his death (xi. 31).

Reign of Baldwin II. In this reign there are five Christian year dates and each of them is associated with a corresponding regnal date as follows:

- ii^o = A.D. 1120 (xii. 12-13)
- vi^o = A.D. 1124 (xiii. 14)
- viii^o = A.D. 1126 (xiii. 18)
- xii^o = A.D. 1130 (xiii. 26)
- xiii^o = A.D. 1131 (xiii. 28).

Of the Christian year dates 1120² and 1130 are errors for 1119 and 1129 (see pp. 103 ff. and 128). 1119 is implied by the relative chronology, but the agreement of 1120 with the series of dates as printed above forbids confident assumption of textual error. The year may have been calculated from other members of the series as the proper equivalent of ii^o. 1130 also might be calculated backwards from the death of the king (xiii. 28) on the

¹ In xi. 13 Migne has 1112, where the Recueil text has 1111 in harmony with xi. 14.

² In xii. 12 the Old French translation and MSS. B and C (Recueil edition) have 1118 for 1120.

assumption that the events of xiii. 26 occurred in the previous year. If the originality of the (later) regnal years were not so doubtful (see below) it might be supposed that 1130 was calculated from xii°. Both xii° and 1130 are consistent with the relative chronology.

The unreliability of the regnal year dates and their artificial origin are again clearly exemplified in the series which belongs to this reign. If Baldwin's second year be reckoned as beginning either on 1st January 1119 or on 7th April 1119 the regnal years corresponding to the Christian dates June—August 1120, June 1124, December 1130 and August 1131 should be iii°, vii°, xiii° and xiv° instead of ii°, vi°, xii° and xiii° as above. January 1126 (xiii. 18) is correctly in viii° on the second hypothesis, although not on the first. If established dates and only they be made the tests (xii. 12, xiii. 14, xlii. 18) June—August 1119 is rightly in ii°, June—July 1124 wrongly in vi° and January 1126 rightly in viii° (assuming the regnal year to commence in April).

All these discrepancies are removed on the assumption that the above equations rest on a system in which i° = 1119, ii° = 1120, etc. If this view of the series be correct some of the Christian year dates have clearly been got by calculation (e.g. A.D. 1120). But in the light of previous results it is to be supposed that the regnal year dates are more especially the secondary element. The author of the framework may have had one or two regnal dates given him in William Tyre's narrative (e.g. in xiii. 18) or he may have based his calculations on the information he possessed regarding the king's death year. Given a single equation and two or three Christian year dates he would be in a position to supply all the material that is contained in the above table.

The most obscure part of the relative chronology of this reign is at the end, where it is particularly important because of its bearing on the date of Baldwin's death. In xiii. 25 the death of the patriarch of Jerusalem, which took place in 1128 (Röhricht 184, note 8), is put in the same year as the coming of Fulk to Jerusalem (spring 1129). Conceivably the representation is due to a source which reckoned the spring of 1129 part of

1128. On this assumption the return of Hugh Payns (in the summer of 1129) is rightly put "*anno sequenti*" (xiii. 26). But the *prima facie* interpretation of the narrative is that the patriarch died in 1129 and that Hugh came to Jerusalem in 1130. The erroneous date "*anno 1130 regni domini Balduini duodecimo*" in xiii. 26 is presumably due to the obscurity of the relative chronology. The error of this chronology, if there be one, lies in the "*eodem anno*" of xiii. 25 rather than in the "*anno sequenti*" of xiii. 26.

The kings' death years according to William Tyre.

Baldwin I	[2nd April] 1118	xviii ^a	(xi. 31)
Baldwin II	21st August 1131	xiii ^a	(xiii. 28)
Fulk	15th November 1142	xi ^a	(xv. 27)
Baldwin III	10th February 1162	xx ^a	(xviii. 34)
Amalric	11th July 1173	xii ^a	(xx. 33)

In considering the errors which are undoubtedly contained in this table due account must be taken of the fact that in its present form it exhibits a consistent scheme constructed on the principles exemplified in the framework of the reign of Baldwin II. Necessary corrections of the Christian year dates cannot be made on the assumption of accidental textual error, unless it is further assumed that the regnal year dates have been adapted to these textual errors. The two series of Christian and regnal year dates have been adjusted to one another and neither series can be relied on as supplying purely traditional data.

It is certain that Amalric died in 1174 and not in 1173 (p. 213) and that Fulk died in 1143 or 1144 and not in 1142 (p. 147). The death years of Baldwin II (p. 130) and Baldwin III (p. 184) are only doubtfully correct. If Fulk succeeded Baldwin II in August or September 1131 and died in November 1142 his death occurred in the twelfth year of his reign not the eleventh as above, and if November 1142 be corrected to November 1143 or 1144 he died in xiii^a or xiv^a (and possibly in xv^a if he succeeded in 1130). xiii^a, xx^a and xii^a may be maintained as the death years of Baldwin II, Baldwin III and Amalric respectively, only if we correct the parallels A.D. 1131 and A.D. 1162 to

A.D. 1130 and A.D. 1163. Conceivably the regnal dates of the death years are of more historical value than those already discussed. But the ascertained character of the others does not tend to inspire confidence in these. If we retain the Christian year dates 1131 and 1162, the corresponding regnal dates of the death years of Baldwin II, Baldwin III and Amalric are xiv^o, xix^o and xiii^o respectively.

An important fact in connection with the dates of the above table is that several of them do not agree with the relative chronology of William Tyre's history. According to it Fulk's death year appears to be 1144 (p. 147). If the death year of the emperor John was given by William himself as 1143 (see above), it is impossible that he should have made Fulk's death year 1142. In Amalric's reign if the death of Thomas à Becket be taken as a fixed point (xx. 23), the death year of the king falls in 1175 (or 1174). The relative chronology of Baldwin II's reign favours 1130 as the year of that king's death unless its author (William Tyre) supposed that Bohemond II died in 1131. In the case of Baldwin III the relative dating is ambiguous. A year is completely omitted from the history, either just before or just after the death of the king. In the former case Baldwin III died in February 1163, in the latter in February 1162.

In the reigns of Baldwin II, Baldwin III and Amalric there are other equations of Christian and regnal dates which may be compared with the equations for the death years of these kings. The equation xiii^o = A.D. 1131 agrees with the other equations in the framework of Baldwin II's reign. The equations xx^o = A.D. 1162 and xii^o = A.D. 1173 on the other hand are not parallel to the other equations of the reigns of Baldwin III and Amalric, according to which the former should be 1163 and the latter 1175. It follows from these facts that the author of the framework has constructed his system of death year dates in part independently of the systems he applied to the events of each reign.

The last question connected with these dates is what has been the history of their insertion in William Tyre's narrative. It is tempting to attach importance to the complete omission of a date for Fulk's death in the Old French translation. The

equation $\text{xi}^{\circ} = \text{A.D. 1142}$ is the weakest part of the whole scheme and the least likely of the dates to be due to William Tyre himself. Presumably some of the Christian dates other than 1142 have been retouched by the author of the framework in the interests of his system. But if so it cannot be assumed with confidence that the regnal year dates have escaped treatment. It is likely that some of the Christian dates and possibly some regnal dates were included in William Tyre's original narrative. But criteria for determining his share in the death year dates as they stand in the printed texts are not available.

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
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
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